A WAY FORWARD FOR SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON SCIENCE AND RELIGION: A REVIEW AND A RIFF

John Evans’s new book Morals Not Knowledge pushes scholars to rethink contemporary debates about religion and science by moving past the rhetoric of societal elites to examine the perspectives of everyday Americans, identifying the moral conflicts at the heart of debates. We review Evans’s key contributions while also extending and challenging his arguments, urging consideration of how renewed moral debates might be informed by a broader set of U.S. “publics.” Drawing on empirical research, we highlight four sets of voices that are missing from Evans’s analysis. Specifically, we highlight the voices of racial and ethnic minorities, religious communities (as opposed to individuals), members of minority religious traditions, and everyday religious scientists. Through doing so we offer avenues for future research on these diverse publics that will help facilitate a broader set of better and more informed debates about moral conflict between religious and scientific communities.     

The Danish Biofuel Debate: Coupling Scientific and Politico-Economic Claims

What role does scientific claims-making play in the worldwide promotion of biofuels for transport, which continues despite serious concerns about its potentially adverse social and environmental effects? And how do actors with very different and conflicting viewpoints on the benefits and drawbacks of biofuels enrol scientific authority to support their positions? The sociological theory of functional differentiation combined with the concept of advocacy coalition can help in exploring this relationship between scientific claims-making and the policy stance of different actors in public debates about biofuels. In Denmark two distinct scientific perspectives about biofuels map onto the policy debates through articulation by two competing advocacy coalitions. One is a reductionist biorefinery perspective originating in biochemistry and neighbouring disciplines. This perspective works upwards from the molecular level and envisions positive synergies in the use of biomass. The other is a holistic bioscarcity perspective originating in life-cycle analysis and ecology. This perspective works downwards from global resource scope conditions, and envisions negative consequences from an increased reliance on biomass. Understanding how these scientific perspectives and policy stances are coupled sheds light on three contentious policy questions: how Denmark should include biomass in its energy provision, what role Denmark might play in the global development of biofuels and what kind of subsidy schemes should be implemented.     

Human Psychological Autonomy: Reflections on the Debates about its Understanding in Modern Psychology

This article addresses the centuries old but recently revived topic of human autonomy and its relation to people’s functioning: physiological, psychological, and socio‐cultural. It provides a review of current debates about status, nature, and perspectives of studying autonomy, agency, free will and self‐determination in neuro‐ and cognitive sciences, motivation, personality and cultural psychology. This review starts with the theoretical definitions of the concepts and differentiates personal, intrapsychic, and motivational autonomy as well as behavioral freedom; delineates the distinction between autonomous and controlled forms of human agency; and relates all these concepts to the notion of human happiness and optimal functioning. It supports the idea of the universality of psychological autonomy as a fundamental capability of human species and argues that this capability is a real natural power that does not contradict the principle of determinism. Special attention is paid to the debates about the role culture plays in enabling and regulating human autonomy. The idea of dialectical relations between culture and human autonomy is presented and defended.     

On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will

In a recent paper in this journal, “How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?” Christopher Evan Franklin critically examines my libertarian view of free will and attempts to improve upon it. He says that while Kane's influential [view] offers many important advances in the development of a defensible libertarian theory of free will and moral responsibility?…?[he made] “two crucial mistakes in formulating libertarianism” – one about the location of indeterminism, the other about its role – “both of which have helped fan the flame of the luck argument”. In this paper, I respond to Franklin's criticisms, arguing that, so far from making it significantly more difficult to answer objections about luck and control, as he claims, giving indeterminism the location and role I do makes it possible to answer such objections and many other related objections to libertarian free will. A central theme of this paper will emerge in my responses: In order to make sense of freedom of will in general and to do justice to the complex historical debates about it, one must distinguish different kinds of control agents may have over events and correspondingly different kinds of freedom they may possess.     

The miracle of Maglavit (1935) and the Romanian psychology of religion

This paper examines the debates around the “miracle of Maglavit”, a shepherd's vision of God that took place in 1935 in Romania and attracted much contemporary popular and intellectual interest. The debates drew in arguments from doctors and theologians, who discussed the psychology of divine revelation and tried to elaborate the implications that such an event could have for the life of the Romanian nation. The paper places these debates in the context of wider contemporary discussions about psychology and religion. I argue that what Maglavit shows is that, in Romania at least, public debates about visionary experience in the 1930s were not only debates about its psychology, but of a psychology thoroughly imbricated with political concerns.     

How to be a structuralist all the way down

This paper considers the nature and role of axioms from the point of view of the current debates about the status of category theory and, in particular, in relation to the “algebraic” approach to mathematical structuralism. My aim is to show that category theory has as much to say about an algebraic consideration of meta-mathematical analyses of logical structure as it does about mathematical analyses of mathematical structure, without either requiring an assertory mathematical or meta-mathematical background theory as a “foundation”, or turning meta-mathematical analyses of logical concepts into “philosophical” ones. Thus, we can use category theory to frame an interpretation of mathematics according to which we can be structuralists all the way down.     

Cutaneous saltation within and across arms: a new measure of the saltation illusion in somatosensation

A new objective procedure was used to measure the strength of cutaneous saltation, in order to clarify current debates about the nature of this illusion. Three taps were presented successively to three possible forearm locations. Participants attended to the middle location and reported whether a tap was perceived there. When all stimuli were delivered to the same arm and intertap intervals were short, participants were unable to distinguish real and illusory stimuli at the middle location. When both arms were stimulated, location judgments on one arm were shifted toward a tap subsequently delivered to the other arm. These results challenge the view that saltation is a purely attentional phenomenon, but they are inconsistent with the idea that this illusion is produced in the primary somatosensory cortex.     

What is at Stake in Debates among Normative Realists?

One class of central debates between normative realists appears to concern whether we should be naturalists or reductionists about the normative. However, metaethical discussion of naturalism and reduction is often inconsistent, murky, or uninformative. This can make it hard to see why commitments relative to these metaphysical categories should matter to normative realists. This paper aims to clarify the nature of these categories, and their significance in debates between normative realists. I develop and defend what I call the joint‐carving taxonomy, which builds on David Lewis’ notion of elite properties. I argue that this taxonomy is clear and metaphysically interesting, and answers to distinctive taxonomic interests of normative realists. I also suggest that it has important implications for the project of adjudicating debates among normative realists.     

Cutaneous saltation within and across arms: A new measure of the saltation illusion in somatosensation

A new objective procedure was used to measure the strength of cutaneous saltation, in order to clarify current debates about the nature of this illusion. Three taps were presented successively to three possible forearm locations. Participants attended to the middle location and reported whether a tap was perceived there. When all stimuli were delivered to the same arm and intertap intervals were short, participants were unable to distinguish real and illusory stimuli at the middle location. When both arms were stimulated, location judgments on one arm were shifted toward a tap subsequently delivered to the other arm. These results challenge the view that saltation is a purely attentional phenomenon, but they are inconsistent with the idea that this illusion is produced in the primary somatosensory cortex.     

Photography as unconcealment: revisiting the idea of photographic transparency

What distinguishes photography from other visual mediums? This deceptively simple but fundamental question has been at the centre of both past and current debates on the aesthetics of photography for quite some time. In this article, I will first address the premise that this question is intrinsically ontological and unfolded in pioneering debates as a sequence of implications about photographic indexicality. I will then argue that the ontological implications of photographic indexicality have been largely overlooked in subsequent research due to scholars’ concerns with how photography appears to us rather than what photography is in itself. To this end, I will specifically examine Kendall Walton's highly contested transparency thesis and some of its rebuttals, which have exerted a sprawling influence on debates on the aesthetics of photography. I will also argue that, having been exceedingly implicit in his account, what appears as indexicality to Walton and the implications thereof with respect to the transparency argument has operated on a phenomenological level; thus, the thesis itself has failed in instances in which the problem of representation and the very existence of the medium come into play. Finally, I will suggest that indexicality can be regarded as a distinctive feature of photography only when it is considered a predicate of transparency as an interstice of ‘unconcealment’ in the Heideggerian sense that would call into question the very existence of the representation and the photographic medium.     

Temporal existence and temporal location

We argue that sensitivity to the distinction between the tensed notion of being something and the tensed notion of being located at the present time serves as a good antidote to confusions in debates about time and existence, in particular in the debate about how to characterise presentism, and saves us the trouble of going through unnecessary epicycles. Both notions are frequently expressed using the tensed verb ‘to exist’, making it systematically ambiguous. It is a commendable strategy to avoid using that verb altogether in these contexts and to use quantification and a location predicate instead.

     

The Illusion of Exclusivity

It is widely held that when you are deliberating about whether to believe some proposition p, only considerations relevant to the truth of p can be taken into account as reasons bearing on whether to believe p and motivate you accordingly. This thesis of exclusivity has significance for debates about the nature of belief, about control of belief, and about certain forms of evidentialism. In this paper I distinguish a strong and a weak version of exclusivity. I provide reason to think that strong exclusivity is an illusion and that weak exclusivity may also be an illusion. I describe a number of cases in which exclusivity seems not to hold, and I show how an illusion of exclusivity may be generated by a rather different feature of doxastic deliberation, which I call demandingness.     

Windows to the soul: children and adults see the eyes as the location of the self

Where are we? In three experiments, we explore preschoolers’ and adults’ intuitions about the location of the self using a novel method that asks when an object is closet to a person. Children and adults judge objects near a person’s eyes to be closer to her than objects near other parts of her body. This holds even when considering an alien character whose eyes are located on its chest. Objects located near the eyes but out of sight are also judged to be close, suggesting that participants are not using what a person can see as a proxy for what is close to her. These findings suggest that children and adults intuitively think of the self as occupying a precise location within the body, at or near the eyes.     

Intimations of mortality

In Thai Buddhism, a high number of examples show that during the last 20 years or so the triangular interrelationship between hermeneutics, canonical authenticity and authority has been—more or less consciously—the subject of numerous, often very fervent debates. This has made clear the importance of the Pāli canon as a centre of reference for normative and formative authority in Thai society. Also, during these debates the conservatism of Thai Theravāda, and thereby its identity, has been challenged in various ways, e.g. by Western influenced text-critical or intertextual approaches, by reference to superior religious insight and by requests for feminist interpretations of the Pāli canon. At the same time, however, and in response to these challenges, the rationale for Thai Theravāda's conservatism and identity have become very clearly articulated, to an extent that has arguably never happened before in Thai history. By looking at some of the debates in which the foremost Thai Buddhist thinker and scholar monk P. A. Payutto (1939– ) has been involved, I seek to gain a deeper understanding of what these debates can teach us about the specific context and state of Thai Buddhist studies.     

Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes

One of the many ways that ‘deflationary’ and ‘inflationary’ theories of truth are said to differ is in their attitude towards truth qua property. This difference used to be very easy to delineate, with deflationists denying, and inflationists asserting, that truth is a property, but more recently the debate has become a lot more complicated, owing primarily to the fact that many contemporary deflationists often do allow for truth to be considered a property. Anxious to avoid inflation, however, these deflationists are at pains to point out that the truth property, on their view, is not a property of any significant interest. Correspondingly, inflationists have seen this as an opportunity to refine what kind of property they think truth is, which—according to them—moves their views beyond deflationism. The upshot of this is that there are number of different accounts in the literature of what distinguishes an inflationary truth property from a deflationary one, or—as it is sometimes put—what distinguishes a ‘substantive’ property from an ‘insubstantive’ one. This has made it hard to pin down exactly what is at issue at the metaphysical level between deflationists and inflationists, which makes it increasingly hard to see how debates between them are properly phrased. Given that these positions represent the two central attitudes towards truth in contemporary debates, this makes for a serious obstacle for the project of discerning the correct theory of truth. The aim of this paper is to discern the best way to distinguish between substantive and insubstantive properties, and thus to restore some focus to these debates. I argue that the three central distinctions in the literature fail, and offer what I take to be a more promising distinction in terms of a graded distinction between abundant and sparse properties.     

Hide-and-seek around the centre of interest: The dead zone of attention revealed by change blindness

Three experiments examined spatial allocation of attention during active search for visual changes. In all experiments, there were three conditions of change location related to a centre of interest: (1) Central (most attended location itself), (2) near, and (3) far marginal change. In Experiment 1, participants showed the slowest search and the largest number of undetected changes in near condition. Moreover, they misidentified near changes more frequently than central and far ones. In Experiment 2, participants had to search for marginal changes in the presence of a once noticed central change that summoned additional attention to a central location. It resulted in further search slowing for near changes. In Experiment 3, participants searched for one of two concurrent marginal changes in the presence of a central one. They detected far changes about 2.3 times more frequently than near ones. Taken together, these results support the notion of “dead zone of attention” surrounding attentional focus. Several speculations about the nature of dead zone are discussed.     

Visually perceived location is an invariant in the control of action

We provide experimental evidence that perceived location is an invariant in the control of action, by showing that different actions are directed toward a single visually specified location in space (corresponding to the putative perceived location) and that this single location, although specified by a fixed physical target, varies with the availability of information about the distance of that target. Observers in two conditions varying in the availability of egocentric distance cues viewed targets at 1.5, 3.1, or 6.0 m and then attempted to walk to the target with eyes closed using one of three paths; the path was not specified until after vision was occluded. The observers stopped at about the same location regardless of the path taken, providing evidence that action was being controlled by some invariant, ostensibly visually perceived location. That it was indeed perceived location was indicated by the manipulation of information about target distance—the trajectories in the full-cues condition converged near the physical target locations, whereas those in the reduced-cues condition converged at locations consistent with the usual perceptual errors found when distance cues are impoverished.     

Dewey and the Question of Realism

An interpretation is given of John Dewey's views about “realism” in metaphysics, and of how these views relate to contemporary debates. Dewey rejected standard formulations of realism as a general metaphysical position, and interpreters have often been taken him to be sympathetic to some form of verificationism or constructivism. I argue that these interpretations are mistaken, as Dewey's unease with standard formulations of realism comes from his philosophical emphasis on intelligent control of events, by means of ordinary action. Because of his views about relations, Dewey's views in this area do risk collapsing into an overly holistic position. I discuss how these problems might be avoided, and consider also how Dewey's views about naturalism and realism might usefully inform ongoing work.     

De‐Centering and Re‐Centering: Rethinking Concepts and Methods in the Sociological Study of Religion

Four conceptual and methodological edges or areas of study are outlined. They are located near what have been the boundaries between the sociology of religion and other subfields, where we believe a potential exists to encourage a wide range of scholars to revisit some central concepts. Paying attention to these edges—as a means to de‐center to re‐center our debates in new ways—not only broadens and deepens our knowledge of the “religious,” it encourages us to reexamine long‐standing conceptual tools, unquestioned assumptions, and accepted methods in the sociology of religion. We illustrate these edges through a review of recent literature and examples drawn from our current empirical projects.     

Analyzing Argumentative Discourse from a Rhetorical Perspective: Defining `Person' and `Human Life' in Constitutional Disputes Over Abortion

In this paper, a case study is presented of constitutional debates about abortion. An analysis is given of arguments from the Roe v. Wade case for definitions concerning the key notions of `person' and `human life'. The paper illustrates how the Court has gradually taken a more pragmatic or rhetorical position on definitional matters crucial to the purpose of regulating abortion.