Categories of insight and their correlates: An exploration of relationships among classic‐type insight problems,rebus puzzles,remote associates and esoteric analogies

A central question in creativity concerns how insightful ideas emerge. Anecdotal examples of insightful scientific and technical discoveries include Goodyear's discovery of the vulcanization of rubber, and Mendeleev's realization that there may be gaps as he tried to arrange the elements into the Periodic Table. Although most people would regard these discoveries as insightful, cognitive psychologists have had difficulty in agreeing on whether such ideas resulted from insights or from conventional problem solving processes. One area of wide agreement among psychologists is that insight involves a process of restructuring. If this view is correct, then understanding insight and its role in problem solving will depend on a better understanding of restructuring and the characteristics that describe it. This article proposes and tests a preliminary classification of insight problems based on several restructuring characteristics: the need to redefine spatial assumptions, the need to change defined forms, the degree of misdirection involved, the difficulty in visualizing a possible solution, the number of restructuring sequences in the problem, and the requirement for figure‐ground type reversals. A second purpose of the study was to compare performance on classic spatial insight problems with two types of verbal tests that may be related to insight, the Remote Associates Test (RAT), and rebus puzzles. In doing so, we report on the results of a survey of 172 business students at the University of Waikato in New Zealand who completed classic‐type insight, RAT and rebus problems.     

In Mediis Rebus

For Quine all talk is in mediis rebus, is itself a physical phenomenon. To grasp what a sentence is, its relation to a language, and what it is for a sentence to be true is to be invited to see that notions of shared meaning across languages, of truth, even of knowledge, are far from what they are ordinarily taken to be. To read Quine reflectively is to plunge with him into the midst of things, shunning the vain support of purported transcendental certainties or Archimedean points, and spurning claims of the intuitive clarity of meaning, thought, and belief, for in the midst of things they themselves are what are most lacking in clarity.     

Philosophy in Mediis Rebus

Philosophy should begin in the middle of things. I distinguish two ways in which I think that philosophy should begin in the middle of things, and then I describe the two dominant approaches to analytic philosophy today: scientific pragmatism and conceptual analysis (or, more broadly, "a priorism"). After giving reasons for dissatisfaction with both of these dominant approaches, I set out my own view – Practical Realism – and argue for the merits of its methodological and metaphysical components.     

Differentiating insight from non-insight problems

This study aimed to investigate whether a range of tasks that have been generally classed as requiring insight form an empirically separable group of tasks distinct from tasks generally classed as non-insight. In this study, 24 insight tasks, 10 non-insight tasks, and tests of individual differences in cognitive abilities and working memory were administered to 60 participants. Cluster analysis of the problem-solving tasks indicated that the presumed insight problems did tend to cluster with other presumed insight problems, and similarly the presumed non-insight problems tended to cluster with other presumed non-insight tasks. Performance on presumed insight problems was particularly linked to measures of ideational flexibility with a different pattern of results for the non-insight tasks. Spatial insight problems were linked to spatial flexibility and verbal insight tasks were linked to vocabulary scores. The results are discussed in relation to recent developments of dual process theories of thinking.     

Conceptual transfer insimple insight problems

Three experiments explored the conditions under which information presented in the first part of an experiment facilitates the subsequent solving of simple insight problems. We argue that previous unsuccessful attempts to obtain such facilitation are attributable to the experimenters’ failure to present this information in a form that induces the conceptual operations needed to solve the problem. Substantial facilitation is obtained if the information is presented in a form that induces a few seconds of puzzlement and then a clue is presented that leads to an appropriate reconception; if identical information is presented without such a period of puzzlement and reconception, no facilitation is observed. The results demonstrate that conceptual processing operations, not merely informational content, must be relevant if conceptual transfer is to occur. One possible mechanism involved in such transfer is the indexing of concepts such that they contain pointers to conceptually anomalous episodes     

The gender puzzles

What is gender and how do we know what our gender is? These are the questions I propose to answer here. I review and reject several hypotheses: gender as sex or—a more careful version of the view—as subjective experiences that arise from sexual characteristics; gender as brain configuration; and gender as a historical kind. I express sympathy with an existentialist conception of gender but argue that such a conception, even according to its proponents, cannot help solve the problems of what gender is and how we know what our gender is. I then advance a new view.     

The puzzles of ground

Philosophical Studies - I outline and provide a solution to some paradoxes of ground.     

Why compositional nihilism dissolves puzzles

Synthese - One of the main motivations for compositional nihilism, the view that there are no composite material objects, concerns the many puzzles and problems associated with them. Nihilists...     

A generalization of the representational change theory from insight to non-insight problems: the case of arithmetic word problems

This paper provides evidence for a possible generalization of Knoblich and colleagues’ representational change theory [Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H., & Rhenius, D. (1999). Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25, 1534-1555; Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., & Raney, G. E. (2001). An eye movement study of insight problem. Memory and Cognition, 29, 1000-1009] outside its original scope of application. While this theory has been proposed to explain insight problem solving, we demonstrate here that its main concepts, namely, constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition, are applicable to incremental problem solving. In a first experiment, we confirm, as already shown by problem solving and reasoning researchers, that individuals avoid the construction of alternative representations of the problems when possible. In the second and third experiments, we show that alternative representations of arithmetic problems are easier to construct and maintain when they violate constraints of narrow rather than wide scope. The specificity of insight problem solving is discussed in the light of these new findings.     

Teaching students to solve insight problems: Evidence for domain specificity in creativity training

The purpose of this research was to investigate whether insight problem solving depends on domain‐specific or domain‐general problem‐solving skills, that is, whether people think in terms of conceptually different types of insight problems. In Study 1, participants sorted insight problems into categories. A cluster analysis revealed 4 main categories of insight problems: verbal, mathematical, spatial, and a combination of verbal or spatial. In Studies 2 and 3, participants received training in how to solve verbal, spatial, or mathematical problems, or all 3 types. They were taught that solutions to verbal insight problems lie in defining and analyzing the terms in the problem, solutions to mathematical insight problems lie in a novel approach to numbers, or solutions to spatial insight problems lie in removing a self‐imposed constraint. In both studies, the spatial trained group performed better than the verbal trained group on spatial problems but not on other types of problems. These findings are consistent with the idea that people mentally separate insight problems into distinct types. Implications for instruction in insight problem solving are discussed.     

Data analysis as insight: Reply to Morrison and Weaver

I begin by underscoring a fundamental point of agreement between Morrison and Weaver and me: that data analysis should entail designing whatever set of techniques optimizes insight into whatever question the experiment was designed to address, rather than implementing some rote set of preordained rules and regulations. Against this shared philosophical backdrop, I then (1) reiterate problems with hypothesis testing, and (2) address some of the quite pertinent issues that Morrison and Weaver raise with respect to computation of confidence intervals.     

The dynamics of insight: Mathematical discovery as a phase transition

In recent work in cognitive science, it has been proposed that cognition is a self-organizing, dynamical system. However, capturing the real-time dynamics of cognition has been a formidable challenge. Furthermore, it has been unclear whether dynamics could effectively address the emergence of abstract concepts (e.g., language, mathematics). Here, we provide evidence that a quintessentially cognitive phenomenon—the spontaneous discovery of a mathematical relation—emerges through self-organization. Participants solved a series of gear-system problems while we tracked their eye movements. They initially solved the problems by manually simulating the forces of the gears but then spontaneously discovered a mathematical solution. We show that the discovery of the mathematical relation was predicted by changes in entropy and changes in power-law behavior, two hallmarks of phase transitions. Thus, the present study demonstrates the emergence of higher order cognitive phenomena through the nonlinear dynamics of self-organization.