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1.
Emer O’Hagan 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):525-537
Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge
requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt
the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral
constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as
sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception
of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a
protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness
of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics. 相似文献
2.
Ryan W. Davis 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(2):207-222
Political liberals, following Rawls, believe that justice should be ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical.’ In other words,
a conception of justice ought to be freestanding from first-order moral and metaethical views. The reason for this is to ensure
that the state’s coercion be justified to citizens in terms that meet political liberalism’s principle of legitimacy. I suggest
that privileging a political conception of justice involves costs—such as forgoing the opportunity for political theory to
learn from other areas of philosophy. I argue that it is not clear that it provides any benefit in return. Whether a political
conception of justice more adequately satisfies the liberal principle of legitimacy than a metaphysical conception of justice
is an open question. To show this, I describe three ways in which political conceptions of justice have been developed within
the literature. I then argue that while each might be helpful in finding reasons that reasonable citizens can accept, all
face challenges in satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy. Political conceptions of justice confront the same set
of justificatory problems as ‘metaphysical’ conceptions. The question of whether a political conception is preferable should
receive greater scrutiny. 相似文献
3.
As a U.S. civil rights policy, affirmative action commonly denotes race-conscious and result-oriented efforts by private and
public officials to correct the unequal distribution of economic opportunity and education attributed to slavery, segregation,
poverty and racism. Opponents argue that affirmative action (1) violates ideals of color-blind public policies, offending
moral principles of fairness and constitutional principles of equality and due process; (2) has proven to be socially and
politically divisive; (3) has not made things better; (4) mainly benefits middle-class, wealthy and foreign-born blacks; (4)
stigmatizes its beneficiaries; and (5) compromises the self-esteem and self-respect of beneficiaries who know that they have
been awarded preferential treatment. By way of a thought experiment, imagine that after decades of public policy and experimentation,
the United States public finally came to agree: affirmative action is morally and legally wrong. Employing such a thought
experiment, this essay by a beneficiary of affirmative action—written in response to James Sterba’s Affirmative Action for the Future (2009)—examines duties of moral repair and the possibility that the past beneficiaries of affirmative action owe apologies,
compensation or some other highly personal form of corrective accountability. Beneficiaries of affirmative action have experienced
woundedness and moral insecurity. Indeed, the practice of affirmative action comes with a psychology, a set of psychological
benefits and burdens whose moral logic those of us who believe in our own fallibility—as much as we believe in the justice
of what we have received and conferred on others—should address. 相似文献
4.
Gary Foster 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):153-168
Harry Frankfurt characterizes love as “a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for
it.” As such, he views romantic love as an inauthentic paradigm for love since such love desires reciprocation, sexual gratification
and so on. I argue that Frankfurt’s conception of love is (a) too general—he does not distinguish between the type of love
one has for one’s partner, one’s country, a moral ideal, etc., (b) it overemphasizes the role of bestowal at the expense of
the part played by appraisal and (c) it is insufficiently social. Certain forms of love, romantic love and friendship for
instance, are defined largely in terms of reciprocation. For Frankfurt, reciprocation is somewhat of an accidental feature
of love. This deficiency in Frankfurt’s conception of love can be traced to a problem in his conception of selfhood which
I argue is insufficiently social in nature.
相似文献
Gary FosterEmail: |
5.
Seth R. M. Lazar 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(4):355-368
In this paper, I ask how – and whether – the rectification of injury at which corrective justice aims is possible, and by
whom it must be performed. I split the injury up into components of harm and wrong, and consider their rectification separately.
First, I show that pecuniary compensation for the harm is practically plausible, because money acts as a mediator between
the damaged interest and other interests. I then argue that this is also a morally plausible approach, because it does not
claim too much for compensation: neither can all harms be compensated, nor can it be said when compensation is paid that the
status quo ante has been restored. I argue that there is no conceptual reason for any particular agent paying this compensation.
I then turn to the wrong, and reject three proposed methods of rectification. The first aims to rectify the wrong by rectifying
the harm; the second deploys punitive damages; the third, punishment. After undermining each proposal, I argue that the wrong
can only be rectified by a full apology, which I disaggregate into the admission of causal and moral responsibility, repudiation
of the act, reform, and, in some cases, disgorgement and reparations, which I define as a good faith effort to share the burden
of the victim’s harm. I argue, further, that only the injurer herself can make a full apology, and it is not something that
can be coerced by other members of society. As such, whether rectification of the wrong can be a matter of corrective justice
is left an open question.
相似文献
Seth R. M. LazarEmail: |
6.
Gunderson M 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(2):87-102
It is tempting to argue that Kantian moral philosophy justifies prohibiting both human germ-line genetic engineering and non-therapeutic
genetic engineering because they fail to respect human dignity. There are, however, good reasons for resisting this temptation.
In fact, Kant’s moral philosophy provides reasons that support genetic engineering—even germ-line and non-therapeutic. This
is true of Kant’s imperfect duties to seek one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. It is also true of the categorical
imperative. Kant’s moral philosophy does, however, provide limits to justifiable genetic engineering. 相似文献
7.
Itay Snir 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):407-437
This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is
an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It
is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative
attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential
part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge
to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to
suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into
happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My
interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence
and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. 相似文献
8.
John Nolt 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(3):203-237
Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions
of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if
it can be fixedly warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions. This paper offers a general critique
of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic
logic. It is shown that each of the two plausible notions of fixed warrant faces difficulties and that, moreover, “truth”
defined in terms of either of them is distressingly dependent upon one’s conception of idealized inquiry and perhaps also
upon one’s standards of warrant. 相似文献
9.
Jerome A. Miller 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(3):401-419
In recent years there has been widespread interest in assimilating forgiveness into a rational conception of the moral life.
This project usually construes forgiveness as a way of “moving past” evil and resuming the moral narrative it disrupted.
But to develop a philosophical sound conception of forgiveness, we must recognize that moral evil is world-shattering and
cannot be assimilated into the moral narrative of our lives. It is not an event that happens in one’s world but to one’s world. In this respect it is similar to death as Heidegger has described it. But, contrary to what Heidegger implies,
evil is more traumatic than death because, unlike the latter, it shatters moral reasoning and moral narrative. Evil is a monstrosity;
it traumatizes historical existence by impossibilizing the future. A philosophical account of forgiveness must therefore
be traumatological: recognizing the traumatizing impact that evil has on historicity, it has provide us a heuristic that will
help us to imagine the unimaginable possibility of transforming historical horror into good. 相似文献
10.
Michael Robinson 《Philosophia》2010,38(3):589-594
In a series of recent papers, Saul Smilansky has argued that compatibilists have no principled way of resisting the view that
prepunishment is at least sometimes appropriate, thus revealing compatibilism to be a radical position, out of keeping with
our ordinary moral judgments. Recent attempts to resist this conclusion seem to have overlooked the biggest problem with Smilansky’s
argument, which is this: Smilanksy argues that the most obvious objection to prepunishment—namely, that it is inappropriate
because it involves punishing the innocent for crimes they have not committed—is unavailable to compatibilists. If compatibilism
is true, he says, then if it is causally determined that someone is going to commit a crime, the fact that one has not yet
done so is a mere temporal matter bearing no moral significance. I argue that there is no reason for compatibilists to accept
this point. Compatibilists can (and should) resist Smilansky's claim that one’s not yet having committed a crime is morally
insignificant and so resist the temptation to prepunish. 相似文献
11.
This article presents the results of a study carried out with the aim to: (1) analyze secondary school students’ and their
teachers’ ideal representations of classroom justice, (2) deepen the topic of students’ sense of injustice, and (3) explore
the links between students’ perceived injustice and their psychological engagement in school, measured on different aspects
(identification with one’s own class, learning motivation, dialogue with teachers). A questionnaire was distributed to 400
Italian secondary school students and their 79 teachers. Results show that the representations of ideal classroom justice
refer to communication, principle of equality and principles of effort/need, and that the positions of teachers and students
on these representations differ. Moreover, students report a rather diffuse and shared feeling of being treated in an unjust
manner by their teachers, and this affects their psychological engagement in school. Results are commented on their theoretical,
methodological and applicative implications. 相似文献
12.
Ömer Faruk Şimşek 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2009,10(5):505-522
The current model of subjective well-being (SWB) has been operationalized as the unity of affective and cognitive dimensions
concerning the evaluation of one’s life, called emotional well-being and life satisfaction, respectively. There has been no
theoretical framework, however, by which the unity is explained. The present paper offers a new construct of subjective well-being
in an attempt to show that the cognitive and affective dimensions of SWB can be unified using the concept of goal. The concept
of goal refers to the life as a project when the concern is the evaluation of life as a whole. The evaluation of the whole
life, moreover, should take a whole-time perspective into account if it is supposed to be ‘whole’. Ontological well-being
(OWB) construct is structured in a theoretical framework by which the cognitive and affective components of the current conceptualization
of SWB are reframed and interpreted in a whole time perspective. By taking as base the historical and philosophical resources
of the affective and cognitive dimensions of subjective well-being, this new construct defines subjective well-being as one’s
evaluation of life in both past and future time perspectives in addition to the present. 相似文献
13.
Cain J 《Science and engineering ethics》1999,5(4):531-540
Justifying ethical practices is no easy task. This paper considers moral justifications for peer review so as to persuade
even the sceptical individualist. Two avenues provide a foundation for that justification: self-interest (the right behaviour
is that which maximally serves one’s own interests) and social contract theory (the right behaviour is that which best meets
obligations set in binding social contracts). A wider notion of “interest” permits the self-interest approach to justify not
only submitting one’s own work to peer review but also removing oneself momentarily from the production of primary knowledge
to serve as a rigorous, independent, and honest referee. The contract approach offers a non-selfish alternative and relies
on four types of binding social contracts: those implicit in accepting funds, those implicit in asserted professional status,
those to contribute what is of most value to society, and those to defend the ideals of the Academy. Efforts to restore respect
for rigorous, independent, honest peer review should begin in earnest. 相似文献
14.
Thing, Value, Time, and Freedom: A Consideration of Some Key Concepts in Marx’s Philosophical System
Wujin Yu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):114-123
Criticizing the misunderstanding and wrong explanation of Marx’s philosophical system made by recent Chinese textbooks on
Marxist philosophy, the author argues that Marx’s philosophy has practical, economical-philosophical, and ontological dimensions
and stresses on reconstructing Marx’s philosophical system through synthesizing the above three dimensions. This paper intends
to set up a new outline of Marx’s philosophical system, in terms of the following four concepts—thing, value, time, and freedom.
Translated by Tang Jie from Zhexue Yanjiu, 2004:11 相似文献
15.
16.
To be justifiable, the demands of a conception of human rights and global justice must be such that (a) they focus on the protection of important human interests, and (b) their fulfilment is feasible. I discuss the feasibility condition. I present a general account of the relation between moral desirability, feasibility and obligation within a conception of justice. I analyse feasibility, a complex idea including different types, domains and degrees. It is possible to respond in various ways if the fulfilment of basic socioeconomic human rights against severe poverty seems at first to be infeasible. 相似文献
17.
Kelly Staples 《Res Publica》2012,18(1):93-106
This article focuses on the account of disrespect found in Honneth’s theory of recognition. In it, I am particularly interested
in the form of misrecognition or disrespect which is the negation of respect, and which is clearly represented by statelessness. Respect, for Honneth, is closely connected to legal recognition. Guided
by Honneth’s view of critical theory as ‘not entirely without a foundation in social reality’, the article puts together an
analysis of the political dynamics of his model of disrespect. This analysis is used to challenge certain aspects of Honneth’s
political theory and in particular the implications of his conception of the state. The article argues that the way in which
the state is used has the effect of obscuring significant political obstacles to recognition, and in particular, the way in
which the state limits respect. 相似文献
18.
Katinka J. P. Quintelier Daniel M. T. Fessler Delphine De Smet 《Thinking & reasoning》2013,19(2):183-195
There is a widespread conviction that people distinguish two kinds of acts: on the one hand, acts that are generalisably wrong because they go against universal principles of harm, justice, or rights; on the other hand, acts that are variably right or wrong depending on the social context. In this paper we criticise existing methods that measure generalisability. We report new findings indicating that a modification of generalisability measures is in order. We discuss our findings in light of recent criticisms of moral/conventional research. 相似文献
19.
20.
Gert Biesta 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):141-153
Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good
citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I
ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this
question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the
political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to
explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order.
For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the
extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure
of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what
the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning
and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational
implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on
the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on
the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This
is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for
a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy. 相似文献