Placing inspection time, reaction time, and perceptual speed in the broader context of cognitive ability: The VPR model in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936

The idea that information processing speed is related to cognitive ability has a long history. Much evidence has been amassed in its support, with respect to both individual differences in general intelligence and developmental trajectories. Two so-called elementary cognitive tasks, reaction time and inspection time, have been used to compile this evidence, but most studies have used either one or the other. Relations between speed and fluid intelligence have tended to be stronger than those between speed and crystallized intelligence, but studies testing this have confounded verbal abilities with crystallized intelligence and spatial/perceptual abilities with fluid intelligence. Questions have also been raised regarding whether speed contributes directly to general intelligence or to more specific cognitive abilities to which general intelligence also contributes. We used 18 ability and speed measures in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936, assessed at approximately age 70, to construct alternative versions of the Verbal-Perceptual-Image Rotation (Johnson & Bouchard, 2005a) model of cognitive ability to test different hypotheses regarding these issues. Though differences in the extents to which our models fit the data were relatively small, they suggested that reaction and inspection time tasks were comparable indicators of information processing speed with respect to general intelligence, that verbal and spatial abilities were similarly related to information processing speed, and that spatial, verbal, and perceptual speed abilities were more directly related to information processing speed than was general intelligence. We discuss the theoretical implications of these results.     

Neophobia does not account for motoric self-regulation performance as measured during the detour-reaching cylinder task

The ability to restrain a prepotent response in favor of a more adaptive behavior, or to exert inhibitory control, has been used as a measure of a species’ cognitive abilities. Inhibitory control defines a spectrum of behaviors varying in complexity, ranging from self-control to motoric self-regulation. Several factors underlying inhibitory control have been identified, however, the influence of neophobia (i.e., aversion to novelty) on inhibitory control has not received much attention. Neophobia is known to affect complex cognitive abilities, but whether neophobia also influences more basic cognitive abilities, such as motoric self-regulation, has received less attention. Further, it remains unclear whether an individual’s response to novelty is consistent across different paradigms purported to assess neophobia. We tested two North American corvid species, black-billed magpies (Pica hudsonia) and California scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica) using two well-established neophobia paradigms to assess response stability between contexts. We then evaluated neophobia scores against the number of trials needed to learn a motoric self-regulation task, as well as subsequent task performance. Neophobia scores did not correlate across paradigms, nor did the responses during either paradigm account for motoric self-regulation performance.     

Variations in working memory capacity predict individual differences in general learning abilities among genetically diverse mice

Up to 50% of an individuals' performance across a wide variety of distinct cognitive tests can be accounted for by a single factor (i.e., "general intelligence"). Despite its ubiquity, the processes or mechanisms regulating this factor are a matter of considerable debate. Although it has been hypothesized that working memory may impact cognitive performance across various domains, tests have been inconclusive due to the difficulty in isolating working memory from its overlapping operations, such as verbal ability. We address this problem using genetically diverse mice, which exhibit a trait analogous to general intelligence. The general cognitive abilities of CD-1 mice were found to covary with individuals' working memory capacity, but not with variations in long-term retention. These results provide evidence that independent of verbal abilities, variations in working memory are associated with general cognitive abilities, and further, suggest a conservation across species of mechanisms and/or processes that regulate cognitive abilities.     

Distinct neuronal patterns of positive and negative moral processing in psychopathy

Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by severe and frequent moral violations in multiple domains of life. Numerous studies have shown psychopathy-related limbic brain abnormalities during moral processing; however, these studies only examined negatively valenced moral stimuli. Here, we aimed to replicate prior psychopathy research on negative moral judgments and to extend this work by examining psychopathy-related abnormalities in the processing of controversial moral stimuli and positive moral processing. Incarcerated adult males (N = 245) completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging protocol on a mobile imaging system stationed at the prison. Psychopathy was assessed using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R). Participants were then shown words describing three types of moral stimuli: wrong (e.g., stealing), not wrong (e.g., charity), and controversial (e.g., euthanasia). Participants rated each stimulus as either wrong or not wrong. PCL-R total scores were correlated with not wrong behavioral responses to wrong moral stimuli, and were inversely related to hemodynamic activity in the anterior cingulate cortex in the contrast of wrong > not wrong. In the controversial > noncontroversial comparison, psychopathy was inversely associated with activity in the temporal parietal junction and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These results indicate that psychopathy-related abnormalities are observed during the processing of complex, negative, and positive moral stimuli.     

Beyond cognitive myopia: a patchwork approach to the concept of neural function

In this paper, I argue that looking at the concept of neural function through the lens of cognition alone risks cognitive myopia: it leads neuroscientists to focus only on mechanisms with cognitive functions that process behaviorally relevant information when conceptualizing “neural function”. Cognitive myopia tempts researchers to neglect neural mechanisms with noncognitive functions which do not process behaviorally relevant information but maintain and repair neural and other systems of the body. Cognitive myopia similarly affects philosophy of neuroscience because scholars overlook noncognitive functions when analyzing issues surrounding e.g., functional decomposition or the multifunctionality of neural structures. I argue that we can overcome cognitive myopia by adopting a patchwork approach that articulates cognitive and noncognitive “patches” of the concept of neural function. Cognitive patches describe mechanisms with causally specific effects on cognition and behavior which are likely operative in transforming sensory or other inputs into motor outputs. Noncognitive patches describe mechanisms that lack such specific effects; these mechanisms are enabling conditions for cognitive functions to occur. I use these distinctions to characterize two noncognitive functions at the mesoscale of neural circuits: subsistence functions like breathing are implemented by central pattern generators and are necessary to maintain the life of the organism. Infrastructural functions like gain control are implemented by canonical microcircuits and prevent neural system damage while cognitive processing occurs. By adding conceptual patches that describe these functions, a patchwork approach can overcome cognitive myopia and help us explain how the brain’s capacities as an information processing device are constrained by its ability to maintain and repair itself as a physiological apparatus.     

Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an important,overlooked dimension in judgments of moral standing

Entities that possess moral standing can be wronged and deserve our moral consideration. Past perspectives on the folk psychology of moral standing have focused exclusively on the role of “patiency” (the capacity to experience pain or pleasure) and “agency” (usually defined and operationalized in terms of intelligence or cognitive ability). We contend that harmfulness (i.e., having a harmful vs. benevolent disposition) is an equally if not more important determinant of moral standing. We provide support for this hypothesis across four studies using non-human animals as targets. We show that the effect of harmfulness on attributions of moral standing is independent from patiency and intelligence (Studies 1–2), that this effect pertains specifically to an animal’s harmful disposition rather than its capacity to act upon this disposition (Study 3), and that it primarily reflects a parochial concern for human welfare in particular (Study 4). Our findings highlight an important, overlooked dimension in the psychology of moral standing that has implications for real-world decisions that affect non-human animals. Our findings also help clarify the conditions under which people perceive patiency and agency as related versus truly independent dimensions.     

Happiness from Ancient Indian Perspective: Hitopadeśa

People who seek happiness intentionally often do not get it. That is, as per the paradox of happiness, in order to be happy one should forget about it (Martin in J Happiness Stud 9(2):171–184, 2008) and try to make others happy. Given that, the purpose of present article is to suggest a six-stage people-centric (rather than self-centric) theoretical model of happiness (sukha), which is constructed using a framework based on one of the eminent ancient Indian texts—Hitopade?a. The ancient yet novel model describes a balanced path to happiness. The propounded model indicates “knowledge” (vidyā) as a foremost antecedent of happiness. The model propounded not only offers insights on achieving integrated well-being and happiness in a moral and philanthropic way, but also extends complex constructs and perspectives in the realm of happiness studies and psychology, which could subsequently promote further research. Furthermore, the proposed model seems to corroborate some of the modern well-being theories.     

Intelligence and the rest of cognition

Cognitive psychologists have become enamored with intelligence. Increasingly, the theories, findings, and methods of what is known as the information processing approach are being used in attempts to explain intelligence related phenomena. This article examines intelligence from a different perspective, which emphasizes domain-specific constraints on knowledge structures. It is argued that conceptions of what intelligence is and how it relates to the rest of cognition can vary considerably when viewed from the vantage points of these two perspectives. The constraints approach views intelligence as being closely related to a special subset of all of our cognitive abilities and as having unique distinguishing properties. It is also argued that the evaluation of any cognitive ability as being intelligent depends crucially on a prior specification of the formal constraints on the domain or domains of knowledge from which that ability originates.     

Cleaner fish <Emphasis Type="Italic">Labroides dimidiatus</Emphasis> discriminate numbers but fail a mental number line test

Several species of primates, including humans, possess a spontaneous spatial mental arrangement (i.e. mental number line MNL) of increasing numbers or continuous quantities from left to right. This cognitive process has recently been documented in domestic chicken in a spatial–numerical task, opening the possibility that MNL is a cognitive capacity that has been conserved across vertebrate taxa. In this scenario, fish might possess the MNL as well. Here we investigated whether cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus show evidence for MNL in two experiments. In Experiment I, we tested fish’s abilities in number discrimination, presenting simultaneously either small (2 vs 5) or large (5 vs 8) continuous quantities where one quantity was systematically rewarded. Experiment II used a protocol of an MNL task similar to the study on chickens. We trained cleaners with a target number (i.e. 5 elements), then we presented them with an identical pair of panels depicting either 2 elements or 8 elements, and we recorded their spontaneous choice for the left or right panel on each presentation. Cleaner fish showed high abilities in discriminating small and large numbers in Experiment I. Importantly, cleaners achieved this discrimination using numerical cues instead of non-numerical cues such as the cumulative surface area, density, and overall space. In contrast, cleaners did not allocate continuous quantities to space in Experiment II. Our findings suggest that cleaner fish possess numbering skills but they do not have an MNL. While similar studies on animals from various clades are needed to trace the evolution of MNL within vertebrates, our results suggest that this cognitive process might not be a capacity conserved across all vertebrate taxa.     

Mastering moral misery: Emotional and coping responses to intragroup morality (vs. competence) evaluations

In social groups, individuals are often confronted with evaluations of their behaviour by other group members and are motivated to adapt their own behaviour accordingly. In two studies we examine emotional responses towards, and perceived coping abilities with, morality vs. competence evaluations individuals receive from other in-group members. In Study 1, we show that evaluations of one's immoral behaviour primarily induce guilt, whereas evaluations of incompetent behaviour raise anger. In Study 2, we elaborate on the psychological process associated with these emotional responses, and demonstrate that evaluations of immorality, compared to incompetence, diminish group members’ perceived coping abilities, which in turn intensifies feelings of guilt. However, when anticipating an opportunity to restore one's self-image as a moral group member, perceived coping abilities are increased and the experience of guilt is alleviated. Together these studies demonstrate how group members can overcome their moral misery when restoring their self-image.     

SELF‐KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL STUPIDITY

Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to harm or humiliate others. It is more banal and ubiquitous – a form of moral stupidity that gives rise to rationalization, self‐deception, failures of due moral consideration, and the evasion of responsibility. A kind of crude, perception‐distorting self‐absorption, moral stupidity is the cause of many moral missteps; moral development demands the development of self‐knowledge as a way out of moral stupidity. Only once aware of the presence or absence of particular desires and beliefs can an agent have authority over them or exercise responsibility for their absence. But what is the connection between self‐knowledge and moral development? I argue that accounts (such as Kant's and Richard Moran's) which construe instances of self‐knowledge as like the verdicts of a judge cannot explain its potential role in moral development, and claim that it must be conceived of in a way that makes possible a process of self‐refinement and self‐regulation. Making use of Buddhist moral psychology, I argue that when self‐knowledge plays a role in moral development, it includes a quality of attention to one's experience best modeled as the work of the craftsperson, not as judge.     

Avoiding the Conflation of Moral and Intellectual Virtues

One of the most pressing challenges facing virtue theorists is the conflation problem. This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining the distinction between different types of virtue, such as the distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Julia Driver has argued that only an outcomes-based understanding of virtue can provide an adequate solution to the conflation problem. In this paper, I argue against Driver’s outcomes-based account, and propose an alternative motivations-based solution. According to this proposal, intellectual virtues can be identified by the shared motivation for cognitive contact with reality, while moral virtues are identified by appeal to the characteristic motivations of kindness and justice. I defend the proposal by demonstrating that it produces plausible verdicts concerning the virtue status of candidate moral and intellectual virtues.     

Predicting pleasure at others’ misfortune: Morality trumps sociability and competence in driving deservingness and schadenfreude

Schadenfreude occurs when people feel pleasure at others’ misfortunes. Previous research suggested that individuals feel such a malicious pleasure when the misfortune befalls social targets perceived as highly competent but lacking human warmth. Two experiments explored whether the two components of warmth (i.e., sociability and morality) have distinct roles in driving schadenfreude. Study 1 (N = 128) compared a competent but immoral individual to a competent but unsociable person and found that people felt more schadenfreude when a misfortune befell an individual lacking morality. Study 2 (N = 199) confirmed the primary role of morality in driving schadenfreude by manipulating not only morality and sociability, but also competence. Moreover, both experiments showed that social targets lacking moral qualities elicited higher levels of schadenfreude because their misfortunes were perceived as deserved. Overall, our findings suggest that morality has a primary role over other basic dimensions of person perception (i.e., sociability and competence) in driving schadenfreude.     

But for the Grace of God: Abortion and Cognitive Disability,Luck and Moral Status

Many theories of moral status that are intended to ground pro-choice views on abortion tie full moral status to advanced cognitive capabilities. Extant accounts of this kind are inconsistent with the intuition that the profoundly cognitively disabled have full moral status. This paper improves upon these extant accounts by combining an anti-luck condition with Steinbock’s stratification of moral status into two levels. On the resulting view, a being has full moral status if and only if (1) she has moral status and (2) (a) has had advanced cognitive capacities, (b) has the potential to develop such capacities, or (c) would have had such capacities were it not for luck. I argue that modal accounts of luck provide a non-speciesist basis for attributing the lack of advanced cognitive capacities in humans to luck without doing the same for non-human animals.     

Dogs and Monsters: Moral Status Claims in the Fiction of Dean Koontz

This article explores conceptions of moral status in the work of American thriller author Dean Koontz. It begins by examining some of the general theories of moral status used by philosophers to determine whether particular entities have moral status. This includes both uni-criterial theories and multi-criterial theories of moral status. After this examination, the article argues for exploring bioethics conceptions in popular fiction. Popular fiction is considered a rich source for analysis because it provides not only a good approximation of the beliefs of ordinary members of the moral community, but also explores important issues in a context where ordinary individuals are likely to encounter them. Following on from this, the article then explores theories of moral status in the context of Koontz’s novels. In particular, the article focuses on the novel Watchers and Koontz’s Frankenstein series. Through these works, Koontz indicates that entities have moral status for a variety of reasons and thus presumably, he is a proponent of multi-criterial theories of moral status. The article concludes with an examination of what this might mean for our understanding of moral status claims generally.     

儿童道德概念垂直空间隐喻的认知发展

本研究考察了不同年龄阶段儿童道德概念垂直空间隐喻的认知发展。实验1采用图片迫选法,要求学前儿童将道德人物图片和不道德人物图片分别放到垂直空间的上方或下方;实验2采用词汇迫选法,要求学龄儿童将道德词和不道德词分别放到垂直空间的上方或下方。结果发现,儿童均倾向于把道德材料放到上方而把不道德材料放到下方;而且这种趋势随着年龄增长愈发明显。研究结果证明幼儿阶段已开始出现“道德是上,不道德是下”的空间隐喻,其发展规律为：4~5 岁初步形成,7~9 岁基本形成,11~13 岁已接近成人水平。     

Visual-object ability: a new dimension of non-verbal intelligence

The goal of the current research was to introduce a new component of intelligence: visual-object intelligence, that reflects one's ability to process information about visual appearances of objects and their pictorial properties (e.g., shape, color and texture) as well as to demonstrate that it is distinct from visual-spatial intelligence, which reflects one's ability to process information about spatial relations and manipulate objects in space. Study 1 investigated the relationship between performance on various measures of visual-object and visual-spatial abilities, and areas of specialization (visual art, science and humanities). Study 2 examined qualitative differences in approaches to interpreting visual abstract information between visual artists, scientists and humanities/social science professionals. Study 3 investigated qualitative differences in visual-object versus visual-spatial processing by examining how members of different professions generate, transform, inspect, and manipulate visual images. The results of the three studies demonstrated that visual-object ability satisfies the requirements of an independent component of intelligence: (1) it uniquely relates to specialization in visual art; (2) it supports processing of abstract visual-object information; and (3) it has unique quantitative and qualitative characteristics, distinct from those of visual-spatial processing.     

眼动技术在个体认知能力差异研究中的应用

本文从可能性和可行性两方面介绍和论述了眼动技术在个体认知能力差异研究中的应用。在可能性方面,个体眼动特征具有的良好的重测信度和内部一致性信度;在可行性方面,已有研究利用注视和眼跳相关指标、眼动轨迹和瞳孔直径这三类指标对该问题进行探索,结果均发现这些眼动特征与认知能力之间存在着密切关系。今后研究应继续深入探索两者关系的内在认知和神经机制,并尝试结合人工智能算法开发高信效度的眼动认知测验。     

Adults' conceptions of intelligence across the adult life span.

To examine whether young, middle-aged, and older adults view the concept of intelligent person as similar or different during adulthood, 140 adults of various ages rated how likely it would be for individuals of average and exceptional intelligence at 30, 50, and 70 years of age to be engaged in behaviors previously identified by adults as characterizing adult intelligence. Adults perceived more similarity between exceptionally intelligent prototypes of closer ages (i.e., 30 and 50 and 50 and 70). Intelligence was perceived to consist of interest and ability to deal with novelty, everyday competence, and verbal competence--dimensions that were perceived to be differentially important for different-aged prototypes and by individuals of different ages. Participants' conceptions also included the idea that intelligence is malleable and that abilities differentially increase or decrease across the life span.