The time windows of the sense of agency

The sense of agency depends on some internal cues that derive from action control, as well as external cues like contextual information and prior information (degree of contingency between an action and is effect). We assessed whether external agency cues are combined with internal agency cues to affect the sense of agency. In two experiments participants performed a movement (button press) that elicited, after a varying delay, an effect (ball appearing on a screen), and reported their sense of agency over the effect (full, partial or no-agency) while internal cues (premotor information) and external cues (contextual and prior information) were manipulated. We assessed the effect of agency cues on the delays at which the sense of agency varied. The delays were increased with premotor signals but were decreased with contextual information. These findings favour a model of integration of internal and external agency cues over time.     

Illusion of sense of self-agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but not the sense of self-ownership

It is proposed that knowledge of motor commands is used to distinguish self-generated sensation from externally generated sensation. In this paper, we show that the sense of self-agency, that is the sense that I am the one who is generating an action, largely depends on the degree of discrepancy resulting from comparison between the predicted and actual sensory feedback. In Experiment 1, the sense of self-agency was reduced when the presentation of the tone was unpredictable in terms of timing and its frequency, although in fact the tone was self-produced. In Experiment 2, the opposite case was found to occur. That is, participants experienced illusionary sense of self-agency when the externally generated sensations happened to match the prediction made by forward model. In Experiment 3, the sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences, regardless of presence or absence of a discrepancy between the intended and actual consequences of actions. In all the experiments, a discrepancy between the predicted and actual feedback had no effects on sense of self-ownership, that is the sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience. These results may suggest that both senses of self are mutually independent.     

The development of time sense in middle adulthood

The focus of this paper is on the normal, intrapsychic, subjective experience of time in a developmental context. Time sense in middle age is determined less by the chronological age markers of forty or sixty and more by powerful, complex dynamic factors. Issues such as physical aging and illness, relationship to spouse and children, death of parents, and retirement will be explored in terms of how time is experienced.     

The sense of life time in human development

The subjective sense oflife time is the medium within which issues of identity and growth take place. Youth, middle age, early old age, and old age are each presented as developmental stages with dominant experiences oflife time. Directivity, or purposeful movement toward a goal, is then related to the experience of future and occurs in the gap between present and future. The sense of now in old age is viewed as a stage in the life cycle with the potential for unique personal creativity and growth, being free from bondages found at other points in the life cycle.     

Making sense of age-related distractibility: The critical role of sensory modality

Older adults are known to have reduced inhibitory control and therefore to be more distractible than young adults. Recently, we have proposed that sensory modality plays a crucial role in age-related distractibility. In this study, we examined age differences in vulnerability to unimodal and cross-modal visual and auditory distraction. A group of 24 younger (mean age = 21.7 years) and 22 older adults (mean age = 65.4 years) performed visual and auditory n-back tasks while ignoring visual and auditory distraction. Whereas reaction time data indicated that both young and older adults are particularly affected by unimodal distraction, accuracy data revealed that older adults, but not younger adults, are vulnerable to cross-modal visual distraction. These results support the notion that age-related distractibility is modality dependent.     

Disturbances of the sense of time with special reference to the experience of timelessness

Disturbances of the experience of time are examined, with emphasis on the effects of the vicissitudes of the sense of self, affect, unconscious fantasies, and ideas concerning death. The manifest experience is interpreted as a derivative of unconscious, conflict-laden fantasies. Disturbances of the experience of time may be regarded as specific types of affective states, pleasurable or unpleasurable, the quality of the experience being determined by the nature of the underlying unconscious ideational content. Two experiences of timelessness are analyzed, in which the sense of timelessness was determined by the wish to extend time indefinitely. Many elements have been condensed into this basic wish which, as in a dream, was momentarily experienced as already realized.     

The structure of sensory events and the accuracy of time judgments

We investigated how does the structure of empty time intervals influence temporal processing. In experiment 1, the intervals to be discriminated were the silent durations marked by two sensory signals, both lasting 10 or 500 ms; these signals were two identical flashes (intramodal: VV), or one visual flash (V) followed by an auditory tone (A) (intermodal: VA). For the range of duration under investigation (standards = 0.2, 0.6, 1, or 1.4 s), the results indicated that both the marker length and sensory mode influenced discrimination, but no interaction between these variables or between one of these variables and standard duration was significant. In experiment 2, we compared, for each of four marker-type conditions (VV, AA, VA, AV; and standard = 1 s), intervals marked by two 10 ms signals with intervals marked by unequal signal length (markers 1 and 2 lasting 10 and 500 ms, or 500 and 10 ms). As in experiment 1, the results revealed significant marker-mode and marker-length effects, but no significant interaction between these variables. Experiment 3 showed that, for the same conditions as in experiment 2, perceived duration is not influenced by marker length and that the variability of interval reproductions does not depend on the perceived duration of intervals. The results are discussed in the light of a single-clock hypothesis: marker-length and marker-mode effects are presented as being non-temporal sources of variability associated mainly with sensory and memory processes.     

Responding under time pressure: Testing two animal learning models and a model of visual categorization

Two experiments are reported, which employed a Pavlovian eyelid conditioning procedure with human participants. The experiments tested the predictions of three models of the time-course of processing under time pressure. These were the extended generalized context model (Lamberts, 1998), and two variants of the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), which were activated in cascade mode. Reinforcement schedules in the experiments were equivalent either to an AND rule or to an XOR rule. The time available for processing the conditioned stimulus and initiating a conditioned response was manipulated by varying the interval from the onset of the conditioned stimulus to the onset of the unconditioned stimulus. The results were in accord with the predictions of one of the two variants of the Rescorla-Wagner model.     

The lexical constituency model: some implications of research on Chinese for general theories of reading

The authors examine the implications of research on Chinese for theories of reading and propose the lexical constituency model as a general framework for word reading across writing systems. Word identities are defined by 3 interlinked constituents (orthographic, phonological, and semantic). The implemented model simulates the time course of graphic, phonological, and semantic priming effects, including immediate graphic facilitation followed by graphic inhibition with simultaneous phonological facilitation, a pattern unique to the Chinese writing system. Pseudocharacter primes produced only facilitation, supporting the model's assumption that lexical thresholds determine phonological and semantic, but not graphic, effects. More generally, both universal reading processes and writing system constraints exist. Although phonology is universal, its activation process depends on how the writing system structures graphic units.     

Testing some attribution-emotion relations in the People's Republic of China

We conducted a questionnaire study to test the generality of attribution-emotion relations to individuals in the People's Republic of China. Replications of prior findings of studies conducted with American subjects were reported: (a) High effort and success enhanced interpersonal evaluations when ability, effort, and outcome information were provided; (b) affective communications of pity, anger, and guilt were respectively used to infer low ability, lack of effort, and teacher as causes of failure; (c) effort and ability levels were inferred from the presence or absence of anger reactions; and (d) controllable causes of a broken social contract were expected to result in anger from others. Chinese and American respondents also indicated what situations would arouse the affects of anger, guilt, pity, pride, and shame. We found no evidence for the characterization of Chinese as (a) emphasizing effort over ability as a cause of achievement outcomes or (b) de-emphasizing the importance of personal achievement and stressing group goals and accomplishments.     

Testing the assumptions of exponential,additive reaction time models

Two assumptions commonly made by choice reaction time (RT) models are (1) that certain experimental tasks can be found that cause an extra processing stage to be inserted into the cognitive process and (2) that the duration of one or more processing stages is random with an exponential distribution. Few rigorous tests of either assumption exist. This paper reviews existing tests and presents several new results that can be used to test these assumptions. First, in the case in which the duration of an inserted stage is exponentially distributed, it is shown that the observable RT density functions must always intersect at the mode of the density requiring the extra processing stage. Second, when only the first assumption (Assumption 1) is made, it is shown that the cumulative RT distribution functions and, in many cases, the hazard functions must be ordered. Finally, when only Assumption 2 is assumed, it is shown that, under fairly weak conditions, the taft of the RT density function must be exponential. The first two results are applied to data from a memory scanning experiment, and the two assumptions are found to receive tentative support     

Self-focused attention and the placebo effect: Fooling some of the people some of the time

An experiment tested the hypothesis that mirror-induced self-awareness would minimize a “placebo” effect. Some subjects were led to believe that a drug that they were about to ingest would produce arousal symptoms as a side effect. Self-aware subjects in this condition subsequently reported experiencing less arousal from the placebo, and fewer of the side effects ascribed to it, than did less self-aware subjects. Discussion centered on the implications of these findings for placebo research and implications for two common alternative interpretations of self-awareness effects.