Anaphoric Pronouns and the Computation of Prominence Profiles

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research - Previous research has investigated anaphoric resolution at the anaphor. Using a self-paced reading study we show that prominence profiles, i.e. the ranking of...     

Relational Semantics and Domain Semantics for Epistemic Modals

The standard account of modal expressions in natural language analyzes them as quantifiers over a set of possible worlds determined by the evaluation world and an accessibility relation. A number of authors have recently argued for an alternative account according to which modals are analyzed as quantifying over a domain of possible worlds that is specified directly in the points of evaluation. But the new approach only handles the data motivating it if it is supplemented with a non-standard account of attitude verbs and conditionals. It can be shown the the relational account handles the same data equally well if it too is supplemented with a non-standard account of such expressions.     

A Temporal Semantics for Basic Logic

In the context of truth-functional propositional many-valued logics, Hájek’s Basic Fuzzy Logic BL [14] plays a major rôle. The completeness theorem proved in [7] shows that BL is the logic of all continuous t-norms and their residua. This result, however, does not directly yield any meaningful interpretation of the truth values in BL per se. In an attempt to address this issue, in this paper we introduce a complete temporal semantics for BL. Specifically, we show that BL formulas can be interpreted as modal formulas over a flow of time, where the logic of each instant is ?ukasiewicz, with a finite or infinite number of truth values. As a main result, we obtain validity with respect to all flows of times that are non-branching to the future, and completeness with respect to all finite linear flows of time, or to an appropriate single infinite linear flow of time. It may be argued that this reduces the problem of establishing a meaningful interpretation of the truth values in BL logic to the analogous problem for ?ukasiewicz logic.     

Conjunctions,Disjunctions and Lewisian Semantics for Counterfactuals

Consider the reasonable axioms of subjunctive conditionals (1) if p q ₁ and p q ₂ at some world, then p (q ₁ & q ₂) at that world, and (2) if p ₁ q and p ₂ q at some world, then (p ₁ ∨ p ₂) q at that world, where p q is the subjunctive conditional. I show that a Lewis-style semantics for subjunctive conditionals satisfies these axioms if and only if one makes a certain technical assumption about the closeness relation, an assumption that is probably false. I will then show how Lewisian semantics can be modified so as to assure (1) and (2) even when the technical assumption fails, and in fact in one sense the semantics actually becomes simpler then.     

A Complete and Consistent Formal System for Sortals

A formal logical system for sortal quantifiers, sortal identity and (second order) quantification over sortal concepts is formulated. The absolute consistency of the system is proved. A completeness proof for the system is also constructed. This proof is relative to a concept of logical validity provided by a semantics, which assumes as its philosophical background an approach to sortals from a modern form of conceptualism.     

A Semantics and Methodology for Ceteris Paribus Hypotheses

Taking seriously the arguments of Earman, Roberts and Smith that ceteris paribus laws have no semantics and cannot be tested, I suggest that ceteris paribus claims have a kind of formal pragmatics, and that at least some of them can be verified or refuted in the limit. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Propositional Dynamic Logic for Instantial Neighborhood Semantics

Studia Logica - We propose a new perspective on logics of computation by combining instantial neighborhood logic $$\mathsf {INL}$$ with bisimulation safe operations adapted from $$\mathsf {PDL}$$ ....     

Proof-Theoretic Semantics,a Problem with Negation and Prospects for Modality

This paper discusses proof-theoretic semantics, the project of specifying the meanings of the logical constants in terms of rules of inference governing them. I concentrate on Michael Dummett’s and Dag Prawitz’ philosophical motivations and give precise characterisations of the crucial notions of harmony and stability, placed in the context of proving normalisation results in systems of natural deduction. I point out a problem for defining the meaning of negation in this framework and prospects for an account of the meanings of modal operators in terms of rules of inference.     

Multivalent Semantics for Vagueness and Presupposition

Both the phenomenon of presupposition and that of vagueness have motivated the use of one form or another of trivalent logic, in which a declarative sentence can not only receive the standard values true (1) and false (0), but also a third, non-standard truth-value which is usually understood as ‘undefined’ (#). The goal of this paper is to propose a multivalent framework which can deal simultaneously with presupposition and vagueness, and, more specifically, capture their projection properties as well as their different roles in language. Now, there is a prima facie simple way of doing this, which simply consists in assimilating the two phenomena, and using an appropriate type of trivalent logic. On this view, we just need a compositional system that deals with the ‘undefined’ truth-value, and does not care about whether the source of undefinedness is ‘presuppositional’ or related to vagueness. I will argue that such a simple solution cannot succeed, and point out a number of desiderata that any successful approach must meet. I will then present and discuss two seven-valued semantics, inspired, respectively, by the Strong Kleene semantics and by supervaluationism, which meet these desiderata.     

Formal systems as physical objects: A physicalist account of mathematical truth

This article is a brief formulation of a radical thesis. We start with the formalist doctrine that mathematical objects have no meanings; we have marks and rules governing how these marks can be combined. That's all. Then I go further by arguing that the signs of a formal system of mathematics should be considered as physical objects, and the formal operations as physical processes. The rules of the formal operations are or can be expressed in terms of the laws of physics governing these processes. In accordance with the physicalist understanding of mind, this is true even if the operations in question are executed in the head. A truth obtained through (mathematical) reasoning is, therefore, an observed outcome of a neuro-physiological (or other physical) experiment. Consequently, deduction is nothing but a particular case of induction.