From heart attacks to melanoma: do common sense models of somatization influence symptom interpretation for female victims?

Common sense models regarding gender and stress influenced how laypeople responded to information about symptoms in 3 experiments. In Study 1, medical intervention was perceived to be less important for female targets reporting chest pain and stressful events than for male targets experiencing identical symptoms and stressors. In addition, chest pain was less likely to be attributed to cardiac causes for female targets. This gender-based stress-discounting effect was replicated for symptoms of gallstones and melanoma in Study 2, where participants again were less likely to recommend medical care for female than for male targets. Recognition memory for information about a somatizing target was tested in Study 3; results suggested that laypeople hold stereotypes associating somatization with female gender. The authors' findings provide insight into the naive theories that shape symptom interpretation and self-referral behavior.     

Knowledge and expectations: Perceived illness in myocardial infarction patients

In a study of 367 patients with myocardial infarction (MI), questionnaires were developed to assess two central aspects of perceived illness: factual and consensual illness knowledge and subjective expectations for the personal consequences of the MI. In a factor analysis, these two aspects of perceived illness were found to load on separate factors, and the patients views of the personal consequences of the MI were only moderately associated with their general cardiac health knowledge. Among a series of sociodemographic, medical, and psychological variables, including a standardized in-hospital patient education programme, the two aspects of perceived illness also proved to have different determinants. Differences in factual and consensual illness knowledge were mainly related to differences in formal education, and this aspect of perceived illness was influenced by the standardized education programme. In contrast, differences in subjective expectations were associated with levels of hopelessness. The implications for psychosocial interventions in the rehabilitation of MI patients are discussed.     

Causal explanations for lack of pregnancy applying the common sense model of illness representation to the fertility context

Abstract

Objectives: The current study explored causal explanations for lack of pregnancy and association with help-seeking behaviour. Differences based on gender and country Human Development Index were examined.

Design: A mixed method design was used.

Main outcome measures: Data were drawn from the International Fertility Decision-Making Study, a cross-sectional study of 10,045 individuals (1690 men; 8355 women) from 79 countries. Respondents rated to what extent they believed their lack of pregnancy was due to something they or their partner had done/not done or other factors and described their reasons for making this rating.

Results: Respondents were aged 18–50 (M?=?31.83) years, partnered and had been trying to achieve a pregnancy/father a child for over six months (M?=?2.8 years). Men and women primarily believed their lack of pregnancy was due to medical problems or chance/bad luck. Thematic analysis of textual responses from 29.7% of the sample found that respondents focused on their personal experience or a salient life event when describing the cause of their lack of pregnancy. Women expressed more regret and helplessness about causes than men. Significant country differences were observed.

Conclusions: Individuals may develop inaccurate causal explanations based on their personal experiences. Access to accurate information is necessary to facilitate timely help-seeking.     

Appealing to common humanity increases forgiveness but reduces collective action among victims of historical atrocities

Appealing to common humanity is often suggested as a method of uniting victims and perpetrators of historical atrocities. In the present experiment (N = 109), we reveal that this strategy may actually work against victim groups' best interests. Appealing to common humanity (versus intergroup identity) increased forgiveness of perpetrators but independently also served to lower intentions to engage in collective action. Both effects were mediated but not moderated by reduced identification with the victim group. We, thus reveal an important feature of appeals to common humanity: That this strategy may reduce social change at the same time as helping to promote more positive intergroup attitudes. These novel findings extend research on the human identity to a new theoretically interesting and socially important domain. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relations between symptom severity,illness perceptions,visceral sensitivity,coping strategies and well-being in irritable bowel syndrome guided by the common sense model of illness

Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS) is a common condition affecting around 10–20% of the population and associated with poorer psychological well-being and quality of life. The aim of the current study was to explore the efficacy of the Common Sense Model (CSM) using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) in an IBS cohort. One hundred and thirty-one IBS patients (29 males, 102 females, mean age 38 years) participating in the IBSclinic.org.au pre-intervention assessment were included. Measures included IBS severity (Irritable Bowel Syndrome Severity Scoring System), coping patterns (Carver Brief COPE), visceral sensitivity (Visceral Sensitivity Index), illness perceptions (Brief Illness Perceptions Questionnaire), psychological distress (Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale), and quality of life (IBS Quality of Life scale; IBS-QoL). Using SEM, a final model with an excellent fit was identified (χ² (8) = 11.91, p = .16, χ²/N = 1.49, CFI > .98, TLI > .96, SRMR < .05). Consistent with the CSM, Illness perceptions were significantly and directly influenced by IBS severity (β = .90, p < .001). Illness perceptions in turn directly influenced maladaptive coping (β = .40, p < .001) and visceral sensitivity (β = .70, p < .001). Maladaptive coping and visceral sensitivity were significantly associated with psychological distress (β = .55, p < .001; β = .22, p < .01) and IBS-QoL (β = –.28, p < .001; β = –.62, p < .001). Based on these findings, we argue that to augment the adverse impact of IBS severity on IBS-QoL and psychological distress, psychological interventions will be best to target the mediating psychological processes including illness beliefs, visceral sensitivity and maladaptive coping.     

Gender differences in eating attitudes,body concept,and self-esteem among models

Eating attitudes, body concept, and self-esteem were investigated among professional fashion models and controls. Samples were predominantly Caucasian and from upper and middle class backgrounds. Women displayed significantly more eating-disordered behavior and lower levels of body satisfaction and self-esteem than men. Whereas the self-esteem of female models was higher than that of female controls the self-esteem of male models and male controls did not differ. Female undergraduates displayed the lowest self-esteem among the groups. Finally, despite findings that the majority of female models were underweight while the majority of female undergraduates were within recommended weight ranges, both groups displayed similar levels of eating-disordered behavior. Results suggest that the slender figures of professional fashion models are best viewed as lying at one extreme of the normal distribution of body types rather than as the product of purposeful dieting behavior to be attained by average women.We wish to thank Thomas Boone, Peter Conrad, Susan Mcdonald, and Malcolm Watson for their support of this project. This research was funded in part by a Brandeis University Undergraduate Fellowship. Requests for reprints should be sent to either author at Department of Psychology, 125 Brown Social Science Center, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02254-9110.     

Gender asymmetry in common couple violence

In companion studies I examine the acceptability of two forms of “common couple violence” that vary in seventy. According to Johnson (1995), common couple violence is enacted equally by both men and women, is therefore gender symmetrical, and can be distinguished from patriarchal terrorism, which often includes frequent and systematic violence enacted by men in the control and domination of women. The 160 randomly selected respondents in Study 1 (representative of a midsize northeastern American university) were asked whether they would be likely to hit their partner, and whether they would expect to be hit, in any one of 10 situations common to a dating relationship. Contrary to the expectations of gender symmetry, 83% of the women indicated they would be at least somewhat likely to hit their partner in any one situation compared to 53% of the men. Men were also more likely to report expecting to be hit (70%) than women (50%). Interactions of gender with dating status or year in school cannot account for these findings: however, women and men differ in their motivations. Although most men enact violence for reasons similar to women—because they are angry or contused—a sizable minority of men invoke violence because of strong feelings like love or hate. Study 2 queried 97 randomly selected students about their willingness to use a more serious form of violence (i.e., beating up their partner). Findings were similar to Study 1 with one exception. In most instances, women report a greater expectation of being beaten.     

Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. We report six experiments that investigate the nature of the relations we represent between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and its other properties. The experiments provide evidence that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g. having four legs for dogs), but not other properties (t-properties; e.g. being brown for dogs). Principled connections are different from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections, (i) license the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess the k-property, (ii) license explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is, and (iii) license normative expectations concerning the presence of the k-property in tokens of the type. The experiments provide evidence for all three of these aspects of principled connections. The experiments also demonstrate that principled connections must be distinguished from merely strong statistical connections. We suggest that principled connections are one of the fundamental types of relations (in addition to logical, statistical, and causal relations) in terms of which our conceptual knowledge is structured. We argue that principled connections reveal a formal mode of understanding and explanation. This mode of understanding complements other modes of understanding that have been studied within the theory-based approach to conceptual representation. Finally, we suggest that kind representations are distinguished from representations of mere types by the representation of principled connections to k-properties.     

The root delusion enshrined in common sense and language

This paper is a critique of certain arguments given by the Milindapanha and Jay Garfield for the conventional nature of reality or existence. These arguments are of interest in their own right. They also are significant if they are presumed to attack an obstacle we all face in achieving non‐attachment, namely, our belief in the inherent or substantial existence of ourselves and the familiar objects of our world. The arguments turn on a distinction between these objects, and some other way of conceiving of them, in terms of which their conventional existence becomes apparent. After the distinction and the arguments that depend on it are shown to be problematic, the paper concludes with some reflections on the doctrine of skillful means and its applicability to Buddhist philosophical argument.     

Stigma of mental illness,religious change,and explanatory models of mental illness among Jewish patients at a mental-health clinic in North Jerusalem

During 3 months in 2004, 38 recent referrals to a Community Mental Health Clinic in North Jerusalem, a substantially Ultra-Orthodox Jewish neighborhood, were evaluated by the Explanatory Model Interview Catalogue. This questionnaire, which includes a 13-item scale measuring stigma towards mental illness, was adapted and translated into Hebrew. Patients with a more religious upbringing expressed a greater sense of stigma towards mental illness; however, patients who now had a more religious affiliation did not. The 14 patients who had experienced a religious change toward a more religious affiliation reported a lower level of stigma than the 24 non-returnees. Even when controlling for religious upbringing, the partial correlation between stigma score and religious change was significant. Stigma was lower among younger but not older returnees. Findings from this study support the hypothesis that a stigma of mental illness may be a deterrent to the use of a public mental-health clinic for religious Jews in Israel. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish patients (especially non-Hasidic) used a nonreligious explanatory model (perception and understanding) of mental illness more often than a religious explanatory model. This last finding could reflect a shift in the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities from a religious to a more medical and psychological explanatory model.     

Transcending common sense in psychological theorizing: A developmental perspective

The necessity for transcendence of any particular system of common sense in psychologists' theorizing is reiterated in the process of analyzing Smedslund's response to the author's previous (Valsiner, 1985) critical analysis of the role of common sense in psychology. It is emphasized that the ways of how personally unique construction of meaning in individuals' ontogenies proceed are directed by social canalization, which guarantees sufficient (but not absolute) similarity in persons' individual thinking and acting. Such similarity forms the basis for intelligibility of interpersonal communication. A developmental perspective can overcome two opposite traditions in non-developmental psychologies which either disregard common sense, or make it the criterion of adequacy of thinking towards which psychological theories should strive. In contrast, it is suggested that common sense be studied in conjunction with research on psychological phenomena for which it serves as their context, and that generalizations about psychological phenomena retain information about the common-sense frames of the phenomena.     

Common sense and the common morality in theory and practice

The unfinished nature of Beauchamp and Childress’s account of the common morality after 34 years and seven editions raises questions about what is lacking, specifically in the way they carry out their project, more generally in the presuppositions of the classical liberal tradition on which they rely. Their wide-ranging review of ethical theories has not provided a method by which to move beyond a hypothetical approach to justification or, on a practical level regarding values conflict, beyond a questionable appeal to consensus. My major purpose in this paper is to introduce the thought of Bernard Lonergan as offering a way toward such a methodological breakthrough. In the first section, I consider Beauchamp and Childress’s defense of their theory of the common morality. In the second, I relate a persisting vacillation in their argument regarding the relative importance of reason and experience to a similar tension in classical liberal theory. In the third, I consider aspects of Lonergan’s generalized empirical method as a way to address problems that surface in the first two sections of the paper: (1) the structural relation of reason and experience in human action; and (2) the importance of theory for practice in terms of what Lonergan calls “common sense” and “general bias.”