The effects of independent and interdependent self-construals on reactions to transgressions: distinguishing between guilt and shame

The self-conscious emotions of guilt and shame are commonly distinguished by the self-reflective processes that foster these emotions. Distinctions based on resulting behavioral reactions, however, have been questioned in recent studies highlighting the role of different self-motivations. The current work draws on the self-construal literature to further clarify the antecedents and consequences of guilt and shame. We hypothesized that conceptualizing the self as independent from (vs. interdependent with) others fosters behavior-related (vs. self-related) cognitions typically associated with guilt (vs. shame). Additionally, we predicted that the deleterious consequences of shame for externalizing blame are more characteristic of independent (vs. interdependent) selves. These hypotheses were supported across two studies that measured (Study 1) and primed (Study 2) self-construals. Overall, our results suggest that the cognitive reactions associated with guilt and shame are differently encouraged by independent and interdependent self-construals.     

TRANSCENDENTAL GUILT: On an Emotional Condition of Moral Experience

This article considers a central ethically relevant interpersonal emotion, guilt. It is argued that guilt, as an irreducible moral category, has a constitutive role to play in our ways of conceptualizing our relations to other people. Without experiencing guilt, or being able to do so, we would not be capable of employing the moral concepts and judgments we do employ. Elaborating on this argument, the paper deals with what may be described as the “metaphysics of guilt.” More generally, it is suggested, through a case study on the concept of guilt, that a moral theory avoiding naïve emotivism yet emphasizing the role of emotions in morality can and should pay attention to the transcendental status of emotions such as guilt—emotions constitutive of our concept of moral seriousness. Instead of psychologizing moral emotions, the paper employs Raimond Gaita's Wittgenstein‐inspired way of examining the place of the concepts of guilt and remorse in our ethical language‐use. Finally, some methodological remarks on the possibility of transcendental reflection in moral philosophy are presented. While it is not necessary to commit oneself to any specific religious tradition in order to emphasize the constitutive role of guilt in the way suggested in the paper, it turns out that the moral depth of this concept requires that one is at least open to religiously relevant ways of using moral language. In the fundamental metaphysical sense examined in the paper, guilt is a concept whose home language‐game is religious rather than secular ethics.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.     

Development and validation of the Moral Outcomes of Relationship Aggression Scale: A measure of moral distress following intimate partner violence perpetration

Research with military veterans has established that distress may arise in response to perpetrating violent behaviors that violate individuals' moral beliefs. To date, no studies have similarly examined morally-related cognitive and emotional responses specifically among intimate partner violence (IPV) perpetrators. However, research on moral cognitions and emotions in response to IPV perpetration may inform understanding of the behavior and potential mechanisms for intervention. In the current series of four studies, we used classical test theory to develop a measure of moral distress following IPV perpetration that focuses on thoughts about the actions (assimilated cognitions), thoughts about the self due to one's actions (accommodated cognitions), and emotions experienced due to one's actions (moral emotions). Items were developed and tested among two samples of undergraduate students, and psychometric properties of the final measure were confirmed among two community samples. The final measure consists of three subscales consisting of five items each. Results demonstrate support for internal consistency and test–retest reliability, convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity, and factor structure. This measure can be used in future research designed to examine how individuals respond to their IPV perpetration, and to study the implications this may have for long-term outcomes and behavioral change.     

Reappraising the Moral Nature of Emotions in Decision Making: The Case of Shame and Guilt

Emotions play a crucial role in moral behavior. The present paper does not contest this point but argues that qualifications of certain feelings such as shame and guilt as moral emotions should not exclusively be based on a proximal analysis of their function. A proximal analysis details how moral emotions produce moral behavior. Emotions are qualified as moral when they are elicited by concerns for others rather than the self and produce prosocial action tendencies. Although researchers have acknowledged that moral emotions may also have an ultimate function that details why it is in the individual interest that these moral effects occur, they have neglected to translate such ideas into testable hypotheses. Using guilt and shame as an example, we show how an analysis of ultimate functions accommodates recent findings, which contest the view that guilt is more moral than shame and provides new insights as to when and why moral emotions will produce moral effects.     

When feeling bad makes you look good: guilt, shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

心理学视角下的道德损伤

道德损伤是指个体实施、未能阻止、目睹或听闻违背自身深层的道德信念和期望的行为,对心理、生理、精神、行为和社会的持久影响。道德损伤作为一个跨学科概念,自2009年Litz从心理学角度对其重新做出界定以来,在心理学、伦理学、精神病学、社会学等领域引起了广泛关注。目前研究者已经编制出多个多维度量表来对道德损伤的事件或症状进行测量,运用认知行为疗法、认知加工疗法和针对道德损伤研发的适当暴露疗法等措施来进行干预。未来的研究可以继续深入探究道德损伤的发生发展机制,确立道德损伤的诊断标准,推广道德损伤的适用范围,丰富道德损伤的内涵,从而拓展道德损伤研究的广度和深度。     

When feeling bad makes you look good: Guilt,shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

Intrapsychic and interpersonal guilt: a critical review of the recent literature

Various authors hold that some emotions (i.e., moral emotions) have the function of orienting people toward ethical actions. In addition to embarrassment, shame and pride, the moral emotion of guilt is believed to affect humans’ behavior when they carry out transgressions that violate social and cultural standards. Over the past century, many studies (including controversial ones) have been conducted on guilt. In this study, we analyzed and summarized mainly the most recent literature on this emotion. On one side, the destructiveness of guilt is emphasized. It inflicts punishment and pain on individuals for their errors and can lead to psychopathology (e.g., depression). On the other side, it is described as a “friendly” emotion that motivates behavior adapted to social and cultural rules. How can this asymmetry be explained? Different existing views on guilt are presented and discussed, together with recent proposals, supported by research data. Finally, we discussed some systematic models that try to incorporate these different views in a single framework that could facilitate future researches.     

Profiles of Peritraumatic Emotions

Researchers have identified peritraumatic emotions as important predictors of who will develop posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms. However, such investigations have not examined full profiles of emotions, perhaps because of the typical emphasis on fear or other Criterion A2 emotions. Such an examination could help us identify which peritraumatic emotions are prominent, and how they relate to important posttrauma outcomes. Thus, the aim of this study was to identify distinct profiles of peritraumatic emotions and their correlates using a comprehensive survey of peri- and posttraumatic reactions. We conducted a latent profile analysis of peritraumatic emotions in 398 undergraduate students who reported a DSM–IV A1 trauma and then compared the resulting profiles on trauma type, PTSD, depression, and posttraumatic cognitions. Six distinct profiles emerged: 3 had consistently low, medium, or high levels across the range of emotions, with 3 others primarily characterized by low shame and guilt, high anger and guilt, and low guilt. These profiles significantly differed in terms of trauma type, PTSD, depression, and posttraumatic cognitions. In particular, profiles with high levels of anger, shame, and guilt were consistently related to overall worse functioning. Importantly, fear and associated emotions did not differentiate between profiles. These results have important implications for the phenomenology of posttrauma emotional reactions and strongly suggest that the clinical assessment of traumatic experiences go beyond fear-based conceptualizations.     

The Effect of Shame‐Proneness,Guilt‐Proneness,and Internalizing Tendencies on Nonsuicidal Self‐Injury

Nonsuicidal self‐injury is especially common in adolescents and young adults. Self‐injury may be related to shame or guilt—two moral emotions—as these differentially predict other maladaptive behaviors. Using a college sample, we examined not only how shame‐proneness, guilt‐proneness, and internalizing emotional tendencies related to self‐injury, but also whether these moral emotions moderate the relation between internalizing tendencies and self‐injury. High shame‐proneness was associated with higher frequencies of self‐injury. High guilt‐proneness was associated with less self‐injury, although this effect was mitigated at higher levels of internalizing tendencies. These results suggest shame‐proneness is a risk factor for self‐injury, while guilt‐proneness is protective.     

Inhibitory Control and Moral Emotions: Relations to Reparation in Early and Middle Childhood

ABSTRACT. This study examined links between inhibitory control, moral emotions (sympathy and guilt), and reparative behavior in an ethnically diverse sample of 4- and 8-year-olds (N = 162). Caregivers reported their children's reparative behavior, inhibitory control, and moral emotions through a questionnaire, and children reported their guilt feelings in response to a series of vignettes depicting moral transgressions. A hypothesized meditation model was tested with inhibitory control relating to reparative behavior through sympathy and guilt. In support of this model, results revealed that high levels of inhibitory control were associated with high levels of reparative behavior through high levels of sympathy and guilt. However, the mediation of inhibitory control to reparation through guilt was significant for 4-year-olds only. Results are discussed in relation to the temperamental, regulatory, and affective-moral precursors of reparative behavior in early and middle childhood.     

Impairment in judgement of the moral emotion guilt following orbitofrontal cortex damage

Although neuroimaging studies have provided evidence for an association between moral emotions and the orbitofrontal cortex, studies on patients with focal lesions using experimental probes of moral emotions are scarce. Here, we addressed this topic by presenting a moral emotion judgement task to patients with focal brain damage. Four judgement tasks in a simple pairwise choice paradigm were given to 72 patients with cerebrovascular disease. These tasks consisted of a perceptual line judgement task as a control task; the objects’ preference task as a basic preference judgement task; and two types of moral emotion judgement task, an anger task and a guilt task. A multiple linear regression analysis was performed on each set of task performance scores to take into account potential confounders. Performance on the guilt emotion judgement task negatively correlated with the orbitofrontal cortex damage, but not with the other variables. Results for the other judgement tasks did not reach statistical significance. The close association between orbitofrontal cortex damage and a decrease in guilt emotion judgement consistency might suggest that the orbitofrontal cortex plays a key role in the sense of guilt, a hallmark of morality.     

The paradox of group-based guilt: modes of national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the in-group's moral violations

The authors examined the relationships between 2 modes of national identification (attachment to the in-group and the in-group's glorification) and reactions to the in-group's moral violations among Israeli students. Data were collected during a period of relative calm in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as during a period of great intensification of this conflict. As expected, in Study 1, the 2 modes of identification had contrasting relationships with group-based guilt: Attachment was positively related whereas glorification was negatively related to group-based guilt for in-group's past infractions. Glorification suppressed the attachment effect but not vice versa. Both relationships were mediated by the use of exonerating cognitions. In Study 2, group-based guilt for the in-group's current wrongdoings was increased by priming critical rather than conventional attachment to the in-group, suggesting a causal effect of mode of identification on the experience of negative group-based emotions.     

Assessing the effectiveness of jail diversion programs for persons with serious mental illness and co-occurring substance use disorders

In recent years, jail diversion programs for people with serious mental illness and co-occurring substance use disorders have received increasing attention and have rapidly grown in number. Previous studies suggest that jail diversion programs have the potential to achieve positive outcomes. The present study reports findings from 6 jail diversion programs (3 pre-booking and 3 post-booking) participating in a federally-funded research initiative to assess the effectiveness of jail diversion programs for people with co-occurring disorders. Diverted and non-diverted groups were compared on self-reported outcomes at 12 months following diversion. The findings suggest that jail diversion reduces time spent in jail without increasing the public safety risk, while linking participants to community-based services. Jail diversion costs and the implications of these results for jail diversion programs and future research are discussed.     

Group-based guilt and shame in the context of intergroup conflict: The role of beliefs and meta-beliefs about group malleability

Group-based guilt and shame are part of a wide range of moral emotions in intergroup conflicts. These emotions can potentially motivate group members to make compromises in order to promote conflict resolution, and increase support for reparations and apologies following moral transgressions committed by the in-group. Thus, it is important to understand how to induce these emotions and the mechanisms for their effects. In the present paper, we examined the mechanisms underlying group-based guilt and shame in four studies. Across the first three studies, conducted in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we found that group-based guilt was mostly predicted by individuals’ implicit theories about groups (ITG). Specifically, we found that the more participants believed that groups are malleable, the more they experienced group-based guilt. Group-based shame, however, was found to be dependent upon individuals’ perception of other people’s perceptions about the malleability of groups (i.e., meta-ITG), as the perceived damage to one’s in-group image is a major component in experiencing shame. In Study 4, conducted in the context of gender relations, we differentiated between the two components of shame, that is, moral and image shame. As predicted, while group-based guilt and moral shame showed similar patterns of results, meta-ITG had a moderating effect on the association between ITG and group-based image shame. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed in relation to promoting intergroup conflict resolution and reconciliation.     

Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors

Three experiments explored how hypocrisy affects attributions of criminal guilt and the desire to punish hypocritical criminals. Study 1 established that via perceived hypocrisy, a hypocritical criminal was seen as more culpable and was punished more than a non-hypocritical criminal who committed an identical crime. Study 2 expanded on this, showing that negative moral emotions (anger and disgust) mediated the relationships between perceived hypocrisy, criminal guilt, and punishment. Study 3 replicated the emotion finding from Study 2 using new scenarios where group agents were clearly aware of the hypocrisy of their actions, yet acted anyway. Again, perceived hypocrisy worked through moral emotions to affect criminal guilt and punishment. The current studies provide empirical support for theories relating hypocrisy and moral transgressions to moral emotions, also informing the literature on the role of moral emotions in moral reasoning and legal decision making.     

Is gratitude a moral affect?

Gratitude is conceptualized as a moral affect that is analogous to other moral emotions such as empathy and guilt. Gratitude has 3 functions that can be conceptualized as morally relevant: (a) a moral barometer function (i.e., it is a response to the perception that one has been the beneficiary of another person's moral actions); (b) a moral motive function (i.e., it motivates the grateful person to behave prosocially toward the benefactor and other people); and (c) a moral reinforcer function (i.e., when expressed, it encourages benefactors to behave morally in the future). The personality and social factors that are associated with gratitude are also consistent with a conceptualization of gratitude as an affect that is relevant to people's cognitions and behaviors in the moral domain.     

White guilt and racial compensation: the benefits and limits of self-focus

In two studies, the authors investigated guilt as a response to group-based advantage. Consistent with its conceptualization as a self-focused emotion, White guilt was based in self-focused beliefs in racial inequality. Thus, guilt was associated with belief in White privilege (Study 1) and resulted from seeing European Americans as perpetrators of racial discrimination (Study 2). Just as personal guilt is associated with efforts at restitution, White guilt was predictive of support for affirmative action programs aimed at compensating African Americans. White guilt was not, however, predictive of support for noncompensatory efforts at promoting equality, such as affirmative action programs that increase opportunities (Study 2). In contrast, the other-focused emotion of group-based sympathy was a more general predictor of support for different affirmative action policies. Our findings demonstrate the benefits and limits of group-based guilt as a basis of support for social equality and highlight the value of understanding the specific emotions elicited in intergroup contexts.     

从信任违背到信任修复:道德情绪的作用机制

早期学者已经从认知的角度分析信任违背的原因及修复方式。近年来,情绪对信任修复的影响引起了重点关注,但是情绪在其中的作用机制并未得到解答。当前的研究主要从情绪影响信任的线索依赖效应和离散情绪(内疚、羞愧、愤怒、悲伤等)对信任修复的影响这两个角度着手研究情绪对信任修复的影响。通过文献梳理发现内疚和共情两种道德情绪是影响信任修复最重要的情绪因素:内疚能够促进受信方做出补偿行为,共情能够促进信任方宽恕他人。基于此构建了道德情绪的信任修复模型,并考虑了目标线索和信任方的特质性宽恕的调节作用。同时建议未来的研究进一步探讨其他离散情绪尤其是道德情绪对信任修复的作用,并关注情境与情绪的交互作用。