The effects of predictive ability information,locus of control,and decision maker involvement on decision aid reliance

This study examines several factors that influence decision makers' willingness to rely on mechanical decision aids. The first experiment examined the effects of predictive ability information and locus of control on decision aid reliance. The results indicate that decision makers were more likely to rely on a decision aid when its predictive validity was not disclosed. Further, decision makers with an external locus of control relied more on the decision aid than those with an internal locus of control. The second experiment expanded upon this result to examine the interactive effects of decision maker involvement and locus of control. The results suggest that involving decision makers in the aid's development enhanced reliance. However, decision makers with an internal locus of control were more strongly influenced by this form of involvement (in terms of increasing their reliance on the decision aid) than decision makers with an external locus of control. Copyright 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual and Group Decisions in Response to a Mock Trial: A Methodological Note1

An audiovisual slide-show presentation of a murder trial was used to examine the effects of group deliberations on juror's responses. Sex of defense attorney and race of defendant were systematically varied in the mock trial. Verdicts were assessed immediately following the trial presentation (before group deliberations) and immediately following group deliberations. Neither sex nor race significantly affected distributions of individual juror's predeliberation verdicts. Following group deliberations, however, an effect of attorney's sex emerged in both jury (group) verdicts and in individual, postdeliberation verdicts. Jurors in the male defense attorney conditions were more likely to vote not guilty following deliberations than were jurors in the female defense attorney conditions. This effect is discussed in terms of group shift.     

Jury Deliberations: Discussion Content and Influence Processes in Jury Decision Making1

The present research investigated the jury deliberation process. Representative juror subjects viewed a realistic videotaped trial consisting of three offenses, deliberated in groups of six and reached verdicts on each charge, and completed a post-deliberation questionnaire that assessed individual cognitions. Deliberations were videotaped and content-analyzed. The results indicated that the initial vote distribution was a good predictor of the final verdict; majorities tended to prevail. Deliberation content was concentrated primarily in two areas: (a) the facts of the case and (b) statements of preference for guilty or not guilty verdicts. Path analyses suggested that decisions on the first charge were based jointly on the content of deliberations and on the group vote distribution, whereas decisions on later charges were based largely on normative pressures. Jurors' post-deliberation impressions of the trial were affected by whether or not they had changed votes during deliberations.     

Evaluating Decision Makers: The Role of Choice Congruence and Outcome

Two studies were conducted in which decision makers were evaluated by subjects who had agreed or disagreed with the decision maker's choice. Subjects read one of two vignettes describing the alternatives available to the decision maker, indicated which alternative they personally favored, and then learned about the decision maker's choice and the outcome that occurred. Study 1 varied whether the outcomes of the decision maker's choice were positive or negative, and whether the subject's preferred option matched (congruent choice) or did not match (incongruent choice) that of the decision maker. Subjects rated the extent to which they thought the decision maker was worthy of praise (in the case of positive outcomes) or blame (in the case of negative outcomes), and the decision maker's likableness and competence. Results revealed a strong effect of congruence on attributions of praise and blame: More praise was ascribed to an agreeing decision maker and more blame to a disagreeing decision maker. The degree to which the decision maker was seen as likable was affected by congruence only, whereas perceived competence was influenced by both outcome and congruence. Study 2 addresses some methodological issues that were unresolved in Study 1 and replicated the results of the first study, using new stimulus materials and an expanded set of dependent measures.     

Overcoming the winner's curse: an adaptive learning perspective

The winner's curse phenomenon refers to the fact that the winner in a common value auction, in order to actually win the auction, is likely to have overestimated the item's value and consequently is likely to gain less than expected and may even lose (i.e., it is said to be “cursed”). Past research, using the “Acquiring a company” task has shown that people do not overcome this bias even after they receive extensive feedback. We suggest that the persistence of the winner's curse is due to a combination of two factors: variability in the environment that leads to ambiguous feedback (i.e., choices and outcomes are only partially correlated) and the tendency of decision makers to learn adaptively. We show in an experiment that by reducing the variance in the feedback, performance can be significantly improved. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

Goal attainment as a resource: The cushion effect in risky choice above a goal

Goals are a ubiquitous part of life and have been shown to change behavior in many domains. This research studied the influence of goal attainment on risky choice behavior. Previous research has shown that goals tend to increase risk‐seeking behavior when potential outcomes fall below a goal. We examined a new problem: Choice behavior when all potential outcomes in a choice set achieve or exceed the goal. Two studies show a “cushion effect” of goal attainment on choice under risk. When all possible outcomes of all options are above a salient and specific goal, decision makers are more likely to choose a risky option over a certain outcome with equal expected value (EV). We hypothesized that the attainment of a goal serves as a cushion that softens the negative emotions associated with receiving a gamble's low outcome. This allows risk taking that would otherwise be unattractive. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Charismatic Leadership and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Matter of Transforming Motives?1

The present experiment examined whether leaders high in charisma are able to motivate decision‐makers to cooperate more in a public goods dilemma. On the basis of charismatic leadership theories, it was expected that a charismatic leader would be able to transform people's motives beyond self‐interest, consequently increasing cooperation. This transformation effect was expected to occur among individuals aimed at maximizing their own self‐interest (i.e., pro‐selfs), but not among those aimed at maximizing joint or collective outcomes (i.e., pro‐socials). Furthermore, leader's charisma was experimentally manipulated by means of describing the leader as either self‐sacrificing or benefiting. The results revealed that self‐sacrificing leaders, contrary to benefiting leaders, were perceived as more charismatic and were able to motivate decision‐makers to cooperate more. The latter effect appeared to be more pronounced among pro‐selfs rather than pro‐socials, as such supporting the transformational idea of charismatic leaders. Further results showed that this behavioral effect was mediated by perceptions of legitimacy. The meaning and conception of charismatic leadership in decision‐making situations are discussed by using insights from the social dilemma and charismatic leadership literature.     

Responses to comparisons in romantic relationships: Empathy,shared fate,and contrast

Individuals who empathize and share outcomes with their partner are likely to react more positively to upward comparisons (UCs) than downward comparisons (DCs). Three studies examined responses to comparisons in romantic relationships. Participants reported more positive affect following UCs than DCs; positive affect was also predicted by empathy and shared outcomes. Relationship‐maintaining responses were predicted by empathy and shared outcomes: Participants who felt boosted by sharing their partner's success were less likely to report distancing themselves from the partner following UCs, and participants who felt concern for their partner's failure were especially likely to help the partner following DCs. Our findings suggest that individuals respond functionally to these comparisons by focusing on protecting the relationship rather than protecting the self.     

Group Decision Makers' Preferences Modelling within the Goal Programming Model: An Overview and a Typology

The Goal Programming (GP) model is one of the first models that have been developed to deal with managerial decision‐making problems where several incommensurable and conflicting objectives are involved. The GP variants integrate the decision maker's preferences differently. This model has also been applied to group decision‐making situations. The aim of this paper is to propose a new typology based on preferences articulation of decision makers through the GP model. This typology is based on the articulation and the elucidation process of the group decision makers' preferences. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consumers Object to Algorithms Making Morally Relevant Tradeoffs Because of Algorithms’ Consequentialist Decision Strategies

Why do consumers embrace some algorithms and find others objectionable? The moral relevance of the domain in which an algorithm operates plays a role. The authors find that consumers believe that algorithms are more likely to use maximization (i.e., attempting to maximize some measured outcome) as a decision-making strategy than human decision makers (Study 1). Consumers find this consequentialist decision strategy to be objectionable in morally relevant tradeoffs and disapprove of algorithms making morally relevant tradeoffs as a result (Studies 2, 3a, & 3b). Consumers also object to human employees making morally relevant tradeoffs when they are trained to make decisions by maximizing outcomes, consistent with the notion that their objections to algorithmic decision makers stem from concerns about maximization (Study 4). The results provide insight into why consumers object to some consumer relevant algorithms while adopting others.     

Effects of Perceived Consensus on Selective Reinforcement of Other People's Stated Opinions

Three studies tested whether perceived consensus affects selective reinforcement of other people's stated opinions on important social issues. Participants who perceived relatively high consensus for their opinions were more likely than participants who perceived low consensus to reward another person's agreeing statements more than the person's disagreeing statements about gun control (Study 1) and to prolong interrogating another student about abortion (Study 2). In Study 3, participants who were told they were in a two-thirds majority regarding gay scout troop leaders were more likely than participants who were told they were in a one-third minority to practice selective reinforcement. The results have implications for settings in which interrogators believe they can exercise power over the person who is being questioned.     

Trust maintenance as a function of construal level and attributions: The case of apologies

When do recipients of an apology (“trustors”) base their decision to trust a perpetrator (a “trustee”) on the attributional information embedded in an apology? Attributions provide a detailed account of the trustee's causal involvement in committing a transgression. We therefore argue that trustors in a low construal level mindset use this information in their trusting decision. However, trustors in a high construal level mindset likely consider all apologies as simple statements of regret, regardless of the attributional information they contain. We find support for this argument in four laboratory experiments. This research nuances the idea that to restore trust by means of an apology, the trustee must only use an effective attribution for a negative outcome. We also present a more realistic understanding of the process leading from apologies to trust than has been offered in previous work by simultaneously considering the role of the trustor and that of the trustee in the trust restoration process.     

Belief in Magic Predicts Children's Selective Trust in Informants

Children are able to distinguish between regular events that can occur in everyday reality and magical events that are ordinarily impossible. How do children respond to a person who brings about magical as compared with ordinary outcomes? In two studies, we tested children's acceptance of informants' claims when the informants had produced either magical or ordinary outcomes. In Study 1, children's skeptical or credulous stance toward magic predicted their endorsement of the claims made by the informants. Children who were more credulous were likely to accept information from the informant who had produced magical outcomes. In Study 2, a brief manipulation was only partially effective in changing children's initial stance toward magic. Their initial stance toward magic continued to predict their acceptance of information from the informant who had produced magical outcomes.     

Feedback Delays: How Can Decision Makers Learn Not to Buy a New Car Every Time the Garage Is Empty?

Decision makers in dynamic environments (e.g., stock trading, inventory control, and firefighting) learn poorly in experiments where feedback about the outcomes of their actions is delayed. In searching for ways to mitigate these effects, this paper presents two computational models of learning with feedback delays and contrasts them against human decision-makers' performance. The no-memory model hypothesizes that decision makers always perceive feedback as immediate. The with-memory model hypothesizes that, over time, decision makers are able to develop internal representations of the task that help them to perform with delayed feedback. As borne out by human subjects, both models predict that a display of past history improves learning with delay and that increasing delay increasingly degrades performance. Even though the length of training in this task exceeds that used in many laboratory-based dynamic tasks, neither the two models nor the subjects are able to effectively learn without decision aids when faced with feedback delays. When given an amount of training that more closely approximates that provided in functioning dynamic environments, the with-memory model predicts that human decision makers may learn without decision aids over the long term if feedback delays are simple. These results raise several issues for continued theoretical investigation as well as potential suggestions for training and supporting decision makers in dynamic environments with feedback delays. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

The effects of process and outcome accountability on judgment process and performance

This article challenges the view that it is always better to hold decision makers accountable for their decision process rather than their decision outcomes. In three multiple-cue judgment studies, the authors show that process accountability, relative to outcome accountability, consistently improves judgment quality in relatively simple elemental tasks. However, this performance advantage of process accountability does not generalize to more complex configural tasks. This is because process accountability improves an analytical process based on cue abstraction, while it does not change a holistic process based on exemplar memory. Cue abstraction is only effective in elemental tasks (in which outcomes are a linear additive combination of cues) but not in configural tasks (in which outcomes depend on interactions between the cues). In addition, Studies 2 and 3 show that the extent to which process and outcome accountability affect judgment quality depends on individual differences in analytical intelligence and rational thinking style.     

“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.