A review of the déjà vu experience

For more than a century, the déjà vu experience has been examined through retrospective surveys, prospective surveys, and case studies. About 60% of the population has experienced déjà vu, and its frequency decreases with age. Déjà vu appears to be associated with stress and fatigue, and it shows a positive relationship with socioeconomic level and education. Scientific explanations of déjà vu fall into 4 categories: dual processing (2 cognitive processes momentarily out of synchrony), neurological (seizure, disruption in neuronal transmission), memory (implicit familiarity of unrecognized stimuli),and attentional (unattended perception followed by attended perception). Systematic research is needed on the prevalence and etiology of this culturally familiar cognitive experience, and several laboratory models may help clarify this illusion of recognition.     

The Anticipation of the Present: Phenomenology of déjà vu

This paper analyses the déjà-vu experience in order to deepen the understanding of the complex nature of time-consciousness from a phenomenological point of view. The paper is divided into two sections: the first section focuses on Bergson’s research on déjà vu in order to assess the validity of his position; the second section describes a specific form of déjà-vu experience from a phenomenological perspective. This investigation will question the widespread assumption according to which déjà vu should be conceived as a disturbance of the memory of the past. On the contrary, the author shows that the disturbance primarily pertains to the dimension of the future. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to focus on the coherent deformation of the immediate expectation of the imminent future.     

The similarity hypothesis of déjà vu: On the relationship between frequency of real-life déjà vu experiences and sensitivity to configural resemblance

Prior research has suggested that configural resemblance between a current scene and a previously experienced but forgotten one may trigger déjà vu experiences. The present study examined whether there is a relationship between the frequency of actual déjé vu experiences, measured by questionnaires, and sensitivity to a configural resemblance between past and present events, measured by questionnaires, and between two scenes presented simultaneously in the laboratory. We measured familiarity ratings and remember–know judgements of several scenes. Some scenes had been previously presented, some were similar to previously presented scenes and the others were dissimilar. Déjà vu tendencies were significantly correlated with sensitivity to similarity in the measured questionnaires and in the laboratory, as well as to a feeling of familiarity for similar scenes. In this study, we found for the first time that people who more frequently experience déjé vu states were also more likely to regard themselves as sensitive to similarity and more likely to notice the similarity between two scenes in the laboratory.     

Can déjà vu result from similarity to a prior experience? Support for the similarity hypothesis of déjà vu

The strange feeling of having been somewhere or done something before—even though there is evidence to the contrary—is called déjà vu. Although déjà vu is beginning to receive attention among scientists (Brown, 2003, 2004), few studies have empirically investigated the phenomenon. We investigated the hypothesis that déjà vu is related to feelings of familiarity and that it can result from similarity between a novel scene and that of a scene experienced in one’s past. We used a variation of the recognition-without-recall method of studying familiarity (Cleary, 2004) to examine instances in which participants failed to recall a studied scene in response to a configurally similar novel test scene. In such instances, resemblance to a previously viewed scene increased both feelings of familiarity and of déjà vu. Furthermore, in the absence of recall, resemblance of a novel scene to a previously viewed scene increased the probability of a reported déjà vu state for the novel scene, and feelings of familiarity with a novel scene were directly related to feelings of being in a déjà vu state.     

Delay and déjà vu: Timing and repetition increase the power of false evidence

False images and videos can induce people to believe in and remember events that never happened. Using a novel method, we examined whether the timing of false evidence would influence its effect (Experiment 1) and determined the relationship between timing and repetition (Experiment 2). Subjects completed a hazard perception driving test and were falsely accused of cheating. Some subjects were shown a fake video or photograph of the cheating either after a 9-min delay (Experiment 1) or more than once with or without a delay (Experiment 2). Subjects were more likely to falsely believe that they had cheated and to provide details about how the cheating happened when the false evidence was delayed or repeated—especially when repeated over time—relative to controls. The results show that even a strikingly short delay between an event and when false evidence is disclosed can distort people’s beliefs and that repeating false evidence over a brief delay fosters false beliefs more so than without a delay. These findings have theoretical implications for metacognitive models of autobiographical memory and practical implications for police interrogations.     

The “Loving Parent” analogy

A crucial part of William Rowe’s evidential argument from evil implies that God, like a loving parent, would ensure that every suffering person would be aware of his comforting presence. Rowe’s use of the “loving parent” analogy however fails to survive scrutiny as it implies that God maximally loves all persons. It is the argument of this paper that no one could maximally love every person; and whatever variation there is in the divine love undercuts the claim that every suffering person would be aware of the divine presence.     

Does learning a skill with the expectation of teaching it impair the skill’s execution under psychological pressure if the skill is learned with analogy instructions?

ObjectiveHaving learners practice a motor skill with the expectation of teaching it (versus an expectation of being tested on it) has been revealed to enhance skill learning. However, this improvement in skill performance is lost when the skill must be performed under psychological pressure due to ‘choking under pressure.’ The present study will investigate whether this choking effect is caused by an accrual of declarative knowledge during skill practice and could be prevented if a technique (analogy instructions) to minimize the accrual of declarative knowledge during practice is employed.DesignWe will use a 2 (Expectation: teach/test) x 2 (Instruction: analogy/explicit) x 2 (Posttest: high-pressure/low-pressure) mixed-factor design, with repeated measures on the last factor.MethodsA minimum of 148 participants will be quasi-randomly assigned (based on sex) to one of four groups. Participants in the teach/analogy and teach/explicit groups will practice golf putting with the expectation of teaching putting to another participant, and analogy instructions or explicit instructions, respectively. Participants in the test/analogy and test/explicit groups will practice golf putting with the expectation of being tested on their putting, and analogy instructions or explicit instructions, respectively. The next day all participants will complete low- and high-pressure putting posttests, with their putting accuracy serving as the dependent variable.     

Does learning a skill with the expectation of teaching it impair the skill’s execution under psychological pressure if the skill is learned with analogy instructions?

ObjectiveHaving learners practice a motor skill with the expectation of teaching it (versus an expectation of being tested on it) has been revealed to enhance skill learning. However, this improvement in skill performance is lost when the skill must be performed under psychological pressure due to ‘choking under pressure.’ The present study investigated whether this choking effect is caused by an accrual of declarative knowledge during skill practice and could be prevented if a technique (analogy instructions) to minimize the accrual of declarative knowledge during practice is employed.DesignWe used a 2 (Expectation: teach/test) x 2 (Instructions: analogy/explicit) x 2 (Posttest: low-pressure/high-pressure) mixed-factor design, with repeated measures on the last factor.MethodsOne-hundred fifty-six participants were quasi-randomly assigned (based on sex) to one of four groups. Participants in the teach/analogy and teach/explicit groups practiced golf putting with the expectation of teaching putting to another participant, and analogy instructions or explicit instructions, respectively. Participants in the test/analogy and test/explicit groups practiced golf putting with the expectation of being tested on their putting, and analogy instructions or explicit instructions, respectively. The next day all participants completed low- and high-pressure putting posttests, with their putting accuracy serving as the dependent variable.ResultsWe observed an Expectation x Instructions × Posttest interaction, such that a main effect of expectation was found in the low-pressure posttest, with the teach group exhibiting superior accuracy, and an Expectation × Instructions interaction was revealed for the high-pressure posttest. This interaction resulted from the teach group showing greater accuracy than the test group exclusively when receiving analogy instructions.ConclusionResults show that participants who practiced with the expectation of teaching exhibited superior learning and indicate that they choked under pressure likely due to their accrual of declarative knowledge during practice, since the choking effect was prevented by having them practice with analogy instructions. Accordingly, having learners practice with the expectation of teaching and techniques that minimize the accrual of declarative knowledge is recommended.     

Familiarity from the configuration of objects in 3-dimensional space and its relation to déjà vu: a virtual reality investigation

Déjà vu is the striking sense that the present situation feels familiar, alongside the realization that it has to be new. According to the Gestalt familiarity hypothesis, déjà vu results when the configuration of elements within a scene maps onto a configuration previously seen, but the previous scene fails to come to mind. We examined this using virtual reality (VR) technology. When a new immersive VR scene resembled a previously-viewed scene in its configuration but people failed to recall the previously-viewed scene, familiarity ratings and reports of déjà vu were indeed higher than for completely novel scenes. People also exhibited the contrasting sense of newness and of familiarity that is characteristic of déjà vu. Familiarity ratings and déjà vu reports among scenes recognized as new increased with increasing feature-match of a scene to one stored in memory, suggesting that feature-matching can produce familiarity and déjà vu when recall fails.     

The Return of the Myth of the Mental∗

McDowell's claim that “in mature human beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness”,1 1. “What Myth?”, this issue, p. 339. suggests a new version of the mentalist myth which, like the others, is untrue to the phenomenon. The phenomena show that embodied skills, when we are fully absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of non‐mental content that is non‐conceptual, non‐propositional, non‐rational and non‐linguistic.

This is not to deny that we can monitor our activity while performing it. For solving problems, learning a new skill, receiving coaching, and so forth, such monitoring is invaluable. But monitoring what we are doing as we are doing it degrades performance to at best competence. On McDowell's view, there is no way to account for such a degradation in performance since the same sort of content would be involved whether we were fully absorbed in or paying attention to what we were doing.

McDowell claims that it is an advantage of his conceptualism that it avoids any foundationalist attempt to build up the objective world on the basis of an indubitable Given or any other ground‐floor experience. And, indeed, if the world is all that is the case and our minds are unproblematically open to it, all experience is on the same footing. But one must distinguish motor intentionality, and the interrelated solicitations our coping body is intertwined with, from conceptual intentionality and the world of propositional structures it opens onto. The existential phenomenologist can then agree with McDowell in rejecting traditional foundationalisms, while yet affirming and describing the ground‐floor role of motor intentionality in providing the support on which all forms of conceptual intentionality are based.     

To be at the tail of the lions or the head of the foxes?

Agents seeking an opportunity for profit often have to compete with others who pursue the same opportunity. When having to choose between a number of opportunities differing in their value and if individuals differ in their chances of outperforming others, the choice can be cognitively and emotionally demanding. We explore choice between opportunities using stylized Lions–Foxes games. In such a game, each of three players, with different odds of beating others, has to choose one of two contests that offer different rewards. After game theoretically analyzing the games, which we have experimentally employed, we report four experiments that vary in choice elicitation (repeated play or strategy method), in players' matching (random strangers or partners) and in rewards. Regarding contest choices, we found the choice of the higher value (and seemingly more prestigious) contest to be positively related to winning odds, contrary to what four out of the five (mixed, partially mixed, or pure) equilibria predict. Participants started out rather optimistic, with a large majority choosing the higher value option, but with experience, they approached the only viable of two pure strategy equilibria. Still, mixing continued via reacting to past play and outcome, apparently balancing dissatisfaction from choosing either contest.     

What is the Good/ Good of the FORM of the GOOD?

‘Good’ is nothing specific but is transcendentally or generally applied over specific, and specified, ‘categories’. These ‘categories’ may be seen—at least for the purposes of this note—as under Platonic Forms. The rule that instances under a category or form need a Form to be under is valid. It may be tautological: but this is OK for rules. Not being specific, however, ‘good’ neither needs nor can have a specifying Form. So, on these grounds, the Form of the Good is otious. Any rule of the kind, ‘Everything needs a Form, so good needs a Form of the Good’ is mistaken, in that good is not a kind, but a transcendental. To give a Form to the transcendental ‘good’ is a mistake: it is a Rylian category mistake. And the Form of the Good either does no work, or works unprofitably in any but an aesthetic sense.     

From the Characterization of ‘European Philosophy of Science’ to the Case of Philosophy of the Social Sciences

How distinct is European philosophy of science? The first step is to characterize what is or might be considered as ‘European philosophy of science’. The second is to analyse philosophy of the social sciences as a relevant case in the European contribution to philosophy of science. (1) ‘European perspective’ requires some clarification, which can be done from two main angles: the historical approach and the thematic view. Thus, there are several structural and dynamic things to be considered in European philosophy of science and compare with other conceptions: (i) the topics discussed; (ii) the contents proposed; and (iii) the style of thought used. (2) The case of philosophy of the social sciences is relevant for the historical approach and for the thematic view. Historically, the Erklären–Verstehen methodological controversy arose in this continent, where the main authors and most of the influential approaches are located. Thematically, we can consider the contributions made by these European approaches to philosophy of the social sciences. They give us some distinctive features of European philosophy of science.     

Al-Ghazali’s Position on the ‘Second Proof’ of the ‘Philosophers’ for the Eternity of the World,in the First Discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ (represented chiefly by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina) on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position (and thus, the second proof) is incoherent.     

How should the History of Education be Written? Some Reflections about the Nature of the Discipline from the Perspective of the Reception of our Work

How should history of education be written? To put the question is far more easier than to provide a concrete answer. In contemporary research, there continue to be pedagogistic complaints about finding answers to present-day educational problems via history. In our view, such an ahistorical utilitarianism as well as the legitimizing and/or mythologizing belief in a particular pedagogical system, in which the history of this field is so rich since the institutionalization of the discipline at the end of the nineteenth century, should be avoided at all costs. But the danger of presentism lurks around the corner as a sine qua non condition in any form of historical research. As can be found out via the comments on our own work, much of the criticism goes back to old conceptions of the discipline, conceived as historical pedagogy rather than as history of education. Apparently, in the field of pedagogy people are still convinced that the history of education, even if it does not provide edifying examples and useful lessons, must in any case have a training value for professionals – which in the light of modern, advanced research is rather a difficult idea to defend.     

Is the loss of diagnosticity of the eye region of the face a common aspect of acquired prosopagnosia?

A recent study published in this journal has shown an abnormal performance at discriminating differences with respect to the eyes of unfamiliar faces in two acquired prosopagnosic patients, but preserved processing of the mouth region. Here we extend these findings by showing a similar lack of sensitivity to the eyes in the very same face matching experiment for the prosopagnosic patient PS, who also showed normal performance for detecting differences in the mouth region. These results complement previously published evidence that the patient PS presents a lack of sensitivity to diagnostic information located on the eyes of familiar faces during individual face recognition tasks. More generally, they indicate that the impaired processing of the eyes of faces is a fundamental aspect of acquired prosopagnosia that can arise following damage to different brain localizations.     

The persistence of erroneous familiarity in an epileptic male: challenging perceptual theories of déjà vu activation

We report the case of a 39-year-old, temporal lobe epileptic male, MH. Prior to complex partial seizure, experienced up to three times a day, MH often experiences an aura experienced as a persistent sensation of déjà vu. Data-driven theories of déjà vu formation suggest that partial familiarity for the perceived stimulus is responsible for the sensation. Consequently, diverting attention away from this stimulus should cause the sensation to dissipate. MH, whose sensations of déjà vu persist long enough for him to shift his perceptual focus a number of times during the experience, spontaneously reports that these shifts make no difference to the sensation experienced. This novel observation challenges data-driven theories of déjà vu formation which have been used to explain the occurrence of déjà vu in those with temporal lobe epilepsy and the general population. Clearly, in epilepsy, erratic neuronal firing is the likely contributor, and in this paper we postulate that such brain firing causes higher-order erroneous 'cognitive feelings'. We tentatively extend this account to the general population. Rather than being a reaction to familiar elements in perceptual stimuli, déjà vu is likely to be the result of a cognitive feeling borne of the erroneous activation of neural familiarity circuits such as the parahippocampal gyrus, persisting as long as this activation persists.     

In the Name of the Spirits -- A Reading of Solov'ëv's Justification of the Good

In this contribution, the author analyzes Vladimir Solov'ëv's intention to study the idea of the Good as something relatively independent from religion and metaphysics. Some implications of Solov'ëv's definition of moral philosophy in The Justification of the Good are investigated, and illustrated with his applied ethics of war in chapter 18 of this book. It appears that Solov'ëv's moral philosophy and his account of war must be understood in connection with the central place of the cult of ancestors in his ethics. The idea of the Good and the idea of God spring from a religious origin and appear in our efforts to conjure up and exorcize the spirits of our forefathers. The author explains this ethics by referring to Solov'ëv's article China and Europe. There, Solov'ëv assumes that the Christian mind is treatened by the danger of a cultural order in which the cult of ancestors is most purely preserved. In the future war against China, however, Christian civilization must show itself superior to its enemy without betraying its loyalty to its own ancestors. The author concludes that in Solov'ëv's ethics, the moral subject is divided between the confirmation of its own autonomy and its being haunted by the spirits of its forefathers, a haunt which results in relentless wars against others