Self and space

Abstract

Seemingly incomparable, self and space are seen as related, both psychologically and ontologically. The experience of self as expansive space has distinct psychological benefits, which are explored through a clinical vignette. Next, the issue of the “reality” of self is taken up. It is argued that the ontological status of self is indeterminate, which means that it is open to being that which it is considered to be. The powerful effect of such considerations on the being of self and its Ufe experience are explored both through various philosophical conceptions of self (e.g., as extensionless point, intentional consciousness, or limitless space) and through the self‐fulfilling prophecies which conceptions of self generate in people's lives. Lastly, it is proposed that the consideration of self as space can open the door to a rich, expanded, connected, harmonious living.     

Self and society in the claims of individualism

The paper argues that an assessment of individualism requires distinguishing five individualistic claims about the self and society: 1) Philosophical Individualism holds that individuals are distinct from society in their reality and capacity for knowledge; 2) The dignity of the individual is a moral belief about the status of human beings; 3) The ideal of individuality is a value belief about the value of diversity; 4) Moral individualism is a comprehensive moral theory based upon philosophical individualism; 5) Political liberalism is a theory of social justice based on construing human dignity in terms of equal liberty. It is argued that philosophical individualism should be rejected and, hence, moral individualism, that individuality is desirable but not obligatory, and that political liberalism, if it can avoid a tendency toward favoring individualistic conceptions of the good, is necessary for dignity in a modern society.     

Figuring the Porous Self: St. Augustine and the Phenomenology of Temporality

This article examines the phenomenological structures of the homo temporalis filtered through Augustine's illuminating, if unsystematic, insights on temporality and the imago Dei. It situates such a phenomenological interpretation of the Augustinian self in view of current interpretations that polarize or split the Augustinian self into an either/or scheme—either an “interior” self or an “exterior” self. Given this imbalance, the article suggests that a phenomenological evaluation of Augustine brings to light how interior and exterior spheres are deeply integrated. The article elaborates this position by contending that the self's temporal streaming within the exterior world‐horizon is inescapable because it reflects basic constituents of a self created by God which is nevertheless capable of contemplating a God who transcends time. This seeming paradox is resolved by recourse to what is described as the “double entry” of the self. The temporal streaming of the self in the world‐horizon (entry one) is porous to the eternal inwardly (entry two); the eternal entry is thus interior and analyzable in terms of a non‐reflective self‐awareness on display in Augustine's De Trinitate; and finally Augustine's understanding of the temporality of faith indicates how the self of faith can be lived in light of Heidegger's emphasis on the future and Husserl's emphasis on the past.     

The Confucian Self and Experiential Spirituality

Since the publication of his book on Zhongyong (Tu 1976), Tu Weiming has worked for more than 30 years on an anthropocosmic reconstruction of the Confucian universe, in which self-transformation is defined both as the starting point and as the necessary vehicle for one’s spiritual journey. This article is primarily intended to examine Tu’s attempts to reconstruct Confucian spirituality but further to take a step forward to argue that in the spiritual world as construed by Confucius and Mencius, the experiential functions as transcendental by which the self initiates and empowers the transformative process. Through exploring the spiritual significance of Confucian experiences, this essay will conclude that although “transcendental experience” is only one of many dimensions in other religious or intellectual traditions, it is the most important path for Confucians by which the self is enabled to become fully integrated with ultimate reality.     

Creativity and Aging: Personal Journals and the Creation of Self

This article considers the writing of personal journals as a process through which an individual constructs a linguistic representation of one's self, with the self constituting a narrative. Rather than a fixed narrative, one's life exists as a narrative subject to revision and reinterpretation. Through journal writing, then, one constructs and reconstructs his or her identity. Berman finds the value in personal journals not only in the themes that surface but also in the creative process they reveal. In this article, he examines passages from five journalists that demonstrate this process of creating and revising meaning in one's life.     

Heidegger on Existentiality,Constancy, and the Self

In Being and Time, Heidegger develops an account of the self in terms of his existential ontology. He contrasts his view to Cartesian and Kantian accounts, and seems to reject features that we take to be fundamental for a self, such as diachronic unity and being the subject of one's experiences. His positive account is obscured by the difficult vocabulary of authenticity and temporality. This paper traces Heidegger's argument, outlines his existential conception of the self, and shows how it fits the basic criteria for a self.     

Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self

In the contemporary debate on the nature of autonomy, it is generally taken for granted that autonomy is to be understood as rule by the self, with the debate centring on how that self is to be identified. Garnett [2013b Garnett, Michael 2013b. The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91/4. [Google Scholar]] has recently proposed a theory that rejects the dominant understanding of autonomy as rule by the self and views it instead as resistance to rule by others. According to that theory, an autonomous agent is one whose various ‘autonomy traits’ render her sufficiently resistant to subjection to foreign wills. I argue that Garnett has not given us good reason to abandon the understanding of autonomy as rule by the self. His account is plausible only if it is understood to require for autonomy the possession of at least one trait with which the agent can be identified. And the best explanation of the necessity of some such trait(s) is offered, not by Garnett's, but by the dominant understanding of autonomy he rejects.     

Reality-Testing a Vocational Choice: Congruence Between Self,Ideal, and Occupational Percepts Among Student Nurses

A total of 168 student nurses (24 each at 7 levels of vocational experience and preparation) Q-sorted 50 self-relevant, socially neutral statements to measure self-concept, ideal self-concept, and occupational role percept. Mean r's for congruence between ideal and occupational percepts tended to exceed and to reach higher levels of significance than corresponding r's for congruence between either self and ideal or self and occupational percepts. Congruences between self, ideal, and occupational percepts reach significance at p = .01 for graduate students, who have attained “adult” professional status. However, no significant relationship appears to obtain between either pre-professional or professional nursing experience and congruence between self and ideal, self and occupational role, or ideal and occupational role percepts. Results are interpreted in terms of a self-concept theory of vocational development.     

The Pre-reflective Situational Self

It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to  this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role of mineness. We argue that there are alternative possibilities and that the necessity for an adequate theory of the self within psychopathology gives us good reasons to believe that we need a thicker notion of the pre-reflective self. To this end, we develop such a notion: the Pre-Reflective Situational Self. To do so, we will first show how alternative conceptions of pre-reflective self-awareness point to philosophical problems with the standard phenomenological view. We claim that this is mainly due to fact that within the phenomenological account the mineness aspect is implicitly playing several roles. Consequently, we argue that a thin interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness—based on a thin notion of mineness—cannot do its needed job within, at least within psychopathology. This leads us to believe that a thicker conception of pre-reflective self is needed. We, therefore, develop the notion of the pre-reflective situational self by analyzing the dynamical nature of the relation between self-awareness and the world, specifically through our interactive inhabitation of the social world.

     

The Self as a Relational Structure A Dialogue with Multiple-Self Theory

This paper addresses the postmodern critique of unified-self theories that argues that the self is not unified but multiple, not a static entity but in constant flux, not a separate center of initiative but intersubjectively constituted. The author proposes that there are two kinds of division in self-experience: the dissociative divisions of multiple-self theory, and a division, akin to the divisions between Freud's structural agencies, between what are here termed the “intersubjective self” and “primary subjective experience.” In contrast to dissociated self-states, which occur in different moments in time, these two dimensions of self-experience occur simultaneously; indeed, what is most important about them is their relationship. The author suggests that it is this intrapsychic relationship, as it occurs in a given psychological moment, that determines the qualities of self-experience that are emphasized in unified-self theories: such qualities as cohesiveness versus fragmentation; authenticity vs. falseness; vitality versus depletion; optimal versus nonoptimal self-regulation; and agency versus feeling one is at the mercy of others. Furthermore, a major organizer of the intersubjective self is early identifications, especially “identifications with the other's response to the self.” The implications of these concepts for therapeutic action are discussed and illustrated with an extended account of an analytic case.     

Advances in Neuropsychoanalysis,Attachment Theory,and Trauma Research: Implications for Self Psychology

In 1971, Heinz Kohut, trained in neurology and then psychoanalysis, published The Analysis of the Self, a detailed exposition of the central role of the self in human existence. This classic volume of both twentieth century psychoanalysis and psychology was more than a collection of various clinical observations—rather it represented an overarching integrated theory of the development, structuralization, psychopathogenesis, and psychotherapy of disorders of the self. Although some of these ideas were elaborations of previous psychoanalytic principles, a large number of his concepts, including an emphasis on self rather than ego, signified an innovative departure from mainstream psychoanalysis and yet a truly creative addition to Freud's theory.     

Child Development and Counseling

Elkind outlines three constructs, the assumptive reality of childhood and the imaginary audience and personal fable of adolescence, which help explain normal as well as problem behavior. In dealing with individuals operating under the premises of these constructs, counselors are asked to accept the young person's view of reality as valid for him or her, but not necessarily for the counselor or others. To structure a new reality, they should not be shown they are wrong, but helped to distinguish between personal and social reality.     

General self‐efficacy in various domains of human functioning: Evidence from five countries

Based on social‐cognitive theory ( 1 Bandura, 1997), this paper examined whether perceived self‐efficacy is a universal psychological construct that accounts for variance within various domains of human functioning. Perceived self‐efficacy is not only of a task‐specific nature, but it can also be identified at a more general level of functioning. General self‐efficacy (GSE) is the belief in one's competence to tackle novel tasks and to cope with adversity in a broad range of stressful or challenging encounters, as opposed to specific self‐efficacy, which is constrained to a particular task at hand. The study aimed at exploring the relations between GSE and a variety of other psychological constructs across several countries. Relations between general self‐efficacy and personality, well‐being, stress appraisals, social relations, and achievements were examined among 8796 participants from Costa Rica, Germany, Poland, Turkey, and the USA. Across countries, the findings provide evidence for associations between perceived general self‐efficacy and the selected variables. The highest positive associations were with optimism, self‐regulation, and self‐esteem, whereas the highest negative associations emerged with depression and anxiety. Academic performance is also associated with self‐efficacy as hypothesized. The replication across languages or cultures adds significance to these findings. The relations between self‐efficacy and other personality measures remained stable across cultures and samples. Thus, perceived general self‐efficacy appears to be a universal construct that yields meaningful relations with other psychological constructs.     

Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures

People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the self? To address this question, we tested the good true self theory against two potential boundary conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual differences in misanthropy—the tendency to view humans negatively—predict beliefs about the good true self in an American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in a good true self, even among individuals who have an explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true self‐attributions across cultural groups, by comparing samples from an independent country (USA) and a diverse set of interdependent countries (Russia, Singapore, and Colombia). Results indicated that the direction and magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy, suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the true self as morally good.     

The aim of psychoanalysis

The changing aims of psychoanalysis are discussed with reference to Money-Kyrle's paper on the subject. The theory of dammed-up libido, the theory of moral conflict and the theory of misrepresentations and perversion of reality which he described, all imply different aims. It is argued that, in addition, the theory of projective identification leads to a radical change in the aim of treatment which can now be formulated in terms of helping the patient regain lost parts of the self.     

Single and Multiple Self Implications for Change Grids: Studies of Consistency

Abstract

This study, derived from the work of Hinkle (1965), explored the short-term test-re-test stability of two forms of Implications for Change grids. In the Single Self implications task, persons considered whether a general self change on one personal construct dimension would influence change on their other dimensions. The Multiple Self implications task followed the same form of questioning. However, in this latter procedure, persons were asked about self change within more specific contexts of activity (e.g., self as friend, self at play). Average consistency levels were calculated for the Single Self and the Multiple Self grids. Predictions were made regarding which subjects would show more or less consistency using measures of self meaningfulness and construct organization at first testing     

Hume's Dispositional Account of the Self

This paper will argue that Hume's notion of the self in Book 2 of the Treatise seems subject to two constraints. First, it should be a succession of perceptions [THN 2.2.1.2, 2.1.2.3]. Second, it should be durable in virtue of the roles that it plays with regard to pride and humility, as well as to normativity. However, I argue that these two constraints are in tension, since our perceptions are too transient to play these roles. I argue that this notion of self should be characterized as a bundle of dispositions to our perceptions, such that these dispositions are durable and counterfactual-supporting. I argue that Hume confused his ‘philosophical’ notion of dispositions, as nothing above and beyond their effects, with the thicker notion of dispositions to which the passions respond—which explains his mistaken commitment to the durability constraint.     

THE DESIRE OF GOD

By exploring the contours of human longing and desire, particularly in its complex relationship with the body and material reality, the article shows that it is in the very nature of the humanum to seek after and promise the presence of a divinity whose arrival cannot be guaranteed (not from the human side, at least). Biblical poetry from the Psalms and the Song of Songs will be invoked and explored as exemplars of that psycho‐theological landscape. While human desire is not enough to guarantee God's arrival, desire perseveres on the basis of a mysterious sense of call or promise which, while experienced and apprehended within the self, nevertheless appears to emanate or broadcast as from another place.