Arendt’s genealogy of thinking

This paper presents what I will call Arendt’s genealogy of thinking. My purpose in doing so is to strengthen Arendt’s critique of thoughtlessness which I believe is both a powerful, but underappreciated analytic tool and a consistent, but under-examined thread that occurs throughout Arendt’s oeuvre. To do so I revisit her phenomenology of thinking and the distinction between thinking and cognition she introduces in her last, unfinished work, The Life of the Mind. When read alongside the genealogy of action in The Human Condition to create a parallel genealogy of thinking, we can begin to see that the implications of this distinction between thinking and cognition are radical, challenging, and deeply important.     

Counterfactual thinking about one’s birth enhances well-being judgments

Previous research demonstrates that thinking counterfactually about life experiences facilitates meaning making about those events. Two studies extend this work into the well-being domain by examining the effects of writing factually or counterfactually about one’s birth on well-being. In Study 1, participants (N?=?252) were randomly assigned to write factually or counterfactually about their births or the election of Barack Obama and then completed measures of meaning in life and life satisfaction. Writing counterfactually about one’s birth led to higher evaluations of life relative to all other groups. In Study 2, (N?=?98) participants wrote factually or counterfactually about their births and again completed well-being measures. Fate attributions, probability estimates, and feelings of luck were explored as potential mediators. The effect on well-being from Study 1 replicated, but was not driven by any of the measured variables. Implications for existential psychology and well-being research are discussed.     

Differences in children’s thinking and learning during attentional focus instruction

Considerable evidence supports the motor learning advantage associated with an external focus of attention; however, very few studies have investigated attentional focus effects with children despite individual functional constraints that have the potential to impact use of instructional content. Thus, the purpose of this study was to determine the effect of attentional focus instruction on motor learning in children. Participants (n = 42) aged 9–11 years were randomly assigned to one of three gender-stratified groups: (1) control, (2) internal focus, or (3) external focus. Following initial instructions and task demonstration, participants performed 100 modified free throws over two days while receiving additional cues respective to their attentional focus condition and returned approximately 48 h later to perform 20 additional free throws. Results revealed no significant learning differences between groups. However, responses to retrospective verbal reports suggest that the use of external focus content during practice may have contributed to some participants’ superior performance in retention. Future research should continue to examine attentional focus effects across a variety of ages and incorporate retrospective verbal reports in order to examine children’s thoughts during attentional focus instruction.     

The influence of practicum supervisors’ facilitation styles on student teachers’ reflective thinking during collective reflection

Student teachers’ reflective thinking is closely associated with learning and improving practice. Novice student teachers require adequate support to reflect more deeply. The role of ‘others’ in collective reflection and knowledge generation as an outcome creates a platform for deep reflection, addressing both the processes and premises of reflective thinking. Facilitation styles of practicum supervisors could influence the level of student teachers’ reflective thinking during collective reflection. This is a case study using purposeful sampling involving a Malaysian teacher training institution that conducted an undergraduate early childhood programme in collaboration with a UK university. Sources of evidence were interviews, direct observations and documents. Data collected were analysed using both inductive and deductive methods. It was found that facilitation styles influence the depth of student teachers’ reflective thinking during group dialogic reflection. A continuum of facilitation styles from collaborative to instructive typologies was constructed. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

John Locke, ‘Hobbist’: of sleeping souls and thinking matter

In this paper, I consider Isaac Newton’s fevered accusation that John Locke is a ‘Hobbist.’ I suggest a number of ways in which Locke’s account of the mind–body relation could plausibly be construed as Hobbesian. Whereas Newton conceives of the human mind as an immaterial substance and venerates it as a finite image of the Divine Mind, I argue that Locke utterly deflates the religious, ethical, and metaphysical significance of an immaterial soul. Even stronger, I contend that there is good reason to suspect that Locke is a crypto-materialist, at least with respect to human beings, and in this respect, could reasonably be labeled a ‘Hobbist.’     

Heidegger’s thinking on the “Same” of science and technology

In this article, we trace and elucidate Heidegger’s radical re-thinking on the relation between science and technology from about 1940 until 1976. A range of passages from the Gesamtausgabe seem to articulate a reversal of the primacy of science and technology in claiming that “Science is applied technology.” After delving into Heidegger’s reflection on the being of science and technology and their “coordination,” we show that such a claim is essentially grounded in Heidegger’s idea that “Science and technology are the Same [das Selbe].” In addition, we argue that, although different ontic epochs can be distinguished in the evolvement of science and/or technology, for Heidegger there is only one unique ontological Epoch of modernity that encompasses various ontic epochs. Therefore, the change from an “epoch of objectivity” to an “epoch of orderability [Bestellbarkeit]” cannot be considered to be an ontological shift. Furthermore, it is not right to ascribe to Heidegger the view that the development of quantum physics signals the beginning of a new ontological Epoch.     

Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking

Martin Heidegger’s radical critique of technology has fundamentally stigmatized modern technology and paved the way for a comprehensive critique of contemporary Western society. However, the following reassessment of Heidegger’s most elaborate and influential interpretation of technology, “The Question Concerning Technology,” sheds a very different light on his critique. In fact, Heidegger’s phenomenological line of thinking concerning technology also implies a radical critique of ancient technology and the fundamental being-in-the-world of humans. This revision of Heidegger’s arguments claims that “The Question Concerning Technology” indicates a previous unseen ambiguity with respect to the origin of the rule of das Gestell. The following inquiry departs from Heidegger’s critique of modern technology and connects it to a reassessment of ancient technology and Aristotle’s justification of slavery. The last part of the paper unfolds Heidegger’s underlying arguments in favor of continuity within the history of technology. According to these interpretations, humans have always strived to develop “modern” technology and to become truly “modern” in the Heideggerian sense. The danger stemming from the rule of das Gestell is thus not only transient and solely directed toward contemporary Western society, but also I will argue that humans can only be humans as the ones challenged by the rule of das Gestell.     

Don’t wait to incubate: Immediate versus delayed incubation in divergent thinking

Previous evidence for the effectiveness of immediate incubation in divergent creative tasks has been weak, because earlier studies exhibited a range of methodological problems. This issue is theoretically important, as a demonstration of the effects of immediate incubation would strengthen the case for the involvement of unconscious work in incubation effects. For the present experiment, we used a creative divergent-thinking task (alternative uses) in which separate experimental groups had incubation periods that were either delayed or immediate and that consisted of either spatial or verbal tasks. Control groups were tested without incubation periods, and we carried out checks for intermittent conscious work on the target task during the incubation periods. The results showed significant incubation effects that were stronger for immediate than for delayed incubation. Performance was not different between the verbal and spatial incubation conditions, and we found no evidence for intermittent conscious working during the incubation periods. These results support a role for unconscious work in creative divergent thinking, particularly in the case of immediate incubation.     

The ‘thinking aloud’ process: a way forward in social work supervision

Within current neoliberal discourses, critical reflection provides opportunity for innovation in social work practice. This article describes a thinking aloud process used with supervisor–supervisee dyads in community-based child welfare social work to assist critical reflection via the use of open-ended questioning and inquiry. The strength of thinking aloud permitted a deeper appreciation of how the supervision session is utilised to reflect on practice and provided a learning tool within supervision. The feedback from the dyads concurred that thinking aloud assisted in stimulating reflection, developing solutions to the key issues discussed, and was transformative in recognising areas for future development. The process of thinking aloud supports the opportunity and space for the supervisor and supervisee to articulate meaning, critically develop insight, reconstruct, and transport this into future practice. Thinking aloud offers an example of how knowledge can be co-constructed by practitioners within practice and critical reflection captured within qualitative research approaches.     

Is thinking an action?

I argue that entertaining a proposition is not an action. Such events do not have intentional explanations and cannot be evaluated as rational or not. In these respects they contrast with assertions and compare well with perceptual events. One can control what one thinks by doing something, most familiarly by reciting a sentence. But even then the event of entertaining the proposition is not an action, though it is an event one has caused to happen, much as one might cause oneself to see a book by looking at it. I also discuss how this may support the view that thinking about the world is a source of information about it.     

Metaphysics as interpretation of conscious life: some remarks on D. Henrich’s and D. Kolak’s thinking

In this article, I discuss the manner in which Dieter Henrich’s theory of subjectivity has emerged from the fundamental questions of German Idealism, and in what manner and to what extent this theory effects a reinstatement of metaphysics. In so doing, I shall argue that Henrich’s position represents a viable refutation of the attempt of the physicalist explanation of the world to prove the concept of the subject to be superfluous. Henrich’s metaphysics of subjectivity is primarily focused on the ‘ultimate questions’ which also compose “the deep levels of our subjectivity” and concern the factors that should promote stability in our emotional, moral and intellectual life. I argue with Henrich that the indisputable facticity of our conscious life is worthy of our special consideration and interpretation, explanation and clarification, just as the deeper meaning (the individual and collective subconscious structure) hidden beneath the layers of apparent comprehensibility calls for urgent investigation. Such interpretation and elucidation of life’s meaning has a tripartite character: first, it consists of clarification of the totality of human experience together with the realities playing a part in it; second, it builds on the process by which the contents of experience are cognized, and the knowledge thereof which results; thirdly, it embraces the transcendental precondition enabling each and every one of us to consciously lead our lives—for life, in a human sense, does not merely happen to one. Henrich’s metaphysical foundation of subjectivity is compared with Kolak‘s position, according to which individual consciousness is not insular, but integrated into the totality of overall unity that some have called “the Universal Self”, “the Noumenal Self”.     

Is talking to yourself thinking?

The question whether talking to yourself is thinking is considered from two viewpoints: radical behaviorism and teleological behaviorism. For radical behaviorism, following Skinner (1945), mental events such as ‘thinking’ may be explained in terms of private behavior occurring within the body, ordinarily unobservable by other people; thus, radical behaviorism may identify talking to yourself with thinking. However, to be consistent with its basic principles, radical behaviorism must hold that private behavior, hence thinking, is identical with covert muscular, speech movements (rather than proprioception of those movements). For teleological behaviorism, following Skinner (1938), all mental terms, including ‘thinking,’ stand for abstract, temporally extended patterns of overt behavior. Thus, for teleological behaviorism, talking to yourself, covert by definition, cannot be thinking.     

Informed consent—Wishful thinking?

This article is concerned with the concept of “informed consent” as applied both in biomedical research involving human subjects and in clinical medicine in general. The current crisis over the elaboration and interpretation of the concept will be examined, along with the broader question of whether “informed consent” is any longer meaningful or viable as a criterion for complex bioethical policy-making. Finally, I will attempt to sketch a prognosis for the concept in doctor-patient relations, even if it is only wishful thinking.     

Schools as promoters of moral judgment: the essential role of teachers’ encouragement of critical thinking

The assumption that high level functioning is characterized by a great deal of autonomy is central to some major theories of moral development [Kohlberg (in T. Lickona (ed.) Moral development and behavior: Theory, research and social issues, 1976); Piaget (The moral judgment of the child, 1932)] and to the self-determination theory of motivation [Ryan and Deci (The American Psychologist, 55, 68–78, 2000)]. Based on these theories, we hypothesized that students’ perceptions of their teachers as autonomy supportive, mainly in the form of encouragement of critical thinking, and perhaps also choice, would be positively associated with students’ advanced moral judgment. Data collected from 12th grade students in two regular schools and two democratic schools supported this hypothesis. Results also showed that being a student in a democratic school (as opposed to a regular one) was associated with autonomous moral judgment, and that this association was mediated by students’ perceptions of teachers as encouraging criticism, but not choice. A possible implication is that programs of moral education should explicitly promote teachers’ inclination to encourage critical thinking in their students.

Does expertise and thinking mode matter for accuracy in judgments of job applicants’ cognitive ability?

The present research examined the role of thinking mode for accuracy in recruiters and laypeople’s judgments of applicants’ cognitive ability. In Study 1, students who relied on their intuition were somewhat less accurate. In Study 2, an experimental manipulation of thinking mode (intuitive vs analytical) revealed no apparent differences in accuracy. Moreover, there were no differences in accuracy or agreement between recruiters and laypeople. Examination of the use of specific resume content suggested that intuitive thinking corresponds to basing one’s judgments more on the way that applicants present themselves in their personal letter and less on diagnostic biographical information such as SAT scores. The findings point to the possibility that professional recruiters may not possess intuitive expertise in this context.     

Are expressivists guilty of wishful thinking?

Some contemporary philosophers have argued that expressivism or non-cognitivism, if suitably developed, can solve the well-known Frege–Geach problem. Of course, whether this is true is a matter of debate. Recently, Cian Dorr has advanced an argument that, if successful, would show that this debate is unimportant. For, according to Dorr, a solution to the Frege–Geach problem will not save expressivism from a new and distinct problem, namely that an expressivist theory—even assuming a solution to the Frege–Geach problem—entails that intuitively rational beliefs are in fact irrational. If Dorr is correct about this, then the new problem he raises would be as devastating as the old Frege–Geach problem is often thought to be. I will argue that Dorr is not correct. Rather than constituting a new and potent objection, the issue Dorr raises—at least absent further argument—does not pose a threat to any expressivist theory which is able to solve the Frege–Geach problem and is otherwise acceptable.