Wittgenstein: “I can’t believe…or rather can’t believe it yet”

This paper presents a characterization of the ontological dependence relation between an existent and its sustaining cause, which allows to straightforwardly deduce that the being of any dependent existent is grounded on an independent one. Furthermore, an argument is given to the conclusion that there is a unique independent existent, which is therefore the ultimate ground of being.     

What you don’t know can’t hurt you: realism and the unconceived

Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006, Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper, I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.

Don’t Know,Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance,Culpability, and Caution

This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.

‘You can’t buy love’: trivializing and the challenge for religious education

While there has been an increase in empirical research which explores the spirituality of children, few studies have explicitly named and described factors which may inhibit children’s expression of their spirituality. This paper, emanating from the author’s own research into children’s spirituality in Australian Catholic primary schools, presents and describes one such factor, which has been termed trivializing. An example of hermeneutic phenomenological writing—the text—in which trivializing was revealed is presented, followed by a reflection upon the text guided by van Manen’s lifeworld existentials (lived body, lived time, lived space, lived human relations). In the light of this reflection some initial implications for nurturing the spirituality of children within the primary religious education classroom are presented.     

Global obligations,collective capacities,and ‘ought implies can’

Philosophical Studies - It is sometimes argued that non-agent collectives, including what one might call the ‘global collective’ consisting of the world’s population taken as a...     

(I can’t get no) antisatisfaction

Synthese - Substructural approaches to paradoxes have attracted much attention from the philosophical community in the last decade. In this paper we focus on two substructural logics, named...     

Why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony?

Philosophical Studies - Musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth Symphony. Ella Fitzgerald and many other artists have made it acceptable to sing the jazz standard “All the Things...     

Moral dilemmas,disjunctive obligations,and Kant's principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’

In moral dilemmas, where circumstances prevent two or more equally justified prima facie ethical requirements from being fulfilled, it is often maintained that, since the agent cannot do both, conjoint obligation is overridden by Kant's principle that ought implies can, but that the agent nevertheless has a disjunctive obligation to perform one of the otherwise obligatory actions or the other. Against this commonly received view, it is demonstrated that although Kant's ought-can principle may avoid logical inconsistency, the principle is incompatible with disjunctive obligation in standard deontic logic, and that it entails paradoxically that none of the conflicting dilemma actions will in fact occur. The principle appears to provide the only plausible safeguard against deontic antinomy, but cannot be admitted because of its collision with considered moral judgments.     

This Girl Can,can’t she? Perspectives from physical activity providers and participants on what factors influence participation

AimsThe present study used a multi-method approach to qualitatively explore whether the perceptions of young women and girls and exercise providers are aligned in terms of the factors that influence participation with the aim to better understand how these factors influence participation.DesignThematic analysis was used to synthesise focus groups and interview data within the intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisation, environmental, and policy levels of an ecological model.MethodsInterviews were conducted with 4 experienced exercise providers (2 men, 2 women). Focus groups were conducted with 21 young women and girls (M = 17.9, SD = 2.4) who had participated in one of the exercise interventions developed and delivered by the providers.ResultsThe perceptions of participants and providers were often disparate but revolved around the same themes especially at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. They expressed contrasting views regarding the importance of skill development and enjoyment, and the role of boys and instructors. At the organisational level, both participants and providers agreed that schools offer opportunities as well as barriers to engagement in physical activity and exercise. At the environmental level, urbanisation, safety, culture, and social media appeared as main themes where the perspectives of participants and providers complemented each other. Finally, at the policy level the main themes were derived from providers and concerned issues around programme funding. Participants provided valuable commentary about a nationwide campaign to promote physical activity to females.ConclusionsIn order to provide engaging physical activity and exercise for young women and girls it is necessary to align the needs and expectations of participants and providers at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. For sustainable exercise provision that impacts young women and girls, it is essential to align funding strategies and deliverables between exercise providers, local and national stakeholders.     

Rhythmic entrainment: Why humans want to,fireflies can’t help it,pet birds try,and sea lions have to be bribed

Until recently, the literature on rhythmic ability took for granted that only humans are able to synchronize body movements to an external beat—to entrain. This assumption has been undercut by findings of beat-matching in various species of parrots and, more recently, in a sea lion, several species of primates, and possibly horses. This throws open the question of how widespread beat-matching ability is in the animal kingdom. Here we reassess the arguments and evidence for an absence of beat-matching in animals, and conclude that in fact no convincing case against beat-matching in animals has been made. Instead, such evidence as there is suggests that this capacity could be quite widespread. Furthermore, mutual entrainment of oscillations is a general principle of physical systems, both biological and nonbiological, suggesting that entrainment of motor systems by sensory systems may be a default rather than an oddity. The question then becomes, not why a few privileged species are able to beat-match, but why species do not always do so—why they vary in both spontaneous and learned beat-matching. We propose that when entrainment is not driven by fixed, mandatory connections between input and output (as in the case of, e.g., fireflies entraining to each others’ flashes), it depends on voluntary control over, and voluntary or learned coupling of, sensory and motor systems, which can paradoxically lead to apparent failures of entrainment. Among the factors that affect whether an animal will entrain are sufficient control over the motor behavior to be entrained, sufficient perceptual sophistication to extract the entraining beat from the overall sensory environment, and the current cognitive state of the animal, including attention and motivation. The extent of entrainment in the animal kingdom potentially has widespread implications, not only for understanding the roots of human dance, but also for understanding the neural and cognitive architectures of animals.     

What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt You,Unless You Don’t Know You’re Wrong

The purpose of this investigation was to determine the impact of students’ background knowledge and how they utilized “don’t know” affordances to comprehend and learn from text. In two studies, over 8,000 middle and high school students interacted with a content-area learning environment in which they answered a series of background knowledge questions before they completed a unit on the same topic. Students were given the opportunity to indicate they “did not know” the answers to the knowledge questions. Higher knowledge was related to higher understanding, and the use of the “don’t know” option further explained variability in students’ understanding of the sources beyond background knowledge. When responding to knowledge questions, students who selected incorrect options before the task understood less and were less likely to learn content when given the opportunity compared to students who indicated they did not know. Thus, low knowledge students were still able to comprehend and learn as long as they acknowledged they lacked background knowledge. One’s comprehension and learning can be facilitated or impaired, depending upon the veracity of their knowledge, and whether students choose to acknowledge their lack of background knowledge. Implications of this work are discussed in terms of learning and instruction.     

Categorical perception of tonal intervais: Musicians can’t tellsharp fromflat

Six musicians with relative pitch judged 13 tonal intervals in a magnitude estimation task. Stimuli were spaced in .2-semitone increments over a range of three standard musical categories (fourth, tritone, fifth,). The judged magnitude of the intervals did not increase regularly with stimulus magnitude. Rather, the psychophysical functions showed three discrete steps cor-responding to the musically defined intervals. Although all six subjects had identified in-tune intervals with >95% accuracy, all were very poor at differentiating within a musical category— they could not reliably tell “sharp” from “flat.” After the experiment, they judged 63% of the stimuli to be “in tune,” but in fact only 23% were musically accurate. In a subsequent labeling task, subjects produced identification functions with sharply defined boundaries between each of the three musical categories. Our results parallel those associated with the identification and scaling of speech sounds, and we interpret them as evidence for categorical perception of music.     

I can’t get no satisfaction: Potential causes of boredom

A variety of causes of boredom have been proposed including environmental, motivational, emotional, and cognitive factors. Here, we explore four potential cognitive causes of boredom: inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and executive dysfunction. Specifically, we examine the unique and common associations between these factors and boredom propensity. Recent research has established that the two most commonly used measures of boredom propensity (BPS and BSS) are not measuring the same underlying construct. Thus, a second goal of the present project is to determine the unique and common roles of inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity and poor executive system functioning in predicting the BPS and BSS specifically. The findings reveal that inattention, hyperactivity and executive dysfunction predict boredom propensity, with shared variance accounting for the greater part of this effect. Further, executive dysfunction and hyperactivity uniquely predict boredom propensity as measured by the BPS and BSS, respectively.     

So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?

In this paper I revisit Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle and propose a novel solution to it. Like some previous accounts, mine postulates a tight link between intentions and reasons but, unlike them, in my account these are motivating rather than normative reasons, i.e. reasons that explain (rather than justify) the intended action. I argue that sensitivity to the absence of possible motivational explanations for the intended action is constitutive of deliberation-based intentions. Since ordinary rational agents display this sensitivity, when placed in the toxin scenario they will believe that there is no motivational explanation for actually drinking the toxin and this is why they can’t form the intention to drink it in the first place. I thus argue that my Motivating-Explanatory Reason Principle correctly explains the toxin puzzle, thereby revealing itself as a genuine metaphysical constraint on intentions. I also explore at length the implications of my account for the nature of intention and rational agency.     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Fairness

According to the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it is never the case that you ought to do something you cannot do. While many accept this principle in some form, it also has its share of critics, and thus it seems desirable if an argument can be offered in its support. The aim of this paper is to examine a particular way in which the principle has been defended, namely, by appeal to considerations of fairness. In a nutshell, the idea (due to David Copp) is that moral requirements we cannot comply with would be unfair, and there cannot be unfair moral requirements. I discuss several ways of spelling out the argument, and argue that all are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.     

Intergroup Contact,Prejudicial Attitudes,and Policy Preferences: The Case of the U.S. Military’s “Don’t Ask,Don’t Tell” Policy

Data from 115,052 active United States military personnel were analyzed to explore links between contact with gay people and attitudes about repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Results showed that prejudice against homosexuals significantly mediated the association between contact and supporting repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”; quality of contact in the military was a stronger predictor than other measures of contact. Quality and quantity of contact interacted: more contact quantity had opposing statistical effects on policy attitudes for people experiencing high versus low quality contact. Findings are discussed in terms of contact theory, the association between intergroup attitudes and policy preferences, and practical implications for situations in which groups’ access to new positions or roles is limited, and hence contact opportunities are rare.     

Your goals or mine? Women’s personal and vicarious eating regulation goals and their partners’ perceptions of support,well-being,and relationship quality

This research examined the types of eating regulation goals that women have for themselves as well as for their romantic partner, and how these relate to their interpersonal style toward their partner, and to their partner’s psychological and relational well-being. Participants were 131 heterosexual couples. Results show that the eating regulation goals that women have for their partner (health or appearance oriented) reflect the type of goals that they personally pursue. Furthermore, women who have health-focused eating goals for their partner are perceived as more autonomy-supportive, which is associated with the partner’s report of higher relationship quality. Conversely, women who have appearance-focused eating goals for their partner are more likely to be perceived as controlling, which negatively predicts the partner’s psychological and relational well-being. These results attest to the importance of considering women’s personal eating regulation goals for a better understanding of the type of goals they have for their partners and how these relate to their partners’ well-being and relationship quality.     

I won’t do it! Self-prediction,moral obligation and moral deliberation

This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of ‘won’t’ claims (i.e., claims that an agent won’t Φ), the question is separated into two different issues: firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations, and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to be appropriate in deliberation. The discussion illuminates an interesting and significant tension between agency and prediction.