Beliefs,points of view,and multiple environments

The paper describes a system for dealing with nestings of belief in terms of the mechanism of computational environment. A method is offered for computing the beliefs of A about B (and so on) in terms of the systems existing knowledge structures about A and B separately. A proposal for belief percolation is put forward: percolation being a side effect of the process of the computation of nested beliefs, but one which could explain the acquisition of unsupported beliefs. It is argued that the mechanism proposed is compatible with a general least effort hypothesis concerning human mental functioning.     

Examining Conspiracist Beliefs About the Disappearance of Amelia Earhart

Previous studies have suggested that conspiracist ideation forms part of a monological belief system in which one conspiracist idea acts as evidence for new conspiracist ideas. Here, we examined this possibility in relation to an event lacking reliable or conclusive evidence, namely the disappearance of Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan. A total of 914 members of the British general public completed scales measuring their beliefs about the disappearance of Earhart and Noonan, belief in conspiracy theories, the Big Five personality factors, support for democratic principles, political cynicism, self-esteem, and self-assessed intelligence. Results showed that belief in conspiracy theories was associated with the endorsement of less plausible explanations for the disappearance of Earhart and Noonan. In addition, belief in less plausible explanations was also significantly associated with lower self-assessed intelligence, greater political cynicism, lower self-esteem, and higher Agreeableness scores. These results are discussed in relation to monological belief systems.     

The Relationship between Cultural Values and Political Ideology, and the Role of Political Knowledge

Cultural theory maintains that four worldviews—egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchicalism, and fatalism—can be used to describe people and societies. We examine survey measures of two of those worldviews—egalitarianism and individualism—to understand their relationship with belief systems. Contrary to what one might expect based on the cultural theory literature, we find that people with low levels of political knowledge seem not to have coherent worldviews regarding these issues. In contrast, people with high levels of political knowledge respond to egalitarianism and individualism questions as if they were opposite ends of a single, liberal-conservative continuum, rather than two of four distinct worldviews. We conclude that cultural theory researchers should take account of the influence of political knowledge whenever they investigate worldviews.     

Individual difference factors and beliefs in medical and political conspiracy theories

This study examined the relationship between a series of individual difference measures and belief in political and medical conspiracy theories. Participants (N = 323) rated 20 conspiracy theories (10 medical, 10 political) and completed a set of questionnaires. Belief in political conspiracies was strongly positively correlated with belief in medical conspiracies. Belief in both conspiracy types was correlated with low self‐esteem, low Conscientiousness, more right‐wing political views, younger age, and greater belief in the benefits of Alternative Medicine. It was also correlated with religiousness and gender. Low Emotional Stability and Agreeableness were also correlated with belief in political conspiracies, and higher education level was correlated with belief in medical conspiracies. The findings generally demonstrated support for a monological belief system. Implications and limitations are discussed.     

Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology

ABSTRACT— We trace the rise, fall, and resurgence of political ideology as a topic of research in social, personality, and political psychology. For over 200 years, political belief systems have been classified usefully according to a single left–right (or liberal–conservative) dimension that, we believe, possesses two core aspects: (a) advocating versus resisting social change and (b) rejecting versus accepting inequality. There have been many skeptics of the notion that most people are ideologically inclined, but recent psychological evidence suggests that left–right differences are pronounced in many life domains. Implicit as well as explicit preferences for tradition, conformity, order, stability, traditional values, and hierarchy—versus those for progress, rebelliousness, chaos, flexibility, feminism, and equality—are associated with conservatism and liberalism, respectively. Conservatives score consistently higher than liberals on measures of system justification. Furthermore, there are personality and lifestyle differences between liberals and conservatives as well as situational variables that induce either liberal or conservative shifts in political opinions. Our thesis is that ideological belief systems may be structured according to a left–right dimension for largely psychological reasons linked to variability in the needs to reduce uncertainty and threat.     

Differences between belief and knowledge systems

Seven features which in practice seem to differentiate belief systems from knowledge systems are discussed. These are: nonconsensuality, “existence beliefs,” alternative worlds, evaluative components, episodic material, unboundedness, and variable credences. Each of these features gives rise to challenging representation problems. Progress on any of these problems within artificial intelligence would be helpful in the study of knowledge systems as well as belief systems, inasmuch as the distinction between the two types of systems is not absolute.     

Logic in religious and non-religious belief systems

The paper first proposes a new definition of religion which features a novel four-layered element and which does not involve any circularity (as some definitions do); thereby, it allows to clearly distinguish the phenomenon of religion from certain other worldviews, in particular from certain political ideologies (a number of other definitions do not). Relying on the findings, the paper develops two structural conceptual models which serve to describe religious and non-religious belief systems. Further, the definition and the conceptual models allow to establish a clear criterion to distinguish pivotal structural differences between religious and non-religious belief systems. The criterion is based on the concept of two kinds of rationality: first-level and second-level rationalities. These will demonstrate to what degree religion can be a rational enterprise, and what role logic can play in it. The result is a clear-cut line in the structures of religious and certain consistent non-religious belief systems (e.g. a scientific theory).     

Thinking outside the ballot box

A deeply heterogeneous set of ideological cohorts have shaped the course of history. From anarchists and authoritarians to Zionists and Zapatistas, the expansive alphabet of politics demands an equally expansive psychological vocabulary to describe political belief systems. We propose that constructing such a vocabulary is best facilitated by decentering familiar models that emphasize psychological differences between leftists and rightists. Synthesizing recent developments in the fields of personality, political science, and psychopathology, we characterize individual variation in politics as high-dimensional, heterarchical, intrapersonally eclectic, and contextually shaped and activated. Developing a data-driven taxonomic model of political-psychological phenomena will help create a foundational base of knowledge within political psychology that is more rigorous, more replicable, and certainly richer to investigate.     

The origins of belief representation: Monkeys fail to automatically represent others’ beliefs

Young infants’ successful performance on false belief tasks has led several researchers to argue that there may be a core knowledge system for representing the beliefs of other agents, emerging early in human development and constraining automatic belief processing into adulthood. One way to investigate this purported core belief representation system is to examine whether non-human primates share such a system. Although non-human primates have historically performed poorly on false belief tasks that require executive function capacities, little work has explored how primates perform on more automatic measures of belief processing. To get at this issue, we modified Kovács et al. (2010)’s test of automatic belief representation to examine whether one non-human primate species—the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta)—is automatically influenced by another agent’s beliefs when tracking an object’s location. Monkeys saw an event in which a human agent watched an apple move back and forth between two boxes and an outcome in which one box was revealed to be empty. By occluding segments of the apple’s movement from either the monkey or the agent, we manipulated both the monkeys’ belief (true or false) and agent’s belief (true or false) about the final location of the apple. We found that monkeys looked longer at events that violated their own beliefs than at events that were consistent with their beliefs. In contrast to human infants, however, monkeys’ expectations were not influenced by another agent’s beliefs, suggesting that belief representation may be an aspect of core knowledge unique to humans.     

Stability, Strength and Sensitivity:Converting Belief into Knowledge

In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to keep apart the very different roles that systems of spheres can play. Nozicks sensitivity account turns out to be closer to the stability analysis of knowledge (versions of which I identify in Plato, Descartes, Klein and Lehrer) than one might have suspected.     

初中生精神信仰现状研究

用问卷法对431名初中生的精神信仰状况进行调查,发现初中生的精神信仰特点如下:(1)总体状况表现为社会信仰最强、实用信仰次之、超自然信仰最弱。在7个信仰维度上的信仰程度由强到弱依次为国家民族、政治信仰、家庭主义、生命崇拜、宗教信仰、金钱物质、神灵崇拜;(2)男生比女生更看重政治信仰和金钱物质,女生比男生具有更高的宗教信仰;(3)初三年级学生的金钱物质和生命崇拜的信仰程度最高,初二年级次之,初一年级最弱;(4)非学生干部比学生干部具有更强的金钱物质信仰;(5)团员的政治信仰程度高于非团员;(6)学习成绩为上等的学生对国家民族的信仰程度高于学习成绩为中等和下等的学生,学习成绩为下等的学生对金钱物质的信仰程度高于学习成绩为上等和中等的学生。     

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge,Ignorance, and False Belief

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.     

Compelling Fictions: Spinoza and George Eliot on Imagination and Belief

Spinoza took it to be an important psychological fact that belief cannot be compelled. At the same time, he was well aware of the compelling power that religious and political fictions can have on the formation of our beliefs. I argue that Spinoza allows that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ fictions. His complex account of the imagination and fiction, and their disabling or enabling roles in gaining knowledge of Nature, is a site of disagreement among commentators. The novels of George Eliot (who translated Spinoza's works) represent a significant development for those who aim to resolve such disagreement in favour of the epistemic value of the imagination and fiction. Although Eliot agreed with Spinoza that belief cannot be compelled, she nevertheless affirmed the potential of certain kinds of fiction to be not only compelling but also edifying. The parallel reading of Eliot and Spinoza offered here raises the question of whether his philosophy can accommodate a theory of art in which the artist is seen to be capable of attaining and imparting dependable knowledge.     

Political Affiliation,Spirituality, and Religiosity: Links to Emerging Adults’ Life Satisfaction and Optimism

The goal of this study was to extend the existing literature regarding the intersection between belief systems shaping psychological processes and subjective well-being among emerging adults. A nationwide sample of 3966 college students reported on their political affiliation, spirituality, and religiosity in relation to their subjective well-being. Multivariate analyses demonstrated that politically conservative participants were significantly more optimistic and satisfied with life than their liberal counterparts and Republican emerging adults reported significantly higher life satisfaction than Democrats. Republican emerging adults also reported significantly higher rates of religiosity and spirituality than Democratic and Independent politically affiliated emerging adults. Our findings corroborate and expand upon existing literature regarding belief systems and political identity as determinants of subjective well-being in emerging adults.     

The orientation of evolution and the intellect

Prediction has been central in the development of both science and society. Chaos theory, however, has given rise to the widespread belief that in all but the most stable situations prediction of the future is impossible. But this belief is contradicted by theory and findings over many years of the psychology of prediction as well as by the findings of the new field of chaos psychology and the experience of entrepreneurs in business and political leaders. At stake is a belief central to an enormous body of “law” in all scientific fields as well as to business, political, and governmental managers and leaders concerned with governance of economic and political systems in a time of global social chaos. At its core, the problem is a critical one for the development of a General Evolution Theory that can span the findings of natural science and social science to find “laws” consonant with systems requirements at both pre‐human and human evolutionary levels. This paper analyzes the problem in terms of chaos theoretical views of the limits of predictability, evidence from the fields of psychology and brain research of human predictive abilities that transcend these limits, and the practical consequence of a resolution of this conflict for science and society.     

Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis

Abstract

In this paper I explore Plato’s reasons for his rejection of the so‐called standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. I argue that Plato held that knowledge is an infallible mental state in which (a) the knowable is present in the knower and (b) the knower is aware of this presence. Accordingly, knowledge (epistēmē) is non‐propositional. Since there are no infallible belief states, the standard analysis, which assumes that knowledge is a type of belief, cannot be correct. In addition, I argue that Plato held that belief (doxa) is only possible for the sort of being capable of knowledge. This is because self‐reflexivity is necessary for infallible knowledge and self‐reflexivity is only possible if the intellect is immaterial. This capacity for self‐reflexivity is also essential for belief, since beliefs are, paradigmatically, not dispositions but self‐reflexive mental states.     

Sorting Out Support for Democracy: A Q‐Method Study

Support for democracy is crucial to democratic stability. Yet the nature and range of democratic belief systems, and whether these belief systems are idiosyncratic to specific individuals and polities or are more general, remain largely unknown. Such unknowns complicate an already daunting measurement task. Extant survey‐based measures are fraught with validity problems and say little about the democratic beliefs individuals most strongly hold or reject. To address these problems, this study blends focus groups, interviews, and Q‐sort methodology to examine patterns of subjective, behavioral renderings of democratic support profiles. It finds seven shared profiles of beliefs concerning democracy, alternative regimes, and political and civil freedoms across Chile and Argentina. Their resemblance to democratic belief systems found with other methods bolsters their validity and generalizability. The analyses reveal the relative weight of each orientation within each belief profile and their intensity across profiles. In so doing, they identify which items are crucial for within‐ and across‐case comparisons. Altogether, these insights should inform survey‐based approaches to detecting and describing the democratic support profiles latent in the polity.     

Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of U.S. Foreign Policy

The conventional account of American diplomacy in the modern era is marked by a cultural tension between realist and idealist themes symbolized by the statecraft of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. However, a revisionist account has emerged to challenge and even reverse the conventional account of Roosevelt and Wilson. This poses an intriguing empirical puzzle that is essentially psychological, as it pertains to the belief systems of these two presidents. In order to investigate this puzzle and its implications for U.S. strategic culture, we employ an automated content analysis of the public statements by the two leaders regarding their operational code beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the best approach to effective political action. The results reveal similarities and differences in their belief systems and illustrate how psychological models can provide insights into the psychocultural origins of U.S. diplomacy that remain relevant to the present day.     

Troubling Consequences of Online Political Rumoring

Fear that the Internet promotes harmful political rumoring is merited but not for reasons originally anticipated. Although the network accelerates and widens rumor circulation, on the whole, it does not increase recipient credulity. E‐mail, however, which fosters informal political communication within existing social networks, poses a unique threat to factual political knowledge. A national telephone survey conducted immediately after the 2008 U.S. presidential election provides evidence that aggregate Internet use promotes exposure to both rumors and their rebuttals, but that the total effect on rumor beliefs is negligible. More troublingly, the data demonstrate that rumors e‐mailed to friends/family are more likely to be believed and shared with others and that these patterns of circulation and belief exhibit strong political biases.