Generalist genes: implications for the cognitive sciences

In the 'generalist genes' hypothesis, it is suggested that the same genes affect most cognitive abilities and disabilities. This recently proposed hypothesis is based on considerable multivariate genetic research showing that there is substantial genetic overlap between such broad areas of cognition as language, reading, mathematics and general cognitive ability. We assume that the hypothesis is correct and consider here its implications for cognitive neuroscience. In our opinion, the two key genetic concepts of pleiotropy (in which one gene affects many traits) and polygenicity (in which many genes affect a trait) that underlie the generalist genes hypothesis imply a 'generalist brain'. That is, the genetic input into brain structure and function is general not specific.     

The overlooked ubiquity of first-person experience in the cognitive sciences

Synthese - Science aims to transform the subjectivity of individual observations and ideas into more objective and universal knowledge. Yet if there is any area in which first-person experience...     

Sexual predator commitment laws: lessons for law and the behavioral sciences

Sex offender commitment laws use a mental health commitment model to lock up the "most dangerous" sex offenders after their prison sentences expire. In Kansas v. Hendricks, the United States Supreme Court rejected the major constitutional challenges to these laws. The Hendricks case clarifies important ambiguities about the use of civil commitment to enforce "police power" interests, as opposed to "parens patriae" interests. Hendricks also clarifies the role of "treatment" in justifying civil commitment. While there remain some important legal issues to be resolved, the future direction of sex offender commitment schemes will turn most significantly on policy decisions. The behavioral sciences can play an important role in shaping these decisions. The most significant questions concern whether expensive commitment programs are the most effective use of scarce treatment and supervision dollars. Additional research should be directed to improving dynamic predictors of recidivism, operationalizing "inability to control" standards, judging the "social meaning" of commitment laws, and assessing the potential treatment disincentives of these laws.     

From universal laws of cognition to specific cognitive models

The remarkable successes of the physical sciences have been built on highly general quantitative laws, which serve as the basis for understanding an enormous variety of specific physical systems. How far is it possible to construct universal principles in the cognitive sciences, in terms of which specific aspects of perception, memory, or decision making might be modelled? Following Shepard (e.g., 1987 ), it is argued that some universal principles may be attainable in cognitive science. Here, 2 examples are proposed: the simplicity principle (which states that the cognitive system prefers patterns that provide simpler explanations of available data); and the scale‐invariance principle, which states that many cognitive phenomena are independent of the scale of relevant underlying physical variables, such as time, space, luminance, or sound pressure. This article illustrates how principles may be combined to explain specific cognitive processes by using these principles to derive SIMPLE, a formal model of memory for serial order ( Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007 ), and briefly mentions some extensions to models of identification and categorization. This article also considers the scope and limitations of universal laws in cognitive science.     

How a cognitive psychologist came to seek universal laws

My early fascination with geometry and physics and, later, with perception and imagination inspired a hope that fundamental phenomena of psychology, like those of physics, might approximate universal laws. Ensuing research led me to the following candidates, formulated in terms of distances along shortest paths in abstract representational spaces: Generalization probability decreases exponentially and discrimination time reciprocally with distance. Time to determine the identity of shapes and, provisionally, relation between musical tones or keys increases linearly with distance. Invariance of the laws is achieved by constructing the representational spaces from psychological rather than physical data (using multidimensional scaling) and from considerations of geometry, group theory, and symmetry. Universality of the laws is suggested by their behavioral approximation in cognitively advanced species and by theoretical considerations of optimality. Just possibly, not only physics but also psychology can aspire to laws that ultimately reflect mathematical constraints, such as those of group theory and symmetry, and, so, are both universal and nonarbitrary.     

Integrating computation into the mechanistic hierarchy in the cognitive and neural sciences

It is generally accepted that, in the cognitive and neural sciences, there are both computational and mechanistic explanations. We ask how computational explanations can integrate into the mechanistic hierarchy. The problem stems from the fact that implementation and mechanistic relations have different forms. The implementation relation, from the states of an abstract computational system (e.g., an automaton) to the physical, implementing states is a homomorphism mapping relation. The mechanistic relation, however, is that of part/whole; the explaining features in a mechanistic explanation are the components of the explanandum phenomenon and their causal organization. Moreover, each component in one level of mechanism is constituted and explained by components of an underlying level of mechanism. Hence, it seems, computational variables and functions cannot be mechanistically explained by the medium-dependent states and properties that implement them. How then, do the computational and the implementational integrate to create the mechanistic hierarchy? After explicating the general problem (Sect. 2), we further demonstrate it through a concrete example, of reinforcement learning, in the cognitive and neural sciences (Sects. 3 and 4). We then examine two possible solutions (Sect. 5). On one solution, the mechanistic hierarchy embeds at the same levels computational and implementational properties. This picture fits with the view that computational explanations are mechanistic sketches. On the other solution, there are two separate hierarchies, one computational and another implementational, which are related by the implementation relation. This picture fits with the view that computational explanations are functional and autonomous explanations. It is less clear how these solutions fit with the view that computational explanations are full-fledged mechanistic explanations. Finally, we argue that both pictures are consistent with the reinforcement learning example, but that scientific practice does not align with the view that computational models are merely mechanistic sketches (Sect. 6).

     

Auditory verbal hallucinations: Dialoguing between the cognitive sciences and phenomenology

Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are a highly complex and rich phenomena, and this has a number of important clinical, theoretical and methodological implications. However, until recently, this fact has not always been incorporated into the experimental designs and theoretical paradigms used by researchers within the cognitive sciences. In this paper, we will briefly outline two recent examples of phenomenologically informed approaches to the study of AVHs taken from a cognitive science perspective. In the first example, based on Larøi and Woodward (Harv Rev Psychiatry 15:109–117, 2007), it is argued that reality monitoring studies examining the cognitive underpinnings of hallucinations have not reflected the phenomenological complexity of AVHs in their experimental designs and theoretical framework. The second example, based on Jones (Schizophr Bull, in press, 2010), involves a critical examination of the phenomenology of AVHs in the context of two other prominent cognitive models: inner speech and intrusions from memory. It will be shown that, for both examples, the integration of a phenomenological analysis provides important improvements both on a methodological, theoretical and clinical level. This will be followed by insights and critiques from philosophy and clinical psychiatry—both of which offer a phenomenological alternative to the empiricist–rationalist conceptualisation of AVHs inherent to the cognitive sciences approach. Finally, the paper will conclude with ideas as to how the cognitive sciences may integrate these latter perspectives into their methodological and theoretical programmes.     

Manipulation is key: on why non-mechanistic explanations in the cognitive sciences also describe relations of manipulation and control

A popular view presents explanations in the cognitive sciences as causal or mechanistic and argues that an important feature of such explanations is that they allow us to manipulate and control the explanandum phenomena. Nonetheless, whether there can be explanations in the cognitive sciences that are neither causal nor mechanistic is still under debate. Another prominent view suggests that both causal and non-causal relations of counterfactual dependence can be explanatory, but this view is open to the criticism that it is not clear how to distinguish explanatory from non-explanatory relations. In this paper, I draw from both views and suggest that, in the cognitive sciences, relations of counterfactual dependence that allow manipulation and control can be explanatory even when they are neither causal nor mechanistic. Furthermore, the ability to allow manipulation can determine whether non-causal counterfactual dependence relations are explanatory. I present a preliminary framework for manipulation relations that includes some non-causal relations and use two examples from the cognitive sciences to show how this framework distinguishes between explanatory and non-explanatory, non-causal relations. The proposed framework suggests that, in the cognitive sciences, causal and non-causal relations have the same criterion for explanatory value, namely, whether or not they allow manipulation and control.     

Scaling Satan

The influence on social behavior of beliefs in Satan and the nature of evil has received little empirical study. Elaine Pagels (1995) in her book, The Origin of Satan, argued that Christians' intolerance toward others is due to their belief in an active Satan. In this study, more than 200 college undergraduates completed the Manitoba Prejudice Scale and the Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale (B. Altemeyer, 1988), as well as the Belief in an Active Satan Scale, developed by the authors. The Belief in an Active Satan Scale demonstrated good internal consistency and temporal stability. Correlational analyses revealed that for the female participants, belief in an active Satan was directly related to intolerance toward lesbians and gay men and intolerance toward ethnic minorities. For the male participants, belief in an active Satan was directly related to intolerance toward lesbians and gay men but was not significantly related to intolerance toward ethnic minorities. Results of this research showed that it is possible to meaningfully measure belief in an active Satan and that such beliefs may encourage intolerance toward others.     

Scaling satan

The influence on social behavior of beliefs in Satan and the nature of evil has received little empirical study. Elaine Pagels (1995) in her book, The Origin of Satan, argued that Christians' intolerance toward others is due to their belief in an active Satan. In this study, more than 200 college undergraduates completed the Manitoba Prejudice Scale and the Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale (B. Altemeyer, 1988), as well as the Belief in an Active Satan Scale, developed by the authors. The Belief in an Active Satan Scale demonstrated good internal consistency and temporal stability. Correlational analyses revealed that for the female participants, belief in an active Satan was directly related to intolerance toward lesbians and gay men and intolerance toward ethnic minorities. For the male participants, belief in an active Satan was directly related to intolerance toward lesbians and gay men but was not significantly related to intolerance toward ethnic minorities. Results of this research showed that it is possible to meaningfully measure belief in an active Satan and that such beliefs may encourage intolerance toward others.     

Scaling happiness

This paper focuses on a particular method which is used in contemporary empirical happiness studies, namely measuring people's happiness by scoring their emotions (Kahneman is a prominent scholar). I examine the presupposition in this field that emotion scores can be added or subtracted, that throughout affective space runs a straight axis that plots hedonic tone or pleasure.     

Entre neurosciences et neurophilosophie : la psychologie cognitive et les sciences cognitives

The cognitive sciences are all at once a scientific field with far-reaching epistemological implications and the locus of institutional confrontation between several academic disciplines. In this context, cognitive psychology occupies a key historical and theoretical position. It is therefore essential to clearly situate its contribution to the origin and the development of the cognitive sciences. For some, cognitive psychology may end up being dissolved by cognitive neuroscience, with its brain imaging techniques, which in the long run, should solve the age-old problem of brain-mind dualism. For others, this epistemic wager can only be won by reducing cognition to its most elementary states and processes. Here, the problem of mental representation (of meaning and consciousness) is brought to bear to rule out a view that strictly reduces the mind to the brain. Will the cognitive sciences, then, be nothing more than a mere stage in the integration of cognitive psychology into the cognitive neurosciences? Or on the contrary, will the other disciplines in the cognitive sciences be led to recognize the specificity of cognitive psychology and put it at the centre of their research program? The debate is underway, but the scientific and institutional outcome is uncertain.