What is consciousness for?

The answer to the title question is, in a word, volition. Our hypothesis is that the ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional movement possible. All conscious processes exist to subserve that ultimate function. Thus, we believe that all conscious organisms possess at least some volitional capability. Consciousness makes volitional attention possible; volitional attention, in turn, makes volitional movement possible. There is, as far as we know, no valid theoretical argument or convincing empirical evidence that consciousness itself has any direct causal efficacy other than volition. Consciousness, via volitional action, increases the likelihood that an organism will direct its attention, and ultimately its movements, to whatever is most important for its survival and reproduction.     

How many kinds of consciousness?

Ned Block's influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that have qualitative character plainly differ from those with no mental qualities, a mental state's being conscious is the same property for both kinds of mental state. For one thing, as Block describes access consciousness, that notion does not pick out any property that we intuitively count as a mental state's being conscious. But the deeper problem is that Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness, or phenomenality, is ambiguous as between two very different mental properties. The failure to distinguish these results in the begging of important theoretical questions. Once the two kinds of phenomenality have been distinguished, the way is clear to explain qualitative consciousness by appeal to a model such as the higher-order-thought hypothesis.     

Awareness is awareness is awareness? Decomposing different aspects of awareness and their role in operant learning of pain sensitivity

Regarding awareness as a consistent concept has contributed to the controversy about implicit learning. The present study emphasized the importance of distinguishing aspects of awareness in order to determine whether learning is implicit. By decomposing awareness into awareness of contingencies, of the procedure being a learning task, and of the reinforcing stimuli, it was demonstrated that implicit operant learning modulated pain sensitivity. All of these aspects of awareness were demonstrated to not be necessary for learning. Additionally, discrimination of contingencies was not necessary on different levels of processing as demonstrated by a verbal and a behavioral method. It was demonstrated that explicit cognitive processes about one's own behavior, impaired learning, even though these cognitions were not immediately related to the learning process. The results of this study are of special interest in the context of pain, since implicit operant learning can explain the gradual development of hypersensitivity in chronic pain.     

How international is psychology?

Psychology claims to be an international discipline. This claim has been based upon subjective estimates of attendance at international congresses, status reports from selected countries published within edited volumes, and a survey of the member countries of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) (Rosenzweig, 1992). However, to be truly international, the work of psychologists in countries around the world must be internationally disseminated. Systematic examination of international congress presentations and abstracts of published psychological literature indexed on widely available electronic databases (e.g., PsycLIT) provides a more objective means of documenting the international presence of psychology. In this article, counts by country were made of research contributions reported within PsycLIT and on the programs of International Congresses of Applied Psychology over the five years in which the congresses were held from 1982 to 1998. Analyses of these data revealed PsycLIT to be more international in scope than previously assumed—45% of its entries were by authors from outside the US. Coverage of research from developing countries was even more limited within PsycLIT (4.67%), but proportionally greater within international congresses (10%). PsycLIT entries not in the English language were found noticeably to have declined from approximately 12–14% levels in the 1980s to only about 6% in the 1990s. An index of the presence of psychology in each country, based upon presentations at IAAP congresses, memberships in international associations, and the extent of PsycLIT entries over the previous three decades, provided an objective, empirically‐based answer to the question ‘How International is Psychology?' This index indicated that psychology has a significant presence in 47 countries, a presence in another 22 countries, but minimal or no presence in 82 other countries. The meaning of these data for the discipline and ways in which psychology's worldwide presence might be strengthened and extended were discussed.     

How Transparent is Disgust?

According to the so‐called transparency thesis, what is disgusting in nature cannot but be disgusting in art. This paper critically discusses the arguments that have been put forward in favour of the transparency thesis, starting with Korsmeyer's ( 2011 ) sensory view of disgust. As an alternative, it offers an account of the relationship between disgust and representation that explains, at least in part, whatever truth there is in the transparency thesis. Such an account appeals to a distinction between object‐centric and situation‐centric emotions.     

How could phenomenal consciousness be involved in mental function?

In a phylogenetic perspective, the phenomenal and the functional aspects of consciousness cannot be separated because consciousness, as a phenomenal experience, must be causally effective. The hypothesis I propose is that the fundamental property of consciousness consists of a self-organizing process: the differentiation of a content. The differentiation of a content occurs on the basis of the relations internal to a representational whole, which behaves like a field and tends towards a condition of equilibrium. This hypothesis can be somehow considered an extension of Gestalt visual perceptual theory. Unlike neurocomputational processes, which are non-conscious and extrinsic to the representation, conscious processes are intrinsic to the representational whole. Consciousness, as an intrinsically self-organizing process interwoven with its phenomenal aspects, can be more than epiphenomenal and it can be involved in mental function. The paper then discusses the implications of this hypothesis for subjectivity and the explanatory gap.     

The earliest electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness?

To examine the neural correlates and timing of human visual awareness, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) in two experiments while the observers were detecting a grey dot that was presented near subjective threshold. ERPs were averaged for conscious detections of the stimulus (hits) and nondetections (misses) separately. Our results revealed that hits, as compared to misses, showed a negativity around 180-350 ms at occipital and posterior temporal sites. It was followed by a positive wave after 400-500 ms, peaking at parietal sites. These correlates were not affected by a manipulation of attention. The early negativity, called 'visual awareness negativity' (VAN), may be a general, primary electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness. The present data show that it can be observed in response to appearance of a stimulus in visual awareness and that it generalizes across different manipulations of stimulus visibility.     

The moon illusion: I. How high is the sky?

The most common explanations of the moon illusion assume that the moon is seen at a specific distance in the sky, which is perceived as a definite surface. A decrease in the apparent distance to the sky with increasing elevation presumably leads to a corresponding decrease in apparent size. In Experiment 1 observers (N = 24) gave magnitude estimates of the distance to the night sky at different elevations. The results did not support the flattened-dome hypothesis. In Experiment 2 observers (N = 20) gave magnitude estimates of the distance to the sky at points around a 360 degrees circle just above the horizon. The results were consistent with those of Experiment 1, and in addition, estimates were highly correlated with the physical distances of buildings at the horizon. In a third, control experiment, observers (N = 20) gave magnitude estimates of the distances of buildings at the horizon. A power function fit the relation between estimated and physical distance (exponent = 1.17) as well as the relation between estimates of the sky points above the buildings (Experiment 2) and estimates of building distances (exponent = .46). Taken together, the results disconfirm all theories that attribute the moon illusion to a "sky illusion" of the sort exemplified by the flattened-dome hypothesis.     

How abstract is symbolic thought?

In 4 experiments, the authors explored the role of visual layout in rule-based syntactic judgments. Participants judged the validity of a set of algebraic equations that tested their ability to apply the order of operations. In each experiment, a nonmathematical grouping pressure was manipulated to support or interfere with the mathematical convention. Despite the formal irrelevance of these grouping manipulations, accuracy in all experiments was highest when the nonmathematical pressure supported the mathematical grouping. The increase was significantly greater when the correct judgment depended on the order of operator precedence. The result that visual perception impacts rule application in mathematics has broad implications for relational reasoning in general. The authors conclude that formally symbolic reasoning is more visual than is usually proposed.     

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

How Causal is Downward Causation?

Summary  The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization.In our discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of ‘causing’ in downward causation? We have concluded that the concept of ‘downward causation’ is muddled with regard to the meaning of causation and fuzzy with regard to the nature of the causes and the effects. Moreover, we have concluded that ‘causation’ in respect of ‘downward causation’ is usually understood in terms of explanation and determination rather than in terms of causation in the sense of ‘bringing about’. Thus, the term ‘downward causation’ is badly chosen.     

How controllable is occupational violence?

Occupational violence may be an issue in a number of workplaces, and be of two main sources—those sites where cash is handled, and sites with aggressive clients. Legal requirements make it mandatory for an employer to provide a safe workplace, but just how controllable is occupational violence? A risk management equation is developed to assist the manager to ascertain the level of risk for violence in the workplace.     

How suboptimal is suboptimal choice?

In a frequently used suboptimal‐choice procedure pigeons choose between an alternative that delivers three food pellets with p = 1.0 and an alternative that delivers ten pellets with p = 0.2. Because pigeons reliably choose the probabilistic (suboptimal) alternative, the procedure has been proposed as a nonhuman analog of human gambling. The present experiments were conducted to evaluate two potential threats to the validity of this procedure. Experiments 1 and 2 evaluated if pigeons obtained food at a lower unit price (i.e., pecks per pellet) on the suboptimal alternative than on the optimal alternative. When pigeons worked under this suboptimal procedure they all preferred the suboptimal alternative despite some pigeons paying a higher price for food on that alternative. In Experiment 2, when the unit price ratio more closely approximated the inverse of the expected value ratio, pigeons continued to prefer the suboptimal alternative despite its economic suboptimality. Experiment 3 evaluated if, in accord with the string‐theory of gambling, the valuation of the suboptimal alternative was increased when pigeons misattributed a subset of the suboptimal no‐food trials to the optimal alternative. When trial sequences were arranged to minimize these possible attribution errors, pigeons still preferred the suboptimal alternative. These data remove two threats to the validity of the suboptimal choice procedure; threats that would have suggested that suboptimal choice reflects economic maximization.