Rationalizing two-tiered choice functions through conditional choice

Set-valued choice functions provide a framework that is general enough to encompass a wide variety of theories that are significant to the study of rationality but, at the same time, offer enough structure to articulate consistency conditions that can be used to characterize some of the theories within this encompassed variety. Nonetheless, two-tiered choice functions, such as those advocated by Isaac Levi, are not easily characterized within the framework of set-valued choice functions. The present work proposes conditional choice functions as the proper carriers of synchronic rationality. The resulting framework generalizes the familiar one mentioned above without emptying it and, moreover, provides a natural setting for two-tiered choice rules.     

Conflict-mediated choice

Research on behavioral decision making has demonstrated that preferences are affected by the set of options under consideration. Formal models offer an account of such choice-set effects on the basis of principles according to which the similarity of the options in the choice set has an effect on choice probabilities. Behavioral formulations are Tversky's (1972) elimination-by-aspects (EBA) model, based on the principle of sequential elimination, and Tversky and Simonson's (1993) componential context (CC) model, based on the principle of pairwise comparisons subject to loss aversion. While these principles are assumed to determine choice behavior, the conflict induced by the set of options under consideration is assumed to be merely a source of indeterminacy in choice behavior. This paper challenges past models by offering a behavioral account of choice-set effects according to which the effect of similarity on choice probabilities is mediated by conflict. A conflict-mediated choice (CMC) model is developed, its testable implications are derived, and its predictions are contrasted with those of the EBA model and the CC model. Specifically, it is described how, according to each of the three models, choice probabilities are affected by the similarity of the options in the choice set and how choice-set effects are moderated by the relative weight of the attributes along which the options are positioned. In two experimental studies, the CMC model offers an accurate account of observed choice-set effects and outperforms the alternative models.     

Optimal choice

We present a classification and theoretical analysis of discrete-trial and free-operant choice procedures in which reinforcement is assigned to one alternative only, or independently to both, is either always available or conditionally available, and is either "held" or not from trial to trial. Momentary-maximizing and (globally) optimal choice sequences are defined in terms of initializing and marker events. Free-operant choice is analyzed in terms of a clock space whose axes are the times since the last A and B choices. The analysis shows that most molar matching data are derivable from momentary maximizing, and that the momentary-maximizing hypothesis has not been adequately tested in either discrete-trial or free-operant situations.     

Emotion-regulation choice

Despite centuries of speculation about how to manage negative emotions, little is actually known about which emotion-regulation strategies people choose to use when confronted with negative situations of varying intensity. On the basis of a new process conception of emotion regulation, we hypothesized that in low-intensity negative situations, people would show a relative preference to choose to regulate emotions by engagement reappraisal, which allows emotional processing. However, we expected people in high-intensity negative situations to show a relative preference to choose to regulate emotions by disengagement distraction, which blocks emotional processing at an early stage before it gathers force. In three experiments, we created emotional contexts that varied in intensity, using either emotional pictures (Experiments 1 and 2) or unpredictable electric stimulation (Experiment 3). In response to these emotional contexts, participants chose between using either reappraisal or distraction as an emotion-regulation strategy. Results in all experiments supported our hypothesis. This pattern in the choice of emotion-regulation strategies has important implications for the understanding of healthy adaptation.     

Preference for free choice over forced choice in pigeons

Eight severely retarded young men learned color and line-tilt discrimination. After 95% accuracy was achieved for both dimensions, they were combined to form "conflict-compound" stimuli in which prior reinforcement history was reversed for one element of the compound and unchanged for the other. When responding to the compound was 95% accurate, control exerted by each element was measured. The unchanged element consistently exercised control in agreement with the reinforcement contingencies associated with the compound, regardless of whether it was color or line orientation. The reversed element, which had a conflicting prior history or reinforcement, most often exerted control associated wtih original training, or no control, suggesting that it had been "ignored" during the compound. Conflict compounds produced selective attention. When elements were combined to form "compatible-compound" stimuli, both exercised control in agreement with the compound in post-tests. Selective attention was not produced by compatible compounds.     

Scalable choice models

Two representational criteria for probabilistic choice models are studied. These criteria, called scalability and weak scalability, are shown to be characterized by behavioral axioms designated, respectively, as pairwise dependence and weak pairwise dependence. The former is shown to be equivalent to the order independence axiom of Tversky. In addition, structural conditions on the choice alternatives are established under which all axioms are equivalent.     

Elaboration and choice

Dhar and Gorlin (2013) proposed a dual-process perspective on choice. We applaud the effort to generate such a model, and we support the effort to integrate potentially disparate literatures under a general theoretical approach. In an attempt to further that goal of integration, we discuss similarities and differences between the proposed approach and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty, 1977, Petty and Cacioppo, 1979, Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) — one of the earliest models of evaluative judgment to propose different mechanisms and consequences of judgments formulated at different levels of motivation and ability to process available information. In addition, because many choice settings involve familiar options that have been previously evaluated, we discuss potential implications of the literature on influences of attitudes on behavior (which can often be framed as involving a choice to act or not or to act in one way rather than another). In each case, we believe that these previous social psychological literatures provide insights that could enhance and extend the proposed model.     

Understanding choice utterances

When individuals offer choices, they intend them to be mandatory (requiring action) or permissive (not requiring action), and they intend them to be open (allowing the choice of both options) or closed (not allowing the choice of both options). In two studies subjects were presented with sets of syntactically equivalent disjunctive sentences with varying content designed to represent four patterns of permitted choice. The research indicates that individuals distinguish four distinct uses of “or” in deontic contexts, and that individuals more often judge choices as mandatory than permissive. The research also compared responses to questions about choice giver intent and receiver choice. The data indicate that when judging intent, individuals are inclined to understand some choices to be permissive. However, when judging what action they might take as choice receiver, subjects tend to regard action to be mandatory. It appears that although people have some facility in assessing a permission giver's intent, they often apply a more restrictive rule to themselves than is required by the choice giver.     

Maximizing,choice freedom,and duration judgments in choice making

This paper examines (a) whether people are less accurate in judging choice time as choice tasks involve more choice options, more choice information, or a combination of both and (b) whether people with a higher tendency to look for the best option in choice making (maximizers) have less accurate duration judgments of choice time as compared to people who are more easily settling for a choice outcome that is satisfactory (satisficers). A multilevel analysis is used to explore the relationships of interest using data collected through a series of choice tasks. In general, the results suggest that people seem to misjudge time durations when making choices. Moreover, empirical evidence demonstrates that people with an outspoken tendency to maximize in choice making do not differ significantly in estimating choice time accurately as compared to people who experience almost no need to maximize.     

The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

When confidence in a choice is independent of which choice is made

For forced-choice two-alternative general-information questions, confidence in the correctness of the answer differed reliably for different questions, regardless of which answer was chosen. Results suggested that this choice-independent confidence is mediated by the domain familiarity of the question and by its tendency to bring to mind either few or many thoughts and considerations. Ratings of the questions on familiarity and accessibility yielded strong correlations with participants’ confidence in whichever of two answers they had chosen, and with estimates of the percentage of participants who were likely to have chosen either of the answers in a previous experiment. The results were interpreted in terms of confirmation bias: Because items differ in the extent to which they bring to mind few or many pertinent thoughts, selective focusing on supportive evidence should yield a positive correlation between mean confidence in one answer and mean confidence in the alternative answer, as if there is no competition between them.     

Influencing choice without awareness

Forcing occurs when a magician influences the audience’s decisions without their awareness. To investigate the mechanisms behind this effect, we examined several stimulus and personality predictors. In Study 1, a magician flipped through a deck of playing cards while participants were asked to choose one. Although the magician could influence the choice almost every time (98%), relatively few (9%) noticed this influence. In Study 2, participants observed rapid series of cards on a computer, with one target card shown longer than the rest. We expected people would tend to choose this card without noticing that it was shown longest. Both stimulus and personality factors predicted the choice of card, depending on whether the influence was noticed. These results show that combining real-world and laboratory research can be a powerful way to study magic and can provide new methods to study the feeling of free will.     

Dissociation of theories of choice by temporal spacing of choice opportunities.

Rats were trained on a discrete-trial version of a concurrent variable-interval (VI) variable-ratio (VR) schedule in which the relative reinforcement rates were varied across conditions. Subjects with the shorter intertrial interval (ITI) had a significant bias toward the VR alternative, as predicted by optimality theory, and were also more likely to choose the VI alternative with longer times since responses to the VI alternative, as predicted by momentary-maximizing theory. Subjects with the longer ITI failed to show either of these effects. Approximation to the matching law was greater with the longer ITI. Thus, matching is not derivative of the processes postulated by optimality or momentary-maximizing theory but instead is in competition with those processes.     

Timing in choice experiments

In Experiment 1, pigeons chose between variable- and fixed-interval schedules. The timer for 1 schedule was reset by a reinforcement on that schedule or on either schedule. In both cases, the pigeons timed reinforcement on each schedule from trial onset. The data further suggest that their behavior reflects 2 independent processes: 1 deciding when a response should be emitted and responsible for the timing of the overall activity, and the other determining what this response should be and responsible for the allocation of behavior between the 2 response keys. Results from Experiment 2, which studied choice between 2 fixed-interval schedules, support those 2 conclusions. These results have implications for the study of operant choice in general.