What did Popper learn from Lakatos?

The canonical version of the history of twentieth century philosophy of science tells us that Lakatos was Popper’s disciple, but it is rarely mentioned that Popper would have learned anything from Lakatos. The aim of this paper is to examine Lakatos’ influence on Popper’s philosophical system and to argue that Lakatos did have an important, yet somewhat unexpected, impact on Popper’s thinking: he influenced Popper’s evolutionary model for ‘progress’ in science. And Lakatos’ influence sheds new light on why and how Popper continually revised one of the central claims of his philosophy of science: the evolutionary account of scientific theory change.     

What’s in It for the Historian of Science? Reflections on the Value of Philosophy of Science for History of Science

In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice.     

Rationality,sociology and the symmetry thesis

This paper attempts to clarify the debate between those philosophers who hold that the development of science is governed by objective standards of rationality and those sociologists of science who deny this. In particular it focuses on the debate over the ‘symmetry thesis’. Bloor and Barnes argue that a properly scientific approach to science itself demands that an investigator should seek the same general type of explanation for all decisions and actions by past scientists, quite independently of whether or not she or he happens to agree with those decisions or approve those actions as ‘correct’ or ‘rational’. I try to improve on previous treatments of the ‘rationalist’ position (by Lakatos, Laudan, Newton‐Smith and Brown) and clarify the exact asymmetries to which the ‘rationalist’ is, and is not, committed.     

Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy

With the recent revival of moral intuitionism, the work of W. D. Ross has grown in stature. But if we look at some recent well-regarded histories, anthologies and companions of analytic philosophy, Ross is noticeably absent. This discrepancy of assessments raises the question of Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy. Hans-Johann Glock has recently claimed that Ross is not an analytic philosopher at all, but is instead a ‘traditional philosopher’. In this article, I will identify several undeniable features of analytic philosophy that Ross’s work bears: a focus on linguistic analysis, great respect for pre-theoretical thoughts, the conviction that philosophy is a collaborative, piecemeal enterprise and so on. Such an investigation, I claim, reveals two historically significant results: Ross was the first ethicist to fully draw from commonsense beliefs about morality in light of characteristic analytic considerations to secure his theory. Two, concerning the matter of whether the notions ‘right’ and ‘good’ are reducible to other notions, Ross appears to have been right: ‘right’ and ‘good’ are irreducible notions. The classical analytic metaethicists, who based their entire research programme on the promise of finding suitable reductive semantic analyses of ‘right’ and ‘good’, were wrong. These results, I believe, suffice to secure W. D. Ross a high place in the history of analytic philosophy.     

The Political Philosophy of Science and the Problem of Rationality

The present article offers an introductory vision to the political philosophy of science. The political philosophy of science is a new field of study where the philosophy of science and political philosophy converge. We will see the main contents of this field. We will also note that it depends on the construction of a model of rationality where science and politics can meet each other. Finally, the article tries to outline such a model of rationality. In order to do so, we will review the relationship between Karl Popper’s scientific and political philosophy. I suggest to read Popper’s critical rationalism in terms of a kind of prudential rationality.     

The curious incident of wisdom in the thought of Feng Qi (1915–1995): comparative philosophy,historical materialism,and metaphysics

After some introductory remarks on the work of the modern Chinese philosopher Feng Qi, I begin this article by providing some observations concerning the ambiguous notion of ‘wisdom’ in Orientalist representations of non-Western thought and in comparative philosophy, as well as on the peculiar form of subjectivity ascribed to the ‘wise’ subject. I then proceed by offering an account of Feng’s philosophical universalism and historical materialist outlook, outlining the identification of wisdom with metaphysics in his early work and exploring the status and function of wisdom in his mature writings. In doing so, I analyze the tension in Feng’s work between the theoretical rationality and systematicity of ‘metaphysics’ on the one hand and the existential and transformative orientation of ‘wisdom’ on the other.     

History,methodology and early algebra 1

The limits of ‘criterial rationality’ (that is, rationality as rule‐following) have been extensively explored in the philosophy of science by Kuhn and others. In this paper I attempt to extend this line of enquiry into mathematics by means of a pair of case studies in early algebra. The first case is the Ars Magna (Nuremburg 1545) by Jerome Cardan (1501–1576), in which a then recently‐discovered formula for finding the roots of some cubic equations is extended to cover all cubics and proved. The second is the formulation by Albert Girard (1595–1632) of an early version of the fundamental theorem of algebra in his L'invention nouvelle en l'algèbre (Amsterdam, 1629). I conclude that in these cases at least, the questions raised in the philosophy of science debate can also be asked of the history of mathematics, and that a modest methodological anarchism is the appropriate stance.     

The Crucial Importance of Nancey Murphy’s Deployment of Lakatos’s Methodology for Theology and Science

Russell's paper explores the astonishing fruitfulness of Nancey Murphy’s use of Imre Lakatos’s philosophy of science in the field of “theology and science.” Murphy’s work can be used to choose between competing theologies according to the theologians’ willingness to engage with science, their ability to continue the engagement as scientific theories change, and their ability to make empirical predictions based on this engagement. Topics range from creation and cosmology, the “cosmic Christ”, and non-interventionist objective divine action in quantum mechanics and evolution. Russell has followed Murphy’s lead and used Lakatos to place theology and science into “creative mutual interaction” (CMI).     

Learning from the past: Reflections on the role of history in the philosophy of science

In recent years philosophers of science have turned away from positivist programs for explicating scientific rationality through detailed accounts of scientific procedure and turned toward large-scale accounts of scientific change. One important motivation for this was better fit with the history of science. Paying particular attention to the large-scale theories of Lakatos and Laudan I argue that the history of science is no better accommodated by the new large-scale theories than it was by the earlier positivist philosophies of science; both are, in their different ways, parochial to our conception of rationality. I further argue that the goal of scientific methodology is not explaining the past but promoting good scientific practice, and on this the large-scale methodologies have no obvious a priori advantages over the positivist methodologies they have tried to replace.     

Deviant interdisciplinarity as philosophical practice: prolegomena to deep intellectual history

Philosophy may relate to interdisciplinarity in two distinct ways On the one hand, philosophy may play an auxiliary role in the process of interdisciplinarity, typically through conceptual analysis, in the understanding that the disciplines themselves are the main epistemic players. This version of the relationship I characterise as ‘normal’ because it captures the more common pattern of the relationship, which in turn reflects an acceptance of the division of organized inquiry into disciplines. On the other hand, philosophy may be itself the site for the production of interdisciplinary knowledge, understood as a kind of second-order understanding of reality that transcends the sort of knowledge that the disciplines provide, left to their own devices. This is my own position, which I dub ‘deviant’ and to which most of this article is devoted. I begin by relating the two types of interdisciplinarity to the organization of inquiry, especially their respective attitudes to the history of science. Underlying the two types are contrasting notions of what constitutes the ‘efficient’ pursuit of knowledge. This difference is further explored in terms of the organization of the university. The normal/deviant distinction was already marked in the institution’s medieval origins in terms of the difference between Doctors and Masters, respectively, an artefact of which remains in the postgraduate/undergraduate degree distinction. In the context of the history of the university, the prospects for deviant interdisciplinarity were greatest from the early sixteenth to the early nineteenth century—the period called ‘early modern’ in the philosophy curriculum. Towards the end of that period, due to Kant and the generation of idealists who followed him, philosophy was briefly the privileged site for deviant interdisciplinarity. After Hegel’s death, the mantle of deviant interdisciplinarity increasingly passed to some version of ‘biology’. I explore the ‘Natur-’ and ‘Geisteswissenschaft’ versions of that post-philosophical vision, which continue to co-exist within today’s biological science. I then briefly examine the chequered reputation of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, someone who exemplified the promise and perils of deviant interdisciplinarity over the past 200 years. I conclude with an Epilogue that considers contemporary efforts to engage philosophy in interdisciplinary work, invoking William James as an exemplar.     

Kuhn’s Legacy: Theoretical and Philosophical Study of History

This paper considers the legacy of Kuhn and his Structure with regard to the current history and philosophy of science. Kuhn can be seen as a myth breaker, whose contribution is the way he connected historical and philosophical studies of science, questioning the cumulativist image and demanding historical responsibility of the views of science. I build on Kuhn’s legacy and outline a suggestion for theoretical and philosophical study of history (of science), which can be subdivided into three categories. The first is the philosophical analysis of historical interpretation and its relation to the historical record. The second is ‘theoretical history’ in which one tries to infer philosophically relevant interpretations on the nature of science on the basis of historical evidence. The third is the conceptual reflection of the assumptions and implications of the contemporary historiography of science. At the end I suggest that theoretical and philosophical study of history offers a fresh way to make history and philosophy relevant to each other.     

After Lakatos

The work of the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos has been highly influential upon scholars of science and religion, especially persons who want to demonstrate how theological inquiry may meet the intellectual standards of science. I first argue against Lakatos' position, showing how it fails to meet its own ambitions of providing clear and public criteria for assessing scientific theories. I then argue that the same weaknesses will manifest themselves in the work of his followers, using Nancey Murphy's early work as an example. I conclude by affirming Murphy's recent shift towards Alasdair MacIntyre's theory of rationality.     

Echoes of Tsültrim Lodrö: An Indigenous Voice from Contemporary Tibet on the ‘Buddhism and Science Dialogue’

This paper seeks to find a place for the intellectual voices of an indigenous movement of ‘Buddhist modernism’ that recently took shape in eastern Tibet. It presents how a prominent leader of this movement, Tsültrim Lodrö (tshul khrims blo gros, b. 1962), articulates Buddhism in response to modern discourses of rationality and science. In particular, since the ‘dialogue’ between Buddhism and science in recent years has largely been a series of monologues, this paper seeks to open up the conversation in order to shed light on the nature of this dialogue and what is at stake in this conversation. I will discuss Tsültrim Lodrö’s most recent work on philosophy and science with the aim to shed light on the nature of the current Buddhism and science discourses through considering the contributions of this influential contemporary Tibetan.     

The long past and the short history of social psychology

In 1908 Ebbinghaus distinguished between the long past and the short history of psychology. The short history dated from 1879 when Wundt established a psychological laboratory at Leipzig. The long past concerns the time when psychology was a branch of philosophy. Implicit in such a break with the past is a positivist philosophy of science. I show how this philosophy of science distorts the historical record. I then analyse the history of social psychology. Unwittingly Lindzey and Aronson (1985) distinguish between the long past of social psychology as part of the Western intellectual tradition and its short history as an experimental science that is mainly American. Murchison's Handbook of Social Psychology (1935), whilst marking the boundary between the long past and the short history, belongs to the long past. The break with tradition came in 1954, when Lindzey published the first Handbook in the modern series. There is a self-conscious need, in the post World War II era, to train a whole new generation of social psychologists. The Lindzey series of Handbooks meets that need. The ‘progress’ of modern social psychology is now measured in terms of its distance from the Murchison milestone of 1935.     

Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

In this paper, I highlight the significance of practices of refutation in philosophical inquiry, that is, practices of showing that a claim, person or theory is wrong. I present and contrast two prominent approaches to philosophical refutation: refutation in ancient Greek dialectic (elenchus), in its Socratic variant as described in Plato’s dialogues, and as described in Aristotle’s logical texts; and the practice of providing counterexamples to putative definitions familiar from twentieth century analytic philosophy, focusing on the so-called Gettier problem. Moreover, I discuss Lakatos’ method of proofs and refutations, as it offers insightful observations on the dynamics between arguments, refutations, and counterexamples. Overall, I argue that dialectic, in particular in its Socratic variant, is especially suitable for the philosophical purpose of questioning the obvious, as it invites reflection on one’s own doxastic commitments and on the tensions and inconsistencies within one’s set of beliefs. By contrast, the counterexample-based approach to philosophical refutation can give rise to philosophical theorizing that is overly focused on hairsplitting disputes, thus becoming alienated from the relevant human experiences. Insofar as philosophical inquiry treads the fine line between questioning the obvious while still seeking to say something significant about human experiences, perhaps a certain amount of what Lakatos describes as ‘monster-barring’—a rejection of overly fanciful, artificial putative counterexamples—has its place in philosophical argumentation.

     

The Role of Science in Evangelical Hermeneutics

In this article, I argue that evangelical Christians can accommodate science within the limits of strict Biblical exegesis governed by grammatical-historical hermeneutics. To this end, I describe the grammatical-historical method to show how science enters into it. I then distinguish between theological and exegetical uses of science. Next, I use Lakatos’ philosophy of science to distinguish between ad hoc and well-motivated exegetical moves. Based upon these criteria, I then present the gap- and day-age theories as examples of hermeneutical failure in the accommodation of science. Finally, I use the framework interpretation to illustrate a hermeneutically successful accommodation of science.     

Yu in the Xunzi: toward a precise understanding

An ongoing dialogue in Xunzi scholarship addresses the role of yu (欲), often rendered as ‘desire,’ in motivation, but little has been said about what yu actually is, or whether the translation of ‘desire’ accurately reflects Xunzi’s use of the term. Employing textual analysis alongside research in cognitive science, most notably work on the so-called ‘wanting-liking’ distinction, I work toward a more precise understanding of Xunzi’s notion of yu and its functions. I suggest that yu be construed as a kind of desire with an emphasis on ‘wanting’ that, while motivational, differs from broader, less precise notions of desire, and that this feature constitutes a distinctive aspect of Xunzi’s philosophy of psychology. In so doing, I propose a particular methodological approach for the interpretation of classical Chinese philosophy: when interpreting concepts that are subjects of empirical inquiry, empirical findings should lead us to favor some interpretations over others.     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

Kenosis,Dynamic Śūnyatā and Weak Thought: Abe Masao and Gianni Vattimo

The verb κεν?ω (kenos) means ‘to empty’ and St. Paul uses the word ?κ?νωσεν (ekenosen) writing that ‘Jesus made himself nothing’ and ‘emptied himself’. ?ūnyatā is a Buddhist concept most commonly translated as emptiness, nothingness, or nonsubstantiality. An important kenosis–?ūnyatā discussion was sparked by Abe Masao’s paper ‘Kenotic God and Dynamic ?ūnyatā’ (in 1984). I confront the kenosis–?ūnyatā theme with Vattimo’s kenosis-based philosophy of religion. For Vattimo, kenosis refers to ‘secularization’: when strong structures such as the essence and the fulfilment of the Christian message are weakened. Parallels between Abe’s and Vattimo’s thought will be demonstrated with regard to themes current in East–West comparative philosophy: reality and emptiness, the overcoming of metaphysics, the position of the Self, the human and the divine, and the relationship between science and religion. The latter point is particularly timely because since the 1990s religious fundamentalism has pushed forward a curious ‘religion as science’ hypothesis. Both thinkers’ relationship with the idea of Nothingness will also be explored. Finally, Abe’s interpretation of ?ūnyatā will be presented as a form of ‘weak thought’. Both Abe and Vattimo design a religious attitude based on negativity without falling into the trap of anti-religious nihilism. Abe’s negation of the subject, which leads to a pluralism of beings, can very well be compared with Vattimo’s paradoxical ‘credere di credere’ (to believe to believe), through which Vattimo describes the attitude of an ego that has lost its own subjectivity. The person who does not believe but only ‘believes to believe’ is a sort of non-ego. I show that a ‘half-theistic’ way of thinking God based on kenosis can work in the service of plurality because it deconstructs the principle of reality based on faith and ‘fullness’.