Is the emotional modulation of the attentional blink driven by response bias?

Several studies have shown that the attentional blink (AB; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) is diminished for highly arousing T2 stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 2005). Whereas this effect is most often interpreted as evidence for a more efficient processing of arousing information, it could be due also to a bias to report more arousing stimuli than neutral stimuli. We introduce a paradigm that allows one to control for such a response bias. Using this paradigm, we obtained evidence that the diminished AB for taboo words cannot be explained by a response bias. This supports the idea that the emotional modulation of the AB is caused by attentional processes.     

What's in a name? Attachment-related attentional bias

Participants completed a dot probe task that presented pairs of first names: the participant's own name and a neutral name (Experiments 1-4), the name of their attachment figure and a neutral name (Experiments 1-4), or the name of a known person and a neutral name (Experiments 2-4). A significant attentional bias effect was found for the attachment name in attachment-related contexts, whether they were threatening or positive. The results of Experiments 2 and 4 showed that the attentional bias effects for the attachment name were not driven by familiarity effects and could not be interpreted in terms of salience. Attachment anxiety was associated with hypervigilance toward the attachment name in threatening and positive attachment contexts. Attachment avoidance was unrelated to any attentional bias effects.     

Spatial asymmetries in viewing and remembering scenes: Consequences of an attentional bias?

Given a single fixation, memory for scenes containing salient objects near both the left and right view boundaries exhibited a rightward bias in boundary extension (Experiment 1). On each trial, a 500-msec picture and 2.5-sec mask were followed by a boundary adjustment task. Observers extended boundaries 5% more on the right than on the left. Might this reflect an asymmetric distribution of attention? In Experiments 2A and 2B, free viewing of pictures revealed that first saccades were more often leftward (62%) than rightward (38%). In Experiment 3, 500-msec pictures were interspersed with 2.5-sec masks. A subsequent object recognition memory test revealed better memory for left-side objects. Scenes were always mirror reversed for half the observers, thus ruling out idiosyncratic scene compositions as the cause of these asymmetries. Results suggest an unexpected leftward bias of attention that selectively enhanced the representations, causing a smaller boundary extension error and better object memory on the views’ left sides.     

Temporal dynamics of anxiety-related attentional bias: is affective context a missing piece of the puzzle?

Previous research has demonstrated that anxious individuals attend to negative emotional information at the expense of other information. This is commonly referred to as attentional bias. The field has historically conceived of this process as relatively static; however, research by [Zvielli, A., Bernstein, A., &; Koster, E. H. W. (2014). Dynamics of attentional bias to threat in anxious adults: Bias towards and/or away? PLoS ONE, 9(8), e104025; Zvielli, A., Bernstein, A., &; Koster, E. H. W. (2015). Temporal dynamics of attentional bias. Clinical Psychological Science, 3(5), 772–788.], and others, challenges this assumption by demonstrating considerable temporal variability in attentional bias amongst anxious individuals. Still, the mechanisms driving these temporal dynamics are less well known. Using a modified dot-probe task, the present study examined the impact of two relevant contextual variables- affective valence and trial repetition. Affective context was instantiated by the presentation of negative versus neutral pictures before each trial, while repetition context was achieved via the presentation of the valenced pictures in either a blocked- or mixed-trial design. Results indicate that individuals with higher trait-anxiety levels were significantly more influenced by blocked presentations of negative affective information, leading to greater temporal fluctuations in attentional bias. Furthermore, our findings provide additional evidence that attentional bias is best conceptualised as dynamic and variable, and that an individual’s affective experience is one factor that regulates attentional bias dynamics. Implications relating to theoretical and methodological factors are discussed.     

Over-estimation in numerosity estimation tasks: More than an attentional bias?

Over- and under-estimation have been observed in numerosity estimation and approximate arithmetic tasks. Two different models have been proposed to account for these reverse patterns of performance: 1) the bi-directional mapping account (Crollen, Castronovo, & Seron, 2011); 2) the operational momentum hypothesis (McCrink, Dehaene, & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2007). Our study was designed to examine whether the operational momentum could account for the over-estimation found in numerosity estimation tasks. To this aim, a series of 3 experiments involving a symbolic to non-symbolic numerical mapping and a rightward or leftward displacement along the mental number line were designed. Over-estimation was observed in these three tasks irrespective of the direction and size of the displacement to be done on the mental number line. These results thus clearly demonstrated that overestimation was not merely due to an attentional bias, but rather relied on the cognitive operation of mapping two differently scaled numerical representations.     

Do zoo visitors induce attentional bias effects in primates completing cognitive tasks?

Animal Cognition - While previous research has focused on the impact of visitors on zoo-housed animals’ behavior, here, we evaluated the impact of visitors on the performance of four...     

Hindsight bias and outcome bias in judging directors’ liability and the role of free will beliefs

Following a corporate disaster such as bankruptcy, people in general and damaged parties, in particular, want to know what happened and whether the company's directors are to blame. The accurate assessment of directors’ liability can be jeopardized by having to judge in hindsight with full knowledge of the adverse outcome. The present study investigates whether professional legal investigators such as judges and lawyers are affected by hindsight bias and outcome bias when evaluating directors’ conduct in a bankruptcy case. Additionally, to advance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these biases, we also examine whether free will beliefs can predict susceptibility to hindsight bias and outcome bias in this context. In two studies (total N = 1,729), we demonstrate that legal professionals tend to judge a director's actions more negatively and perceive bankruptcy as more foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight and that these effects are significantly stronger for those who endorse the notion that humans have free will. This contribution is particularly timely considering the many companies that are currently going bankrupt or are facing bankruptcy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.     

Is there a position bias in the learning of influence structures?

An experiment was conducted to determine the nature of position biases in the cognitive representation of hierarchical social structures. A position in such a structure reflects the relative influence of its occupants. Using DeSoto's technique, 24 Dutch and 24 French Ss learned either a completely ordered or incompletely ordered structure. No significant differences were found between countries. The completely ordered structure was found easier to learn than the incomplete ones. According to the results of previous studies (Van Kreveld and Zajonc, 1966; Poitou, 1970) the learning curves for completely and incompletely ordered structures were expected to be respectively curvilinear and monotonic. The results did not support this expectation.     

Tactful or doubtful? Expectations of politeness explain the severity bias in the interpretation of probability phrases

When a statement about the occurrence of a medical condition is qualified by an expression of probability, such as the word possible, listeners interpret the probability of the condition as being higher the more severe the condition. This severity bias can have serious consequences for the well-being of patients. We argue that the bias is due to a misconception of the pragmatic function served by the expression of probability. The more severe the condition, the greater the chance that the listener construes the expression as a politeness marker rather than as an uncertainty marker. When this misconception does not occur, neither should the severity bias. An analysis of interpretations of probability expressions using a membership-function approach validates this account. We discuss the consequences of this bias for the communication of risk within and outside the medical domain.     

Do alerting signals increase the size of the attentional focus?

Previous research has shown that the presentation of an auditory alerting signal before a visual target increases the interference from flanking distractors. Recently, it has been suggested that this increase in interference may be due to an expansion of the spatial focus of attention. In five experiments, this hypothesis was tested by using a probe technique dedicated to measuring variations in the size of the attentional focus: In the majority of trials, participants performed a letter discrimination task in which their attention was focused on a central target letter. In a randomly intermixed probe task, the size of the attentional focus was measured by letting participants respond to a probe occurring at varying positions. In all experiments, reaction time (RT) to the probe increased from the most central to more lateral probe positions. This V-shaped probe-RT function, however, was not flattened by the presentation of an alerting signal. Overall, this pattern of results is inconsistent with the hypothesis that alerting signals increase the attentional focus. Instead, it is consistent with nonspatial accounts that attribute the increase in interference to an alerting effect on perceptual processing, which then leads to a detrimental effect at the level of response selection.     

Is the attentional blink effect located in short-term memory?

The attentional blink (AB) effect is characterized by a failure to detect a second target following the identification of a previous target in a RSVP stream. This effect has been attributed to capacity limitations at a central level of visual information processes. Postperceptual models suppose that the AB locus is located in short-term memory. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence of a short-term memory deficit on the AB effect in a patient with such a deficit. The three main results of this study are (1) the persistence of an AB effect, (2) a large number of T1 missed identifications and (3) a T2 detection deficit for a specific delay (367 ms). These results indicate that a short-term memory deficit disrupts the processing of each target (T1 and T2) but does not product an abolition of the AB effect.     

Older adults’ associative deficit in episodic memory: Assessing the role of decline in attentional resources

In this study, we evaluated an associative deficit hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that the deficit seen in the episodic memory performance of older adults is due, in considerable part, to older adults’ difficulty in binding together unrelated components of an episode into a cohesive entity (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). The study extended the conditions under which older adults show a differential deficit in tests requiring associations among the episode components to situations in which the item and the associative recognition tests are equated on the response mode used and on the amount of information displayed. In addition, we tested the potential role of a decrease in attentional resources in the associative deficit of older adults by comparing their performance to that of younger adults under conditions of reduced attentional resources. The results of the study, which indicate that younger adults under divided attention do not show an associative deficit, are interpreted as indicating that the associative deficit of older adults is due to factors other than depleted attentional resources.     

Standing up for whom? Targets’ different goals in the confrontation of discrimination

We challenge the common interpretation of targets’ immediate confrontation in reaction to discrimination as self-serving behavior and propose different underlying motivations for this phenomenon. In five online scenario studies (N_overall = 1,447), we demonstrate across different samples and contexts that targets indicate a distinct pursuit of the following self-reported confrontation goals: individual-benefit (e.g., perpetrator apologizes); group-benefit (e.g., prejudice reduction); and distancing (e.g., demonstrating that one is different from typical group members). Furthermore, meaningful associations of the pursuits of individual-benefitting goals and group-benefitting goals with group identification, disidentification, and further collective action intentions indicate that they represent different confrontation motivations: Individual-benefitting confrontation serves to cope with the individual mistreatment of discrimination, whereas group-benefitting confrontation represents a form of collective action. Distancing goals were associated with disidentification and—unexpectedly—group identification. Our results show that the phenomenon of confrontation in reaction to discrimination can be the result of different underlying psychological processes.     

Priming in the attentional blink: Perception without awareness?

The attentional blink refers to a reduction in accuracy that occurs when observers are required to identify the second of two rapidly sequential targets. Even when the second target cannot be reported, however, it is still capable of priming the response to a subsequent related item. At issue in the present work was whether this priming is attributable mainly to conscious or unconscious processes. To answer this question, we used an exclusion procedure that permitted an assessment of the relative dominance of conscious and unconscious processes. The results showed that second targets that are identified incorrectly are nonetheless processed extensively outside of awareness. Moreover, this processing is sufficient to prime a subsequent response for at least 1 s after the onset of the prime.     

Effects of emotion regulation strategies on smoking craving, attentional bias, and task persistence

The goal of this study was to investigate the effects of different strategies for regulating emotions associated with smoking on subjective, cognitive, and behavioral correlates of smoking. Emotion regulation was manipulated by instructing participants to reappraise (n = 32), accept (n = 31), or suppress (n = 31) their emotions associated with smoking. The dependent measures included subjective reports of craving, negative affect, and attentional biases, as measured by a modified dot-probe task, and persistence during a task to measure distress tolerance. Individuals who were encouraged to reappraise the consequences of smoking showed diminished craving, lower negative affect, had reduced attentional biases for smoking-related cues, and exhibited greater task persistence than those who were instructed to accept and suppress their urge to smoke. These findings suggest that reappraisal techniques are more effective than acceptance or suppression strategies for targeting smoking-related problems.     

Female first,leader second? Gender bias in the encoding of leadership behavior

In the current paper we investigate whether gender affects the encoding of leadership behavior. In three studies we found evidence that perceivers had difficulty encoding leadership behaviors into their underlying prototypical leadership traits when the behavior implied an agentic trait and the behavior was enacted by a female. Using a lexical decision making task, in Study 1 we demonstrated that agentic leadership traits were less accessible than communal leadership traits when the leader was female. Additionally, Study 1 also demonstrated that agentic traits were less accessible when the leader was female versus male. In Studies 2a and 2b, we replicated the differences we found for agentic leadership behaviors using perceiver’s self-ratings as the dependent variable. Results are discussed both in terms of their implications for future research on gender bias in leadership and their practical implications for eliminating gender bias against females who aspire to leadership positions.     

Does confrontation with potential goal failure promote self-regulation? Examining the role of distress in the pursuit of weight goals

Implementation intentions planning in advance the situation in which one will act, have been proposed to be an effective self-regulatory technique for changing health behaviour. Encouraging people to receive text message reminders of their implementation intentions should enhance their strength and, thus, it was predicted that this combined approach would be particularly effective in increasing exercise. Participants (N = 155) were randomly allocated to one of five conditions (implementation intentions and SMS, implementation intention, SMS or one of two control groups) then completed self-report measures of exercise behaviour and motivation. Four weeks later, they responded to similar items. Results suggested that the combined intervention increased exercise frequency significantly more than the other strategies including the implementation intention group. It is proposed, therefore, that implementation intention effects can be enhanced via plan reminders.     

Directional bias in the mental representation of spatial events: nature or culture?

Previous research has shown a tendency for people to imagine simple sentences as evolving from left to right, with the sentence subject being located to the left of the object. In two cross-cultural studies comparing Italian and Arab participants, we investigated whether this bias is a function of hemispheric specialization or of directionality of written language (left to right in Italian, right to left in Arabic). Both studies found a reversal of directional bias in Arabs. Italians tended to position the subject to the left of the object, and Arabs tended to position the subject to the right of the object (Experiment 1); both groups were facilitated in a sentence-picture matching task when the subject was drawn in the position that it would usually occupy in the written language (left for Italians, right for Arabs; Experiment 2). In Experiment 2, an additional, language-independent facilitation was observed when action evolved from left to right, suggesting that both hemispheric specialization and scanning habit affect visual imaging.     

What kind of bias is hindsight bias?

When people are asked to recollect a former response after having received feedback information, their recollection tends to approach the feedback answer. This phenomenon is referred to as hindsight bias. Recently, Erdfelder and Buchner proposed a multinomial model designed to independently measure the contributions of reconstruction and recollection processes. On its basis, they only found firm evidence for the contribution of reconstruction biases to hindsight effects. In the present study, we tried to experimentally enhance the probability of recollection biases by (a) reducing the depth of processing of the original estimate, (b) minimizing the distinctness of the original estimate and feedback, and (c) combining both treatments. The empirical data were analyzed using a variant of the Erdfelder and Buchner model which allows for the experimental manipulation of the feedback answer. This model is shown to adequately describe the data of our experiment. Moreover, although both treatments were effective in that the first one reduced correct recollections in general and the second one diminished differences between original estimates and recalled estimates, the parameter estimates indicate that the probability of recollecting the original estimate is not hampered by feedback information, even under conditions which are thought to enhance memory impairments. Received: 10 December 1995 / Accepted: 29 October 1997     

Is there a universal positivity bias in attributions? A meta-analytic review of individual, developmental, and cultural differences in the self-serving attributional bias

Researchers have suggested the presence of a self-serving attributional bias, with people making more internal, stable, and global attributions for positive events than for negative events. This study examined the magnitude, ubiquity, and adaptiveness of this bias. The authors conducted a meta-analysis of 266 studies, yielding 503 independent effect sizes. The average d was 0.96, indicating a large bias. The bias was present in nearly all samples. There were significant age differences, with children and older adults displaying the largest biases. Asian samples displayed significantly smaller biases (d = 0.30) than U.S. (d = 1.05) or Western (d = 0.70) samples. Psychopathology was associated with a significantly attenuated bias (d = 0.48) compared with samples without psychopathology (d = 1.28) and community samples (d = 1.08). The bias was smallest for samples with depression (0.21), anxiety (0.46), and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (0.55). Findings confirm that the self-serving attributional bias is pervasive in the general population but demonstrates significant variability across age, culture, and psychopathology.