Differences between estimating protagonists’ emotions and evaluating readers’ emotions in narrative comprehension

We examined the differences between estimating the emotions of protagonists and evaluating those of readers in narrative comprehension. Half of the participants read stories and rated the emotional states of the protagonists, while the other half of the participants rated their own emotional states while reading the stories. The results showed that reading comprehension was facilitated when highly extraverted participants read stories about, and rated the emotional experiences of, extraverted protagonists, with personalities similar to their own. However, the same facilitative effect was not observed for less extraverted participants, nor was it observed for either type of participants under the condition in which participants rated their own emotional experiences. Thus, at least for highly extraverted participants, readers both facilitated the construction of a situation model and correctly estimated the emotional states of protagonists who were similar to themselves, perhaps due to empathy.     

Are there basic emotions?

Ortony and Turner's (1990) arguments against those who adopt the view that there are basic emotions are challenged. The evidence on universals in expression and in physiology strongly suggests that there is a biological basis to the emotions that have been studied. Ortony and Turner's reviews of this literature are faulted, and their alternative theoretical explanations do not fit the evidence. The utility of the basic emotions approach is also shown in terms of the research it has generated.     

Are epistemic emotions metacognitive?

This article addresses the question whether epistemic emotions (such as surprise, curiosity, uncertainty, and feelings of knowing) are in any sense inherently metacognitive. The paper begins with some critical discussion of a recent suggestion made by Joelle Proust, that these emotions might be implicitly or procedurally metacognitive. It then explores the theoretical resources that are needed to explain how such emotions arise and do their work. While there is a perennial temptation to think that epistemic emotions are somehow about the cognitive states of the person undergoing the emotion, we will see that such views can and should be resisted.     

Emotional intelligence or adaptive emotions?

R. D. Roberts, M. Zeidner, and G. Matthews (2001) challenged the adequacy of the psychometric properties of the principal performance measure of emotional intelligence (EI). They raised doubt about the existence of emotion-related abilities that influence behavioral outcomes and social competence after controlling for general intelligence and personality. I agree with Roberts et al. that demonstrating the discriminant and predictive validity of a measure of EI in the context of rival predictors will require more research. I agree with the proponents of EI that emotion-related abilities do exist and show that such abilities in children account for unique variance in measures of adaptive behavior and social competence. However, evidence from developmental and clinical research suggest that these emotion-related abilities and their influence on socioemotional competence stem more from the direct effects of emotions than from a special form of intelligence.     

What's basic about basic emotions?

A widespread assumption in theories of emotion is that there exists a small set of basic emotions. From a biological perspective, this idea is manifested in the belief that there might be neurophysiological and anatomical substrates corresponding to the basic emotions. From a psychological perspective, basic emotions are often held to be the primitive building blocks of other, nonbasic emotions. The content of such claims is examined, and the results suggest that there is no coherent nontrivial notion of basic emotions as the elementary psychological primitives in terms of which other emotions can be explained. Thus, the view that there exist basic emotions out of which all other emotions are built, and in terms of which they can be explained, is questioned, raising the possibility that this position is an article of faith rather than an empirically or theoretically defensible basis for the conduct of emotion research. This suggests that perhaps the notion of basic emotions will not lead to significant progress in the field. An alternative approach to explaining the phenomena that appear to motivate the postulation of basic emotions is presented.     

Nostalgia’s place among self-relevant emotions

How is nostalgia positioned among self-relevant emotions? We tested, in six studies, which self-relevant emotions are perceived as most similar versus least similar to nostalgia, and what underlies these similarities/differences. We used multidimensional scaling to chart the perceived similarities/differences among self-relevant emotions, resulting in two-dimensional models. The results were revealing. Nostalgia is positioned among self-relevant emotions characterised by positive valence, an approach orientation, and low arousal. Nostalgia most resembles pride and self-compassion, and least resembles embarrassment and shame. Our research pioneered the integration of nostalgia among self-relevant emotions.     

Explaining embodied emotions – with and without representations

Embodied accounts have offered a theoretical framework in which emotions are understood to be patterned embodied responses that are about core relational themes. Some authors argue that this intentionality should be understood in terms of some kind of non-conceptual representation format, while others suggest a radical enactivist framework that takes emotions to be intentional but not representational. In this paper I will argue that the abstract nature of the core relational themes emotions are about and the interrelatedness of emotions with each other and with other mental states speak in favor of emotions being representations.     

Basic emotions: can conflicting criteria converge?

The authors discuss some of the key points raised by Ekman (1992), Izard (1992), and Panksepp (1992) in their critiques of Ortony and Turner's (1990) suggestion that there are and probably can be no objective and generally acceptable criteria for what is to count as a basic emotion. A number of studies are discussed that are relevant to the authors' contention that a more promising approach to understanding the huge diversity among emotions is to think in terms of emotions being assemblages of basic components rather than combinations of other basic emotions. The authors stress that their position does not deny that emotions are based on "hardwired" biological systems. On the other hand, the existence of such systems does not mean that some emotions (such as those that appear on lists of basic emotions) have a special status. Finally, the authors note that Ekman, Izard, and Panksepp, in adopting different starting points for their research, arrive at rather different conclusions as to what basic emotions are and which emotions are basic. It is concluded that converging resolutions of these questions are improbable.     

What kind of evaluative states are emotions? The attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of emotions

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory of emotions.     

Can perceivers recognise emotions from spontaneous expressions?

Posed stimuli dominate the study of nonverbal communication of emotion, but concerns have been raised that the use of posed stimuli may inflate recognition accuracy relative to spontaneous expressions. Here, we compare recognition of emotions from spontaneous expressions with that of matched posed stimuli. Participants made forced-choice judgments about the expressed emotion and whether the expression was spontaneous, and rated expressions on intensity (Experiments 1 and 2) and prototypicality (Experiment 2). Listeners were able to accurately infer emotions from both posed and spontaneous expressions, from auditory, visual, and audiovisual cues. Furthermore, perceived intensity and prototypicality were found to play a role in the accurate recognition of emotion, particularly from spontaneous expressions. Our findings demonstrate that perceivers can reliably recognise emotions from spontaneous expressions, and that depending on the comparison set, recognition levels can even be equivalent to that of posed stimulus sets.     

Criteria for basic emotions: Seeking DISGUST?

In response to our proposal that DISGUST be considered an emotional system comparable to the SEEKING system, Panksepp has argued that the inclusion of disgust would necessitate the addition of hunger, thirst, fatigue, and other affective states. Although the English word disgust may carry primarily gustatory connotations, we are not suggesting a distaste system but a broad multipurpose system comparable to SEEKING. Our proposal is that nutritionally-, sexually-, and socially-related stimuli plus ideational components are all able to activate either the SEEKING or DISGUST systems in analogous ways. Our intent is to point out this evolutionary trajectory from illness-related reactions, which include distaste reflexes, through more complex learned aversions and avoidance responses, to human core disgust, which eventually gives rise to a secondary emotion encompassing socio-moral attributes.     

Drawing mixed emotions: Sequential or simultaneous experiences?

With a view to measuring subjective experience of mixed emotions, we designed an Analogical Emotional Scale (AES). This scale permits the analysis of how, at the subjective level, the emotions evolve from the beginning to the end of the experience, allowing discrimination between simultaneous mixed emotional experiences (i.e., two emotions taking place at the same time) and sequential mixed emotional experiences (i.e., two emotions switching rapidly back and forth). In Study 1 we asked participants to recall a naturally occurring situation, in Study 2 we induced simple vs. mixed emotions in a controlled situation, and in Study 3 we manipulated the structure of emotional stimuli, sequential versus simultaneous. The results showed that the combined use of rating scales and the AES permits us to obtain a more accurate estimation of the actual presence of simultaneous mixed emotional experiences.     

Researching crisis—Recognizing the unsettling experience of emotions

Based on ethnographic research from Sri Lanka on post-tsunami recovery and displacement due to war, this article examines how emotions may have impacted on the research process and how the research participants (researcher, affected people, and partners) construct knowledge in crisis situations. The author discloses her own emotions while researching crisis and also explores the emotions that prevail among research participants in collaborations. Emotions are understood as mental and cultural constructions which unfold in the interaction between individuals and the world. A key driver for the author has been her commitment to those who suffer, which explains her willingness to take risk. It is argued that researchers who make themselves vulnerable to emotions not only make research more engaging and intelligible, but also provoke reflections. In places of crisis, both fluidity and pervasiveness of disillusionment prevail. Building on emotionally sensed knowledge of the research participants in such places, additional insights may be gained and new methods of discovery may be developed. A prerequisite for such a research agenda is a high level of trust and honesty among participants during fieldwork and beyond.     

Are we going into town? Differential construal and group-based expectations mediating popularity ratings

In the present study it was predicted that men and women may differentially construe an ambiguous activity (going into town). Further, it was predicted that subjects would judge the popularity of the ambiguous activity among men and women on the basis of this differential construal and differential expectations about men and women. Results confirmed these predictions.     

Do infants discriminate non-linguistic vocal expressions of positive emotions?

Adults are highly proficient in understanding emotional signals from both facial and vocal cues, including when communicating across cultural boundaries. However, the developmental origin of this ability is poorly understood, and in particular, little is known about the ontogeny of differentiation of signals with the same valence. The studies reported here employed a habituation paradigm to test whether preverbal infants discriminate between non-linguistic vocal expressions of relief and triumph. Infants as young as 6 months who had habituated to relief or triumph showed significant discrimination of relief and triumph tokens at test (i.e. greater recovery to the unhabituated stimulus type), when exposed to tokens from a single individual (Study 1). Infants habituated to expressions from multiple individuals showed less consistent discrimination in that consistent discrimination was only found when infants were habituated to relief tokens (Study 2). Further, infants tested with tokens from individuals from different cultures showed dishabituation only when habituated to relief tokens and only at 10–12 months (Study 3). These findings suggest that discrimination between positive emotional expressions develops early and is modulated by learning. Further, infants' categorical representations of emotional expressions, like those of speech sounds, are influenced by speaker-specific information.     

Transparent emotions? A critical analysis of Moran's transparency claim

I critically analyze Richard Moran's account of knowing one's own emotions, which depends on the Transparency Claim (TC) for self-knowledge. Applied to knowing one's own beliefs, TC states that when one is asked “Do you believe P?”, one can answer by referencing reasons for believing P. TC works for belief because one is justified in believing that one believes P if one can give reasons for why P is true. Emotions, however, are also conceptually related to concerns; they involve a response to something one cares about. As a consequence, acquiring self-knowledge of one's emotions requires knowledge of other mental attitudes, which falls outside the scope of TC. Hence, TC cannot be applied to emotions.     

Do community and autonomy moral violations elicit different emotions?

According to one important set of theories, different domains of immorality are linked to different discrete emotions—panculturally. Violations against the community elicit contempt, whereas violations against an individual elicit anger. To test this theory, American, Indian and Japanese participants (N = 480) indicated contempt and anger reactions (with verbal rating and face selection) to both the types of immorality. To remedy method problems in previous research, community and autonomy violations were created for the same story‐frame, by varying the target to be either the community or an individual. Community and autonomy violations did not differ significantly in the emotion elicited: overall, both types of violations elicited more anger than contempt (and more negative emotion of any kind than positive emotion). By verbal rating, Americans and Indians reported more anger than contempt for both types of violation, whereas Japanese reported more contempt than anger for both types. By face selection, the three cultural groups selected anger more than contempt for both types of violation. The results speak against defining distinct domains of morality by their association with distinct emotions.     

The evolutionary emergence of what we call “emotions”

The term “emotion” is not precise. It refers to an assemblage of processes that contribute to how we relate to the social and physical world. We need to understand the functional bases of such processes, and one such basis is action readiness. Action readiness is the preparation for movement or action. Preparation for movement occurs in all animals. In more recently evolved species, such as birds and mammals, preparation for directed action is found as well. Action readiness is the basis for the states we now call emotions, but its importance goes far beyond emotions: action readiness is an elementary aspect of the way autonomous living beings regulate their interactions with the world.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.