Text Belief Consistency Effects in the Comprehension of Multiple Texts With Conflicting Information

When reading multiple texts about controversial scientific issues, learners must construct a coherent mental representation of the issue based on conflicting information that can be more or less belief-consistent. The present experiment investigated the effects of text–belief consistency on the situation model and memory for text. Students read four texts about a scientific controversy. Learners' situation model was biased towards their beliefs when belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent texts were presented block-by-block. When the texts were presented alternatingly, situation models for belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent texts were equally strong. Moreover, the text base was better for belief-inconsistent texts. These results support the idea that prior beliefs influence the processing of conflicting information in multiple texts differently on the level of the situation model and on the propositional text base. A more balanced situation model of scientific controversies can be promoted by presenting belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent texts in an alternating sequence.     

Children assess informant reliability using bystanders' non-verbal cues

Recent findings show that preschool children are selective with respect to whom they ask for information and whose claims they endorse. In particular, they monitor an informant's record of past accuracy or inaccuracy and use that record to gauge future trustworthiness. We ask if preschoolers also monitor the non-verbal cues of assent or dissent that bystanders display toward an informant's claims and use that information to gauge an informant's trustworthiness. In familiarization trials, 4-year-olds watched as two adult informants made conflicting claims regarding the name of an unfamiliar object. Two adult bystanders consistently signaled assent - via nods and smiles - to the claims of one informant, and dissent - via head shakes and frowns - from the claims of the other informant. When invited to endorse one of the two claims, 4-year-olds mostly agreed with the informant who had received bystander assent. Thus, in the absence of background knowledge about an object's name, children use third-party non-verbal signals to assess the accuracy of conflicting labels. On subsequent test trials, the informants again made conflicting claims about novel object names, but in the absence of the two bystanders. Despite the lack of any informative bystander signals, children with more advanced understanding of mental states continued to display greater trust in the informant who had received bystander assent in the earlier trials.     

Prisoners’ competence to die: hunger strike and cognitive competence

Several bioethicists have recently advocated the force-feeding of prisoners, based on the assumption that prisoners have reduced or no autonomy. This assumed lack of autonomy follows from a decrease in cognitive competence, which, in turn, supposedly derives from imprisonment and/or being on hunger strike. In brief, causal links are made between imprisonment or voluntary total fasting (VTF) and mental disorders and between mental disorders and lack of cognitive competence. I engage the bioethicists that support force-feeding by severing both of these causal links. Specifically, I refute the claims that VTF automatically and necessarily causes mental disorders such as depression, and that these mental disorders necessarily or commonly entail cognitive impairment. Instead, I critically review more nuanced approaches to assessing mental competence in hunger strikes, urging that a diagnosis of incompetence be made on a case-by-case basis—a position that is widely shared by the medical community.     

Mental Causation and Searle’s Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality

In my article I evaluate Searle’s account of mental causation, in particular his account of the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that top-down causation and overdetermination are unsolved problems in Searle’s philosophy of mind, despite his assurances to the contrary. I also argue that there are conflicting claims involved in his account of mental causation and his account of the unconscious. As a result, it becomes impossible to understand how unconscious intentional states can be causally efficacious. My conclusion will be that if Searle’s conception of unconscious intentionality is to play a genuine role in the causal explanation of human action, it needs to be rethought.     

Learning from Conflicting Texts: The Role of Intertextual Conflict Resolution in Between-Text Integration

The present study examined the effect of intertextual conflict resolution on learning from conflicting texts. In two experiments, participants read sets of two texts under the condition of being encouraged either to resolve a conflict between the texts' arguments (the resolution condition) or to comprehend the arguments (the comprehension condition). Experiment 1 found that participants in the resolution condition surpassed participants in the comprehension condition at the understanding of the controversial subjects and succeeded in the understanding of the intertextual relationships. Experiment 2 found that participants in the resolution condition recalled compatible and incompatible information from the texts more than did participants in the comprehension condition. The recalled information from one text was also positively correlated with that from the opposite text. These results suggest that intertextual conflict resolution facilitates successful integration of conflicting arguments in texts in terms of the documents model framework (e.g., Britt & Rouet, 2012).     

Euthanasia,Autonomy and Beneficence

Our interpretation of the Greek term sarx (σ?ρξ) has great impact on how we view the anthropology and theology expressed in Paul’s letters, and in Luke/Acts. This article takes Nida and Taber’s depiction of the semantic componential structure of σ?ρξ in Luke 24:39 and in Romans 11:14 as a starting point for a discussion of the semantic structure of σ?ρξ in these texts. The hermeneutical and translational principle of mental cascades (Lakoff and Wehling) provides a way to describe the associative links that exist between concepts in any language. Often, but not always, σ?ρξ has been translated into the English term flesh.     

Drawing is Integrating: An Examination of Students’ Graphic Representations of Multiple Texts

In this study, integration, or students’ connection formation across texts, was examined across two tasks: when undergraduates were asked to complete a writing assignment and a novel, diagram construction task. While the writing assignment asked students to compose an argument based on multiple texts, the diagram construction task asked students to visually represent a set of eight conflicting texts and the relations among them. The Documents Model Framework (DM) was used to code undergraduates’ written responses and diagrams for the type of multiple text representations they featured (i.e., mush models, separate representations models, and documents models of multiple texts). Moreover, written responses and diagrams were coded for the specificity at which they integrated texts, corresponding to the formation of evidentiary, thematic, and contextual relations. Limited associations were found between college students’ written responses and the diagrams constructed. Implications for understanding multiple text integration are discussed.     

When the “Charm of Three” Fades: Mental Imagery Moderates the Impact of the Number of Ad Claims on Persuasion

Given the prevalence of imagery appeals in today’s marketplace, the current research studies the role of mental imagery in how consumers process and react to advertisements with different numbers of ad claims. Past research has proposed “three” as the magical number of ad claims that maximizes persuasion, with more than three ad claims increasing skepticism and reducing evaluation. In the current research, we replicate this so-called “charm of three” effect, but only when consumers do not engage in mental imagery; when they do, however, we find that the effect is moderated, in that more ad claims beyond three produces more favorable product evaluation. Additionally, we provide evidence that the moderating effect of mental imagery is driven by transportation and skepticism toward the ad claims, with mental imagery increasing transportation and decreasing skepticism when there are more than three ad claims. Our research contributes to a better understanding of the “charm of three” effect, its boundary conditions, and underlying mechanism.     

A logic of comparative obligation

Normal systems of modal logic, interpreted as deontic logics, are unsuitable for a logic of conflicting obligations. By using modal operators based on a more complex semantics, however, we can provide for conflicting obligations, as in [9], which is formally similar to a fragment of the logic of ability later given in [2], Having gone that far, we may find it desirable to be able to express and consider claims about the comparative strengths, or degrees of urgency, of the conflicting obligations under which we stand. This paper, building on the formalism of the logic of ability in [2], provides a complete and decidable system for such a language.     

MORALITY AND POLITICS IN THE WORK OF MICHAEL WYSCHOGROD

Michael Wyschogrod claims that his arguments proceed from his biblical faith. But many of the (commendable) things that he has to say about politics and morality seem to derive from an autonomous ethics. I give five examples of arguments that cannot, in my reading of them, be drawn out of the relevant (but not definitive) biblical texts. Either the texts don't support the arguments at all, or they require interpretation, or some texts must be chosen above others if the arguments are to stand. Faith in the texts cannot by itself sustain the arguments that Wyschogrod wants to make.     

Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist

According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that at least some mental state types consist not merely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but also in nonrelational properties that play a role in explaining functional relations. Consequently, a scientific realist of the sort I describe must reject functionalism.     

The Life Story Schema

Current work on autobiographical memory does not take the term autobiographical seriously enough. Doing so requires taking not just single events, but the whole life and its coherence, into account: Only memories that are linked to self through their emotional or motivational significance over one's life are truly autobiographical. We introduce a new construct, the life story schema, a skeletal mental representation of life's major components and links. The life story schema provides 5 conceptual extensions to current models of autobiographical memory. The conclusion that results from these extensions is that the life story schema serves to bind autobiographical memory and the self over time. Research needed to substantiate our claims and further questions generated by the life story schema construct are discussed.     

Being the Shadow: Witnessing Schizophrenia

This essay discusses Susan Smiley’s documentary film, Out of the Shadow (2004), and Tina Kotulski’s memoir, Saving Millie: A Daughter’s Story of Surviving Her Mother’s Schizophrenia, as filmic and narrative treatments of their mother’s schizophrenia. Mildred Smiley, and her diagnosis of and treatment for schizophrenia, is at the center of both her daughters’ treatments of mental illness, and in these texts, all three become witnesses to the multiple experiences of mental illness and the multiple events of psychiatric power. As I will argue, these two texts are treatments of schizophrenia that both see and don’t see Mildred Smiley’s experience of mental illness. Through these texts, we—viewer and reader—are asked to look again, or to look for the first time, at mental illness, and we are positioned as having the agency to look or look away. As we look and try to make sense of what we see (and don’t see), we too participate in the production of mental illness as a category of analysis.     

Seven principles of goal activation: a systematic approach to distinguishing goal priming from priming of non-goal constructs.

Countless studies have recently purported to demonstrate effects of goal priming; however, it is difficult to muster unambiguous support for the claims of these studies because of the lack of clear criteria for determining whether goals, as opposed to alternative varieties of mental representations, have indeed been activated. Therefore, the authors offer theoretical guidelines that may help distinguish between semantic, procedural, and goal priming. Seven principles that are hallmarks of self-regulatory processes are proposed: Goal-priming effects (a) involve value, (b) involve postattainment decrements in motivation, (c) involve gradients as a function of distance to the goal, (d) are proportional to the product of expectancy and value, (e) involve inhibition of conflicting goals, (f) involve self-control, and (g) are moderated by equifinality and multifinality. How these principles might help distinguish between automatic activation of goals and priming effects that do not involve goals is discussed.     

Functionalism and type-type identity theories

Conclusion Token-token identity theorists do not and need not deny that it may frequently be the same (kind of) brain state which on different occasions fills the functional rôle definitive of a given mental state. That is not at issue. What is at issue is whether functionally-oriented identity theorists should make two claims or three claims.The two claims they customarily make are, first, that each instance of a mental state is an instance of a brain state, and, secondly, that being in a mental state is having in one a state filling the relevant functional rôle. But to be in a mental state is to have that state in one. To be in pain is to have pain, to desire water is to have desire for water, and so on; just as to be poisoned is to have poison in you. (It is to have what is poison for you at the time, of course; and likewise for pain, desire and so on.)Our paper has been about a third sort of claim — relating particularly not to being in a mental state, nor to instances of that state, but to the mental state itself. We have argued that functionally-oriented identity theorists can and should make, in addition to the first two claims, the third type-type identity claim that mental states are brain states. Consequently a token brain state is a token of pain in a derivative sense. What makes it a token of pain is that it is a token of the type of brain state which realizes the pain-rôle for the organism at the time.     

Normative Reasons Contextualism

This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context‐sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context‐sensitivity of the normative “ought” and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone normatively ought to φ but has most reason not to φ. So given that oughts depend on context, a parallel view about normative reasons is needed. It is shown that the resulting view solves notorious puzzles involving apparently conflicting but equally plausible claims about reasons. These puzzles arise especially in cases where agents have limited information or false beliefs. In these cases, we feel torn between reasons claims that take into account the limitations of the agent's perspective and apparently conflicting claims that are made from a more objective point of view. The contextualist account developed here accommodates both objectivist and subjectivist intuitions. It shows that all of the claims in question can be true, provided that they are relativized to different values of the relevant information parameter. Also, contextualism yields a fruitful approach to the debate about having reasons and the alleged failure of the so‐called “factoring account”.     

“SCIENCE,” “RELIGION,” AND “SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION” IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Many intellectuals wrote texts on the relations between Islam and science in the nineteenth‐century Ottoman Empire. These texts not only addressed the massive social and cultural changes the Empire was going through, but responded to European authors’ claims about the extent to which Islam was compatible with the modern world. Focusing on several texts written in the second half of the nineteenth century by the influential Muslim Ottoman authors Namik Kemal, Ahmed Midhat, and ?emseddin Sami, this article shows the influence of these exigencies on arguments on Islam and science. In order to represent Islam as a respectable religion in harmony with science, these intellectuals defined a “pure Islam” that was a set of basic principles that could be found in the Qur'an. Rather than an embedded way of life, Islam in these texts was an objectified, delimitable entity that could be imagined as having relations with other entities, such as science.     

Facts,Ends, and Normative Reasons

This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.     

God and Contemporary Science: Philip Clayton's Defense of Panentheism

Philip Clayton's God and Contemporary Science is summarized and discussed. Clayton presents a theological reading of biblical texts. In my opinion, science-and-religion studies should deal more substantially with insights of secular studies on the situated character of these texts. Clayton uses the relationship between mind and brain as analogy for the relationship between God and the world. This runs the risk of understanding God as analogous to the mind and hence secondary and emergent relative to the world. Besides, Clayton's arguments for “mental causation” are wanting. But then, why should a defender of panentheism decouple the mental and the material?