人不是物:社会认知的稽古维新

当代社会认知的理论版图可分为经典概念工具箱与正在与之对抗的新概念工具两部分。经考证, 理论论和模拟论等经典概念工具集中诞生于1980年代的美国认知科学界, 可以被视为1956认知革命蔓延至社会心理学领域的产物, 而新概念工具可以被视为与第二代认知革命相适合的替代理论。历史上, 社会心理学接受了认知主义的“物”的抽象认知原理, 也全盘接受了它带来的理论负荷, 即对“人”的感知被还原为对“物”的感知, 并且隶属于后者。然而, 基于“物”的抽象认知原理始终无法与社会认知的以“人”为本的实践经验相结合, 也未能实现该领域的自治。事实上, 这一理论困难并非一直存在于“社会认知”的历史路径中, 至少在以Heider为标志性人物的1950年代早期社会认知中便不是这样。Heider “人不是物”理论体系在个体层面上包括知觉实在论、事件归因和生命性−非生命性范畴区分三个部分, 但是第三个理论部件彼时囿于作者主题侧重、证据不足、技术匮乏等多种原因未能完成。结合当代来自演化和比较的、行为和发展的以及神经通路假设的新证据, 通过重新发掘并最终完整构建了“人不是物”论题, 尝试为当代社会认知理论困难提供一个建设性意见。     

Situated Social Cognition

ABSTRACT— Social cognition refers to the mental representations and processes that underlie social judgments and behavior—for example, the application of stereotypes to members of social groups. Theories of social cognition have generally assumed that mental representations are abstract and stable and that they are activated and applied by relatively automatic, context-independent processes. Recent evidence is inconsistent with these expectations, however. Social-cognitive processes have been shown to be adaptive to the perceiver's current social goals, communicative contexts, and bodily states. Although these findings can often be given ad hoc explanations within current conceptual frameworks, they invite a fuller integration with the broad intellectual movement emphasizing situated cognition. Such an approach has already been influential in many areas within psychology and beyond, and theories in the field of social cognition would benefit by taking advantage of its insights.     

间接互惠中的声誉机制：印象、名声、标签及其传递

Alexander在1986年提出了间接互惠的概念, 并在次年出版的《道德体系生物学》一书中进行了系统阐述, 用来解释人类道德以及大规模合作行为的起源。间接互惠一经提出就得到了广泛的关注, 研究者基于进化博弈论的视角对间接互惠进行了诸多研究, 认为人群中间接互惠的大量存在是声誉机制的结果, 并提出了诸如印象分数、名声、标签等不同的声誉机制, 但是目前关于声誉机制的研究大都建立在个体信息可被所有他人观察到的假设之上, 多在个体层面展开声誉机制的研究。今后应该注重在信息不充分情景下开展群体层面上声誉传递机制的研究, 探讨间接互惠中心理机制(如信任、公平等)的作用并提高研究的生态效度。     

The Social Nature of Perception and Action

ABSTRACT— Humans engage in a wide range of social activities. Previous research has focused on the role of higher cognitive functions, such as mentalizing (the ability to infer others' mental states) and language processing, in social exchange. This article reviews recent studies on action perception and joint action suggesting that basic perception–action links are crucial for many social interactions. Mapping perceived actions to one's own action repertoire enables direct understanding of others' actions and supports action identification. Joint action relies on shared action representations and involves modeling of others' performance in relation to one's own. Taking the social nature of perception and action seriously not only contributes to the understanding of dedicated social processes but has the potential to create a new perspective on the individual mind and brain.     

Facial first impressions and partner preference models: Comparable or distinct underlying structures?

Given the frequency of relationships nowadays initiated online, where impressions from face photographs may influence relationship initiation, it is important to understand how facial first impressions might be used in such contexts. We therefore examined the applicability of a leading model of verbally expressed partner preferences to impressions derived from real face images and investigated how the factor structure of first impressions based on potential partner preference-related traits might relate to a more general model of facial first impressions. Participants rated 1,000 everyday face photographs on 12 traits selected to represent (Fletcher, et al. 1999, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 72) verbal model of partner preferences. Facial trait judgements showed an underlying structure that largely paralleled the tripartite structure of Fletcher et al.'s verbal preference model, regardless of either face gender or participant gender. Furthermore, there was close correspondence between the verbal partner preference model and a more general tripartite model of facial first impressions derived from a different literature (Sutherland et al., 2013, Cognition, 127, 105), suggesting an underlying correspondence between verbal conceptual models of romantic preferences and more general models of facial first impressions.