Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth

This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has theresources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussioncenters on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one isincorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesnt statea fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If itdoes, it can be explained.     

Deflationism beyond arithmetic

The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is provided not by theories of truth over arithmetic but by those over subject matters ‘richer’ than arithmetic, such as set theory. The move to this new formal setting provides deflationists with better defence and brings a broader perspective to the debate.

     

Deflationism,Meaning and Truth-Conditions

Philosophical Studies -     

Deflationism About Logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Logical consequence is typically construed as a metalinguistic relation between (sets of) sentences. Deflationism is an account of logic that challenges this...     

Negative Theology and Meaningless Suffering

This article attempts an exploration of the limits of our capacity to weave suffering into patterns of meaning. I try to show that something like an apophatic moment in our response to some kinds of suffering is both necessary and difficult to sustain. From this emerges a question about the relationship between this ‘something like apophasis’ before suffering, on the one hand, and unknowing in face of the mystery of God, on the other. I argue against a tendency in some modern theology to elide one into the other – against a tendency to absorb the ‘mystery of suffering’ into the ‘mystery of God.’ The article concludes with the suggestion that in order to avoid such an elision, and other forms of false reconciliation with suffering, Christian theology needs to maintain a commitment to a future-oriented eschatology, a real – if unimaginable – eschatological hope.     

Deflationism and the Dependence of Truth on Reality

A common objection against deflationism is that it cannot account for the fact that truth depends on reality. Consider the question ‘On what does the truth of the proposition that snow is white depend?’ An obvious answer is that it depends on whether snow is white. Now, consider what answer, if any, a deflationist can offer. The problem is as follows. A typical deflationary analysis of truth consists of biconditionals of the form ‘The proposition that p is true iff p’. Such biconditionals tell us nothing about what the truth of the proposition that p might depend on. Therefore, it seems that a typical deflationist cannot give an answer. Since we know that an answer is available, this throws doubt over the adequacy of deflationism as an account of truth. Articulated here is a defence of deflationism against this objection. It is argued that although biconditionals of the sort mentioned do not explicitly state a dependency between truth and reality, they nevertheless convey one. The reason is that, given the context in which a deflationist invokes the biconditionals, such a dependency is implicated. A potential problem with this defence is that it leaves the deflationist still unable to give an account of what it is for truth to depend on reality. One might think that a deflationist can offer such an account by appealing to truthmaker theory but, it is argued below, truthmaker theory is unavailable to a deflationist. Instead, the deflationist should question the assumption that an account is available.     

紧缩论,证明与保守性

紧缩论者主张真谓词表达了一种逻辑概念,它的全部意义都体现在所有塔斯基式的T-语句中。Shapiro近来论证说,将紧缩论的公理添加到一阶皮亚诺算术公理系统(PA)中,在该扩张理论中能够证明PA的可靠性,并在此基础上证明PA的一致性,这表明紧缩论不具有保守性,因此真谓词不是紧缩的。本文论证,扩张理论预设了反射原则,这导致它推出了更多的东西,而反射原则是可证性谓词定义的推论,这才是造成扩张理论非保守性的真正根源。针对紧缩论的非保守性论证因此失效了。     

On Wright's Argument against Deflationism

I consider Crispin Wright's much discussed 'inflationary' argument against deflationism about truth. I identify a principle apparently involved in it, which I call Wright's principle, and present Wright's argument with the following dilemma. If Wright's principle is sound, the deflationist has a straightforward rejoinder to Wright's argument. If Wright's principle is unsound, the central part of Wright's argument, concerned with how 'true' commutes with the negation operator, is rendered superfluous. I conclude that Wright's argument is either a straightforward failure or completely otiose.     

The Generality of Anaphoric Deflationism

Philosophia - Anaphoric deflationism is a kind of prosententialist account of the use of “true.” It holds that “true” is an expressive operator and not a predicate. In...     

Hume's Explanations of Meaningless Beliefs

Hume's arguments to meaninglessness are too strong for his purposes; they are accompanied by psychological explanations of why we believe in entities that fall under the meaningless expressions. How can Hume consistently provide explanations of beliefs that are without meaning in the first place? Though not derived from experience in accordance with Lockean empiricism about meaning, the relevant expressions must possess some surrogate for meaning or content-like features. For Hume, such quasi -content is the product of a retreat, under the pressure of a conflict, from an illusion to a conceptual confusion that obscures the conflict; different quasi -contents result from different illusions. The notions of material substrata , souls and external existence, which some commentators treat as tolerably meaningful 'relative ideas', are confused quasi -concepts, defective in meaning. A reconstruction of Treatise I iii 14 shows that necessary connection may be seen as parallel to these other cases.