Color measurement and color theory: II. Opponent-colors theory

Quantitative opponent-colors theory is based on cancellation of redness by admixture of a standard green, of greenness by admixture of a standard red, of yellowness by blue, and of blueness by yellow. The fundamental data are therefore the equilibrium colors: the set A₁ of lights that are in red/green equilibrium and the set A₂ of lights that are in yellow/blue equilibrium. The result that a cancellation function is linearly related to the color-matching functions can be proved from more basic axioms, particularly, the closure of the set of equilibrium colors under linear operations. Measurement analysis treats this as a representation theorem, in which the closure properties are axioms and in which the colorimetric homomorphism has the cancellation functions as two of its coordinates.Consideration of equivalence relations based on opponent cancellation leads to a further step: analysis of equivalence relations based on direct matching of hue attributes. For additive whiteness matching, this yields a simple extension of the representation theorem, in which the third coordinate is luminance. For other attributes, precise representation theorems must await a better qualitative characterization of various nonlinear phenomena, especially the veiling of one hue attribute by another and the various hue shifts.     

The Fourier theory of vision.

The historical roots of the Fourier theory of spatial visual perception are traced. The development of the underlying concepts and the psychophysical experiments that led to them, and that they in turn spawned, are examined, as well as their relation to the current knowledge of neural substrates in the retina and primary visual cortex. Allowing nonlinearities or even substituting other types of basis functions does not eliminate the difficulties faced by any theory of visual perception that is built on the notion of fixed spatial filters.     

Stumpf's cognitive--evaluative theory of emotion.

As a historical contribution to the current cognition-emotion debate in psychology, this article seeks (a) to bring to the readers' attention the largely ignored tradition of cognitive emotion theory within introspective psychology by reviewing what is probably the most clearly formulated cognitive emotion theory of this period, that proposed by Carl Stumpf, and (b) to point out the relevance of Stumpf's contributions to the psychology of emotions for the contemporary cognition-emotion discussion. It is suggested that Stumpf's version of a cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion deserves the serious attention of contemporary investigators and that several of his objections to noncognitive theories of emotion retain their force against modern versions of these theories.     

Principles and theory in bioethics.

The following citations were selected from BIOETHICSLINE, the online database prepared at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics for the National Library of Medicine's MEDLARS system. Searching the keywords autonomy, beneficence, casuistry, justice, and virtues, as well as the text word principlism produced more than 400 citations. Only the citations concerned with theory and principle in the practice of bioethics are included here -- e.g., works about justice in resource allocation have been deleted.     

Transformation theory of size judgment.

Perception of size is assessed by having observers adjust a comparison target at a fixed distance to match the size of a standard located at different distances. Results depend on instructions, target orientation, and available stimulus cues. A mathematical theory assumes that the brain performs an inverse transformation on the proximal information impinging on the retina to recover the original distal size of the target. Results depend on the target visual angle, and the effective target distance and orientation applied in performing the inverse transformation. Effective values are linked to instructions, target location, and stimulus cues. Two models are developed and successfully fit to empirical data. One emphasizes the distance parameter; the second, the orientation parameter.     

The molarity of molecular theory and the molecularity of molar theory.

Dinsmoor (2001) rejects shock-frequency reduction as a reinforcer for avoidance behavior, and considers this to be an invalidation of so-called molar avoidance theory. This is a narrow view of operant avoidance theory, for which shock-frequency reduction is by no means the only reinforcer.     

A field theory of consciousness.

This article summarizes a variety of current as well as previous research in support of a new theory of consciousness. Evidence has been steadily accumulating that information about a stimulus complex is distributed to many neuronal populations dispersed throughout the brain and is represented by the departure from randomness of the temporal pattern of neural discharges within these large ensembles. Zero phase lag synchronization occurs between discharges of neurons in different brain regions and is enhanced by presentation of stimuli. This evidence further suggests that spatiotemporal patterns of coherence, which have been identified by spatial principal component analysis, may encode a multidimensional representation of a present or past event. How such distributed information is integrated into a holistic precept constitutes the binding problem. How a precept defined by a spatial distribution of nonrandomness can be subjectively experienced constitutes the problem of consciousness. Explanations based on a discrete connectionistic network cannot be reconciled with the relevant facts. Evidence is presented herein of invariant features of brain electrical activity found to change reversibly with loss and return of consciousness in a study of 176 patients anesthetized during surgical procedures. A review of relevant research areas, as well as the anesthesia data, leads to a postulation that consciousness is a property of quantum-like processes, within a brain field resonating within a core of structures, which may be the neural substrate of consciousness. This core includes regions of the prefrontal cortex, the frontal cortex, the pre- and paracentral cortex, thalamus, limbic system, and basal ganglia.     

Goal theory vs. control theory: Contrasting approaches to understanding work motivation

Control theory has been propounded as an original and useful paradigm for integrating a number of theories of human (especially work) motivation. This paper challenges that claim. First, it is shown that the original, mechanical control theory model is not applicable to human beings. Second, it is shown that the two approaches used by control theorists to remedy its limitations did not succeed. One approach involved incorporating propositions drawn from other theories with the result that there was nothing distinctive left that was unique to control theory. The other approach involved broadening the scope of control theory by adding deduced propositions; however, these propositions were inconsistent with what was already known about the phenomena in question based on empirical research. The control theory approach to theory building is contrasted with that of goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990). Goal-setting theory is a grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) which evolved from research findings over a 25-year period. Goal theory developed in five directions simultaneously: validation of the core premises; demonstrations of generality; identification of moderators; conceptual refinement and elaboration; and integration with other theories. It is hypothesized that the grounded theory approach is a more fruitful one than the approaches used by control theory.The author wishes to thank Judy Olian for her helpful comments on this paper and Dong-OK Chah for making the figures.     

On the falsifiability of matching theory.

Herrnstein's matching theory requires the parameter, k, which appears in the single-alternative form of the matching equation, to remain invariant with respect to changes in reinforcement parameters like magnitude or immediacy. Recent experiments have disconfirmed matching theory by showing that the invariant-k requirement does not hold. However, the theory can be asserted in a purely algebraic form that does not require an invariant k and that is not disconfirmed by the recent findings. In addition, both the original and the purely algebraic versions of matching theory can be asserted in forms that allow for commonly observed deviations from matching (bias, undermatching, and overmatching). The recent finding of a variable k does not disconfirm these versions of matching theory either. As a consequence, matching remains a viable theory of behavior, the strength of which lies in its general conceptualization of all behavior as choice, and in its unified mathematical treatment of single- and multialternative environments.