学校不同群体的阅读信念对记叙文意义建构的影响

采用问卷调查的方法,考察学校三类群体(初中生、大学生、教师)的阅读信念(reading belief)对记叙文意义建构的影响。结果发现:(1)学校三类群体对记叙文的意义建构不同:在表层信息上,教师和大学生显著优于初中生,教师和大学生之间水平相当;而在整体理解上,教师显著优于大学生和初中生,而且大学生也显著优于初中生;(2)在初中阶段,传递信念对记叙文意义建构起主导作用;(3)在大学阶段,互动信念对记叙文意义建构起主导作用。     

大学生精神信仰的现状研究

本研究首次关注大学生的精神信仰,通过问卷对1100名大学生调查,发现大学生精神信仰存在如下特点：社会信仰占优势,其次依次为实用信仰和超自然信仰;民族主义、生命崇拜和国家主义位居前三位,宗教信仰、金钱崇拜和神灵崇拜位居后三位。     

道德信仰简论

道德信仰是时代的强烈呼唤。道德信仰的本质是人在道德人格上的自我超越，它具有高度的主体自觉性、形上性和价值整合性，具有道德境界的提升功能、道德人格的塑造功能、道德行为的动力功能和道德秩序的控制功能。     

Infinitary Belief Revision

This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This framework provides a basis for first-order belief revision and the theory of revising a belief state by a belief state.     

聋童与正常儿童对多种信念的认知

选取了122名3～12岁聋童,并分别用65名3～5岁的正常儿童作对照,开展了2个实验系列,探讨了儿童的正确信念、一级错误信念及二级错误信念认知的发展特点.结果如下: (1)聋童及正常儿童信念认知的发展过程中,无论是关于正确信念,还是关于一级错误信念,都是先发展自我信念认知,再发展他人信念认知;(2)关于正确信念、一级错误信念和二级错误信念认知的发展,聋童都比正常儿童滞后,但两者的发展趋势一致; (3)手语聋童在信念认知上略好于口语聋童; (4)父母为聋人或父母会手语的聋童,以及兄弟姐妹会手语的聋童,其信念认知水平要比其他聋童好.     

道德信仰危机的成因及其克服

道德信仰是对道德的终极关怀,是理性的非理性存在方式,是人的精神支柱。道德理想主义,制度安排不尽合理,市场经济负面效应以及社会主义低谷是道德信仰危机的重要根源。发展经济,加强制度伦理建设,强化规则意识等克服道德信仰危机的主要措施。     

3～6岁儿童信念理解能力的发展研究

研究设计了冲突真实信念任务,用于考察儿童对真实信念的理解;并利用区分信念、冲突真实信念和意外地点的错误信念任务,考察儿童理解信念推理基本规则、真实信念和错误信念的发展顺序。97名3~6岁儿童完成了测试。结果显示,3岁儿童能理解信念推理的基本规则,5岁儿童能理解真实信念,6岁儿童能理解错误信念。结果支持了儿童先理解真实信念,后理解错误信念的发展模式;也说明在理解信念以前儿童已能掌握信念推理的基本规则。     

How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs

People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions (such as trembling in fear when their death becomes an imminent possibility, despite earlier professing that “Death is not bad!”). But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.     

高中生认识论信念调查研究

本研究以526名高中生为被试,运用自行编制的"高中生认识论信念问卷",考察了高中生认识论信念的性别差异、年龄特点以及学校类型差异。结果表明:高中生认识论信念的各个维度上不存在性别差异,但存在着极其显著的学校差异;在整合建构信念、能力信念方面,存在着显著的年级差异;在零散接受信念上存在着学校与年级的交互作用。     

When rock bottom rocks your world: Crisis of belief as a catalyst for change

An experience of severe difficulty can turn the world upside-down, causing individuals to question important beliefs with which they identify. This phenomenon, which we label as Crisis of Belief (COB), amalgamates the disparate conceptualizations of crisis that exist across several subdisciplines of psychology. Unlike existing ideas of crisis, COB distinguishes itself from stress or trauma alone, and is a clearly specified construct that lends itself to practical operationalization and study. Thus, COB addresses a key gap in literature and offers unique value for understanding how hardship that affects closely held beliefs can catalyze change. We conclude by describing the potential utility of COB as a predictor of both positive (e.g., life satisfaction) and negative (e.g., depression) outcomes and the pressing need for a validated measure.     

Measuring superstitious belief: why lucky charms matter

A large body of research has attempted to develop theories about the function and origin of superstitious beliefs on the basis of the psychological correlates of such beliefs. Most of this work has measured superstitious belief using the Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS). However, this scale refers solely to negative superstitions (e.g., breaking a mirror will cause bad luck) and omits items referring to positive superstitions (e.g., carrying a lucky charm will bring good luck). The two studies reported here found significant interactions between belief in negative and positive superstitions, and several individual difference measures. These findings have important implications for theory development, demonstrate that the PBS is an incomplete measure of superstitious belief, and highlight the need for future measures to include items referring to positive superstitions.     

The return of the nativist

Radical Concept Nativism (RCN) is the doctrine that most of our concepts are innate. In this paper I will argue in favour of RCN by developing a speculative account of concept acquisition that has considerable nativist credentials and can be defended against the most familiar anti-nativist objections. The core idea is that we have a whole battery of hard-wired dispositions that determine how we group together objects with which we interact. In having these dispositions we are effectively committed to an implicit conceptual scheme and acquiring concepts is a matter of labelling the elements of that scheme.     

初中生学业错误的实然观与应然观关系研究

运用《初中生学业错误实然观问卷》和《初中生学业错误应然观问卷》调查了453名初中生的学业错误观,结果表明：（1）初中生学业错误的实然观与应然观均表现出显著的年级特征和性别差异;（2）初中生学业错误的应然观对实然观具有显著正向预测效用。     

迷信心理研究述评

迷信在西方心理学界一直是一个比较热门的研究课题,而国内心理研究者对这方面的研究还没有给予足够的重视。文章从迷信的定义、理论以及影响因素三个方面对迷信心理研究做了阐述,并总结了目前迷信心理研究的不足：首先,到目前为止迷信的定义还没有得到统一。其次,迷信心理理论研究还有待进一步完善。再次,对迷信心理的影响因素研究结果存在较大的争论,迷信心理测量工具的信效度以及文化适用性有待进一步检验。迷信心理研究今后应在迷信内涵、测量工具以及实证研究方面进行深入探索     

What Is ‘Real’ in Probabilism?

This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.     

On the Ratio Challenge for Comparativism

This paper discusses a challenge for comparativists about belief, who hold that numerical degree of belief (in particular, subjective probability) is a useful fiction, unlike comparative belief, which they regard as real. The challenge is to make sense of claims like ‘I am twice as confident in A as in B’ in terms of comparative belief only. After showing that at least some comparativists can meet this challenge, I discuss implications for Zynda's [2000] and Stefánsson's [2017] defences of comparativism.     

How Norms (Might) Guide Belief

Abstract

Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (G&W) suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief normativism were true, the relevant norms would have to offer such guidance. I argue that G&W’s case against belief normativism is not successful. In section 1, I defend the idea that truth-norms can guide belief formation indirectly via epistemic norms. In section 2, I outline an account of how the epistemic norms might guide belief. Interestingly, this account may involve a commitment to a certain kind of expressivist view concerning judgments about epistemic norms.     

Justice and desert-based emotions

A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and offers a conceptual overview of some common emotions of this sort having to do with the fortunes of others and of oneself, respectively. The article does not give a definitive answer to the question of whether those emotions really are virtuous, but aims at enriching our understanding of what kind of virtue they might possibly represent.     

Beliefs do not come in degrees

Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees (or that beliefs are graded or that there are partial beliefs). Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that beliefs do not come in degrees.     

Should knowledge entail belief?

The appropriateness of S5 as a logic of knowledge has been attacked at some length in the philosophical literature. Here one particular attack based on the interplay between knowledge and belief is considered: Suppose that knowledge satisfies S5, belief satisfies KD45, and both the entailment property (knowledge implies belief) and positive certainty (if the agent believes something, she believes she knows it) hold. Then it can be shown that belief reduces to knowledge: it is impossible to have false beliefs. While the entialment property has typically been viewed as perhaps the least controversial of these assumptions, an argument is presented that it can plausibly be viewed as the culprit. More precisely, it is shown that this attack fails if we weaken the entailment property so that it applies only to objective (nonmodal) formulas, rather than to arbitrary formulas. Since the standard arguments in favor of the entailment property are typically given only for objective formulas, this observation suggests that care must be taken in applying intuitions that seem reasonable in the case of objective formulas to arbitrary formulas.Research sponsored in part by the Air Force office of Scientific Research (AFSC), under Contract F49620-91-C-0080. The United States Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes.