Action tendencies and characteristics of environmental risks

It is assumed that the mental representation of the causal structure of environmental risks, i.e., the type of cause and the type of potential consequence, determines which sort of action tendencies are formed. We propose a model of risk evaluation that includes consequentialist and deontological judgments as well as specific emotions as mediators of action tendencies. Four hundred participants took part in an experiment which presented scenario information about environmental risks. The scenarios differed with respect to (a) causation (human vs. natural cause; single vs. aggregate causation), (b) consequence (harm to self vs. harm to other people vs. harm to nature), and (c) geographical distance (proximate vs. distant). Participants indicated how much they preferred each of 31 prospective behaviors. Factor analyses yielded five types of action tendencies: help, aggression, escape, political action, and self-focus. The causal structure of the risks was systematically related to action tendencies, e.g., environmental risks that are caused by humans, and in particular those caused by a single human agent, elicit aggressive action tendencies. The findings conform that the perceived causal structure of a specific risk determines whether the focus is upon consequentialist or deontological judgments, which, in turn, elicit specific types of action tendency, mediated by emotions.     

The effects of wording on the understanding and use of uncertainty information in a threshold forecasting decision

Many believe that information about small chances of severe weather would be useful to the general public for precautionary action. What is the best way to explain this kind of information to a non‐expert audience? The studies reported here investigated effects of framing (negative vs. positive), format (frequency vs. probability), likelihood (low vs. high) and compatibility (task‐match) on interpretation of verbal expressions of forecast uncertainty and on subsequent forecasting decisions. The crucial factor was the match between the verbal expression and the overall task goal. Errors increased when there was a mismatch between the expression (e.g. winds less than 20 knots) and the task (e.g. post an advisory when winds will exceed 20 knots). However, framing and format had little impact. We conclude that consideration of user expectations arising from the overall task goal is crucial in explaining uncertainty information to a naïve audience. Global expectations overpower other potential effects. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exploring the influence of encoding format on subsequent memory

Distinctive encoding is greatly influenced by gist-based processes and has been shown to suffer when highly similar items are presented in close succession. Thus, elucidating the mechanisms underlying how presentation format affects gist processing is essential in determining the factors that influence these encoding processes. The current study utilised multivariate partial least squares (PLS) analysis to identify encoding networks directly associated with retrieval performance in a blocked and intermixed presentation condition. Subsequent memory analysis for successfully encoded items indicated no significant differences between reaction time and retrieval performance and presentation format. Despite no significant behavioural differences, behaviour PLS revealed differences in brain–behaviour correlations and mean condition activity in brain regions associated with gist-based vs. distinctive encoding. Specifically, the intermixed format encouraged more distinctive encoding, showing increased activation of regions associated with strategy use and visual processing (e.g., frontal and visual cortices, respectively). Alternatively, the blocked format exhibited increased gist-based processes, accompanied by increased activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus. Together, results suggest that the sequence that information is presented during encoding affects the degree to which distinctive encoding is engaged. These findings extend our understanding of the Fuzzy Trace Theory and the role of presentation format on encoding processes.     

The influence of mortality and socioeconomic status on risk and delayed rewards: a life history theory approach

Why do some people take risks and live for the present, whereas others avoid risks and save for the future? The evolutionary framework of life history theory predicts that preferences for risk and delay in gratification should be influenced by mortality and resource scarcity. A series of experiments examined how mortality cues influenced decisions involving risk preference (e.g., $10 for sure vs. 50% chance of $20) and temporal discounting (e.g., $5 now vs. $10 later). The effect of mortality depended critically on whether people grew up in a relatively resource-scarce or resource-plentiful environment. For individuals who grew up relatively poor, mortality cues led them to value the present and gamble for big immediate rewards. Conversely, for individuals who grew up relatively wealthy, mortality cues led them to value the future and avoid risky gambles. Overall, mortality cues appear to propel individuals toward diverging life history strategies as a function of childhood socioeconomic status, suggesting important implications for how environmental factors influence economic decisions and risky behaviors.     

Experimental Tests of Risk Ladders in the Elicitation of Perceived Likelihood

Risk ladders have the potential to improve numeric judgments of low‐likelihood events by providing information about the likelihoods of comparison risks, thereby letting respondents make risk estimates “in context.” However, to date this tool has been studied systematically only in communication of risk, not in elicitation of perceived likelihoods. In three studies, we evaluated the benefits of risk ladders on the consistency, validity, and mean‐level accuracy of elicited likelihood judgments. When estimates for low‐likelihood hazards were elicited using different numeric response scales (e.g., “1 in x” and “x in 100,000”), scale type had a strong effect on the magnitudes of the elicited estimates, and viewing a risk ladder (Experiment 1) or comparison risks (Experiments 2 and 3) did not attenuate this effect of scale type. Similarly, we found no evidence that risk ladders or comparison risks improved the convergent validity of numeric estimates, as measured using correlations with risk ratings made on alternative scale types. Finally, viewing comparison risks tended to reduce gross overestimation of rare events, with relatively less change in estimates for mid‐likelihood and high‐likelihood hazards. This suggests that comparison risks can spread responses to cover a wider range of values but do not ameliorate scale effects. In the elicitation of numeric risk estimates, how you ask matters, even if you let people make estimates “in context” through the use of comparative risk information. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Well Do We Know Our Inner Daredevil? Probing the Relationship Between Self‐Report and Behavioral Measures of Risk Taking

To measure a person's risk‐taking tendency, research has relied interchangeably on self‐report scales (e.g., “Indicate your likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior”) and more direct measures, such as behavioral tasks (e.g., “Do you accept or reject the risky option?”). It is currently unclear, however, how the two approaches map upon each other. We examined the relationship between self‐report likelihood ratings for risky choice in a monetary gamble task and actual choice, and tested how the relationship is affected by task ambiguity (i.e., when part of the information about risks and benefits is missing) and age. Five hundred participants (aged 19–85 years) were presented with 27 gambles, either in an unambiguous or an ambiguous condition. In a likelihood rating task, participants rated for each gamble the likelihood that they would accept it. In a separate choice task, they were asked to either accept or reject each gamble. Analyses using a signal‐detection approach showed that people's likelihood ratings discriminated between accept and reject cases in their choices rather well. However, task ambiguity weakened the association between likelihood ratings and choice. Further, older adults' likelihood ratings anticipated their choices more poorly than younger adults'. We discuss implications of these findings for existing approaches to the study of risk‐taking propensity, which have often relied on self‐reported risk tendency for ambiguous activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Unity of Self at the Interface of the Animal Body and the Cultural System

The self is defined by unity, which must be constructed from multiple inner processes and representations. The unity is more a requirement of social life than of brain activities. The self exists at the interface between the physical body and the social system, which for humans includes culture. The three main aspects of the self are a network of information (sometimes called the self-concept), an interpersonal being (e.g., member of a group or relationship), and executive function (e.g., making decisions). For each of these, multiple inner processes and representations must be integrated to produce the unity of self. Conscious processing plays a key role in this integrative process, because it is a vital means by which different areas of brain and mind exchange information.     

Risk Perception: Using Conditional Versus General Base Rates for Risk Communication1

In general, people judge their chance of experiencing a health risk as being less than the general base rate because of their favorable status on risk factors (e.g., history of stroke). Presenting base rates for high and low risk groups (conditional base rates) were hypothesized to lessen people's tendency to adjust downward from the base rate because risk factors are included in conditional base rates (CBRs). Young (M= 19 years) and older women (M= 46 years) were presented with either a general base rate (GBR) or CBRs for high‐ and low‐risk groups for 5 health risks. The CBR groups were significantly less likely to adjust their probability judgments from the base rate for the risk group that they believed applied to them (e.g., smoker vs. nonsmoker). The CBR effect was replicated in a second experiment in which women (M = 19 years) were informed of either a GBR, a CBR for a high‐risk group, or a CBR for a low‐risk group. The findings suggest that people might estimate subjective probabilities by considering both the base rate for a health risk and self‐assessments on risk factors. Biases about one's status on risk factors, however, may limit people's identification with relevant risk groups and warrant further investigation.     

Preference reversals are diminished when gambles are presented as relative frequencies

Preference reversals are a well-documented example of suboptimal decision making. Typical preference reversals experiments have involved monetary bets presented in probability format. Research on other examples of decision making have shown that irrational or suboptimal choices are diminished or eliminated entirely when the probabilities are presented as relative frequencies (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). The aim of the present experiment was to determine if the way in which information is presented to participants affects participants' preferences. When the options were presented in the standard probability format 59% of participants' preferences were reversed. However, reversals were significantly decreased in the frequency format group, with only 40% of participants' responses being inconsistent. Although preference reversals were not eliminated when the gambles were presented as frequencies they were significantly diminished and may not be such a robust example of irrational decision making after all.     

面孔表情和声音情绪信息整合加工的脑机制

在现实生活中, 有效的情绪识别往往依赖于不同通道间的信息整合(如, 面孔、声音)。本文梳理相关研究认为, 面孔表情和声音情绪信息在早期知觉阶段即产生交互作用, 且初级感知觉皮层负责两者信息的编码; 而在晚期决策阶段, 杏仁核、颞叶等高级脑区完成对情绪信息内容的认知评估整合; 此外, 神经振荡活动在多个频段上的功能耦合促进了跨通道情绪信息整合。未来研究需要进一步探究两者整合是否与情绪冲突有关, 以及不一致的情绪信息在整合中是否有优势, 探明不同频段的神经振荡如何促进面孔表情和声音情绪信息整合, 以便更深入地了解面孔表情和声音情绪信息整合的神经动力学基础。     

Limits on risks for healthy volunteers in biomedical research

Healthy volunteers in biomedical research often face significant risks in studies that offer them no medical benefits. The U.S. federal research regulations and laws adopted by other countries place no limits on the risks that these participants face. In this essay, I argue that there should be some limits on the risks for biomedical research involving healthy volunteers. Limits on risk are necessary to protect human participants, institutions, and the scientific community from harm. With the exception of self-experimentation, limits on research risks faced by healthy volunteers constitute a type of soft, impure paternalism because participants usually do not fully understand the risks they are taking. I consider some approaches to limiting research risks and propose that healthy volunteers in biomedical research should not be exposed to greater than a 1% chance of serious harm, such as death, permanent disability, or severe illness or injury. While this guideline would restrict research risks, the limits would not be so low that they would prevent investigators from conducting valuable research. They would, however, set a clear upper boundary for investigators and signal to the scientific community and the public that there are limits on the risks that healthy participants may face in research. This standard provides guidance for decisions made by oversight bodies, but it is not an absolute rule. Investigators can enroll healthy volunteers in studies involving a greater than 1% chance of serious harm if they show that the research addresses a compelling public health or social problem and that the risk of serious harm is only slightly more than 1%. The committee reviewing the research should use outside experts to assess these risks.     

A concussion by any other name: Differences in willingness to risk brain injury by label and level of participation in high‐school and college sports

One factor in reducing the likelihood of sports‐related brain injuries is the recognition of risks. However, using colloquial terms may deemphasize the severity of these risks. We hypothesized that using colloquial language to describe sports‐related brain injuries will lead to greater willingness to take on the risk. We conducted two experiments, varying the label describing an injury (getting your bell rung, concussion, or brain injury) and assessing willingness of current athletes, former athletes, and nonathletes to accept this risk as part of sports participation. High‐school and college athletes were willing to expose themselves to a high probability of risk, compared with nonathletes, when described colloquially. However, risk thresholds were low and indistinguishable across groups when using the term “brain injury.” Findings remained significant when controlling for knowledge, age, and sensation seeking. These differences indicate that the term “getting your bell rung” should not be used to describe a brain injury.     

Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems

Three experiments examined people's ability to incorporate base rate information when judging posterior probabilities. Specifically, we tested the (Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgement under uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1-73) conclusion that people's reasoning appears to follow Bayesian principles when they are presented with information in a frequency format, but not when information is presented as one case probabilities. First, we found that frequency formats were not generally associated with better performance than probability formats unless they were presented in a manner which facilitated construction of a set inclusion mental model. Second, we demonstrated that the use of frequency information may promote biases in the weighting of information. When participants are asked to express their judgements in frequency rather than probability format, they were more likely to produce the base rate as their answer, ignoring diagnostic evidence.     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

Risk it? Direct and collateral impacts of peers' verbal expressions about hazard likelihoods*

When people encounter potential hazards, their expectations and behaviours can be shaped by a variety of factors including other people's expressions of verbal likelihood (e.g., unlikely to harm). What is the impact of such expressions when a person also has numeric likelihood estimates from the same source(s)? Two studies used a new task involving an abstract virtual environment in which people learned about and reacted to novel hazards. Verbal expressions attributed to peers influenced participants’ behaviour toward hazards even when numeric estimates were also available. Namely, verbal expressions suggesting that the likelihood of harm from a hazard is low (vs. higher) yielded more risk taking with respect to said hazard. There were also inverse collateral effects, whereby participants’ behaviour and estimates regarding another hazard in the same context were affected in the opposite direction. These effects may be based on directionality and relativity cues inferred from verbal likelihood expressions.     

How probable is probably? It depends on whom you're talking about

Two studies tested whether people interpreted verbal chance terms in a self‐serving manner. Participants read statements describing the likelihood of events in their own future and in the future of a randomly chosen other. They interpreted the chance terms numerically. Chance terms were interpreted as denoting a higher probability when they were used to describe the likelihood of pleasant events in one's own future than when they were used to describe the likelihood of pleasant events in someone else's future (Study 1). Similarly, chance terms were interpreted as denoting a lower probability when they were used to describe the likelihood of unpleasant events in one's own future than when they were used to describe the likelihood of unpleasant events in someone else's future (Studies 1 and 2). These differences occurred primarily when the risk statements were threatening. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Verbal and Numerical Expressions of Probability: "It's a Fifty-Fifty Chance"

When estimating risks, people may use "50" as an expression of the verbal phrase "fifty-fifty chance," without intending the associated number of 50%. The result is an excess of 50s in the response distribution. The present study examined factors determining the magnitude of such a "50 blip," using a large sample of adolescents and adults. We found that phrasing probability questions in a distributional format (asking about risks as a percentage in a population) rather than in a singular format (asking about risks to an individual) reduced the use of "50." Less numerate respondents, children, and less educated adults were more likely to say "50." Finally, events that evoked feelings of less perceived control led to more 50s. The results are discussed in terms of what they reveal about how people express epistemic uncertainty. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Effects of a Relative-Frequency Elicitation Question on Likelihood Judgment Accuracy: The Case of External Correspondence

In three experiments, college students judged the likelihood that they chose the correct alternative for each of 40 two-alternative, general-knowledge items. They responded either to a relative-frequency elicitation question (“Out of 100 questions for which you felt this certain of the answer, how many would you answer correctly?”) or to a probability elicitation question (“What is the probability that you chose the correct answer?”). Judgments in response to the relative-frequency elicitation question tended to be lower, exhibit less scatter, and express complete certainty less often than judgments in response to the probability elicitation question. Two types of explanation for these effects are considered. First, the effect of the relative-frequency elicitation question may be to reduce random response error in participants' likelihood judgments. Second, the relative-frequency elicitation question may encourage the use of frequency information and simpler algorithms for making likelihood judgments.     

Anomalies in the detection of change: When changes in sample size are mistaken for changes in proportions

Detecting changes, in performance, sales, markets, risks, social relations, or public opinions, constitutes an important adaptive function. In a sequential paradigm devised to investigate detection of change, every trial provides a sample of binary outcomes (e.g., correct vs. incorrect student responses). Participants have to decide whether the proportion of a focal feature (e.g., correct responses) in the population from which the sample is drawn has decreased, remained constant, or increased. Strong and persistent anomalies in change detection arise when changes in proportional quantities vary orthogonally to changes in absolute sample size. Proportional increases are readily detected and nonchanges are erroneously perceived as increases when absolute sample size increases. Conversely, decreasing sample size facilitates the correct detection of proportional decreases and the erroneous perception of nonchanges as decreases. These anomalies are however confined to experienced samples of elementary raw events from which proportions have to be inferred inductively. They disappear when sample proportions are described as percentages in a normalized probability format. To explain these challenging findings, it is essential to understand the inductive-learning constraints imposed on decisions from experience.     

Examining the link between adolescent brain development and risk taking from a social–developmental perspective

The adolescent age period is often characterized as a health paradox because it is a time of extensive increases in physical and mental capabilities, yet overall mortality/morbidity rates increase significantly from childhood to adolescence, often due to preventable causes such as risk taking. Asynchrony in developmental time courses between the affective/approach and cognitive control brain systems, as well as the ongoing maturation of neural connectivity are thought to lead to increased vulnerability for risk taking in adolescence. A critical analysis of the frequency of risk taking behaviors, as well as mortality and morbidity rates across the lifespan, however, challenges the hypothesis that the peak of risk taking occurs in middle adolescence when the asynchrony between the different developmental time courses of the affective/approach and cognitive control systems is the largest. In fact, the highest levels of risk taking behaviors, such as alcohol and drug use, often occur among emerging adults (e.g., university/college students), and highlight the role of the social context in predicting risk taking behavior. Moreover, risk taking is not always unregulated or impulsive. Future research should broaden the scope of risk taking to include risks that are relevant to older adults, such as risky financial investing, gambling, and marital infidelity. In addition, a lifespan perspective, with a focus on how associations between neural systems and behavior are moderated by context and trait-level characteristics, and which includes diverse samples (e.g., divorced individuals), will help to address some important limitations in the adolescent brain development and risk taking literature.