The Normative Underpinnings of Democracy and the Balance between Morality and Legitimacy

ABSTRACT

Jürgen Habermas’s political philosophy incorporates the view that legitimacy is immanent to law, even though it makes morality a central component of democratic legitimacy. Taking this as a starting point, the article examines one criticism that applies to Habermas’s political theory, insofar as he puts morality at the centre of his reconstruction of the concept of legitimacy. Habermas claims that the moral point of view justifies only those norms that embody universalizable interests and rules out those that embody particular interests. Therefore, the objection is that particular citizens will have no reason to endorse these norms and act according to them because these norms do not incorporate their interests. The article goes on to show that Habermas can successfully answer this objection by means of the principle of discourse. The principle performs this function, inasmuch as it has a post-Kantian nature. On the one hand, it incorporates Kantian autonomy. And on the other, the Hegelian insight that autonomy has to be actualized through modern institutions and practices.     

The Normative Legitimacy Gap: International Sports Associations,Human Rights and Stakeholder Democracy

ABSTRACT

This conceptual paper explores whether the normative legitimacy of International Sports Associations (ISAs) such as Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) requires an active promotion of human rights conventions. The contention is that ISAs, which are founded on principles of neutrality and autonomy, can no longer rely merely on their internal stakeholders to make legitimate decisions when it comes to episodes where sport and human rights clash. Two situations where this claim applies are the FIA’s funding of Syrian motorsport activities and the FIFA’s involvement in the Israel/Palestine conflict, which have created considerable debate outside the ISAs. These examples are therefore used as basis for a discussion of the ISAs’ philosophical stance on human rights as much as their legal duties as non-governmental organizations.     

"Homogeneity" and Constitutional Democracy: Coping with Identity Conflicts through Group Rights

In this article I explore some ancient issues of political theory in the light of some contemporary social and cultural issues. After developing a check list of the virtues and vulnerabilities of constitutional democracy (Section I), I go on to discuss some types and symptoms of difference, conflict, fragmentation and heterogeneity (Section II). I then proceed to a critical review of a particular set of strategies and institutional solutions—political group rights—that are often thought promising devices for strengthening the virtues and overcoming the vulnerabilities of the constitutional democratic form of regime (Section III).
Much of the contemporary philosophical and political discussion of these issues is enchanted by the post-modern spirit of "multiculturalism,""diversity" and "identity." It tends to neglect issues of citizenship and social justice. It also tends to fixate on North American examples, neglecting some of the less benign West European and, in particular, Central East European varieties of identity politics. The discussion here, while mostly raising questions rather than claiming to provide definitive answers, nevertheless tries to overcome some of these biases.     

The Constitutional Theatre

Constitutionalism is a typically modernist project in that it seeks to dictate social order by means of institutional design. This project, however, fails in two ways. Empirically, constitutionalism is confronted with the fact that constitutions have limited control over their social environment. Epistemologically, constitutionalism has great difficulty in finding a convincing foundational relation between abstract constitutional provisions and constitutional norms for concrete situations. On the basis of this poor record, it is hard to comprehend how constitutionalism remains such an influential factor in our polity. This article tries to explain our adherence to the philosophy of constitutional ordering by analysing its function in constitutional discourse. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Normative Significance of Forgiveness

P.F. Strawson claimed that forgiveness is such an essential part of our moral practices that we could not extricate it from our form of life even if we so desired. But what is it about forgiveness that would make it such a central feature of our moral experience? In this paper, I suggest that the answer has to do with what I will call the normative significance of forgiveness. Forgiveness is normatively significant in the sense that, in its paradigmatic instances, forgiving alters the operative norms bearing on the interaction between the victim and the wrongdoer in certain characteristic ways. My project here is, first, to clarify the ways that paradigmatic cases of forgiveness alter the norms of interaction between victim and wrongdoer and to argue that it is in this respect that forgiveness is a normatively significant feature of our moral responsibility practices. Second, I show that most extant theories of forgiveness fail to explain the characteristic ways in which forgiving alters norms. Third, I offer a theory of forgiveness that accounts for this significant normative feature. I conclude by addressing two objections to my proposal.     

直接民主与间接民主--《代议制政府》的重新解读

直接民主与间接民主的问题,是当代政治哲学的一个热点。本文通过对密《代议制政府》的重新解读,澄清了直接民主和间接民主的关系。密尔系统地阐述了代议制民主的问题,他的间接民主理论中包含着直接民主的因素。一方面密尔把人民亲自参政的直接民主视为代议制民主的基础和前提,阐明了人民参政的直接民主的正当性、合理性;另一方面他又深刻地分析了人民参政的直接民主可能带来的弊病和危险。实际上,直接民主是一把双刃剑,它既可以成为克服暴政的武器,又可能导致多数的暴政;既可以成为自由的保障,也可能成为自由的敌人。因此,需要根据实际情况,扬利避害,在政治制度的设计中,正确地适度地运用直接民主的形式,保证人民的政治参与。     

The Normative Core Of Paternalism

The philosophical debate on paternalism is conducted as if the property of being paternalistic should be attributed to actions. Actions are typically deemed to be paternalistic if they amount to some kind of interference with a person and if the rationale for the action is the good of the person interfered with. This focus on actions obscures the normative issues involved. In particular, it makes it hard to provide an analysis of the traditional liberal resistance to paternalism. Given the fact that actions most often have mixed rationales, it is not clear how we should categorize and evaluate interfering actions for which only part of the rationale is the good of the person. The preferable solution is to attribute the property of being paternalistic not to actions, but to compounds of reasons and actions. The framework of action–reasons provides the tools for distinguishing where exactly paternalism lies in the complex web of reasons and actions.