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1.
We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons
to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity
of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning
of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a
mutual constraint(MC) on each other. This approach would refuse to award any priority of cognitive approaches over neuroscience, and reciprocally,
to refuse any priority of neuroscience over cognitive approaches. MC thus argues against radicalreductionism at the methodological level. 相似文献
2.
Patrick Stokes 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(1):23-44
Visual forms of episodic memory and anticipatory imagination involve images that, by virtue of their perspectival organization,
imply a “notional subject” of experience. But they contain no inbuilt reference to the “actual subject,” the person actually
doing the remembering or imagining. This poses the problem of what (if anything) connects these two perspectival subjects
and what differentiates cases of genuine memory and anticipation from mere “imagined seeing.” I consider two approaches to
this problem. The first, exemplified by Wollheim and Velleman, claims that genuinely reflexive memories and anticipations
are phenomenally “unselfconscious,” with the co-identity of the notional and actual subjects secured by a determinate causal
history. The second approach posits some distinctive phenomenal property that attaches to genuinely reflexive memories and
anticipations and serves to experientially conflate the notional and actual subject. I consider a version of the second approach,
derived from Kierkegaard’s discussions of phenomenal “contemporaneity,” and argue that this approach can better account for
the possibility of affective alienation from the selves we were and will be: the way in which our sense of self and awareness of our causal history can sometimes come apart. 相似文献
3.
John Sutton Celia B. Harris Paul G. Keil Amanda J. Barnier 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2010,9(4):521-560
This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social
memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition
based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with
disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature
of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agree
with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory
as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out,
on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism.
Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop
a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological
and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution
of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence
or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the
idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific
psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall
and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying
conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed
cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive
psychology of memory. 相似文献
4.
Nicholas Shea Kristine Krug Philippe N. Tobler 《Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience》2008,8(4):418-428
Emerging evidence suggests that the long-established distinction between habit-based and goal-directed decision-making mechanisms
can also be sustained in humans. Although the habit-based system has been extensively studied in humans, the goal-directed
system is less well characterized. This review brings to that task the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual representational
mechanisms. Conceptual representations are structured out of semantic constituents (concepts)—the use of which requires an
ability to perform some language-like syntactic processing. Decision making—as investigated by neuroscience and psychology—is
normally studied in isolation from questions about concepts as studied in philosophy and cognitive psychology. We ask what
role concepts play in the “goal-directed” decision-making system. We argue that one fruitful way of studying this system in
humans is to investigate the extent to which it deploys conceptual representations. 相似文献
5.
John Bickle 《Synthese》2006,151(3):411-434
As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot explain cognition and complex behavior directly. These experimental practices involve intervening directly with molecular components of sub-cellular and gene expression pathways in neurons and then measuring specific behaviors. These behaviors are tracked using tests that are widely accepted by experimental psychologists to study the psychological phenomenon at issue (e.g., memory, attention, and perception). Here I illustrate these practices and their importance for explanation and reduction in current mainstream neuroscience by describing recent work on social recognition memory in mammals. 相似文献
6.
Neil Pembroke 《Pastoral Psychology》2012,61(2):245-258
While perfectionism has been associated with guilt dynamics, the form of perfectionism that is most frequently discussed by
psychologists is connected to self-condemnation for perceived failures to reach the high standard set for personal achievement.
There is therefore a strong link between perfectionism and inferiority shame. Psychotherapists have given quite a bit of attention
to shame-based perfectionism; it has been largely neglected by pastoral psychologists. Three approaches to the pastoral care
of shame-based perfectionism are developed. The first approach is based in cognitive therapy. It is argued that perfectionism
is grounded in a faulty core belief about the self—namely, “I am what I achieve.” The second method makes use of strategies
developed by John Bradshaw for accepting and affirming all one’s sub-selves. Bradshaw’s approach is critiqued, however, for
the way in which shame-based and guilt-based perfectionism are confused. The third method is a modification and adaptation
of Heinz Kohut’s strategy of “mirroring” (empathy, admiration, and approval) that he developed for use in work with clients
with narcissistic personality disorder. 相似文献
7.
Michael L. Anderson 《Synthese》2007,159(3):329-345
The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle
course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution
proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components—originally developed
to serve some specific purpose—were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their
participation in existing programs. If the evolution of cognition was indeed driven by such exaptation, then we should be
able to make some specific empirical predictions regarding the resulting functional topography of the brain. This essay discusses
three such predictions, and some of the evidence supporting them. Then, using this account as a background, the essay considers
the implications of these findings for an account of the functional integration of cognitive operations. For instance, MRH
suggests that in order to determine the functional role of a given brain area it is necessary to consider its participation
across multiple task categories, and not just focus on one, as has been the typical practice in cognitive neuroscience. This
change of methodology will motivate (even perhaps necessitate) the development of a new, domain-neutral vocabulary for characterizing
the contribution of individual brain areas to larger functional complexes, and direct particular attention to the question
of how these various area roles are integrated and coordinated to result in the observed cognitive effect. Finally, the details
of the mix of cognitive functions a given area supports should tell us something interesting not just about the likely computational
role of that area, but about the nature of and relations between the cognitive functions themselves. For instance, growing
evidence of the role of “motor” areas like M1, SMA and PMC in language processing, and of “language” areas like Broca’s area
in motor control, offers the possibility for significantly reconceptualizing the nature both of language and of motor control. 相似文献
8.
Kirsten Jacobson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(3):355-373
Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home”
is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar
notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity
that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially
an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for
our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way
of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature
of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving. 相似文献
9.
Static models of culture's influence have given way to a dynamic view, which identifies not only differences across cultures in people's judgments and decisions, but also the situations and conditions in which these differences do or do not appear. Theory and evidence developed from a cognitive psychological perspective underlie this dynamic approach, including research emerging from the “dynamic constructivist” and “situated cognition” models. In the present review, we focus on findings that confirm the utility of this cognitively oriented approach, and briefly discuss the advantages and complementary nature of the “social collective” and neuroscience approaches to understanding culture. 相似文献
10.
Ralph D. Ellis 《Human Studies》2006,29(1):33-55
This paper reports on the Kuhnian revolution now occurring in neuropsychology that is finally supportive of and friendly to phenomenology – the “enactive” approach to the mind-body relation, grounded in the notion of self-organization, which is consistent with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on virtually every point. According to the enactive approach, human minds understand the world by virtue of the ways our bodies can act relative to it, or the ways we can imagine acting. This requires that action be distinguished from passivity, that the mental be approached from a first person perspective, and that the cognitive capacities of the brain be grounded in the emotional and motivational processes that guide action and anticipate action affordances. It avoids the old intractable problems inherent in the computationalist approaches of twentieth century atomism and radical empiricism, and again allows phenomenology to bridge to neuropsychology in the way Merleau-Ponty was already doing over half a century ago. 相似文献
11.
van der Helm PA 《Cognitive processing》2012,13(1):13-40
What, if anything, is cognitive architecture and how is it implemented in neural architecture? Focusing on perceptual organization,
this question is addressed by way of a pluralist approach which, supported by metatheoretical considerations, combines complementary
insights from representational, connectionist, and dynamic systems approaches to cognition. This pluralist approach starts
from a representationally inspired model which implements the intertwined but functionally distinguishable subprocesses of
feedforward feature encoding, horizontal feature binding, and recurrent feature selection. As sustained by a review of neuroscientific
evidence, these are the subprocesses that are believed to take place in the visual hierarchy in the brain. Furthermore, the
model employs a special form of processing, called transparallel processing, whose neural signature is proposed to be gamma-band
synchronization in transient horizontal neural assemblies. In neuroscience, such assemblies are believed to mediate binding
of similar features. Their formal counterparts in the model are special input-dependent distributed representations, called
hyperstrings, which allow many similar features to be processed in a transparallel fashion, that is, simultaneously as if
only one feature were concerned. This form of processing does justice to both the high combinatorial capacity and the high
speed of the perceptual organization process. A naturally following proposal is that those temporarily synchronized neural
assemblies are “gnosons”, that is, constituents of flexible self-organizing cognitive architecture in between the relatively
rigid level of neurons and the still elusive level of consciousness. 相似文献
12.
Daniel McArthur 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(2):209-224
Summary In recent years Structural Realism has been revived as a compromise candidate to resolve the long-standing question of scientific
realism. Recent debate over structural realism originates with Worrall’s (1989) paper “Structural Realism: The best of Both
Worlds”. However, critics such as Psillos contend that structural realism incorporates an untenable distinction between structure
and nature, and is therefore unworkable. In this paper I consider three versions of structural realism that purport to avoid
such criticism. The first is Chakravartty’s “semirealism” which proceeds by trying to show that structural realism and entity
realism entail one another. I demonstrate that this position will not work, but follow Chakravartty’s contention that structural
realism need not imply that scientific knowledge can only be of mathematical structure. I advance from this conclusion to
sketch a version of structural realism that is consistent with recent deflationary approaches to the scientific realism question.
Finally, I consider a third approach to structural realism Ladyman’s “metaphysical structural realism” which tries to avoid
the difficulties of earlier versions by taking structure to be ontologically primary. I show that the deflationary approach
to structural realism undermines the rationale behind Ladyman’s approach. 相似文献
13.
高血压合并糖尿病是冠心病致死的危险因素。有效地控制血压可以显著地降低糖尿病病人心血管事件的发病率与病死率。高血压糖尿病病人的血压控制目标为〈130/80mmHg。为了达到这一血压水平,糖尿病病人的降压治疗包括合理的非药物治疗与药物治疗。在药物治疗中应选用血管紧张素转换酶抑制剂、血管紧张素受体拮抗剂、钙离子拮抗剂和小剂量利尿剂,并且注意联合用药。 相似文献
14.
Jacqueline A. Sullivan 《Synthese》2010,177(2):151-164
The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement
that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences,
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous
responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”,
“spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively
to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have
not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question
of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study
using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed
a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes
nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and
molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental
and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze. 相似文献
15.
Anders John 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(2):137-143
In his “Third Way” Aquinas appears to argue in a way that relies upon shifting quantifiers in a fallacious way. Some have
tried to save this and other parts of the “Third Way” by introducing sophisticated logical and metaphysical machinery. Alternatively,
Aquinas’ apparently fallacious quantifier shift can be seen to be part of a valid argument if we supply a simple premise which
an Aristotelian natural philosopher would surely hold. In this short paper, I consider candidates for this premise, defend
a specific premise, and from that discussion draw a moral about quantifier predicate logic. I conclude that Aristotelian natural
philosophy is more than an historical backdrop to Aquinas’ arguments. 相似文献
16.
17.
Brad J. Kallenberg 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(4):563-576
In 1998, a lead researcher at a Midwestern university submitted as his own a document that had 64 instances of strings of
10 or more words that were identical to a consultant’s masters thesis and replicated a data chart, all of whose 16 entries
were identical to three and four significant figures. He was fired because his actions were wrong. Curiously, he was completely
unable to see that his actions were wrong. This phenomenon is discussed in light of recent advances in neuroscience and used
to argue for a change in the standard way engineering ethics is taught. I argue that engineering ethics is better taught in
the form of a design course in order to maximize “somatic” learning. 相似文献
18.
Peter Mittelstaedt 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(1):45-53
In modern physics, the constant “c” plays a twofold role. On the one hand, “c” is the well known velocity of light in an empty
Minkowskian space–time, on the other hand “c” is a characteristic number of Special Relativity that governs the Lorentz transformation
and its consequences for the measurements of space–time intervals. We ask for the interrelations between these two, at first
sight different meanings of “c”. The conjecture that the value of “c” has any influence on the structure of space–time is
based on the operational interpretation of Special Relativity, which uses light rays for measurements of space–time intervals.
We do not follow this way of reasoning but replace it by a more realistic approach that allows to show that the structure
of the Minkowskian space–time can be reconstructed already on the basis of a restricted classical ontology (Mittelstaedt,
Philosophie der Physik und der Raum-Zeit, Mannheim: BI-Wissenschaftsverlag, 1988 and Mittelstaedt, Kaltblütig: Philosophie von einem rationalen Standpunkt, Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, pp. 221–240, 2003), and that without any reference to the propagation of light. However, the space–time obtained in this way contains still
an unknown constant. We show that this constant agrees numerically with “c” but that it must conceptually clearly be distinguished
from the velocity of light. Hence, we argue for a clear distinction between the two faces of “c” and for a dualism of space–time
and matter. 相似文献
19.
William L. Rowe 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(1):37-48
Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover summarize the essence of their paper as follows: “We argue that divine responsibility is sufficient
for divine thankworthiness and consistent with the absence of divine freedom. We do this while insisting on the view that
both freedom and responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism.” In this response I argue that while it makes sense
for believers to be thankful that God exists, it makes no sense for them to thank him for doing the best act he can, given
the circumstances. 相似文献
20.
Ralph William Clark 《Philosophia》2011,39(2):251-265
I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand
the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper
names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call “cognitive perspectives.” Although both types of perspectives
underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional
intermediaries does not entail that a Kripke-inspired view of direct reference must be abandoned. At the same time, the existence
of these intermediaries can be seen to play illuminating roles as regards the referring functions of proper names in the following
types of cases, among others: (a) where different names pick out the same subject; (b) where names are empty. Along the way,
I argue that “perspectival views” are not something “inside the head” of language users as intended by Putnam in his well-known
discussion of meaning. 相似文献