Rowe’s new evidential argument from evil: Problems and prospects

This paper examines an evidential argument from evil recently defended by William Rowe, one that differs significantly from the kind of evidential argument Rowe has become renowned for defending. After providing a brief outline of Rowe’s new argument, I contest its seemingly uncontestable premise that our world is not the best world God could have created. I then engage in a lengthier discussion of the other key premise in Rowe’s argument, viz., the Leibnizian premise that any world created by God must be the best world God can create. In particular, I discuss the criticisms raised against this premise by William Wainwright as well as Rowe’s attempt to meet these criticisms. The Wainwright-Rowe exchange, I argue, highlights some insuperable difficulties in Rowe’s challenge to theism.     

D. Z. Phillips on Belief in God

In this paper I try briefly to say why I think that what D.Z. Phillips had to say about belief in God can be defended against certain familiar criticisms, and why I think that his treatment could have been improved. I note passages in his writings which might be thought not to reflect what belief in God amounts to, but I argue that these passages can be read as reflecting belief in God as we find it in biblical authors and in writers like Thomas Aquinas. Having noted that Phillips rejects attempts to do natural theology on largely Humean grounds, I argue against these grounds as echoed by Phillips and draw attention to a tradition of natural theology not subject to Humean objections, a tradition to which Phillips might have paid more attention than he did.     

Naive misconceptions of Cooke and Breedin’s research: response to Ranney

In this paper, we respond to Ranney's (1994) comment on our paper on naive physics (Cooke & Breedin, 1994). In his comment, Ranney criticizes our methods and analyses, as well as our claims of theoretical inconsistency. In response to Ranney, we show that mast of his criticisms can be traced to several misconceptions. Some of these misconceptions seem to stem from his drawing of inappropriate similarities between his own research and ours. Specifically, ftanney seems to hall faun' misconceptions about our research: (1) the belief that trajectory responses in our study were relevant to our claims about theoretical consistency, (2) tie belief that aggregation of theoretical variations weakens claims of inconsistency, (3) the belief that the method of written reports is inferior to the method of structured interviews, and (4) the belief that our proposal of on-the-fly theorizing is at odds with temporal consistency and nonimpetus beliefs.     

CONDEMNATION OF A SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE: A CHRONOLOGY AND REFUTATION OF THE ATTACKS AND A DISCUSSION OF THREATS TO THE INTEGRITY OF SCIENCE

On July 12, 1999, our meta-analysis on child sexual abuse published in Psychological Bulletin, one of the American Psychological Association's (APA) premiere journals, was condemned by the U.S. Congress (H. Con. Res. 107). The condemnation followed months of attacks on the article, the APA, and us by various social conservatives and psychoanalytically-oriented clinicians. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) was asked by the APA to independently review our article. After considering criticisms of it and the article itself, AAAS declined, but commented that it was the criticisms, not our methods or analyses, that troubled them because these criticisms misrepresented what we wrote. The current article chronicles this whole affair. First, we provide background, explaining why an article such as ours was needed. Then we accurately summarize the article, given that it has been so widely misrepresented. Next we present a chronology of the events leading up to and following the condemnation. We then present and refute all the major criticisms of the article, which have included both methodological and conceptual attacks. Next we discuss the threat to science that these events portend. We conclude by discussing the need to separate moral judgments from scientific research, the conflation of which formed the basis for the distortions and condemnation.     

A FAILED RECONCILIATION: FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON STERBA'S PROJECT

Although I do not find any of Sterba's responses to my recent criticisms of his work How to Make People Just convincing, I shall not attempt to answer them point by point since this would be a boring, scholastic exercise at best.1 Rather, I shall expand upon what I believe continue to be the three major problems with Sterba's theory and explain why his recent responses to my criticisms (and the criticisms of others) along these lines are not adequate.     

Longuenesse on Kant and the Priority of the Capacity to Judge

'Hobbes and the Imitation of God' ( Inquiry , 44, 223-6) is Eric Brandon's criticism of my article, 'Thomas Hobbes and the Constraints that Enable the Imitation of God' ( Inquiry , 42, 149-76). Brandon's criticisms are rooted in a misunderstanding of what is argued. Observations made concerning Hobbes's claims about prudence - a form of thinking Hobbes distinguishes from philosophic practice - are erroneously described by Brandon as a part of arguments concerning Hobbes's claims about philosophy. Brandon's own account reaffirms a conventional interpretation by claiming that Hobbes envisioned philosophers discovering order, an interpretation challenged in the original argument. Hobbes privileged the creation of order over attempts to discover the order of the world, and this is reflected in his affinity for geometry over physics.     

Thought experiments in personal identity: A dialogue with Beck,Wagner and Wilkes

In a recent series of papers, Beck and Wagner have been arguing about the general role that thought experiments can play in the debate on personal identity, showing their disagreement about the famous criticisms that Wilkes’ launched against their use. In this article I come back to Wilkes’ criticisms to show that her position is deeply problematic. If we adopt instead the mental model account of thought experiments, we can accommodate Wilkes’ criticisms and justify the use of thought experiments in the debate of personal identity. This will allow us to see why Beck and Wagner were both half right and half wrong in their discussion.     

Interpretation as a misunderstanding

In the following article ‘who’ as the agent in the clinical session becomes questioned. By speaking we are introduced in the world of misunderstanding, where we are not merely speaking but being spoken to. Listening to what is being said and in this way misunderstanding what the patient is trying to say helps us in order to locate where the subject of the unconscious places himself in relation to the desire of the Other. In the article, it is conveyed how interpretation is not something that clarifies or explains to the patient his difficulties, but instead locates them by letting them take part in the session. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, locating the subject of the unconscious is crucial as this gives the patient a clue about where they place themselves in relation to the Other. This is why cutting the session is an essential element of its technique, as it stops in this way something that can disturb or hide where the subject of the unconscious has appeared. This allows patients to experience where they are gratifying themselves in their own difficulty. Interpretation is not speaking about the truth but instead, making the truth present in the session.     

Explanation versus accommodation: Reply to Bowers (2010)

Bowers (2010) presented a critique of the account of masked priming presented by Norris and Kinoshita (2008) based on the Bayesian Reader model of visual word recognition (Norris, 2006). In this reply, we point out that: (1) Bowers' criticisms are based on his misunderstanding of both the Bayesian or ideal-observer approach, and the theoretical claims made in Norris and Kinoshita, and (2) Bowers' alternative account of the key data presented in Norris and Kinoshita relies on a series of ad hoc assumptions that are combined in different proportions to postdict any pattern of data.     

Evaluative Conditioning: Arti-fact or -fiction?-A Reply to Baeyens, De Houwer, Vansteenwegen, and Eelen (1998)

Baeyenset al.(1998) claim that Field and Davey's (1997) controversial study of conceptual conditioning offers little threat to current conceptions of evaluative conditioning. This article addresses some of the questions posed by Baeyenset al.First, some criticisms of the conceptual conditioning study appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the procedure. Second, we address the issues surrounding the so-called Type-X procedure. Specifically, we begin by reviewing the status of studies that have used a procedure different from the Type-X procedure. It is then argued that, although the Type-X procedure has been used in only a portion of EC research, it has been used primarily in those studies whose outcome has been used to argue that evaluative conditioning (EC) is functionally distinct from autonomic conditioning. We then review the evidence from non-Type-X procedures that EC is a distinct form of learning. Finally, an attempt is made to explain why between-subject controls should be used as a matter of course in this field of research.     

Response to briscoe (2010)

In an earlier paper my colleagues and I put forth a theory called "perceiving-the-present" that predicts a systematic pattern across a large variety of illusions, and we presented evidence that the systematic pattern exists. Briscoe puts forth arguments against the theory and the existence of the systematic pattern. Here I provide counterarguments to his criticisms of the theory, and I explain why his arguments do not bear on the existence of the systematic pattern.     

The Value of Research Methods in Psychotherapy Research: A Reply to the Commentary of Dr Norton

Norton's commentary on our article has prompted us to think further about the purpose of psychotherapy research. We agree with his suggestion that researchers have much work to do to understand when and for whom interventions are most efficacious. We hope that our field will make progress in this regard. In this reply, we further describe why we believe careful attention to research methods, such as those highlighted in our article, is key to making progress in psychotherapy research.     

Probing the human brain with stimulating electrodes: The story of Roberts Bartholow’s (1874) experiment on Mary Rafferty

Roberts Bartholow’s 1874 experiment on Mary Rafferty is widely cited as the first demonstration, by direct application of stimulating electrodes, of the motor excitability of the human cerebral cortex. The many accounts of the experiment, however, leave certain questions and details unexamined or unresolved, especially about Bartholow’s goals, the nature and quality of the evidence, and the experiment’s role in the history of theory and research on localisation of function. In this article, we try to fill these gaps and to tell the full story. We describe Bartholow’s career up to 1874, review the theoretical and empirical background for the experiment, and present Bartholow’s own account of the experiment as well as those of his supporters and critics. We then present our own analysis, assess the experiment’s influence on contemporaneous scientific opinion about cortical excitability, and trace its citation record into our own time. We also review and assess ethical criticisms of Bartholow and their effects on his career, and we close by discussing the role we think the experiment deserves to play in the history of theory and research on cortical excitability.     

Semantic primitives for emotions: A Reply to Ortony and Clore

Abstract

We respond to four criticisms by Ortony and Clore (1989) of our semantic analysis of English emotion terms (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). We clarify how our theory enables people to speak of certain emotions that they experience without knowing their cause. We explain why emotions are best regarded as mental states with distinctive phenomenal tones—not “just” feelings, and how emotion terms can relate to terms denoting moods. Finally, we discuss an issue that distinguishes our theory from other contemporary cognitive theories: We claim that there is a small number of discriminably different basic emotions, and that the semantics of English emotion terms is comprehensible if these basic states are taken as unanalysable primitives.     

Language‐Games and Relativism: On Cora Diamond's Reading of Peter Winch

We will look critically at three essays by Cora Diamond concerning Peter Winch's views on the possibility of communication and criticism between language‐games. We briefly present our understanding of Winch's approach to philosophy. Then, we argue that Diamond misidentifies Winch's views, taking them to imply language‐game relativism or linguistic idealism. When she does raise valid criticisms against language‐game relativism, her critical points mainly coincide with things that Winch has already stressed in his own work. That leaves us with the question what their real disagreement amounts to. Finally, we suggest that at the bottom of Diamond's objections lies her failure to appreciate Winch's insights about the place of logic in human intercourse.     

On the Very Idea of Denying the Existence of Radically Different Conceptual Schemes

This paper concentrates on three connected features of Taylor's argument. I begin by considering his historical sections on the formation of the modern identity, raising some doubts about the focus of his discussion and offering some specific criticisms in the case of Locke and Rousseau. Next I examine Taylor's list of the moral imperatives allegedly felt with particular force in the contemporary world. I question the extent to which the values listed by Taylor are genuinely shared, and point to a range of criticisms put forward by conservatives, Marxists, feminists, and other opponents of liberalism, all of whose doubts Taylor appears to underestimate. Finally, I address Taylor's underlying claim that a religious dimension is indispensable if our highest human potentialities are to be realized, and conclude with a critique of his theistic arguments.     

Imperialism,Progress, Developmental Teleology,and Interdisciplinary Unification

In a previous article in this journal, we examined John Dupré's claim that ‘scientific imperialism’ can lead to ‘misguided’ science being considered acceptable. Here, we address criticisms raised by Ian J. Kidd and Uskali Mäki against that article. While both commentators take us to be offering our own account of scientific imperialism that goes beyond that developed by Dupré, and go on to criticise what they take to be our account, our actual ambitions were modest. We intended to ‘explicate the sense in which the term is used by Dupré’ and to ‘identify the normative content of his critique of scientific imperialism’. We made no claim to have developed our own account of scientific imperialism that went further than what was implicit in Dupré's work already. However, that said, the discussions presented by both Kidd and Mäki raise important general issues about how the idea of scientific imperialism should be understood and framed. Here, we offer our considered responses to Kidd's and Maki's discussions of scientific imperialism.     

A Different Rationale for Redistribution: A Reply to Bjørnskov

First we would like to thank Christian Bjørnskov for his comments and in particular for acknowledging the contribution we make in introducing the idea that inter-country redistribution might be more effective a way of redistributing incomes than interpersonal redistribution within a country and, in general, the quality of our theoretical and indeed empirical analysis. We feel that the more critical points he makes of the paper are largely due to a misunderstanding and we welcome the opportunity to further clarify our contribution.     

Whether, when, and why Skinner published on biological participation in behavior

This paper brings some data to bear on the criticisms, claims, and arguments that Skinner (a) denied or dismissed biological participation in behavior, (b) addressed it only late in his career or more often later than earlier, or (c) addressed it only because of the overwhelming evidence for it or the criticisms that he had overlooked it. For this, we coded Skinner's every primary-source publication for three content categories (i.e., genetics, physiology, and evolution) and for the extent to which he addressed them (i.e., in publication titles, substantively, or in passing). Our findings are that Skinner addressed biological participation in over a third of his publications throughout his career, albeit more often later than earlier. The latter, however, is accounted for by an increase in his base rate of publication and in general conditions and specific events in his career, psychology, and science. The discussion addresses our research methods; the reasons for and refutations of the criticisms, claims, and arguments; and their sources.     

Bernard Williams on the Human Prejudice

In “The Human Prejudice”, Bernard Williams discusses our treating human beings differently in our moral thinking from the ways we treat other creatures. He criticises the idea that this expresses a prejudice, speciesism, analogous to racism and sexism. His essay has been misunderstood by some of its critics, including Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan. My essay sets out several questions one may have about Williams's essay, and explains how they can be answered. I make clear the connections between “The Human Prejudice” and some main elements in Williams's thinking about ethics, including his criticisms of moral theory.