Depression and processing information about others

We investigated differences between mildly depressed subjects and normal controls in their memory for, and judgments of, another person. All subjects read a story (containing either predominately positive or predominately negative items) under instructions to form an impression of the story target. Subjects later made several judgments about the target and attempted to recall the story. For both the positive and the negative story, depressed subjects produced significantly more negative intrusions (i.e., recalled nonpresented negative items) than did the normal subjects, but they did not recall more negative items correctly than did the normal subjects. Depressed subjects also perceived themselves as more similar to the negative story target than did the normal controls and indicated greater liking for the negative story target than did the normal controls.     

Demonstrating and eliminating the aggregation effect in physical skill tasks

Confidence judgments can be elicited in multiple ways. One of these procedures is to provide confidence judgments regarding each of a number of cases (individual judgments). A second procedure is to provide confidence judgments about a set of items (an aggregate judgment). Much research has demonstrated an aggregation effect—that individual judgments are more confident than aggregate judgments—within the cognitive knowledge domain. However, this effect has not previously been investigated with physical performance skill tasks. In three experiments, participants gave individual and aggregate judgments regarding the number of successful tosses they would make in either a ring toss, ping‐pong toss, or basketball toss task. In keeping with the aggregation effect, individual judgments were more confident than were aggregate judgments of success. Additionally, we eliminated the aggregation effect in Experiments 2 and 3 by employing a case‐specific base rate manipulation. Consistent with previous research with cognitive tasks, these results suggest that individual confidence judgments for physical skill tasks are determined primarily by characteristics associated with the individual case to be judged, whereas aggregate confidence judgments are determined by a more general evaluation of one's ability in the domain. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS)

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.     

On-the-Job Experience and Skill at Detecting Deception1

The role of on-the-job experience in fostering skill at detecting deception was examined. A deception-detection test was administered to three samples of more than 100 subjects each: a group of undergraduates with no special experiences at detecting deceit; a group of new recruits to a federal law enforcement training program, who had some limited on-the-job experience at detecting deceit; and a group of advanced federal law enforcement officers, with years of experience working at jobs in which the detection of deception is very important. Although the officer samples were more confident about their judgments of deceptiveness than were the students, they were no more accurate than the students. None of the three groups showed a significant improvement in deception-detection success from the first half to the second half of the test; however, the advanced officers felt increasingly confident about their performance as they progressed through the test. Correlational analyses of the relationship between accuracy and confidence provided further evidence that experience does not improve people's awareness oi the accuracy or inaccuracy of their judgments. The findings from this research are compared to the results of research on other kinds of professional decision-makers (e.g., clinical psychologists), and several theoretical perspectives on the role of experience in decision making are discussed.     

Children's numerical skill and judgments of confidence in estimation

This study investigated how children's fluent use of a basic numerical skill is related to their perceptions of confidence on a task of quantitative estimation. One hundred four 10th graders (age 15.7 years) were categorized according to level of numerical fluency as assessed by timed tasks of counting in various nonunity increments. They then made estimates of large numbers of dots and rated how confident they were on each trial. The estimation task varied according to two within-subject factors of task difficulty. It was found that counting skill was related not only to accuracy in estimating, but also to the appropriateness of the children's confidence in their responses. Skillful children made judgments that corresponded with actual task difficulty. A derived calibration score corroborated ANOVA findings of the interaction of skill level and task difficulty on confidence ratings. It also revealed that while girls were less confident than boys, they were actually more realistic in their judgments. Findings are discussed in terms of (a) the effect of stimulus knowledge on awareness of task difficulty and (b) sex differences in achievement-related expectancies.     

Age differences in feeling-of-knowing and confidence judgements as a function of knowledge domain

For two semantic knowledge domains, general and computer-related, feeling-of-knowing (FOK) and confidence level (CL) ratings and their relative accuracy were assessed in young, middle-aged, and older adults, after test difficulty was equated across age groups. Global memory self-efficacy beliefs were also assessed for each domain. As expected, greater age was associated with poorer memory self-efficacy beliefs only in the computer domain. The oldest two groups were found to be more underconfident than young adults when rating their FOK but not their CL, for computer items but not for general items. Statistical control of age differences in memory self-efficacy beliefs in the relevant domain greatly reduced this age effect on computer-related FOK ratings. This finding suggests that absolute FOK judgments are more closely related to memory self-efficacy beliefs than are CL judgments. Gamma correlations between judgments and recognition performance revealed that all age groups were equally accurate in FOK and in CL judgments, in both domains.     

Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.     

Automatic activation of categorical and abstract analogical relations in analogical reasoning

We examined activation of concepts during analogical reasoning. Subjects made either analogical judgments or categorical judgments about four-word sets. After each four-word set, they named the ink color of a single word in a modified Stroop task. Words that referred to category relations were primed (as indicated by longer response times on Stroop color naming) subsequent to analogical judgments and categorical judgments. This finding suggests that activation of category concepts plays a fundamental role in analogical thinking. When colored words referred to analogical relations, priming occurred subsequent to analogical judgments, but not to categorical judgments, even though identical four-word stimuli were used for both types of judgments. This finding lends empirical support to the hypothesis that, when people comprehend the analogy between two items, they activate an abstract analogical relation that is distinct from the specific content items that compose the analogy.     

Causal attributions for success and failure in relation to expectations of success based upon selective or manipulative control

Subjects worked at a 10-item Anagrams Test. In a manipulative control condition the prior performance of subjects on a set of practice anagrams was controlled so that half of these subjects began the test with high expectations of success and half with low expectations of success As a check on the manipulation, subjects provided ratings of how confident they were that they could pass the test (i e, solve five anagrams or more) In a selective control condition subjects were not given practice items but were subsequently assigned to high versus low expectation groups on the basis of their confidence ratings The difficulty level of the items in the Anagrams Test was manipulated so that half the subjects in each condition passed the test and half failed. Subsequently all subjects were required to rate the degree to which they considered ability (or lack of ability), effort (or lack of effort), task difficulty (easy or hard), and luck (good or bad) were causes of their performance outcome (success or failure). It was found that the expected success was attributed more to ability and less to good luck than was the unexpected success The expected failure was attributed more to lack of ability and less to bad luck than was the unexpected failure There was a greater tendency for subjects to appeal to task difficulty and effort as causes of their performance when they succeeded than when they failed. These results were discussed in terms of a structural balance model of attribution behavior and also in relation to Heider's naive analysis of the causes of action     

Integrated pictures and relational imagery training in children's learning

The effects of integrated pictures of nouns, training in imagining relations between separate pictures of nouns, and the combination of training and integrated pictures on the recall of noun triplets were assessed in children from grades one, three, and six. The cued recall of nouns under these three conditions was from two to six times greater than that of the control group in all three grades. In grade six, those children who had been trained to generate their own relations between the pictured nouns recalled significantly more than those who had been shown integrated (i.e., already related) pictures of the nouns. It was suggested that encouraging young children to seek out and generate relations between items to be learned might help them become aware of and more confident in their ability to improve their own learning efficiency.     

Peer Input and Revised Judgment: Exploring the Effects of (Un) Biased Confidence1

An experiment was conducted to test the effects of biased versus unbiased peer input on the revised judgments of others. After completing a set of knowledge items and assessing their confidence in each answer, subjects were: (a) given written input (in the form of answers and confidence assessments) from a peer who had completed the same set of items, and (b) allowed to revise their earlier answers and confidence assessments. Peer input was either overconfident, underconfident, or appropriately confident. Relative to appropriately confident input, both overconfident and underconfident input caused subjects’ accuracy in judgment to suffer. Overconfident input was particularly harmful because it led to more extreme overconfidence without any increase in accuracy. Practical implications of these results are discussed.     

Memorability judgments for high- and low-frequency words

Five experiments were conducted in order to examine subjects’ judgments of the memorability of high- (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words in the context of a recognition memory task. In Experiment 1, the subjects were provided study/test experience with a list of HF and LF words prior to making memorability judgments for a new list of HF and LF items. The findings were consistent with previous evidence (Greene & Thapar, 1994; Wixted, 1992) suggesting that subjects are not explicitly aware of the greater recognition memorability of LF words. Experiments 2–5 embedded the memorability judgment task within the recognition test itself. In these experiments, the subjects consistently gave higher memorability ratings to LF items. The contrast between the pattern of results found when the subjects made their judgments at the time of list presentation (Experiment 1) and that when they made their judgments during the recognition test (Experiments 2–5) is consistent with recent evidence that even seemingly highly related metamnemonic judgments (e.g., ease of learning judgments vs. judgments of learning for the same items) may be based on very different factors if they occur at different points in the study/test cycle. The present findings are also consistent with the possibility that very rapid retrieval of memorability information for HF and LF words may affect recognition decisions and may contribute to the recognition memory word frequency effect.     

The accuracy of beliefs about retrieval cues

We investigated the accuracy of predictions about semantic, environmental, and phonological cues for remembering. Subjects rated the pleasantness of 10 words in each of four rooms, predicted the number of words that they would recall with and without one of the three types of cues, and then were tested for free or cued recall. Consistent with their predictions, subjects who received semantic cues recalled more words than did subjects in the free-recall group. The subjects in the other cuing conditions did not benefit from the cues; furthermore, they overestimated the value of phonological cues, and they believed that environmental cues were ineffective. Finally, confidence ratings for cued-recall predictions did not reflect the pattern of cued-recall performance. Subjects were least confident about their predictions for semantic cuing and most confident about their predictions for recall to be cued phonologically.     

Perceptually Equivalent Judgments Made Visually and via Haptic Sensory-Substitution Devices

ABSTRACT

According to the ecological theory of perception–action, perception is primarily of affordances, which are directly perceivable opportunities for behavior. The current study evaluated participants’ ability to use vision and haptic sensory-substitution devices to support perceptual judgments of affordances involving the task of passing through apertures. Sighted participants made perceptual judgments about whether they could walk through apertures of various widths and their level of confidence in each judgment, using unrestricted vision and, when blindfolded, using two haptic sensory-substitution instruments: a cane-like wooden rod and the Enactive Torch, a device that converts distance information into vibrotactile stimuli. The boundary between aperture widths that were judged as pass-through-able versus non-pass-through-able was statistically equivalent across sensory modalities. However, participants were not as confident in their judgments using the rod or Enactive Torch as they were using vision. Additionally, participants’ judgments with the haptic instruments were significantly more accurate than with vision. The results underscore the need to assess sensory-substitution devices in the context of functional behaviors.     

The illusory nature of Implicit Personality Theory: Logical and empirical considerations

Mirels (1976) demonstrated that derivations from Implicit Personality Theory were compromised by marked absolute discrepancies between subjects’ estimates of the coendorsement of personality items and the empirical relations between the items. Arguments presented by Jackson, Chan, and Strieker (1979) in a recent critique of this demonstration were shown to be based on an arbitrary and severely restrictive view of implicit theory. Logical and empirical considerations were brought to bear in the present paper to indicate that (a) empirical conditional probabilities of test item coendorsement are an appropriate comparison standard for estimates of those probabilities, (b) large absolute discrepancies between estimated and empirical coendorsement must be regarded as seriously impugning the accuracy of IPT, and (c) exclusive reliance on the correlational correspondence between estimated and empirical coendorsement results in an overly sanguine view of the accuracy of IPT. Moreover, it was shown that subjects fail to discriminate between highly asymmetrical conditional probabilities, a finding directly at variance with the assertion that the presumably veridical postulates of implicit theory are inductively extracted from experience. Also discussed were the relation between IPT and everyday social judgments, and the influence of IPT on behavioral ratings.     

"Recipe for a Jury" Revisited: A Balance Theory Prediction

This study examined the relationship of three variables to verdict confidence in an experimental simulation of the jury deliberation process. The three variables were: sex of juror, verdict (guilty or innocent), and the similarity or dissimilarity between juror and confederate verdicts (congruence or incongruence). The subjects were 35 male and 37 female college students. They deliberated in groups containing a male confederate who role-played an obnoxious anti-White or anti-Black juror. Results indicated that before deliberation, male and guilt verdict jurors were more confident than females and innocent verdict jurors. After deliberation, however, sex differences in verdict confidence were absent while innocent verdicts jurors were more confident than guilt verdict jurors. Most important, as predicted from Heider's Balance Theory, males who deliberated with a confederate whose verdict was congruent with theirs' became less confident in their verdicts. Unexpectedly, females became more confident. The study's major hypothesis, then, that it may be advantageous for the defense to accept a juror who zealously advocates a guilty verdict, was only supported for males.     

学习困难儿童的元记忆监测与控制特点

以有无意义联系的两种中文词对为材料,采用2×3×2混合实验设计,对小学三到五年级学习困难儿童的元记忆监测、控制水平与学优儿童之间的差异及其发展特点进行研究。结果表明：1．学习困难儿童在三种元记忆监测判断等级上均显著低于学优儿童。2．学习困难儿童具有元记忆控制能力,但其控制水平相对低于学优儿童。3．学习困难儿童的元记忆监测判断和学习时间分配之间存在交互影响。4．学习困难儿童的元记忆监测和控制水平存在较为复杂的发展特点。据此得出结论认为,学习困难儿童的元记忆监测与控制能力都比学优儿童差,同时也表现出一定的发展趋势。     

Eyewitness Recall and Duration Estimates in Field Settings1

Witnesses were tested for either interrogative recall or narrative recall of a young woman to whom they had spoken for approximately 15 s, 2 min earlier. Interrogative responses were more complete and more accurate, but also more error prone than narrative responses. Men and women showed similar performance on most characteristics, but men were more confident in their responses. A negative correlation was found between age of witnesses and accuracy of recall. Women made significantly longer duration estimates of the target-witness encounters than did men. However, both men and women were relatively accurate in duration estimates when they used mental imagery rehearsal prior to giving duration judgments. The results were interpreted in terms of their forensic significance.