Basic emotions,rationality, and folk theory

Abstract

Answering the question of whether there are basic emotions requires considering the functions of emotions. We propose that just a few emotions are basic and that they have functions in managing action. When no fully rational solution is available for a problem of action, a basic emotion functions to prompt us in a direction that is better than a random choice. We contrast this kind of theory with a componential approach which we argue is either a version of the theory of basic emotions or else leads to the doctrine that emotions are mistaken tenets of folk psychology. We defend the psychological reality of the folk theory of emotions, and we argue that universal basic emotions make it possible to understand people from distant cultures, and to translate emotional terminology from one language to another. Finally, we show how theories of basic emotions can be tested, and indicate the kinds of empirical result that can bear on the issue.     

A stitch in time saves nine: Behavioural decision-making explanations for time management problems

Time management problems such as choosing urgent instead of important tasks are prevalent but so far they lack a theoretical explanation. The authors argue that time management implies a choice about the use of time. Therefore rational choice theory as a normative theory of choice is relevant to time management, and so is behavioural decision-making research focusing on biases and heuristics that make people deviate from the prediction of rational choice theory. The authors show how these biases and heuristics lead to non-efficient time management. In particular, steep and hyperbolic time discounting is explained and its implications for time management as well as for time management training are presented. Several propositions about the importance of individual and situational variables are also put forward.     

Against Reductionist Explanations of Human Behaviour: John O'Neill

One response to Dupré's criticism of rational choice theory's unifying aspirations is that it is aimed at over-ambitious versions of the theory. Immodesty about the scope of rational choice theory may look more plausible given suitable modesty in assumptions about the rational agent. The paper examines problems with one immodest version of the theory—public choice theory—and show how these shed light on problems in modest versions employing minimal assumptions about the preference structure of rational agents. However, while rational choice theory may fail in its unifying ambitions, I argue those aspirations are defensible.     

Of Kids and Unicorns: How Rational Is Children's Trust in Testimonial Knowledge?

When young children confront a vast array of adults' testimonial claims, they should decide which testimony to endorse. If they are unable to immediately verify the content of testimonial assertions, children adopt or reject their informants' statements on the basis of forming trust in the sources of testimony. This kind of trust needs to be based on some underlying reasons. The rational choice theory, which currently dominates the social, cognitive, and psychological sciences, posits that trust should be formed on a rational basis, as a result of probabilistic assessments and utility-maximizing calculations. In this paper, the predictions stemming from the rational choice approach to trust are systematically compared with the empirical evidence from the field of developmental psychology on how children establish their trust in testimonial statements. The results of this comparison demonstrate an obvious inadequacy of the rational choice explanation of the emergence and development of children's testimonial trust, regardless of which form of trust rationality—weighting, threshold, or ordering—is examined. As none of the three forms of rationality of children's trust in testimony squares with the empirical data, this paper introduces a new version of trust rationality, adaptively rational trust. It explores the compatibility of the concept of adaptively rational trust with the recent empirical findings in the area of developmental psychology and addresses some avenues for future research on the rationality of testimonial trust.     

Bayesian decision theory,subjective and objective probabilities,and acceptance of empirical hypotheses

It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and the simplicity ranking of alternative hypotheses.     

Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory

Deterrence and compellence couple demands for inaction and action, respectively, to a threat of sanctions. Conventional wisdom holds that deterrence requires less coercive effort than compellence, yet expected utility theory contradicts this claim. Only if exogenous factors affect these situations in a systematic and asymmetrical manner will the claim hold within expected utility theory. Prospect theory provides a systematic and endogenous account for this claim. Experimental findings suggest the degree of effort required to obtain compliance in comparable deterrence and compellence situations. Deterrence is "easier" than compellence, but this relationship is variable. Deterrence requires less effort than expected, and the relative effort it requires decreases substantially as the stakes demanded and costs threatened grow. Compellence requires more effort than expected, and the relative effort it requires decreases slightly as the stakes demanded and costs threatened grow.     

Lax monitoring versus logical intuition: The determinants of confidence in conjunction fallacy

The general assumption that people fail to notice discrepancy between their answer and the normative answer in the conjunction fallacy task has been challenged by the theory of Logical Intuition. This theory suggests that people can detect the conflict between the heuristic and normative answers even if they do not always manage to inhibit their intuitive choice. This theory gained support from the finding that people report lower levels of confidence in their choice after they commit the conjunction fallacy compared to when their answer is not in conflict with logic. In four experiments we asked the participants to give probability estimations to the options of the conflict and no-conflict versions of the tasks in the original set-up of the experiment or in a three-option design. We found that participants perceive probabilities for the options of the conflict version less similar than for the no-conflict version. As people are less confident when choosing between more similar options, this similarity difference is proposed to serve as a mediator in the task in a way that the conflict and no-conflict conditions have their effects on confidence ratings through manipulating the similarity of the answer options.     

Uncertainty and the role of the pawn in extended deterrence

This paper develops an incomplete information model of extended deterrence relationships. It postulates players who are fully informed about the costs of war and all other relevant variables, save for the values their opponents place on the issues at stake, i.e., the pawn. We provide consistent and intuitively satisfying parallel definitions for two types of players, Hard and Soft, in terms of the parameters of our model. We also answer several particular questions about the strategy choices of players in an extended deterrence relationship and, by identifying all the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game model we construct, specify typical behavior patterns.Our most general finding is that an Extended Deterrence Game always has a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with a rather simple form. A challenger initiates for certain if the pawn is valuable enough to it and never challenges otherwise, Likewise, a defender always resists if the pawn is valuable enough and never resists otherwise.In addition to identifying threshold values for optimal strategic choice, we provide existence conditions for the two distinct types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. This permits us to identify the exact set of conditions associated with bluffing strategies and to develop a theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions for extended deterrence crisis initiation and its resolution.     

A response to the critique of rational choice theory: Lakatos' and Laudan's conceptions applied

This paper analyzes the main features of rational choice theory and evaluates it with respect to the conceptions of Lakatos' research program and Laudan's research tradition. The analysis reveals that the thin rationality assumption, the axiomatic method and the reduction to the micro level are the only features shared by all rational choice models. On these grounds, it is argued that rational choice theory cannot be characterized as a research program. This is due to the fact that the thin rationality assumption cannot be understood as a hard core in Lakatos' terms. It is argued that Laudan's conception of a research tradition better characterizes rational choice theory. On the basis of this conclusion, certain important criticisms of rational choice theory are answered. First, the criticisms concerning the core assumptions of rational choice theory are countered. It is argued that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of rational choice theory as a unified set of models, such as Lakatos' research program. Second, Green and Shapiro's rational choice ‘pathologies’ – inconsistent predictions, post hoc theory development and arbitrary domain restrictions – are evaluated. Contrary to Green and Shapiro, it is argued that post hoc theory development is a more preferable strategy for developing RCT than domain restrictions based on ex ante rules.     

中国人价值观特点及其与社会主义核心价值观的契合性

本研究采用汉化的Schwartz《肖像价值观问卷》（2012）测量了2569人的大样本,以验证Schwartz新价值观理论及其工具在中国的适用性及中国人价值观结构特点。结果表明,19种价值观内部一致性系数平均为0.66,范围从“支配权力”价值观的0.54到“社会安全”价值观的0.80,验证性因素分析各项指标均达到可接受水平;中国人个人定向类价值观之间的相关关系与原理论假设不相符合;个人定向类和社会定向类价值观之间,出现了多项位置相对、在原理论中假定为低相关的价值观呈高相关关系。表明Schwartz等（2012）价值观理论虽从测量学角度适用中国人群,但其不能预测和解释中国人价值观的“个人”与“社会”辩证统一与交叉融合特点。     

The Deterrent Effects of Punishments for Noncompliance and Rewards for Compliance: A Comparison of Hospital Employees in Japan and the United States

We integrate social learning theory into Grasmick’s extended model of deterrence to propose that rational actors, in their decision of workplace deviance, consider not only possible costs of noncompliance but possible rewards of compliance. A review of the literature on cultural differences between Japan and the United States leads to the hypotheses that although perceived costs of noncompliance and rewards of compliance operate as deterrents across the two cultures, the deterrent effects of the costs and rewards are stronger and weaker, respectively, in Japan than the U.S. Analysis of survey data from hospital employees provides mixed support for our arguments.     

中国人价值观特点及其与社会主义核心价值观的契合性

本研究采用汉化的Schwartz《肖像价值观问卷》（2012）测量了2569人的大样本,以验证Schwartz新价值观理论及其工具在中国的适用性及中国人价值观结构特点。结果表明,19种价值观内部一致性系数平均为0.66,范围从“支配权力”价值观的0.54到“社会安全”价值观的0.80,验证性因素分析各项指标均达到可接受水平;中国人个人定向类价值观之间的相关关系与原理论假设不相符合;个人定向类和社会定向类价值观之间,出现了多项位置相对、在原理论中假定为低相关的价值观呈高相关关系。表明Schwartz等（2012）价值观理论虽从测量学角度适用中国人群,但其不能预测和解释中国人价值观的“个人”与“社会”辩证统一与交叉融合特点。     

CONSEQUENTIALISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE: LESSONS FROM THE ALLAIS PARADOX

Abstract: This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude that consequentialism should be rejected as a principle of rational choice and that there are reasons to doubt its plausibility in the realm of moral theory. Moreover, this is a reason to doubt whether standard expected utility theory is a plausible theory of rational choice.     

Model Building With Prospect Theory: A Cognitive Approach to International Relations

Despite the growing call for new models of politics grounded in the capacities of real–world decision–makers, much international relations theory still incorporates rationalist assumptions. Scholars defend such assumptions as the best way to produce parsimonious theoretical structures. Recent attempts to deploy prospect theory in the study of international politics are consistent with the call for empirically grounded models of political behavior. However, past attempts have often emphasized individualized comparisons of prospect theory with rational choice at the expense of building deductive theory. The analysis here demonstrates that prospect theory can produce deductive models for empirical comparison with those already manufactured under rational choice. The result is a new set of propositions concerning international politics securely anchored to the actual capacities of human actors.     

The Transcendental Necessity of Morality

David Gauthier tries to defend morality by showing that rational agents would choose to adopt a fundamental choice disposition that permits them to cooperate in prisoner's dilemmas. In this paper, I argue that Gauthier, rather than trying to work out a prudential justification for his favored choice disposition, should opt for a transcendental justification. I argue that the disposition in question is the product of socialization, not rational choice. However, only agents who are socialized in such a way that they acquire a disposition of this type could acquire the capacity to use language. Given the internal connection between language and thought, this means that no agent endowed with such a disposition could rationally choose to adopt another. Thus rational reflection by moral agents upon their own fundamental choice disposition will have no tendency to destabilize it.
"It is a necessary truth that people tend to do what they think they ought to do, for it is a necessary truth that people who occupy a linguistic position which means / ought to do A now , tend to do A. If they did not, the position they occupy could not mean I ought to do A now."
Wilfrid Sellars, "Some Reflections on Language Games."     

Differences in Perceived Levels of Informal Punishments for Noncompliance and Rewards for Compliance: A Comparison of Japanese and American Workers

The current article integrates differential association/social learning theory into Grasmick's extended deterrence theory to propose that rational actors, in deciding whether or not to comply with workplace rules, should be expected to consider not only costs of noncompliance but also rewards of compliance. The cultural differences in perceived levels of informal punishment threats of shame and embarrassment for the rule violations and informal rewards of pride and praise for the rule conformity are then examined in merged samples of employees in Japanese and U.S. hospitals. Consistent with the prediction, these punishment threats and rewards are perceived to be higher and lower, respectively, among Japanese employees than among Americans.     

Foucault, Feminism, and Informed Choice

The purpose of this paper is to show that the standard notion of informed choice is unacceptable and must be replaced. To do so, I examine Foucault's analysis of people in contemporary society, drawing attention to the ways power relations act upon us, and to the possibility of resistance. I show how feminist moral theory can be enriched by Foucault's analysis. Applying this new understanding of people and moral theory to an analysis of informed choice, I claim that the standard notion of informed choice is unacceptable, in part because it relies on a false conception of people. Its “necessary” features—intention, understanding, and absence of controlling influences—are much more difficult, if not impossible, to obtain than proponents of the standard notion believe. I end by offering direction for creating a new, Foucault-inspired, feminist theory of informed choice.     

Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons

Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that rational people will be motivated by any reason they have of which they are aware. Goldman himself embraces (I), and deploys it frequently in his criticisms of orthodox externalism. But there is logical space for an externalist view that includes a commitment to (O) and (E), but that denies (I). The resulting “hyperexternalist” view holds that some reasons need not motivate us, even if we are rational. In this paper I argue that Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism leave hyperexternalism untouched, and that his specific criticisms of my own version of hyperexternalism do not work. In light of Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism and my own criticisms of Goldman’s view, hyperexternalism emerges as the favored option.     

Rational Choice and Moral Theory

Contemporary discussions of the positive relation between rational choice and moral theory are a special case of a much older tradition that seeks to show that mutual agreement upon certain moral rules works to the mutual advantage, or in the interests, of those who so agree. I make a few remarks about the history of discussions of the connection between morality and self-interest, after which I argue that the modern theory of rational choice can be naturally understood as a continuation of this older tradition. I then go on to argue for a controversial three-fold thesis: (1) that grounding a theory of morality in terms of rational self-interest is the only epistemologically respectable way to proceed with the justification of moral principles; (2) that despite this, most of the contemporary explorations of rational choice foundations for moral principles do not work—that the models of rational choice to which they appeal yield less than the substantial results that they are intended to yield; but (3) that if one rethinks just what it means to be rational, one can find in fact a promising way to connect the two—specifically through the development of a theory of genuinely cooperative activity.