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1.
Nanotechnology — A new field of ethical inquiry? 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Grunwald A 《Science and engineering ethics》2005,11(2):187-201
Parallel to the public discussion on the benefits and risks of nanotechnology, a debate on the ethics of nanotechnology has
begun. It has been postulated that a new “nano-ethics” is necessary. In this debate, the — positive as well as negative —
visionary and speculative innovations which are brought into connection with nanotechnology stand in the foreground. In this
contribution, an attempt is made to discover new ethical aspects of nanotechnology in a more systematic manner than has been
the case. It turns out that there are hardly any completely new ethical aspects raised by nanotechnology. It is much rather
primarily a case of gradual shifts of emphasis and of relevance in questions which, in principle, are already known and which
give reason for ethical discussions on nanotechnology. In a certain manner, structurally novel ethical aspects arise through
the important role played by visions in the public discourse. New questions are also posed by the fact that previously separate
lines of ethical reflection converge in the field of nanotechnology. The proposal of an independent “nano-ethics”, however,
seems exaggerated. 相似文献
2.
Chris Toumey 《Nanoethics》2011,5(3):251-267
Nanotechnology—the control of matter at the level of atoms and molecules—has evoked a large body of literature on moral and
ethical issues. Almost all of this is expressed in secular voices. Religious commentaries about nanotechnology have been much
more rare. And yet survey research indicates that religious belief will be one of the most powerful influences in shaping
public views about nanotechnology. This paper argues that it is worth knowing what religious voices have said about nanotechnology,
so that we might anticipate additional religious reactions in the future. After that, this paper presents seven cases of religious
reactions to nanotechnology from a variety of faiths. This information gives us some insights about how religious individuals
and institutions think about this technology, and also insights about how a new technology evokes a variety of hopes and fears. 相似文献
3.
Donald C. Maclurcan 《Nanoethics》2009,3(2):137-156
The term ‘nano-divide’ has become a catch-phrase for describing various kinds of global nanotechnology inequities. However,
there has been little in-depth exploration as to what the global nano-divide really means, and limited commentary on its early
nature. Furthermore, the literature often presents countries from the Global South as ‘passive’ agents in global nanotechnology
innovation—without the ability to develop endogenous nanotechnology capabilities. Yet others point to nanotechnology providing
opportunities for the South to play new roles in the global research and development process. In this paper I report on the
findings of a qualitative study that involved the perspectives of 31 Thai and Australian key informants, from a broad range
of fields. The study was supplemented by a survey of approximately 10% of the Thai nanotechnology research community at the
time. I first explore how the global nano-divide is understood and the implication of the divide’s constructs in terms of
the roles to be played by various countries in global nanotechnology innovation. I then explore the potential nature of Southern
passivity and barriers and challenges facing Southern endogenous innovation, as well as an in-depth consideration of the proposition
that Southern countries could be ‘active’ agents in the nanotechnology process. I argue that it is the nano-divide relating
to nanotechnology research and development capabilities that is considered fundamental to nanotechnology’s Southern outcomes.
The research suggests that Southern countries will encounter many of the traditional barriers to engaging with emerging technology
as well as some new barriers relating to the nature of nanotechnology itself. Finally, the research suggests that nanotechnology
may offer new opportunities for Southern countries to enter the global research and development picture. 相似文献
4.
Am H 《Nanoethics》2011,5(1):115-128
This paper reflects on the change of relations among participants in nanotechnology governance through their participation
in governance processes such as stakeholder dialogues. I show that policymaking in practice—that is, the practice of coming
and working together in such stakeholder dialogues—has the potential for two-fold performative effects: it can contribute
to the development of trust and mutual responsibility on the part of the involved actors, and it may bring about effects on
the formation of boundaries of what is sayable and thinkable in nanotechnology governance. Three vignettes about the work
of the German NanoKommission indicate the development of new relations of trust, recognition and mutual responsibility among
actors. It is concluded that governance in practice can assemble new collectives in which relations of trust are the glue
holding the complex structure together. While such a consensus-based progress may be favourable for smooth technology development,
it can be considered problematic if evaluated against the ideals of deliberative democracy, which often form the premises
on which public engagement is based. Stakeholder forums were set in place with the intention of including various actors,
but this is Janus-faced: if a dialogue becomes encapsulated in new governance networks, new exclusions can arise. For example,
a policing of which information is released to a wider audience can occur. 相似文献
5.
Berne RW 《Science and engineering ethics》2004,10(4):627-638
Nanotechnology, the emerging capability of human beings to observe and organize matter at the atomic level, has captured the
attention of the federal government, science and engineering communities, and the general public. Some proponents are referring
to nanotechnology as “the next technological revolution”. Applications projected for this new evolution in technology span
a broad range from the design and fabrication of new membranes, to improved fuel cells, to sophisticated medical prosthesis
techniques, to tiny intelligent machines whose impact on humankind is unknowable. As with the appropriation of technological
innovation generally, nanotechnology is likely to eventually bring dramatic and unpredictable new capabilities to human material
existence, along with resulting ethical challenges and social changes to be reconciled. But as of yet, aside from a few simple
new consumer goods, such as paint, rackets and fabric coatings, nanotechnology is undeveloped. Its social and ethical dimensions
are not apparent. Even still, given the stated goals of the various nanotechnology initiatives to rearrange matter with increasing
atomic precision, the impact of nanotechnology on human life and society is likely be profound. It is very difficult, however,
to make accurate predictions about the future impact of nanotechnology development on humanity. At this time, the most important
role for ethics analysis is to contribute to a humanitarian, conscientious approach to its development. This paper suggests
that such an approach requires that attention be given to the roles of imagination, meaning-making, metaphor, myth and belief. 相似文献
6.
On the Autonomy and Justification of Nanoethics 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Fritz Allhoff 《Nanoethics》2007,1(3):185-210
In this paper, I take a critical stance on the emerging field of nanoethics. After an introductory section, “Conceptual Foundations of Nanotechnology” considers the conceptual foundations of nanotechnology, arguing that nanoethics can only be as coherent as nanotechnology itself and then discussing concerns with this latter concept; the conceptual foundations of nanoethics are then explicitly addressed in “Conceptual Foundations of Nanoethics”. “Issues in Nanoethics” considers ethical issues that will be raised through nanotechnology and, in “What’s New?”, it is argued that none of these issues is unique to nanotechnology. In “It’s a Revolution!”, I express skepticism about arguments which hold that, while the issues themselves might not be unique, they nevertheless are instantiated to such a degree that extant moral frameworks will be ill-equipped to handle them. In “What’s Different?”, I draw plausible distinctions between nanoethics and other applied ethics, arguing that these latter might well identify unique moral issues and, as such, distinguish themselves from nanoethics. Finally, in “What Now?”, I explore the conclusions of this result, ultimately arguing that, while nanoethics may fail to identify novel ethical concerns, it is at least the case that nanotechnology is deserving of ethical attention, if not a new associative applied ethic. 相似文献
7.
Seth Lazar 《Res Publica》2009,15(3):289-304
This paper explicates a conception of injury as right-violation, which allows us to distinguish between setbacks to interests
that should, and should not, be the concern of theories of justice. It begins by introducing a hybrid theory of rights, grounded
in (a) the mobilisation of our moral equality to (b) protect our most important interests, and shows how violations of rights
are the concern of justice, while setbacks where one of the twin grounds of rights is defeated are not. It then looks more
closely at the substantive moral components of injury, namely harm—damage to one’s interests—and wrong—disrespect for one’s
moral equality. It argues that, on the hybrid conception of rights, harm and wrong are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient components of injury, and the disvalue of neither is reducible to the other—in particular, it is a mistake to construe
the disrespect identified by wrong as another damaged interest. Finally, it distinguishes between the public and private dimensions
of harm and wrong, and makes some preliminary suggestions as to whether the remedy for these different dimensions should lie
in criminal, distributive, or corrective justice. 相似文献
8.
On Genies and Bottles: Scientists’ Moral Responsibility and Dangerous Technology R&;D 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
David Koepsell 《Science and engineering ethics》2010,16(1):119-133
The age-old maxim of scientists whose work has resulted in deadly or dangerous technologies is: scientists are not to blame,
but rather technologists and politicians must be morally culpable for the uses of science. As new technologies threaten not
just populations but species and biospheres, scientists should reassess their moral culpability when researching fields whose
impact may be catastrophic. Looking at real-world examples such as smallpox research and the Australian “mousepox trick”,
and considering fictional or future technologies like Kurt Vonnegut’s “ice-nine” from Cat’s Cradle, and the “grey goo” scenario
in nanotechnology, this paper suggests how ethical principles developed in biomedicine can be adjusted for science in general.
An “extended moral horizon” may require looking not just to the effects of research on individual human subjects, but also
to effects on humanity as a whole. Moreover, a crude utilitarian calculus can help scientists make moral decisions about which
technologies to pursue and disseminate when catastrophes may result. Finally, institutions should be devised to teach these
moral principles to scientists, and require moral education for future funding. 相似文献
9.
Arianna Ferrari 《Nanoethics》2010,4(1):27-52
This paper aims to review different discourses within the emerging field of ethical reflection on nanotechnology. I will start
by analysing the early stages of this debate, showing how it has been focused on searching for legitimacy for this sphere
of moral inquiry. I will then characterise an ethical approach, common to many authors, which frames ethical issues in terms
of risks and benefits. This approach identifies normative issues where there are conflicts of interest or where challenges
to the fundamental values of our society arise. In response to the limitations of this approach, other commentators have called
for more profound analysis of the limits of our knowledge, and have appealed to values, such as sustainability or responsibility,
which should, they suggest, inform nanotechnological development (I will define this approach as a “sophisticated form of
prudence”). After showing the ways in which these frameworks are limited, I will examine more recent developments in debates
on nanoethics which call for the contextualisation of ethical discourse in its ontological, epistemic and socio-economic and
political reflections. Such contextualisation thus involves inquiry into the ‘metaphysical research program’ (MRP) of nanotechnology/ies
and analysis of the socio-economic, political and historical reality of nano. These ideas offer genuinely new insights into
the kind of approach required for nanoethical reflection: they recover a sense of the present alongside the need to engage
with the past, while avoiding speculation on the future. 相似文献
10.
The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Logi Gunnarsson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):305-326
The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights
of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns
a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the
great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral
status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status
of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant
or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to
simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have
a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very
limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative
concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.
相似文献
Logi GunnarssonEmail: |
11.
The Role of the Humanities and Social Sciences in Nanotechnology Research and Development 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Mette Ebbesen 《Nanoethics》2008,2(1):1-13
The experience with genetically modified foods has been prominent in motivating science, industry and regulatory bodies to
address the social and ethical dimensions of nanotechnology. The overall objective is to gain the general public’s acceptance
of nanotechnology in order not to provoke a consumer boycott as it happened with genetically modified foods. It is stated
implicitly in reports on nanotechnology research and development that this acceptance depends on the public’s confidence in
the technology and that the confidence is created on the basis of information, education, openness and debate about scientific
and technological developments. Hence, it is assumed that informing and educating the public will create trust, which will
consequently lead to an acceptance of nanotechnology. Thus, the humanities and social sciences are seen as tools to achieve
public acceptance.
In this paper, the author argues that this is a narrow apprehension of the role of the humanities and social sciences. The
humanities and social sciences have a critical function asking fundamental questions and informing the public about these
reflections. This may lead to scepticism, however, the motivation for addressing the social and ethical dimensions of nanotechnology
should not be public acceptance but informed judgement. The author illustrates this critical function by discussing the role,
motivation and contribution of ethics as an example. Lastly, the author shows that a possible strategy for incorporating the
humanities and the social sciences into nanotechnology research and development is Real-Time Technology Assessment, where
the purpose is to integrate natural science and engineering investigations with ethical, legal and social science from the
outset.
相似文献
Mette EbbesenEmail: |
12.
Hayden Ramsay 《Sophia》2001,40(2):15-29
The paper presents Aquinas’s account of conscience, and argues that key elements of this account are key elements too of Aristotle’s
moral theory. The paper’s purpose is to encourage debate over conscience as not only a Stoic/Christian concept but one with
deeper— and more widespread—roots in western ethical tradition. 相似文献
13.
Andrew Jamison 《Nanoethics》2009,3(2):129-136
Because of the overly market-oriented way in which technological development is carried out, there is a great amount of hubris
in regard to how scientific and technological achievements are used in society. There is a tendency to exaggerate the potential
commercial benefits and willfully neglect the social, cultural, and environmental consequences of most, if not all innovations,
especially in new fields such as nanotechnology. At the same time, there are very few opportunities, or sites, for ensuring
that nanotechnology is used justly and fairly, or for that matter, contribute to alleviating any of the wide variety of injustices
that exist in the world. Most of the public authorities responsible for the development and application of science and technology
are uninterested and unwilling to “assess” the implications of nanotechnology, and there are few, if any spaces in the broader
culture for assessment to take place. Within the various “social movements” that are, in one way or another, concerned with
issues of global justice, there is as yet little interest in nanotechnology. By examining the relations between nanotechnology
and the emerging movement for global justice this article attempts to understand the enormous gap between the potential for
science and technology to do good and the actual ways in science and technology get developed, and what, if anything, might
be done to help close the gap in relation to nanotechnology, so that it might better be able to contribute to global justice. 相似文献
14.
15.
Clare Shelley-Egan 《Nanoethics》2010,4(2):183-189
Issues of responsibility in the world of nanotechnology are becoming explicit with the emergence of a discourse on ‘responsible
development’ of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. Much of this discourse centres on the ambivalences of nanotechnology and
of promising technology in general. Actors must find means of dealing with these ambivalences. Actors’ actions and responses
to ambivalence are shaped by their position and context, along with strategic games they are involved in, together with other
actors. A number of interviews were conducted with industrial actors with the aim of uncovering their ethical stances towards
responsible development of nanotechnology. The data shows that standard repertoires of justification of nanotechnological
development were used. Thus, the industrial actors fell back on their position and associated responsibilities. Such responses
reinforce a division of moral labour in which industrial actors and scientists can focus on the progress of science and technology,
while other actors, such as NGOs, are expected to take care of broader considerations, such as ethical and social issues. 相似文献
16.
On Nanotechnology and Ambivalence: The Politics of Enthusiasm 总被引:3,自引:3,他引:0
The promise of scientific and technological innovation – particularly in fields such as nanotechnology – is increasingly set
against what has been articulated as a deficit in public trust in both the new technologies and regulatory mechanisms. Whilst
the development of new technology is cast as providing contributions to both quality of life and national competitiveness,
what has been termed a ‘legitimacy crisis’ is seen as threatening the vitality of this process. However in contrast to the
risk debates that dominated the technological controversies of the late 1990s the vitality of technological innovation is
now cast as vulnerable to lack of public confidence and trust in the regulatory and governance structures upon which such
innovation depends. In order to address this deficit in public trust, science policy has increasingly turned to the social
sciences, suggesting that public values might be incorporated into the development of nanotechnology at an early stage. Public
ambivalence therefore constitutes the problem addressed by the increasingly central role that public engagement and participation play in contemporary science policy.
Although the recent proliferation of public engagement activities is premised on the need to address this ambivalence through
direct engagement, we re-interpret ambivalence as an engaged – rather than passive – mode of relating to technological determinism.
Whilst the move toward forms of direct public engagement might be regarded as symptomatic of the emergence of affective mode
of governance we interpret public ambivalence as a nested set of enthusiasms and anxieties. Accordingly we suggest that public
engagement might be re-thought, utilising ambivalence as a creative resource, rather than as the problem.
相似文献
Brian WynneEmail: |
17.
18.
Dr. Caroline Whitbeck 《Science and engineering ethics》1995,1(3):299-308
In this paper I outline an “agent-centered” approach to learning ethics. The approach is “agent-centered” in that its central
aim is to prepare students toact wisely and responsibly when faced with moral problems. The methods characteristic of this approach are suitable for integrating
material on professional and research ethics into technical courses, as well as for free-standing ethics courses.
The analogy I draw between ethical problems and design problems clarifies the character of ethical problems as they are experienced
by those who must respond to them. It exposes the mistake, common in ethics teaching, of misrepresenting moral problems as
multiple-choice problems, especially in the form of ‘dilemmas’, that is, a forced choice between two unacceptable alternatives.
Furthermore, I clarify the importance for responsible practice of recognizing any ambiguity in the problem situation.
To foster in students the skills they need, teaching examples should preserve the open-ended, multiply-constrained, and ambiguous
character of problem situations as experienced by the agent. I give guidelines for constructing open-ended scenarios that
present moral problems much as an agent would experience them — guidelines which strongly influenced the construction of ‘cases’
in the latest edition of “On Being a Scientist” — and I discuss how to present historical cases and cases from the instructor’s
own experience to best foster agent-centered learning.
This paper is a modification of material originally included in the handbook which accompanied the AAAS Seminar “Teaching
Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993. 相似文献
19.
鉴于纳米技术目前显现出的启发式控制活力,可以将其作为伦理学一个重要的潜在探索领域。这就要求把对纳米技术的规范分析从一般技术制品和后果评估扩大到技术隐喻、想象和语言评估,由此认为目前占据主流地位的德莱克斯勒式纳米机器是一种机械隐喻,必然导向决定论式的单向度社会命运,但其论敌斯默莱的生物模拟隐喻实际上意味着一种范式转换,因为它为人在纳米技术发展中提供了表达责任感的道德机会。沿着这一线索,目前倡导伦理导向的纳米技术发展,就是要把它作为一个多学科背景依赖领域,把参与其社会意义塑造的各种主客体要素引导到人道主义立场上来,以使纳米世界建构真正体现人的全面发展。 相似文献
20.
Robert E. McGinn 《Nanoethics》2010,4(2):115-128
Whether nanotechnology is ethically unique and “nanoethics” should be treated as a field in its own right remain important,
contested issues. This essay seeks to contribute to the debates on these issues by exploring several foundational questions
about the relationship of ethics and nanotechnology. Ethical issues related to nanotechnology exist and adoption of a defeasible
presumption that such issues amount to old ethical wine in new technological bottles appears justified. Such issues are not
engendered solely by intrinsic features of the nanotechnology field, but also by contingent features of the social contexts
in which work in the field unfolds. The sets of factors that engender ethical issues related to nanotechnology are combinations
of social-contextual and technical elements. While there do not appear to be any qualitatively new nanotechnology-related
ethical issues, nanotechnology is different, ethically, from other fields of technical inquiry in at least two ways. To avoid
diluting ethical concern about nanotechnology and revival of the noxious notions of autonomous technology and technological
determinism, thinking, writing, and speaking about ‘nanoethics’ should yield to thinking, writing, and speaking about ‘ethical
issues related to nanotechnology in society.’ Finally, nanotechnology practitioners should become familiar with the ethical
dimension of their work. 相似文献