‘Sin is Rightly Called the Punishment of Sin’: Francis Turretin’s Reformed Doctrine of Sin

ABSTRACT

This article contextualizes Francis Turretin’s (1623–87) doctrine of sin, and in particular his understanding of sin as a punishment for sin. Specifically, it elaborates on the theological context into which Turretin speaks. Through analyzing Turretin’s historical situation, it progresses to the content of Turretin’s theology in light of his theological and political opponents. Utilizing Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology (1679–1685), St Augustine’s Contra Julianum, and John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion, amongst others, this article evaluates Turretin’s view of the doctrine of sin and its relation to medieval and early-modern European theology. Ultimately, it argues that Turretin’s view of sin as a punishment of sin is born from his understanding of God’s holiness being demonstrated through his ‘vindicatory justice’ and Turretin’s self-understanding as an ‘orthodox’ theologian in the grand tradition of Western theology extending back to the Church Fathers.     

Reception of Analogy of Being in Contemporary Eastern Orthodox Theology

This article examines the relationship between the analogy of being (which is a fundamental principle of Catholic theology and metaphysics) and the most significant contemporary Eastern Orthodox theologians. This question of analogy touches upon the fundamental theological problem of the conceptualization of the relationship between God and creation. Even though there is no analogy in Eastern Orthodox theology, it has two polar positions regarding Western analogy of being—pro and con.     

Heidegger and hallucination

Can Heidegger account for hallucination? I argue that while Heidegger does not develop an account of hallucination, he gives us all the resources we need to develop such an account. I first discuss a prominent argument against the very possibility of such an account. I argue that this argument is mistaken. I then discuss Heidegger's brief remarks on hallucination. In analysing a particular case study, Heidegger claims that the subject hallucinates for two reasons. First, he fails to realize the distinction between the different ways entities are present to him. For this reason, he cannot encounter a particular entity as it is present. Second, he is unable to do anything about the fact and manner of the presence of that entity. He is ‘unable to move in his world freely’, as Heidegger puts it. I show how these remarks, when taken in combination with Heidegger's broader ontology, allow us to explain the possibility of hallucination in a distinctively Heideggerian way.     

Heidegger and the contradiction of Being: a dialetheic interpretation of the late Heidegger

ABSTRACT

It is well known that, from the beginning to the end of his philosophical trajectory, Martin Heidegger tries to develop a fundamental ontology which aims at answering the so-called question of Being: what does Being mean? Unfortunately, in trying to answer this question, Heidegger faces a predicament: given his own premises, speaking about Being leads to a contradiction. Moreover, according to the majority, if not all, of the interpreters who admit the existence of such a predicament, Heidegger tries to avoid the contradiction in question. But is this the only way Heidegger tries to solve the predicament? In this paper, I argue that, in some of his late works and, in particular, in the Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger also takes into serious consideration the possibility of accepting the contradiction he faces in speaking about Being as true. If this is correct, Heidegger endorses what nowadays analytic philosophers call dialetheism, namely the metaphysical position according to which some (but not all) contradictions are true.     

Satisfaction and Stressors in a Religious Minority: A National Study of Orthodox Jewish Marriage

The paucity of mental health studies with Orthodox Jews makes culturally competent counseling care unlikely. In this large‐scale investigation of marriage among Orthodox Jews, most respondents reported satisfaction with marriage and spouse, although satisfaction was highest among recently married couples. The most significant stressors were finances, communication, physical intimacy/sexuality, time pressures, and in‐law conflicts. Counseling interventions are discussed. La escasez de estudios sobre salud mental en poblaciones de judíos ortodoxos limita la posibilidad de ofrecer un cuidado de consejería culturalmente competente. En esta investigación a gran escala sobre el matrimonio entre judíos ortodoxos, la mayoría de los participantes indicaron satisfacción con su matrimonio y esposo/a, aunque la satisfacción fue mayor entre las parejas recién casadas. Los elementos estresantes más significativos fueron las finanzas, la comunicación, el contacto íntimo/sexualidad, la falta de tiempo, y los conflictos con la familia política. Se discuten intervenciones para la consejería.     

Speaking out of Turn: Martin Heidegger and die Kehre

' Speaking out of Turn : Martin Heidegger and die Kehre ' examines the difference between Heidegger's own understanding of 'the turning' and that understanding which originated with Karl Lowith and was later presented to English-speaking readers by William Richardson in Martin Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought . The study focuses on Heidegger's own introduction to Richardson's book, and argues that, far from confirming Richardson's view that there is a 'Heidegger I' and 'Heidegger II' connected by the 'reversal' or turning, Heidegger sought to indicate with (sometimes indirect) reference to his own works that the 'turning' is a movement in thought that it was part of the original project of Being and Time to carry through, but which he only succeeded in describing much later. The study attempts to illustrate this by a close examination of the works to which Heidegger alludes in his Foreword to Richardson's book. Many of these were not available when Richardson published (1963), and so it has only more recently been possible to amplify Heidegger's earlier published works with reference to his lecture courses. The study concludes that the horizon of time and the analytic of Dasein never really disappear from his later thinking, as many have claimed, and proposes that the relationship between the earlier and later Heidegger be re-examined. This re-examination takes the form of accepting that far from the 'turning' representing a fracture, where Heidegger abandons the existential-temporal analytic of Dasein in favour of an attempt to think only being ( das Sein ) as such, the 'turning' represents the point of unity in Heidegger's work. This point of unity shows how Dasein and being 'belong together' in 'the event' ( das Ereignis ).     

Religion,Theology and Science: A Reformational Dooyeweerdian Approach

The most discussed (and applied) approaches to the relationship between religion and science seem to be basically four: opposition, independence, dialogue and integration. Only a few authors take into account the reformational approach that finds its roots in the work of Abraham Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd and others. This model may be described by the formula “inner reformation.” A historical and systematic introduction to this approach is hereby provided by sketching its understanding of the nature of (and relationships among) science, theology and religion. In the process, the originality and value of this approach to the relationship between religion and science are highlighted.     

Power and Freedom in Heidegger’s First Notebook

ABSTRACT

In the first notebook published in Überlegungen II-VI, which covers the years 1931 and 1932, Martin Heidegger uses a conception of power that is different to that found in his later work. Rather than power being the expression of the will to will and source of ruin for humanity, he says that humanity can only be saved from ruin if it can pave the way for an “empowerment of being” (Ermächtigung des Seins). This article will show that this early understanding of power is related to Heidegger’s conception of freedom as the essence of truth, developing his thinking on this topic from the period of 1927–1930. It will show that the terms “empowerment of being” and “letting be” (Seinlassen) are akin, and that Heidegger uses the former to distance his thinking from potential misinterpretations of the essay “On the Essence of Truth”.     

After Heidegger: Transubstantiation

Recent debate over transubstantiation (especially Jean‐Luc Marion's defence of it) has concentrated either on transubstantiation as a kind of embarrassment in consequence of modern physics, or on the extent to which it is both a doctrine elaborated in the light of metaphysics and recoverable in consequence of metaphysics having been overcome. In this sense the tension between Aquinas' apparently metaphysical formulation of the doctrine and the less overtly metaphysical formula adopted by the Council of Trent (in its refusal to speak of ‘accidents’) has indicated a way of ‘rescuing’ or ‘recovering’ the doctrine. This article argues that such a recovery is a false trail. Pope Paul VI was right to be wary of relativising the Eucharistic event to the believing community in any doctrine of transignification. Alternatively, attempts like Chauvet's and Macquarrie's to restate Eucharistic event in terms of Heidegger's Geviert presuppose Heidegger has succeeded in destroying the metaphysics of presence, so that they can use the fruits of his researches. What is actually at issue in thinking through transubstantiation is how the doctrine relates to conceptions of the physical: Aristotelian, what comes to be Newtonian, or postmodern conceptions which appear to eschew physics altogether. Heidegger's contribution to the debate would better point to how knowing anything means being included in and (self‐) disclosed by what I know. A re‐investigation of transubstantiation might therefore take into account the extraordinary reappearance of the term ‘transubstantiation’ in current non‐theological investigations of performativity (especially in the work of Judith Butler). Here transubstantiation would include not the maximal meaning of bread and wine as signs constituted in das Geviert, ‘after’ substance has been critiqued, but their minimality, in enacting a change in (our) substance (self‐realising). This would confirm the divinising meaning of the Eucharistic event, which stresses how we are caught up into the divine. Thus, whereas in transignification the Eucharistic event occurs in consequence of the will of the community of believers, in transubstantiation it is the enactment of the community as community that is at issue, an enactment in consequence of no act of will of its own. In terms of the postmodern and non‐theological appropriation of the word transubstantiation, this means that I who participate in the Eucharistic am re‐ordered, or re‐materialised, or ‘trans‐substantiated’ in the Eucharistic event.     

Space,place, and sculpture: working with Heidegger

Heidegger’s paper ‘Art and Space’ (1969, Man and world 6. Bloomington: Indiana university Press) is the place where he gives his fullest discussion of a major art medium which is somewhat neglected in aesthetics, namely sculpture. The structure of argument in ‘Art and Space’ is cryptic even by Heidegger’s standards. The small amount of literature tends to focus on the paper’s role within Heidegger’s own oeuvre as an expression of changes in his understanding of space. This is ironic; for Heidegger’s main thematic in the essay is the way in which space is overcome in the creation of sculpture. Of course, by virtue of its three-dimensional character, sculpture seems to be a spatial medium, par excellence. The counter-intuitive character of Heidegger’s position requires, accordingly, that his argumentative strategy be scrutinized very closely. In this paper, therefore, I will examine closely the structure of Heidegger’s argument, with the aim of understanding, rectifying, and then developing his most important insights. My ultimate aim is to show the subtle, but radical points which are at issue in Heidegger’s arguments, and to develop them much further in the clarification of sculpture’s key philosophical significance.

An Orthodox View of Philanthropy and Church Diaconia

According to Orthodox theology, philanthropy refers to the loveof God toward man, which man is called to imitate by lovinghis neighbor as himself. This love consists not just in emotionsbut requires specific acts of philanthropy toward our fellowman in need. The church, in keeping the commandments of Christ,has developed throughout her history a rich philanthropic work.The diaconia of the church has taken many forms, thus respondingto historical change and to the specific human needs at differenttimes. Concentrating on diaconia for those who are in need oflong-term care, this article presents the Orthodox view of thediaconia of the church, as realized through her own philanthropicorganizations as well as through her very specific contributionto the diaconia offered by state sponsored charitable institutions.     

大圆满(Dzogchen)及海德格尔的四维时间

关于时间,我们有太多的疑问,比如过去的事情就不再有了吗?未来是不可预期的吗?现在存在吗?时光的流逝是不可逆转的吗?什么是永恒?它与时间的关系如何?本文以藏传佛教大圆满传统的龙清巴和西方现象学派的海德格尔为例讨论时间的经验。他们都没有去构想永恒的生命,而是深入到时间流逝的现象和经验之中,揭示了一个全新的时间维度,即所谓第四时间或时间的第四维度。本文首先介绍大圆满传统中处理时间经验的一种修行,然后分析龙清巴的四时概念及其在佛教史上的意义,接着讨论海德格尔的四维时间概念,以及其追随者对这一概念的进一步讨论。最后在结论中,我将简单说明四维时间在这两个传统中的同异点,并探讨其相似点后的可能原因。     

Arrested Development: On Hegel,Heidegger and Derrida

ABSTRACT

Although both Heidegger and Derrida criticize Hegel as the archetype and historical culmination of the metaphysics of presence, Hegel’s dialectics also serves as a model for their critical destruction or deconstruction of metaphysics. Through an analysis of the notions of ‘arrest’ and ‘halt’ in Derrida and Hegel, this paper will show how both Heidegger and Derrida take up elements of Hegel’s theory of the development of consciousness, which is characterized both by an ‘unhalting forward motion’ but also by delay, interruption and inertia. This paper will develop the strange parallel between Derrida’s notion of l’arrêt and the halting movement of spirit in Hegel. It will show that Hegel’s ‘rhythm of the concept’ is not so distant from the ‘arrhythmia’ Derrida finds in the notion of l’arrêt. It will thus show how time, history and spirit are linked in a self-deconstructive manner in this unstable point of the arrest/halt.     

Reduction,externalism and immanence in Husserl and Heidegger

This paper argues that the Husserl–Heidegger relationship is systematically misunderstood when framed in terms of a distinction between internalism and externalism. Both philosophers, it is argued, employ the phenomenological reduction to immanence as a fundamental methodological instrument. After first outlining the assumptions regarding inner and outer and the individual and the social from which recent epistemological interpretations of phenomenology begin, I turn to the question of Husserl’s internalism. I argue that Husserl can only be understood as an internalist on the assumption that immanence equates with internal. This, however, is not the case as can be seen once the reduction is understood not as setting aside the existence of the world, but rather a reflection on its meaning. Turning to Heidegger, I argue that his commitment to a form of the phenomenological reduction precludes him from being either a semantic or a social externalist. The place of authenticity and the first person perspective in his work derive from his phenomenological commitments, which can be seen in his accounts of discourse and language and of falling (Verfallen). I then go on to briefly outline a more plausible basis for understanding the difference between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies in terms of their respective emphases on logic and on poetics.     

Infinity in Mathematics and Theology

Abstract

“Infinity” and its derivatives are frequently used in mathematics and theology. Do these expressions denote the same thing in those distinct areas of scholarship? In this article the uses of “infinity” in mathematics and its uses in theology are examined and compared. One conclusion is that quite different concepts go under the heading of “infinity.” Although they must not be confused, there are some relations between mathematical and theological senses of infinity.     

Orthodox Christianity as a transnational religion: theoretical,historical and comparative considerations

In this article I analyse Orthodox Christianity as a transnational religion. In the first section I develop a theoretical argument concerning the relationship among diaspora, transnationalism and Orthodoxy. Seen through these lenses, transnationalism represents a newfound situation connected to the epochal shift from empires to nation-states. I then give a historical overview of demographic trends which shows that in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries millions of Orthodox emigrated to North America and Western Europe; while large Orthodox groups were created in the USA by the early twentieth century, the majority of Orthodox immigrants to Canada, Australia and Western Europe are post-1945 arrivals. I then offer a brief overview of the situation of Orthodox transnationalism in the post-Soviet space since 1989, and argue that in contrast to that situation, it is the experience of migration that is most accurately captured by the label of religious transnationalism. Lastly, I conduct an initial comparison of North American and European experiences. The current fragmentation of Orthodox jurisdictions reflects the creation of autonomous church organisations or groups of parishes that extend the jurisdictions of Mother Churches into the host states. I contemplate the consequences of religious transnationalism for future developments.     

Converting to Continuity: Temporality and Self in Eastern Orthodox Conversion Narratives

Based on interviews with converts to Eastern Orthodox Christianity in the United States, this article documents and analyzes a narrative form in which conversion is described as the progressive discovery of a latent religious self that was part of one's life all along, or what I term a conversion to continuity. These findings contrast markedly with those of most contemporary conversion research, which emphasize the narration of a dramatic temporal break between converts’ past and present religious selves (epitomized by the evangelical “born‐again” genre). I examine how and why temporal continuity was a characteristic feature of these conversion accounts and demonstrate how such narratives helped constitute forms of religious experience and self‐identity that differ in important respects from those documented in previous studies. In light of these findings, I argue for a reconceptualization of continuity and discontinuity within processes of religious identity change as an institutionally anchored figure/ground relationship as opposed to an either/or dichotomy. I also highlight promising avenues for future comparative research on the relationships between time, narrative, and subjectivity across religious and secular contexts.