EARLY CORTICAL INFLUENCES IN OBJECT SEGREGATION AND THE PERCEPTION OF SURFACE LIGHTNESS

Abstract— The apparent brightness of a surface is profoundly influenced by the brightness of an adjacent surface., but these contrast effects are reduced when the surface are perceived as separate three-dimensional entities. Previous work has suggested that high-level perceptual and cognitive processes involved in scence segmentation may be responsible for modifying a surface's appearance. We demonstrate large reductions in contrast effects when the sues available for segmentations are restricted to those that isolate separate groups of early cortical neurons in the visual system. Our data contradict standard contract-signaling models of brightness perception and imply that mechanisms of figure-ground segmentation are already available at low levels of visual processing.     

Context-dependent brightness priming occurs without visual awareness

Our visual systems account for stimulus context in brightness perception, but whether such adjustments occur for stimuli that we are unaware of has not been established. We therefore assessed whether stimulus context influences brightness processing by measuring unconscious priming with metacontrast masking. When a middle-gray disk was presented on a darker (or brighter) background, such that it could be consciously perceived as brighter (or darker) via simultaneous brightness contrast (SBC), reaction times were significantly faster to a bright (or dark) annulus than to a dark (or bright) annulus. We further show that context-dependent brightness priming does not correlate with visibility using an objective measure of awareness (Experiment 1) and that context-dependent, but not context-independent brightness priming, occurs equally strongly for stimuli below or above the subjective threshold for awareness (Experiment 2). These results suggest that SBC occurs at early levels of visual input and is not influenced by conscious perception.     

Affect of the unconscious: Visually suppressed angry faces modulate our decisions

Emotional and affective processing imposes itself over cognitive processes and modulates our perception of the surrounding environment. In two experiments, we addressed the issue of whether nonconscious processing of affect can take place even under deep states of unawareness, such as those induced by interocular suppression techniques, and can elicit an affective response that can influence our understanding of the surrounding environment. In Experiment 1, participants judged the likeability of an unfamiliar item—a Chinese character—that was preceded by a face expressing a particular emotion (either happy or angry). The face was rendered invisible through an interocular suppression technique (continuous flash suppression; CFS). In Experiment 2, backward masking (BM), a less robust masking technique, was used to render the facial expressions invisible. We found that despite equivalent phenomenological suppression of the visual primes under CFS and BM, different patterns of affective processing were obtained with the two masking techniques. Under BM, nonconscious affective priming was obtained for both happy and angry invisible facial expressions. However, under CFS, nonconscious affective priming was obtained only for angry facial expressions. We discuss an interpretation of this dissociation between affective processing and visual masking techniques in terms of distinct routes from the retina to the amygdala.     

The influence of intention on masked priming: a study with semantic classification of words

Unconscious perception is commonly described as a phenomenon that is not under intentional control and relies on automatic processes. We challenge this view by arguing that some automatic processes may indeed be under intentional control, which is implemented in task-sets that define how the task is to be performed. In consequence, those prime attributes that are relevant to the task will be most effective. To investigate this hypothesis, we used a paradigm which has been shown to yield reliable short-lived priming in tasks based on semantic classification of words. This type of study uses fast, well practised classification responses, whereby responses to targets are much less accurate if prime and target belong to a different category than if they belong to the same category. In three experiments, we investigated whether the intention to classify the same words with respect to different semantic categories had a differential effect on priming. The results suggest that this was indeed the case: Priming varied with the task in all experiments. However, although participants reported not seeing the primes, they were able to classify the primes better than chance using the classification task they had used before with the targets. When a lexical task was used for discrimination in experiment 4, masked primes could however not be discriminated. Also, priming was as pronounced when the primes were visible as when they were invisible. The pattern of results suggests that participants had intentional control on prime processing, even if they reported not seeing the primes.     

Perceptual organization and apparent brightness in subjective contour figures

According to a number of theories subjective contours arise from brightness contrast and/or assimilation. The apparent brightness gradients generated by these effects are assumed to give rise to the perception of contours delineating the gradients. A study is reported in which naive observers were shown a subjective contour display and asked to report what they saw. They were then asked to judge whether the center or the surround of the display appeared brighter. Subjects whose reports indicated that they had seen the subjective contour figure showed an overwhelming preference for the center of the display being brighter than the surround. However, subjects who did not see the subjective contour figure did not differ significantly in their selection of the center over the surround. This finding presents difficulties for any theory which derives subjective contours from the apparent brightness difference.     

Relative brightness in natural images can be accounted for by removing blurry content

One critical question regarding visual cognition concerns how the physical properties of the visual world are represented in early vision and then relayed to high-level vision. Here, we posit a simple theory: Processes that encode object appearance reduce their response to spatial content that is coarser than the size of the attended object. We show that a filtering procedure based on this theory can account for the relative brightness levels of test patches placed in images of natural scenes and for many hard-to-explain brightness illusions. The implication is that the perception of brightness differences in most brightness illusions actually corresponds to physical differences present in the images. Portions of the visual system may encode these physical differences by means of neural processes that adaptively reduce their response to low-spatial-frequency content.     

Conscious awareness is required for holistic face processing

Investigating the limits of unconscious processing is essential to understand the function of consciousness. Here, we explored whether holistic face processing, a mechanism believed to be important for face processing in general, can be accomplished unconsciously. Using a novel “eyes-face” stimulus we tested whether discrimination of pairs of eyes was influenced by the surrounding face context. While the eyes were fully visible, the faces that provided context could be rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. Two experiments with three different sets of face stimuli and a subliminal learning procedure converged to show that invisible faces did not influence perception of visible eyes. In contrast, surrounding faces, when they were clearly visible, strongly influenced perception of the eyes. Thus, we conclude that conscious awareness might be a prerequisite for holistic face processing.     

The response criterion,the stimulus configuration,and the relationship between brightness contrast and brightness constancy

Four experiments were designed to investigate the nature of the relationship between brightness contrast and brightness constancy while controlling the response criterion, the area of the surround, the stimulus configuration, and the mode of appearance of the modulus target. Ten Os in each of the four experiments estimated the apparent whiteness or brightness of targets with different contrast ratios. All targets were viewed at several illumination levels. Most constancy (whiteness and brightness) functions displayed shallow slopes that reflected a good approximation to constancy. The functions within Experiments I, III, and IV were vertically displaced and parallel; those in Experiment II were vertically displaced and increased in slope. This suggests that decreasing the contrast ratio had no effect on the tendency towards constancy when the area of the surround was greater than that of the target but resulted in a decrease in constancy when the area of the surround was equal to that of the target.     

Masking procedures can influence priming effects besides their effects on conscious perception

Masked priming has been employed to study the role of consciousness for different levels of visual processing. However, masking procedures differ systematically between studies. To examine these procedural differences we contrasted priming effects with metacontrast masking, which is often applied in the context of perceptual priming, and priming effects with sandwich pattern masking, frequently used in studies on semantic priming. Results indicate that the amount of masking neither affects perceptual nor semantic priming effects in a semantic categorization task when a metacontrast masking paradigm was used. However, perceptual and semantic priming effects increased with increasing prime visibility when a sandwich pattern masking paradigm was used. Findings suggest that different types of masking procedures affect the processing of the masked stimuli in substantially different ways even if the masking effect on conscious perception of these stimuli is comparable.     

The relation of discrete stimuli can be integrated despite the failure of conscious identification

ABSTRACT

The integration of the sameness or difference of two unconscious stimuli occurs and affects behaviour without subjective visual consciousness. Yet, intermittent stimulus awareness or a process simpler than integration could also account for these results. In a masked go/no-go task, participants provided or withheld a response based on the same/different relation of two stimuli. Post-trial performance on a discrimination task was used to classify invisible stimuli, providing an objective criterion of awareness. Stimulus pairs with a No-go-associated relation showed reduced and slower responding even when those stimuli were incorrectly discriminated and presumably unconscious. Due to the large set of stimuli, this effect is unlikely to be due to response mapping or action triggers. The integration of the relation of discrete stimuli is a cognitive function that is not dependent upon visual awareness, in the form of conscious identification, to occur.     

Forgotten but not gone: context effects on recognition do not require explicit memory for context

Context effects on recognition memory provide an important indirect assay of associative learning and source memory. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that such context effects may obtain even if the contexts themselves are not remembered--for example, in individuals impaired on direct tests of memory for contextual information. In contrast, a recent study indicated that the effects of temporal context reinstatement on visual recognition obtain only when the contextual information itself was explicitly recollected. Here we report that the effects of reinstatement of spatial-simultaneous context on visual object recognition memory obtain irrespective of whether those context stimuli are explicitly recognized. We suggest that spatial-simultaneous context effects might be based on ensemble unitization of target and context stimuli at encoding, whereas temporal context effects may require recollective processes.     

Does Attention Modulate the Perception of Luminance Changes?

In a previous study assessing the modulation of visual processing by attention, Bonnel, Possami, and Schmitt showed that, when discriminating line-length, subjects precisely shared processing resources between two pairs of lines presented to the left and right of fixation. In a close replication requiring the detection of luminance increments instead of line-length differences, subjects were unable to follow the instructions and to allocate attention differentially, thus supporting the claim that light detection is fundamentally different from shape discrimination. In a subsequent experiment, we tested and rejected the possibility that luminance perception was not open to modulation by attention due to its physical nature. Replacing brightness detection by brightness identification allowed voluntary control on the quality of processing to be evidenced. The similarity between the latter results and the data from line-length discrimination suggests that task requirements may be crucial in determining the distribution of attention.     

Looking more masculine among females: Spatial context modulates gender perception of face and biological motion

Perception of visual information highly depends on spatial context. For instance, perception of a low-level visual feature, such as orientation, can be shifted away from its surrounding context, exhibiting a simultaneous contrast effect. Although previous studies have demonstrated the adaptation aftereffect of gender, a high-level visual feature, it remains largely unknown whether gender perception can also be shaped by a simultaneously presented context. In the present study, we found that the gender perception of a central face or a point-light walker was repelled away from the gender of its surrounding faces or walkers. A norm-based opponent model of lateral inhibition, which accounts for the adaptation aftereffect of high-level features, can also excellently fit the simultaneous contrast effect. But different from the reported contextual effect of low-level features, the simultaneous contrast effect of gender cannot be observed when the centre and the surrounding stimuli are from different categories, or when the surrounding stimuli are suppressed from awareness. These findings on one hand reveal a resemblance between the simultaneous contrast effect and the adaptation aftereffect of high-level features, on the other hand highlight different biological mechanisms underlying the contextual effects of low- and high-level visual features.     

Experimenter naiveté and imaginal judgments

Finke and Kurtzman report that fields of resolution increase with increases in the diameter of both perceived and imagined circular patterns. Their study apparently was conducted by an experimenter who was aware of the hypotheses under test. In contrast to these results, we find no such increase for imagined circular patterns when the experimenter is not aware of the experimental predictions, even though our subjects received imagery training as extensive as that used by Finke and Kurtzman. Our results cannot readily be attributed to differences between the experiments, other than those associated with experimenter naiveté, for we replicated Finke and Kurtzman's observations that (a) the fields of resolution in perception increase with both the diameter and the relative brightness of the patterns and (b) the fields of resolution in imagery do not increase with the relative brightness of the patterns. Our results also challenge Finke and Kurtzman's contentions that imagery and perception are treated as functionally equivalent at area-processing levels of the visual system but not at contrast-processing levels.     

Forgotten but not gone: Context effects on recognition do not require explicit memory for context

Context effects on recognition memory provide an important indirect assay of associative learning and source memory. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that such context effects may obtain even if the contexts themselves are not remembered—for example, in individuals impaired on direct tests of memory for contextual information. In contrast, a recent study indicated that the effects of temporal context reinstatement on visual recognition obtain only when the contextual information itself was explicitly recollected. Here we report that the effects of reinstatement of spatial-simultaneous context on visual object recognition memory obtain irrespective of whether those context stimuli are explicitly recognized. We suggest that spatial-simultaneous context effects might be based on ensemble unitization of target and context stimuli at encoding, whereas temporal context effects may require recollective processes.     

Fractionating working memory: consolidation and maintenance are independent processes

In the present study, we required subjects to remember simple objects that were masked to interrupt consolidation and allow us to estimate the rate of information accrual in visual working memory. We compared a consolidation-baseline condition with a consolidation-during-maintenance condition in which subjects needed to remember a set of unmasked items and then were shown to-be-remembered masked items. We hypothesized that if the control processes of consolidation and maintenance are performed by common mechanisms, then consolidation should be less efficient when performed during maintenance than when performed alone. However, we found that an identical amount of information was encoded per unit time in the two conditions. These results indicate that working memory consolidation is not slowed by maintenance and suggest a two-step model of encoding in visual working memory.     

Preconstancy information can influence visual search: the case of lightness constancy

Can visual search be based on preconstancy representations of the scene--that is, ones in which accidental characteristics of the scene, such as shadows, point of view, and distance, have not yet been discounted? This question was addressed within the specific context of lightness constancy, the phenomenon that surface lightness is perceived as relatively unchanged despite changes in illumination conditions. Three experiments yielded evidence of preconstancy influence on visual search. This was true even when the preconstancy information that seemed to influence search was unavailable at a reportable level. The results suggest that visual search processes can be engaged before the processing that leads to the experienced perception of the scene is complete.     

Effect of structuring the workspace on cognitive and sensorimotor distance estimation: no dissociation between perception and action

Independent processing of visual information for perception and action is supported by studies about visual illusions, which showed that context information influences overtjudgment but not reaching attempts. The objection was raised, however, that these two types of performance are notdirectly comparable, since they generally focus on different properties of the visual input. The goal of the present study was to quantify the influence of context information (in the form of a textured background) on the cognitive and sensorimotor processing of egocentric distance. We found that the subjective area comprising reachable objects (probed with a cognitive task) decreased, whereas the amplitude of reaching movement (probed with a sensorimotor task) increased in the presence of the textured background with both binocular and monocular viewing. Directional motor performance was not affected by the experimental conditions, but there was a tendency for the kinematic parameters to mimic trajectory variations. The similar but opposite effects of the textured background in the cognitive and sensorimotor tasks suggested that in both tasks the visual targets were perceived as closer when they were presented in a sparse environment. A common explanation for the opposite effects was confirmed by the percentage of background influence, which was highly correlated in the two tasks. We conclude that visual processing for perception and action cannot be dissociated from context influence, since it does not differ when the tasks entail the processing of similar spatial characteristics.     

Perceived distance and the perceived speed of self-motion: Linear vs. angular velocity?

Experiments are reported in which it was found that, with the angular speed of a visual surround held constant, the perceived speed of rotary self-motion increased linearly with increasing perceived distance of this surround. This finding was in agreement with a motion constancy equation derived from a consideration of object-referred motion perception. Since information concerning distance is necessary for the perception of linear but not angular speed, this finding supports the conclusion that visually perceived rotary self-motion perception is dependent upon perceived linear surround motion at least in the horizontal plane. The visual motion constancy mechanism which operates for object-referred motion can apparently not be switched off for the special case of self-motion perception.     

Potentiation of action by undetected affordant objects

The physical attributes of objects that are relevant to motor behaviour, or action, are referred to as affordances (Gibson, 1979). Recent evidence has shown that an object's affordance can potentiate an unrelated motor response even when there is no intention to respond to it (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998). In the five experiments, we examined whether conscious perception of an affordance is necessary to produce motor priming by presenting images of affordant objects (e.g., hammer) under conditions which cause them to be undetectable: Brief masked exposure (BME) and attentional blink (AB). We successfully demonstrated that conscious perception is not necessary for an object's affordance to produce motor priming. Since these findings are consistent with the abilities/disabilities of patients with blindsight and visual form agnosia, it is possible that processing accomplished by the dorsal stream produced this effect, though more research is needed to confirm this assertion.