Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission: what else?!)

In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore??s proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure is more than enough, Davies has recently challenged this view: apparently, there are more ways in heaven and earth that warrant can fail to transmit across valid inference from one (set of) belief(s) to another, than have been dreamt of in philosophy so far. More specifically, Davies thinks that a second kind of transmission failure has to be countenanced. He connects each kind of failure of transmission of warrant with two different kinds of epistemic project, respectively, and with the exploration of whether the current dispute between conservatives such as Wright, and liberals such as Jim Pryor, on the nature of perceptual warrant, would have a bearing on them. I point out why Davies??s second kind of transmission failure is indeed no such thing. I then move on to canvass another kind of transmission failure, different from the one studied by both Wright and Davies, and dependent on an alternative conception of the structure of empirical warrants, which I dub ??moderatism??. I then consider how this alternative notion of transmission failure fares with respect to Moore??s proof, its relationship with Wright??s kind of transmission failure and with the Closure principle. In closing, I defend it from criticisms that can be elicited from Pryor??s recent work.     

Quidditism without quiddities

Structuralism and quidditism are competing views of the metaphysics of property individuation: structuralists claim that properties are individuated by their nomological roles; quidditists claim that they are individuated by something else. This paper (1) refutes what many see as the best reason to accept structuralism over quidditism and (2) offers a methodological argument in favor of a quidditism. The standard charge against quidditism is that it commits us to something ontologically otiose: intrinsic aspects of properties, so-called ??quiddities??. Here I grant that quiddities are ontologically otiose, but deny that quidditism requires them. According to a view I call ??austere quidditism??, properties are individuated by bare numerical identity. I argue that, as far as ontological parsimony is concerned, austere quidditism and structuralism are on a par. But is austere quidditism a coherent alternative to structuralism? To see that it is, we must get clear on what exactly we mean by ??property individuation??. What we discover is that structuralism is a counterpart theory for properties, and that austere quidditism is simply the rejection of counterpart theory. I conclude with a methodological argument to the effect that counterpart theory for properties ought to be rejected. This paper begins by situating the debate between structuralists and quidditists within the context of a debate over the epistemic limits of fundamental science. At the center of this debate is David Lewis??s posthumously published ??Ramseyan Humility?? (2008). In the appendix I explain the precise role of austere quidditism in Lewis??s argument.     

Capacity and Potentiality: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.6–7 from the Perspective of the De Anima

The notion of a capacity (dunamis) in the sense of a power to bring about or undergo change plays a key role in Aristotle??s theories about the natural world. However, in Metaphysics ?? Aristotle also extends ??capacity??, and the corresponding concept of ??activity?? (energeia), to cases where we want to say that something is in capacity, or in activity, such and such but not, or not directly, in virtue of being capable of initiating or undergoing change. This paper seeks to clarify and confirm a certain view of how Aristotle wishes us to see the relationship between the two uses of ??capacity?? and ??activity??. To that end, I consider also Aristotle??s employment of the terms in the De Anima, which sheds light on the key examples which direct the discussion in Metaph. ??.     

Dekonstruktion der ?Ambivalenz��

Focusing on the relation between discourse and subject formation, the poststructuralistic reiterations and resignifications within the concept of ambivalence provide important aspects for a contemporary conceptualization of ambivalence, especially within the framework of educational theory (Bildungstheorie). From this point of view the paper explores firstly the notion of ??ambivalence?? in the context of Derrida??s theory and practice of deconstruction and secondly the relation between ??ambivalence?? and ??ambiguity?? considering Derrida??s theory of ??différance?? and Butler??s theory of ??performativity??. Finally the article outlines the meaning of ??ambivalence?? in Butler??s theory of the subjectivation process.     

God as Thou and Prayer as Dialogue: Martin Buber’s Tools for Reconciliation

??Prayer?? can be defined as ??the offering, in public worship or private devotion, of petition, confession, adoration, or thanksgiving to God; also the form of words in which such an offering is made?? (cf. Cohn-Sherbok 2010). In addition to this simple definition it could be said that there are different forms of prayer: some are vocal and articulate and others are only mental in nature; some prayers are communal and liturgical and other prayers are spontaneous or at least composed by the one saying the prayer (cf. Stump 1999). Accordingly, it is evident that there are manifold intricacies involved in any characterisation of ??prayer??. In this article my aims are twofold. First, I explore the implications of Martin Buber??s philosophy, particularly of his conception of God as Thou for our understanding of ??prayer??; second, I will argue that Buber??s understanding of ??prayer?? as dialogue serves as a way for the individual to seek reconciliation with itself, with others, and with God.     

?The person is a monad with windows?: sketch of a conceptual history of ‘person’ in Russia

The basic concepts ??person?? (Person), I/self (Ich) and ??subject?? (Subjekt) structuring the Russian discourse of personhood (Personalit?t) developed during the philosophical discussions of the 1820s?C1840s. The development occurred in the course of an intense reception of German Idealism and Romanticism. Characteristic of this process is that the modern meaning of personhood going back to the theological and natural-law interpretations of the person in Western Europe does not exist in the Russian cultural consciousness. Therefore the Russian concepts of personhood demonstrate the influence of the semantic innovations of Romanticism. Correspondingly, the semantic core of the Russian discourses on personhood is not the idea of an ??autonomous person?? but that of an ??unique individuality??. Here, personhood is not the indefeasible attribute of every man, but the mark of inimitable individuality. Accordingly, the basic distinction underlying the discourse on personhood in Russia is not the differentiation between ??person?? and ??thing?? as in the European tradition, but the distinction between ??individual?? and (anonymous) ??community??. Also, in the meaning of the concept of I/self the dominant differentiation is not that between I/self (Ich) and not-I/not-self (Nicht-Ich), but that between I and We. This discourse on personhood centring on the idea of individuality took form in Russia starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, in particular in aesthetics, psychology, and educational theory, as well as in the philosophy of history. The comparative intercultural analysis of the history of concepts pertaining to personhood in the German-Russian cultural transfer brings to light the dialectic of European modernity in which a degree of tension is visible between the idea of personal autonomy and individuality.     

The categorical and the hypothetical: a critique of some fundamental assumptions of standard semantics

The hypothetical notion of consequence is normally understood as the transmission of a categorical notion from premisses to conclusion. In model-theoretic semantics this categorical notion is ??truth??, in standard proof-theoretic semantics it is ??canonical provability??. Three underlying dogmas, (I) the priority of the categorical over the hypothetical, (II) the transmission view of consequence, and (III) the identification of consequence and correctness of inference are criticized from an alternative view of proof-theoretic semantics. It is argued that consequence is a basic semantical concept which is directly governed by elementary reasoning principles such as definitional closure and definitional reflection, and not reduced to a categorical concept. This understanding of consequence allows in particular to deal with non-wellfounded phenomena as they arise from circular definitions.     

Exemplarization and self-presentation: Lehrer and Meinong on consciousness

Alexius Meinong??s specific use of the term ??self-presentation?? had a significant influence on modern epistemology and philosophical psychology. To show that there are remarkable parallels between Meinong??s account of the self-presentation of experiences and Lehrer??s account of the exemplarization of experiences is one of this paper??s main objectives. Another objective is to put forward some comments and critical remarks to Lehrer??s approach. One of the main problems can be expressed by the following: The process of using a particular experience as a sample, that is, an exemplar that we use to stand for and refer to a plurality of experiences, Lehrer calls ??exemplarization??. As concrete experiences are multifarious (red and round, for example), how can we single out a specific sort of experiences (the red ones) by the process of exemplarization when we use such a multifarious experience as a sample?     

Worlds and times

In the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus suggested that the proper analysis of modality required not just moments of time but also ??moments of nature??. In making this suggestion, he broke with an influential view first presented by Diodorus in the early Hellenistic period, and might even be said to have been the inventor of ??possible worlds??. In this essay we take Scotus?? suggestion seriously devising first a double-index logic and then introducing the temporal order. Finally, using the temporal order, we define a modal order. This allows us to present modal logic without the usual interpretive questions arising concerning the relation called variously ??accessibility??, ??alternativeness??, and, ??relative possibility.?? The system in which this analysis is done is one of those which have come to be called a hybrid logic.     

Looking Through Ulanowicz’s “Third Window”

After a ??very personal?? introduction, and a reference to how accurate indeed is the use of the ??new window?? metaphor by Ulanowicz and about what ??can be seen through it??, the article dwells into the evolution of our understanding about the most general sources??material and/or non-material??of change and transformation; in order to examine further the item about the ways through which ??information?? can be a source of change and transformation also in pre-biotic processes, where commonly it is not taken into account. Thus, the article argues the convergence between Ulanowicz??s and the Author??s treatments of??non only biotic??networks of configuration of processes (a central theme in Ulanowicz??s book). Finally, the article pays attention to how Ulanowicz??s vision through his ??new Third Window??, can indeed help us transcend the non desirable division of contemporary culture into two isolated compartments (science and technology versus the humanities and ethics), which has contributed not only to the globalization of communications, transactions, knowledge and so on, but also to the globalization of multiple crisis of different sort that need to be solved if we want ??a better world to be possible??.     

?Omnipr?senz��

Excessive urge for free individual development even beyond moral law and social rules is discussed as part of the aftermath of severe political repression and traumatization. It is proposed to describe these phenomena which have not yet been sufficiently considered in the scientific literature as ??omnipresence??. In terms of psychoanalytic understanding these mechanisms result from specific unconscious defense activities. The relationship to other defense mechanisms, e.?g. of anal, phobic, paranoid and manic nature, is outlined, and illustrated by a short case vignette. The article ends with a differentiation between omnipresence as described above on the one hand and the phenomena of media-moderated expansion of individual development and acceleration typically and generally found in postmodern societies, on the other hand.     

Stage theory and proper names

In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and ??persist?? by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ??Socrates?? or ??London??. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take to be the best alternative available for them.     

True-to-Hume laws and the open-future (or Hypertemporal Humeanism)

Take open-future Humeanism to comprise the following four tenets: (T1) that truth supervenes on a mosaic of local particular matters of fact; (T2) that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences; (T3) that there is a dynamic present moment; and (T4) that there are no future facts; that is, contingent propositions about the future obtain truth values only when their referents are actualised. Prima facie this is a deeply problematic metaphysic for the Humean, since given that the widely accepted Humean conception takes all truths (inclusive of nomological truths) to supervene on an omnitemporal mosaic of local particular matters of fact, if there are no future facts, then the Humean can neither provide laws of nature, nor justify many everyday inductive inferences. However, I argue that this eternalist metaphysic is in tension with at least one of Hume’s central metaphysical claims concerning causation, e.g. that causal regularities may cease to hold at any time. In this paper I propose and defend one possible open-future Humean metaphysic which admits of “true-to-Hume” causal and nomological facts. Furthermore, although I am happy to concede that induction is problematic for the open-future Humean, I demonstrate that it poses no greater threat to the open-future conception than it does to the popular Lewisian conception of natural law.     

‘Historicising Common Sense’

This essay is an expanded set of comments on the social psychology papers written for the special issue on History and Social Psychology. It considers what social psychology, and particularly the theory of social representations, might offer historians working on similar problems, and what historical methods might offer social psychology. The social history of thinking has been a major theme in twentieth and twenty-first century historical writing, represented most recently by the genre of ??cultural history??. Cultural history and the theory of social representations have common ancestors in early twentieth-century social science. Nevertheless, the two lines of research have developed in different ways and are better seen as complementary than similar. The theory of social representations usefully foregrounds issues, like social division and change over time, that cultural history relegates to the background. But for historians, the theory of social representations seems oddly fixated on comparing the thought styles associated with positivist science and ??common sense??. Using historical analysis, this essay tries to dissect the core opposition ??science : common sense?? and argues for a more flexible approach to comparing modes of thought.     

What ‘biological racial realism’ should mean

A curious ambiguity has arisen in the race debate in recent years. That ambiguity is what is actually meant by ??biological racial realism??. Some philosophers mean that ??race is a natural kind in biology??, while others mean that ??race is a real biological kind??. However, there is no agreement about what a natural kind or a real biological kind should be in the race debate. In this article, I will argue that the best interpretation of ??biological racial realism?? is one that interprets ??biological racial realism?? as ??race is a genuine kind in biology??, where a genuine kind is a valid kind in a well-ordered scientific research program. I begin by reviewing previous interpretations of ??biological racial realism?? in the race debate. Second, I introduce the idea of a genuine kind and compare it to various notions of natural and real biological kinds used in the race debate. Third, I present and defend an argument for my view. Fourth, I provide a few interesting consequences of my view for the race debate. Last, I provide a summary of the article.     

The ‘theory theory’ of mind and the aims of Sellars’ original myth of Jones

Recent proponents of the ??theory theory?? of mind often trace its roots back to Wilfrid Sellars?? famous ??myth of Jones?? in his 1956 article, ??Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind??. Sellars developed an account of the intersubjective basis of our knowledge of the inner mental states of both self and others, an account which included the claim that such knowledge is in some sense theoretical knowledge. This paper examines the nature of this claim in Sellars?? original account and its relationship to more recent debates concerning ??theory of mind??, in particular the theory theory. A close look reveals that Sellars?? original view embodied several distinctions that would enable more recent theory theorists to accommodate certain phenomenological objections that have been raised against that outlook. At the heart of the philosophical issue is an overlooked complexity involved in Sellars?? account of the ??theory/observation?? distinction, involving a conception of the distinction that is both independently plausible and a key to the issue in dispute.     

Is There Any Good Reason to Say Goodbye to “Ethnomethodology”?

This paper is an essay about Harold Garfinkel??s heritage. It outlines a response to Eric Livingston??s proposal to say goodbye to ethnomethodology as pertaining to the sociological tradition; and it rejects part of Melvin Pollner??s diagnosis about the changes occurred in ethnomethodological working. If it agrees with Pollner about the idea that something of the initial ethnomethodology??s program has been left aside after the ??work studies?? turn, it asserts that such a turn has nonetheless made possible authentic discoveries. So the paper speaks for a better integration of the two versions of ethnomethodology separated by Pollner.     

Utopias of return: notes on (post-)Soviet culture and its frustrated (post-)modernisation

This article discusses the role of representative strategies in twentieth-century Russian culture. Just as Russia interacted with Europe in the Marquis de Custine??s time via discourse and representation, in the twentieth century Russia re-entered European consciousness by simulating ??socialism??. In the post-Soviet era, the nation aspired to be admitted to the ??European house?? by simulating a ??market economy??, ??democracy??, and ??postmodernism??. But in reality Russia remains the same country as before, torn between the reality of its own helplessness and poverty, and the messianic myth of its own greatness. Post-Soviet culture is a product of Stalinist culture. ??Russian postmodernism?? was created less by artists, writers, poets, and film makers, than by theorists and critics. At the beginning of the 1990s, a need to describe contemporary Russian culture emerged. In this way, ??Russian postmodernism?? arose from the desire to ??sell?? projects in the West??from the simple obligation to describe socialist experience in concrete, transferable terms that Westerners could grasp. The nostalgia experienced by the post-Soviet era creates its own simulated postmodernism, in which the matrices of the construction and functioning of culture cease to be connected with specifically Russian (Soviet) history, and instead reproduce Western models almost exactly. We are facing yet another attempt at radical cultural modernization. If the first attempt (revolutionary culture) was the most original and fruitful, and the second (Stalinist culture, Socialist Realism) was less productive but still original, then the third, post-Soviet, attempt (rich in individuality, but lacking in original ideas or style) is for the moment the least productive and original. If we exclude sots-art (conceptualism) from ??Russian postmodernism??, there would be nothing left. Clearly, an original cultural model in post-Soviet Russia will not take shape until original strategies for processing the country??s cultural past are developed. In their turn, these strategies can only result from a radical transformation of post-Soviet identity into a new, genuinely Russian one.