A test of the Sophisticated Guessing Theory of word perception

Under difficult viewing conditions, a letter in a familiar word can be perceived more accurately than the same letter alone or in a string of unrelated letters. Sophisticated Guessing Theory asserts that perception is more accurate when a letter appears in a word because its identity is constrained by the identity of neighboring context letters. Experiment 1 tested the following prediction: A letter in a word should be perceived more accurately in strongly constraining word contexts than in weakly constraining word contexts. No such trend was found using a number of different measures of contextual constraint and perceptual accuracy. Experiment 2 verified that, with the same conditions used in Experiment 1 to test Sophisticated Guessing Theory, a strong perceptual advantage could be obtained for letters in words vs. letters alone or in unrelated-letter strings. Several alternative theories of word perception are discussed. The most attractive asserts that for words an additional higher-level perceptual code is formed that is more resistant to degradation than the code formed for letters.     

Learning on a response continuum: Comparison of a linear change and a functional learning model

Two reinforcement schedules were used to compare the predictive validity of a linear change model with a functional learning model. In one schedule, termed “convergent,” the linear change model predicts convergence to the optimum response, while in the other, termed “divergent,” this model predicts that a subject's response will not converge. The functional learning model predicts convergence in both cases. Another factor that was varied was presence or absence of random error or “noise” in the relationship between response and outcome. In the “noiseless” condition, in which no noise is added, a subject could discover the optimum response by chance, so that some subjects could appear to have converged fortuitously. In the “noisy” conditions such chance apparent convergence could not occur.The results did not unequivocally favor either model. While the linear change model's prediction of nonconvergence in the divergent conditions (particularly the “noisy” divergent condition) was not sustained, there was a clear difference in speed of convergence, counter to the prediction inferred from the functional learning model. Evidence that at least some subjects were utilizing a functional learning strategy was adduced from the fact that subjects were able to “map out” the relation between response and outcome quite accurately in a follow-up task. Almost all subjects in the “noisy” conditions had evidently “learned” a strong linear relation, with slope closely matching the veridical one.The data were consistent with a hybrid model assuming a “hierarchy of cognitive strategies” in which more complex strategies (e.g., functional learning) are utilized only when the simpler ones (e.g., a linear change strategy) fail to solve the problem.     

Nontransitive measurable utility

A new theory of preferences under risk is presented that does not use the transitivity and independence axioms of the von Neumann-Morgenstern linear utility theory. Utilities in the new theory are unique up to a similarity transformation (ratio scale measurement). They key to this generalization of the traditional linear theory lies in its representation of binary preferences by a bivariate rather than univariate real valued function. Linear theory obtains a linear function u on a set P of probability measures for which u(p) > u(q) if and only if p is preferred to q. The new theory obtains a skew-symmetric bilinear function φ on P × P for which φ(p, q) > 0 if and only if p is preferred to q. Continuity, dominance, and symmetry axioms are shown to be necessary and sufficient for the new representation.     

Foundations of risk measurement. II. Effects of gains on risk

This paper presents the second part of a two-part study on axiomatizations of perceived risk. The first part (P. C. Fishburn, Foundations of risk measurement, I. Risk as probable loss. Mimeo., Bell Laboratories, 1981) focussed on risk as probable loss. The second part considers measures of risk that include effects of gains on perceived risk. It adopts the position that increased gains can reduce the risk of fixed probable losses without completely negating this risk. Moreover, every prospect that has no chance of yielding a loss is presumed to have no risk. Several numerical measures of risk are axiomatized. The more specialized are separable in gains and losses. Further specializations isolate the effects of loss and gain probabilities.     

Memory without organization: Properties of a model with random storage and undirected retrieval

A very simple spatial model of memory storage and retrieval is described, analyzed, and discussed. The postulated memory is without organization in the sense that neither the place of storage nor the order of search during retrieval is influenced by the nature of the information being stored or retrieved. The memory consists of a three-dimensional space containing a large number of homogeneously distributed loci at which data may be stored. Data received near each other in time are stored at nearby locations. Access is by an undirected expanding-sphere search. The model exhibits a wide variety of quantitatively and qualitatively humanlike behavior with respect to both standard learning and forgetting paradigms and with respect to frequency effects and other phenomena in word processing.     

Restricted thresholds for interval orders: A case of nonaxiomatizability by a universal sentence

Let $\text{P}$_n be the class of all finite interval orders that can be interval-represented using no more than n interval lengths or threshold levels. Thus $\text{P}$₁ is the class of finite semiorders, and $\text{P}$, the union of the $\text{P}$_n, is the class of finite interval orders. While each of $\text{P}$₁ and $\text{P}$ is axiomatizable by a universal sentence in first-order logic, no $\text{P}$_n for $\text{n ≧ 2}$ is axiomatizable in the same sense.     

Knowledge organization and skill differences in computer programmers

Like experts in other fields, expert computer programmers can recall at a glance far more information relevant to their field than novices can. One explanation for this difference is that experts not only have more information, they have it better organized into meaningful chunks. In this paper, we infer the details of individual programmers' chunks of key programming concepts using the Reitman—Rueter (Cognitive Psychology, 1980, 12(4), 554–581.) technique for inferring tree structures from recall orders. Differences in organizations accompany skill-level differences. Beginner programmers' organizations show a rich variety of common-language associations to these programming concepts; Intermediate programmers show mixtures of programming and common-language associations; and Experts show remarkably similar, but not identical, organizations based clearly on programming knowledge.     

A critique of top-down independent levels models of speech production: Evidence from non-plan-internal speech errors

A number of speech errors are examined which are difficult to account for by top-down serial processing models of speech production which hove independent levels of processing. In particular, most of these errors are characterized by the presence of an interfering element which is external to the utterance under current construction. This paper has two main aims: to classify these errors, and to examine the constraints upon them. It is found that phonological similarity between the target and intrusion is a major determinant of error occurrence. The consequences for models of speech production are discussed in a framework consisting of the architecture and control structure of those models. A particular model to account for these data is proposed, consisting of a spreading activation lexical network.     

Generality of a strength model for three conditions of repeated recall

A Markovian model of repeated recall is presented that is based on four memory processes: (a) a presentation increment that strengthens the memory trace of a word when the word is shown to a subject, (b) a recall increment that strengthens the trace when the subject successfully recalls the word, (c) a cueing decrement that weakens the trace as contextual cues for retrieving a word change over successive trials of attempted recall, and (d) a sampling rule that translates the strength of a memory trace into a probability of recall. Mathematically, the model predicts the relative frequencies of the recall patterns that are defined by sequences of recalls and forgets for individual words over trials. According to the model, the recallability of a word depends on its state, which is a function of (a) whether the word has been recalled for the first time, and if so, then (b) how many consecutive forgets of the word immediately precede the current trial, (c) how many successful recalls of the word have accumulated, and (d) how many previous trials of attempted recall have elapsed. Paradigms that were well described by the model were (a) no reminding, in which words were presented once and then recalled repeatedly without additional presentations; (b) restricted reminding, in which words were presented before each trial of attempted recall up to their first successful recall but not thereafter; and (c) complete reminding, in which all words were presented befor each attempted recall, whether previously recalled or not. Differences in recall among these conditions were explained in terms of differences in values of the model's parameters.     

Ethnic group-by-generation interactions in WAIS scores in the Hawaii family study of cognition

This paper is a comparatively small-scale replication of a paper by DeFries, Corley, Johnson, Vandenberg, & Wilson (1982), using that subset of the DeFries subject group that was administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and comparing parent vs. offspring performance of Americans of European and of Japanese Ancestry. Like DeFries et al., significant ethnic group-by-generation interactions were obtained in WAIS scores, suggesting the existence of substantial cultural influences on cognitive-test performance.     

A unifying model for the structure of intellectual abilities

Models of the structure of cognitive abilities suggested by Spearman, Thurstone, Guilford, Vernon and Cattell-Horn are reviewed. It is noted that some of the models include a general intellectual factor (g) while others do not. It is also noted that some models are nonhierarchical, while in others more narrow abilities are subsumed under broader abilities in a hierarchical pattern. An empirical study in which a test battery of 16 tests was administered to some 1000 subjects in the 6th grade is reported. Using the LISREL technique to test different models, good support is obtained for oblique primary factors in the Thurstone tradition as well as for the second-order factors fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and general visualization hypothesized by Cattell and Horn. It is also found, however, that the second-order factor of fluid intelligence i is identical with a third-order g-factor. On the basis of these results a three-level model (the HILI-model) is suggested, with the g-factor at the top, two broad factors reflecting the ability to deal with verbal and figural information, respectively, at the second-order level, and the primary factors in the Thurstone and Guilford tradition at the lowest level. It is argued that most previously suggested models are special cases of the HILI-model.     

Persistence of response prevention effects following retraining of escape behavior

This study evaluated the effects of response prevention procedures on the extinction of escape behavior following the reinstatement of shock-escape training prior to the start of extinction. Female hooded rats were assigned to four groups (N = 10) in a factorial design which orthogonally combined response prevention or pseudo-prevention procedures with escape retraining or no retraining procedures. Results showed that prevention reliably impaired shock-escape behavior on early retraining trials; but this effect dissipated completely by the end of retraining. In extinction, prevention reliably facilitated the extinction of escape behavior relative to that of pseudo-prevention controls; but the degree of facilitation was reliably attenuated by retraining procedures. These findings were related to the competing response interpretation of prevention effects.     

Race differences and the Spearman hypothesis

Certain published data have been reviewed and new data presented relevant to the so-called Spearman hypothesis concerning the racial differences on cognitive tests of black and white Americans. In the published data, the correlation between the profiles of low socio-economic and high socio-economic status (SES) whites became ?.90 when sex, area of the country, and grade/age were controlled. This nearly mirror-image relationship suggests that the residual across-the-board difference between the two groups is primarily on the general factor in intelligence. In contrast, the same correlation between blacks and the low SES whites was only ?.19. This indicated not only independence of the profiles but the presence of multiple causes of differences in addition to a possible contribution of the general factor. These published interpretations have now been confirmed by obtaining correlations between general factor loadings and the group differences for most of the same tests. For the SES dochotomy in whites this correlation is .86. For blacks and the low SES whites it is .17. When the two distributions of differences are correlated, a value of .42 is obtained. The Spearman hypothesis appears to apply primarily to differences in socio-economic status rather than race. Furthermore, one cannot assume a large genetic component for each set of differences. Nor can one argue that the possibility of a large environmental component for each set indicates common environmental causes.     

Induced-compliance attitude change: Once more with feeling

The present study investigated the impact of the perception of emotion on attitude change in active participation situations. Subjects wrote counterattitudinal statements while their emotional experiences were independently manipulated by altering their facial expressions. Subjects who were led to experience additional negative affect changed their attitudes significantly more than did subjects who experienced no added emotional input. Conversely, subjects who were led to experience additional positive affect changed their attitudes significantly less than subjects in the other conditions. These results and their implications are discussed.     

Jensen's reaction-time investigations of intelligence: A critique

Jensen has reported a series of reaction-time studies which lead him to conclude that various parameters correlate significantly with IQ. Certain of these parameters are especially emphasized because of their theoretical background and the resulting theoretical light they shed upon the nature of intelligence. Two of the lime-lighted parameters are slope of RT across set size and increasing correlations of RT with IQ as set size increases. I review these studies in detail. I conclude that Jensen's claims are unwarranted. There are many difficulties in his approach that cover the entire gamut from method to data to theory. Some original reseach of my own is reported to illustrate the methodological problems with Jensen's procedure. The data that he alludes to often do not support his claims. The theory that he applies does not fit his paradigm. My conclusion: such research is not easy.     

II. The comparability of the WISC-R and WAIS among 16-year-old EMR children

Thirty 16-year-old EMR children were administered the WAIS and WISC-R in counterbalance order to determine the comparability of the two assessment instruments. The WAIS was found to yield significantly higher Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQ scores. The comparisons of corresponding subtests indicate that all WAIS subtests were significantly higher than the WISC-R except Picture Completion. Correlations between corresponding WAIS and WISC-R IQ scales and subtests, however, were significant. The results suggest differences between the two instruments among children of subnormal intelligence, thus presenting the possibility that a child may be differentially classified based on the selection of the intelligence test.     

An interpretation of research of feedback interruption in speech.

The controversial question of the scope of sensory control in the voluntary motor patterns involved in speech is examined by reviewing studies in which the auditory, tactile, and proprioceptive feedback channels have been distorted or interrupted. The author makes a case for open loop control of well-learned speech patterns under normal circumstances. The concept of internal feedback is introduced as a possible control system of skilled speech, whereas response feedback and external feedback are viewed as necessary for children developing speech or adults learning new speech patterns.