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1.
The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments.
Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons.
We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of
moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative
mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions.
We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
相似文献
Jeanette KennettEmail: |
2.
The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century.
British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral
sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price
seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. In the twentieth century intuitionism in moral philosophy
was revived by the works of G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross. These philosophers reject Kantian deontological ethics
and utilitarianism insisting that intuition is the only source of moral knowledge. Recently, there is a renewed interest in
intuition by philosophers doing meta-philosophy by reflecting on what philosophers do, and why they disagree. In this essay
we plan to take some of this recent literature on intuition and apply it to moral philosophy. We will proceed by (1) defining
a conception of intuition, (2) answering some skeptical challenges, (3) delimiting its target, and (4) arguing that intuition
is often a source of moral knowledge.
相似文献
Thomas W. SmytheEmail: |
3.
Lawrence Torcello 《Res Publica》2009,15(1):17-31
This article confronts growing conservative opposition to abortion based on the claim that abortion is morally equivalent
to infanticide. By examining the relationship between moral skepticism and precautionary ethics the article promotes a completely
permissive position on abortion from conception to birth while consistently rejecting the possibility that such a position
entails permissive implications for infanticide. The article introduces and traces the implicit relationship between moral
skepticism, the precautionary principle and political liberalism.
相似文献
Lawrence TorcelloEmail: |
4.
The Argument from Moral Experience 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Don Loeb 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):469-484
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality,
has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according
to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according
to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in
this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically
claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact,
we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I
take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B)
epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I
argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
相似文献
Don LoebEmail: |
5.
Emotional expressions of moral value 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Julie Tannenbaum 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):43-57
In “Moral Luck” Bernard Williams describes a lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child, and feels “agent-regret.”
I believe that the driver’s feeling is moral since the thought associated with this feeling is a negative moral evaluation
of his action. I demonstrate that his action is not morally inadequate with respect his moral obligations. However, I show
that his negative evaluation is nevertheless justified since he acted in way that does not live up to his moral values. I
then use this distinctive negative moral evaluation to distinguish agent-regret from guilt and mere regret.
相似文献
Julie TannenbaumEmail: |
6.
Waelbers K 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):51-68
This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility
in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological
delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter
and outcomes are often different from those intended. Third, since the outcomes are often unforeseen and unintended, we can
no longer simply apply the traditional (modernist) models for discussing moral responsibility. We need to reinterpret moral
responsibility. A schematic layout of a model on Social Role-Responsibility that incorporates these three premises is presented
to allow discussion of a new way of interpreting moral responsibility.
相似文献
Katinka WaelbersEmail: |
7.
Fischer’s Way: The Next Level 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Saul Smilansky 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):147-155
I present an analogy between analytic philosophy and a particular sort of computer game, and analyze some aspects of John
Martin Fischer's My Way in the light of this analogy. I set out the different levels of the free will question, and explore how well Fischer does
on them. On the compatibility level, he succeeds, in my view, in confronting the "metaphysical challenge" and the "manipulation
challenge", but does less well with the "moral arbitrariness challenge". The compatibilist perspective captures only part
of the moral and personal truth on the compatibility issue, and is shown to be inherently shallow. On the next levels we see
that Fischer confronts particular dangers: the very virtues that make his minimalist position so resilient on the second (compatibility)
level, render it too impoverished when it comes to the third, which asks about the very importance of taking moral responsibility
seriously. Connecting to other positions (such as P.F. Strawson's version of naturalism) may be an imperative, but would also
be risky. Likewise, on the fourth level, where we confront the difficulty of deciding how to deal with the previous conclusions,
it is doubtful how well Fischer can do, given his previous philosophical commitments.
相似文献
Saul SmilanskyEmail: |
8.
David Merli 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):535-556
Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational
and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation
or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession
of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against
conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail
because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications
of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to
share moral concepts.
相似文献
David MerliEmail: |
9.
Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are
accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness.
In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance
for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought
to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics
that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Mark Timmons (Corresponding author)Email: |
10.
David Enoch 《The Journal of Ethics》2009,13(1):15-50
Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand
how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several
distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating
their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with
a challenge to realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully. Others beg the question
against the moral realist, and yet others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that—when carefully stated—can be
seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement. Arguments based on moral disagreement itself have almost no weight,
I conclude, against moral realism.
相似文献
David EnochEmail: |
11.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
相似文献
Patricia SheridanEmail: |
12.
Derk Pereboom 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):21-33
In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest
a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether
he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the
role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument
is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility
is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.
相似文献
Derk PereboomEmail: |
13.
Educating moral emotions: a praxiological analysis 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
This paper presents a praxiological analysis of three everyday educational practices or strategies that can be considered
as being directed at the moral formation of the emotions. The first consists in requests to imagine other's emotional reactions.
The second comprises requests to imitate normative emotional reactions and the third to re-appraise the features of a situation
that are relevant to an emotional response. The interest of these categories is not just that they help to organize and recognize
the significance of what might otherwise appear to be a disparate set of ordinary moral-educational interactions between children
and educators. We suggest, further, that this analysis provides some new insight into what distinguishes the broad and recurrent
conceptions of moral education from one another. Rather than being straightforwardly reducible to intractable differences
over core normative or meta-ethical questions they can also be seen as correlating with different suppositions about the central
role of the emotions in moral life and, correspondingly, different but to a large degree compatible interpretations of what
the "education of the moral emotions" primarily means.
相似文献
Bruce MaxwellEmail: |
14.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
相似文献
Jeff WisdomEmail: |
15.
David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
相似文献
David PhillipsEmail: |
16.
Michael Rubin 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):307-327
A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The
application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of
papers that make use of their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral
realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic
intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions generated by Moral Twin Earth cannot be appealed to in arguments against externalist
moral semantics. The most developed case against the Moral Twin Earth argument that follows this strategy is found in a paper
by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson. Here I argue that their attack on the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment
fails. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson have not shown that we have reason to distrust the semantic intuitions it generates
相似文献
Michael RubinEmail: |
17.
Yahya Yasrebi 《Topoi》2007,26(2):255-265
After the problems of epistemology, the most fundamental problem of Islamic philosophy is that of causality. Causality has
been studied from various perspectives. This paper endeavors first to analyze the issues of causality in Islamic philosophy
and then to critique them. A sketch is provided of the history of the development of theories of causality in Islamic philosophy,
with particular attention to how religious considerations came to determine the shape of the philosophical theories that were
accepted. It is suggested that outstanding philosophical and theological problems that have plagued the tradition of Islamic
philosophy require a new approach to the issue of causality.
相似文献
Yahya YasrebiEmail: |
18.
19.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):101-116
Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help
with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding
fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in
the philosophy of mathematics.
相似文献
Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
20.
Mark Moller 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(2):131-145
Many who believe that human embryos have moral status are convinced that their use in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research
can be morally justified as long as they are discarded embryos left over from fertility treatments. This is one reason why
this view about discarded embryos has played such a prominent role in the debate over publicly funding hESC research in the
United States and other countries. Many believe that this view offers the best chance of a compromise between the different
sides in this debate. This paper focuses on what seems to be the most plausible argument for this view about discarded embryos.
It shows that this argument is unsound regardless of how one understands the claim that embryos have moral status. It also
discusses the implications of this conclusion for attempts to use this argument as a basis for public policy.
相似文献
Mark MollerEmail: |