NATURAL RHETORIC AND THE PRAXIS OF UNDERSTANDING

Although rhetoric might be thought of as nothing more than an archaic art of manipulation, its ability to bring about action—particularly as the intellect and will engage in acts of persuasion amid the operations of the practical intellect—is a possibility that has gone largely unnoticed among philosophers of human nature. In this paper I explore the possibility that natural rhetoric, much as it serves the practical intellect in precipitating action, serves the speculative intellect as it stimulates acts of cognizing and understanding, thus leading to the acquisition of knowledge.     

Walker on the voluntariness of judgment 1

In his paper ‘The Voluntariness of Judgment’ Mark Thomas Walker claims that judgments are voluntary acts. According to Walker, theoretical reasoning can be seen as an instance of practical reasoning, and the outcomes of practical reasoning are actions. There are two reasons why Walker's argument does not establish this conclusion: (i) There are non‐reflective judgments which cannot reasonably be described as instances of practical reasoning; Walker's argument does not apply to these judgments, (ii) If one judges that p as a result of deliberation, one has had no choice sincerely to judge as well that non‐p instead of p, that is, one cannot judge contrary to one's evidence. Therefore, reflective judgments are not voluntary actions. Walker cannot show that reflective judgments are voluntary, because he fails to give a clear notion of a voluntary action and the role of choice.     

Is Satan a Lover of the Good?

There are, apparently, two inherited stories of intentional action. On the motivational story, intentional agents are pursuers of goals. On the evaluative story, intentional agents are pursuers of value. In a spirit of unification, we might try to supplement the motivational story with the evaluative one – or even collapse the former into the latter. The problem with such moves is that they cannot accomodate certain pathologies of agency. Thus, they convert apparently perverse agents – like Satan and self-haters – into closet lovers of the good. I argue that pathological agents like Satan and self-haters are not lovers of the good. They are just lovers of success in action. We can make sense of such agents as practical reasoners because the cares that constitute us as practical reasoners are plural.     

The Face of Truth

I attempt to explain Plato's choice of dialogue through an analysis of what he regarded as the conditions of knowledge acquisition. I see the main contribution of the paper in exposing the way in which time and pain are, for Plato, conditions of knowledge acquisition. Plato endorsed the "learning through suffering," or pathei mathos , convention, central to Greek drama, and did so not through theory but through the praxis some of the dialogues employ. This addition of experiential components to the more cognitively oriented definitions of knowledge that Socrates uses complicates what these works may say about human knowledge. I analyze these tensions and the bearing they may have on the question of Plato's choice of dialogue, that is, on his rhetoric in practice. The requirements for actual persuasion, as Plato specifies them in the Seventh Letter, , are only partially met by the fictional scenes of argumentation and knowledge conveying that Plato presents. However, such scenes permit transcending some of the limitations of written, systematic, nonpersonal discourse. The presentation of such interactions to a real reader through dialogue turns into a mode of writing that is closer to meeting the demands of actual communication of knowledge – at least knowledge regarding what Plato envisaged as being the highest sort of epistemic communication     

THE PROBLEM OF MAGNITUDE AND CATEGORY SCALES: INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

J unge , K. The problem of magnitude and category scales: interpretation of results. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1962, 3 , 215–218.—It is proposed that three main factors are responsible for the relation between magnitude and category scales: (1) ratio judgments on a transformed category scale, (2) interval judgments, and (3) hybrid judgments. The last term refers to the tentative explanation that magnitude judgments are a cross between pure ratio and interval judgments.     

More than just perception–action recalibration: Walking through a virtual environment causes rescaling of perceived space

Egocentric distances in virtual environments are commonly underperceived by up to 50 % of the intended distance. However, a brief period of interaction in which participants walk through the virtual environment while receiving visual feedback can dramatically improve distance judgments. Two experiments were designed to explore whether the increase in postinteraction distance judgments is due to perception–action recalibration or the rescaling of perceived space. Perception–action recalibration as a result of walking interaction should only affect action-specific distance judgments, whereas rescaling of perceived space should affect all distance judgments based on the rescaled percept. Participants made blind-walking distance judgments and verbal size judgments in response to objects in a virtual environment before and after interacting with the environment through either walking (Experiment 1) or reaching (Experiment 2). Size judgments were used to infer perceived distance under the assumption of size–distance invariance, and these served as an implicit measure of perceived distance. Preinteraction walking and size-based distance judgments indicated an underperception of egocentric distance, whereas postinteraction walking and size-based distance judgments both increased as a result of the walking interaction, indicating that walking through the virtual environment with continuous visual feedback caused rescaling of the perceived space. However, interaction with the virtual environment through reaching had no effect on either type of distance judgment, indicating that physical translation through the virtual environment may be necessary for a rescaling of perceived space. Furthermore, the size-based distance and walking distance judgments were highly correlated, even across changes in perceived distance, providing support for the size–distance invariance hypothesis.     

Moral Reasoning as Naturally Good: A Qualified Defense of Foot's Conception of Practical Rationality

Philippa Foot's version of ethical naturalism, centered on the idea of “natural goodness,” has received a good deal of critical scrutiny. One pervasive criticism contends that less than virtuous modes of conduct may be described as naturally good or, at least, not naturally defective on her account. If true, this contradicts the most ambitious aspect of Foot's naturalistic approach to ethics: to show that judgments of moral goodness are a subclass of judgments of natural goodness. But even if one finds this line of criticism convincing, there is a less ambitious aspect of Foot's project which remains, at least in a qualified way, defensible: her conception of moral reasoning as a legitimate form of practical rationality. This more modest claim turns not on the view that moral judgments are a subclass of judgments of natural goodness but merely on the idea that moral reasoning itself is naturally good for us.     

THE CONTINGENCY OF PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING: Context Modifies Equal-Loudness Relations

Abstract –The relative loudnesses of tones that differ in sound frequency can depend strongly on the stimulus context, that is, on the set of intensity levels m the stimulus ensemble Using a new paradigm, called matching in scaling, this investigation sought to confirm that context modifies loudness relations per se, and not, for example, only overt responses To this end, two experiments revealed that changes in stimulus context differentially affect direct comparisons of loudness of 500-Hz and 2,500-Hz tones, as well as numerical judgments of individual tones—when loudness matches and scaling judgments alike are obtained in the same experimental sessions These contingent effects vary dynamically over time as a function of the recent stimulus history A third experiment revealed analogous effects in a simple matching paradigm, with no numerical judgments at all These findings support the contention that basic properties of loudness perception—grounded in auditory processes often considered "low level"—nevertheless can be deeply contextual     

COHERENTISM AND THE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL BELIEFS: A CASE STUDY IN HOW TO DO PRACTICAL ETHICS WITHOUT APPEAL TO A MORAL THEORY

This paper defends a coherentist approach to moral epistemology. In “The Immorality of Eating Meat” (2000), I offer a coherentist consistency argument to show that our own beliefs rationally commit us to the immorality of eating meat. Elsewhere, I use our own beliefs as premises to argue that we have positive duties to assist the poor (2004) and to argue that biomedical animal experimentation is wrong (2012). The present paper explores whether this consistency‐based coherentist approach of grounding particular moral judgments on beliefs we already hold, with no appeal to moral theory, is a legitimate way of doing practical ethics. I argue (i) that grounding particular moral judgments on our core moral convictions and other core nonmoral beliefs is a legitimate way to justify moral judgments, (ii) that these moral judgments possess as much epistemic justification and have as much claim to objectivity as moral judgments grounded on particular ethical theories, and (iii) that this internalistic coherentist method of grounding moral judgments is more likely to result in behavioral guidance than traditional theory‐based approaches to practical ethics. By way of illustrating the approach, I briefly recapitulate my consistency‐based argument for ethical vegetarianism. I then defend the coherentist approach implicit in the argument against a number of potentially fatal metatheoretical attacks.     

Harming is more intentional than helping because it is more probable: the underlying influence of probability on the Knobe effect

Knobe [2003. Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis, 63, 190–194] demonstrated that people’s intentionality judgments in side effects depend on the outcome of the side-effect, indicating that people’s judgments of intentionality of action depend on not only the intention of the actor but also on the result of the action. However, on the basis of findings in judgment and decision making, the current study proposes another hypothesis to Knobe’s (2003) results: the participants’ intentionality judgments are related to not only the outcomes themselves but also the probabilities of outcomes predicted from the action. To test this hypothesis, the present study employed an identical experimental procedure to Knobe (2003), except that it required not only intentionality but also probability judgments for outcomes that resulted from the actions of a company president. The results replicated the findings of Knobe (2003) and showed a relationship between probability and intentionality judgment.     

The Role of Thin‐Slice Judgments in Consumer Psychology

This article examines the potential theoretical and practical contributions that thin‐slice judgments may offer to consumer psychology. We begin by exploring thin‐slice judgments in the context of existing consumer information processing research. Then, we discuss the antecedents of thin‐slice judgments, the type of processing that may underlie and impact thin‐slice judgment formation. Finally, we review the potential consequences of thin‐slice judgments and investigate applications within the consumer domain.     

Mad and glad: Musically induced emotions have divergent impact on morals

Moral judgments can be positive or negative: we can judge action as good or wrong. Here we show that good judgments and wrong judgments are influenced by incidental emotions. Using instrumental music as an induction method, we show that anger, but not happiness, increases the tendency to judge actions as wrong (Experiment 1). We also show that happiness increases the tendency to praise actions as both good and obligatory, while anger reduces these judgments (Experiment 2). These findings extend the literature on emotions and moral judgment by demonstrating impact of anger and happiness, and by contrasting goodness and wrongness in their emotional valence. The findings also show that music can have a significant impact on moral judgment. This is important because music is a highly prevalent situational variable. The use of instrumental music may have advantages over other induction techniques because it does not carry specific semantic cues that might encourage people to think about morality.     

Incontinence and Perception

The traditional problem of incontinence raises the question of whether there is any way to account for action contrary to judgment. When one acts, rather than only being acted upon by circumstances, the action is explained in terms of the reasons for action one judges oneself to have. It therefore seems impossible to explain action that iscontrary to such judgment. This paper examines the question of how such explanation would be possible. After excluding accounts that either eliminate incontinence or render it inexplicable, I argue that genuine incontinence would require three components: first, a distinction between the types of judgments simultaneously present in the agent; second, the Aristotelian idea that not all of those types of judgments can be directly action-guiding; and third, that the judgments that are action-guiding can be pre-conceptual perceptions. I then use elements of Collingwood's aesthetics to make the case that although such pre-conceptual perceptions would not be propositional judgments and the relationship between them and the behaviors of the agent could not be causal, those behaviors could still qualify as incontinent actions.     

Reactions to Affirmative Action: Substance and Semantics

For both theoretical and practical reasons, researchers have sought to map the motivations that underlie people's support for or opposition to affirmative action. In view of the amount of rhetoric surrounding the issues, it is possible that some of the apparent differences in degrees of support come from differences in how the words affirmative action are interpreted. The present investigation shows that the meanings that people ascribe to affirmative action statistically predict their attitudes toward the policy, even after one accounts for demographic and related attitudinal factors. The implications of our findings are important in both applied and conceptual ways.     

Choice is Not True or False: The Domain of Rhetorical Argumentation

Leading contemporary argumentation theories such as those of Ralph Johnson, van Eemeren and Houtlosser, and Tindale, in their attempt to address rhetoric, tend to define rhetorical argumentation with reference to (a) the rhetorical arguer’s goal (to persuade effectively), and (b) the means he employs to do so. However, a central strand in the rhetorical tradition itself, led by Aristotle, and arguably the dominant view, sees rhetorical argumentation as defined with reference to the domain of issues discussed. On that view, the domain of rhetorical argumentation is centered on choice of action in the civic sphere, and the distinctive nature of issues in this domain is considered crucial. Hence, argumentation theories such as those discussed, insofar as they do not see rhetoric as defined by its distinctive domain, apply an understanding of rhetoric that is historically inadequate. It is further suggested that theories adopting this understanding of rhetoric risk ignoring important distinctive features of argumentation about action.

Predicting Divine Action

This article sets out a formal procedure for determining the probability that God would do a specified action, using our moral knowledge and understanding God as a perfect being. To motivate developing the procedure I show how natural theology – design arguments, the problems of evil and divine hiddenness, and the treatment of miracles and religious experiences as evidence for claims about God – routinely appeals to judgments involving these probabilities. To set out the procedure, I describe a decision-theoretic model for practical reasoning which is deontological so as to appeal to theists, but is designed not to presuppose any substantive moral commitments, and to accommodate normative and non-normative uncertainty. Then I explain how judgments about what we probably ought to do can be transformed into judgments about what God would probably do. Then I show the usefulness of the procedure by describing how it can help structure discussions in natural theology and a-theology, and how it offers an attractive alternative to ‘skeptical theism’.     

When Possibility Informs Reality: Counterfactual Thinking as a Cue to Causality

People often engage in counterfactual thinking, that is, imagining alternatives to the real world and mentally playing out the consequences. Yet the counterfactuals people tend to imagine are a small subset of those that could possibly be imagined. There is some debate as to the relation between counterfactual thinking and causal beliefs. Some researchers argue that counterfactual thinking is the key to causal judgments; current research suggests, however, that the relation is rather complex. When people think about counterfactuals, they focus on ways to prevent bad or uncommon outcomes; when people think about causes, they focus on things that covary with outcomes. Counterfactual thinking may affect causality judgments by changing beliefs about the probabilities of possible alternatives to what actually happened, thereby changing beliefs as to whether a cause and effect actually covary. The way in which counterfactual thinking affects causal attributions may have practical consequences for mental health and the legal system.     

Meeting in the House of Callias: Rhetoric and Dialectic

The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe and compare the original goals and perspectives of both rhetoric and dialectic in theory and in practice. Dialectic is the practice and theory of conversations; rhetoric that of speeches. For theory of dialectic, this paper will turn to Aristotle's Topics and Sophistical Refutations; for theory of rhetoric, to his Rhetoric. Thus it will appear that rhetoric and dialectic are pretty close. Yet, on the other hand, there is a long tradition of mutual antagonism. The paper tries to summarize the common features of, as well as the differences between, the two. To get a taste of both dialectic and rhetoric in practice the reader is invited to enter the House of Callias, as we know it from Plato's Protagoras. After this visit there remains no doubt that rhetoric and dialectic are intertwined on the level of practice. Moreover, we may look forward to their integration on the level of theory.     

On the signals underlying conscious awareness of action

To investigate whether conscious judgments of movement onset are based solely on pre-movement signals (i.e., premotor or efference copy signals) or whether sensory feedback (i.e., reafferent) signals also play a role, participants judged the onset of finger and toe movements that were either active (i.e., self initiated) or passive (i.e., initiated by the experimenter). Conscious judgments were made by reporting the position of a rotating clock hand presented on a computer screen and were then compared to the actual measured time of movement onset. In line with previous studies, judgment errors were found to be anticipatory for both finger and toe movements. There was a significant difference between judgment errors for active and passive movements, with judgments of active movements being more anticipatory than judgments of passive movements. This is consistent with a pre-movement (from here on referred to as an “efferent”) account of action awareness because premotor and efference copy signals are only present in active movements, whereas the main source of movement information in passive movements is sensory feedback which is subject to time delays of conduction (and hence predicts later judgment times for passive movements). However, judgments of active toe movement onset time were less anticipatory than judgments of active finger movement onset time. This pattern of results is not consistent with a pure efferent account of conscious awareness of action onset - as this account predicts more anticipatory judgments for toe movements compared to finger movements. Instead, the data support the idea that conscious judgments of movement onset are based on efferent (i.e., premotor, efference copy) and reafferent (i.e., feedback from the movement) components.