Perspective taking as egocentric anchoring and adjustment

The authors propose that people adopt others' perspectives by serially adjusting from their own. As predicted, estimates of others' perceptions were consistent with one's own but differed in a manner consistent with serial adjustment (Study 1). Participants were slower to indicate that another's perception would be different from--rather than similar to--their own (Study 2). Egocentric biases increased under time pressure (Study 2) and decreased with accuracy incentives (Study 3). Egocentric biases also increased when participants were more inclined to accept plausible values encountered early in the adjustment process than when inclined to reject them (Study 4). Finally, adjustments tend to be insufficient, in part, because people stop adjusting once a plausible estimate is reached (Study 5).     

Egoism and Emotion

Recently, the idea that human beings may be totally egoistic has resurfaced in philosophical and psychological discussions. But many of the arguments for that conclusion are conceptually flawed. Psychologists are making a conceptual error when they think of the desire to avoid guilt as egoistic; and the same is true of the common view that the desire to avoid others’ disapproval is also egoistic. Sober and Wilson argue against this latter idea on the grounds that such a desire is relational, but a deeper reason stems from the fact that it places such intrinsic importance on other human beings. And other basic human desires, like the desire for love, the desire for revenge, the impulse to imitate others, and the desire to belong, also treat others as important and on those grounds cannot count as egoistic. Another line of recent argument for egoism stems from the work of Robert Cialdini et al., and claims that the way we identify and feel one with those other people we empathize with and seek to help shows us to be thinking of those others as part of or identical with ourselves. This is supposed to show that our putative altruism is basically self-centered and egoistic, but Cialdini arguably misinterprets what we mean when we speak of feeling one with someone else, and the phenomena he mentions don’t therefore stand in favor of psychological egoism. More generally, many of the positive and negative emotions we feel toward others are best interpreted as non-egoistic, and there is no reason at this point to doubt that humans are capable of altruistic motivation.     

自动观点采择：内隐心智化与潜心智化的争议

自动观点采择现象已有很多研究证实, 但其产生机制还存在争议。目前存在内隐心智化与潜心智化两种观点：前者认为自动观点采择是自发采择他人视角的领域特殊加工; 而后者提出自动观点采择实质为反射性注意定向、位置的空间编码等领域一般加工, 模拟了心智化在社会环境中的作用。在内隐心智化和潜心智化可独立或共同运行的基础上, 提出了内隐心智化和潜心智化协同作用模型。未来研究应借助先进的技术手段研究多样的被试群体, 探索自动观点采择的作用机制。     

Relational Desires and Empirical Evidence against Psychological Egoism

Abstract: Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person's intentional actions are ultimately self‐interested in some sense; psychological altruism is the thesis that some people's intentional actions are ultimately other‐regarding in some sense. C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists have argued that there are experiments that provide support for a theory called the ‘empathy‐altruism hypothesis’, which entails the falsity of psychological egoism. However, several critics claim that there are egoistic explanations of the data that are still not ruled out. One of the most potent criticisms of Batson comes from Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. I argue for two main theses in this paper: (1) we can improve on Sober and Wilson's conception of psychological egoism and altruism, and (2) this improvement shows that one of the strongest of Sober and Wilson's purportedly egoistic explanations is not tenable. A defense of these two theses goes some way toward defending Batson's claim that the evidence from social psychology provides sufficient reason to reject psychological egoism.     

Influence and adjustment goals: sources of cultural differences in ideal affect

Previous studies have found that in American culture high-arousal positive states (HAP) such as excitement are valued more and low-arousal positive states (LAP) such as calm are valued less than they are in Chinese culture. What specific factors account for these differences? The authors predicted that when people and cultures aimed to influence others (i.e., assert personal needs and change others' behaviors to meet those needs), they would value HAP more and LAP less than when they aimed to adjust to others (i.e., suppress personal needs and change their own behaviors to meet others' needs). They test these predictions in 1 survey and 3 experimental studies. The findings suggest that within and across American and Chinese contexts, differences in ideal affect are due to specific interpersonal goals.     

Social perspective taking and use of discounting in children's perceptions of others' helping behavior

The authors investigated the relationship between children's ability to take the social perspective of another and their use of the causal attribution principle known as discounting in assessing others' kindness in helping. The participants (N = 153), 7 to 16 years old, were interviewed in a township bordering Johannesburg. Each participant was administered 2 perspective-taking tasks and a series of vignettes, based on prosocial versus self-interested motives, assessing perceptions of kindness in helping. A significant relationship was established at p < .01 between social perspective-taking ability and use of discounting, such that participants at higher perspective-taking levels judged helpful behavior as significantly less kind than did their peers when the behavior was motivated by self-interest. This finding is interpreted in terms of literature suggesting that advances in perspective taking facilitate the recognition of the manipulative function of externally offered incentives. Observations are made regarding the cross-cultural investigation of these variables.     

Hegelians Axel Honneth and Robert Williams on the Development of Human Morality

An individual is in the lowest phase of moral development if he thinks only of his own personal interest and has only his own selfish agenda in his mind as he encounters other humans. This lowest phase corresponds well with sixteenth century British moral egoism which reflects the rise of the new economic order. Adam Smith (1723?C1790) wanted to defend this new economic order which is based on economic exchange between egoistic individuals. Nevertheless, he surely did not want to support the moral theory of British egoism. His book The Wealth of Nations suits well into the world view of British moral egoism, but in the book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he presents a moral theory which is the total opposite of moral egoism. Contemporary German intellectuals saw contradiction in Adam Smith??s moral (social) philosophy which they called as Das Adam-Smith-Problem. Smith himself didn??t think that there is any contradiction in a situation where in economic sphere (civil society) individual act egoistically and in ethical sphere (encounter with the imagined Other) he feels humanity and compassion toward his fellow men. Hegel was a passionate reader of Adam Smith and he acknowledged Das Adam-Smith-Problem. He set the task of his social philosophy to overcome this paradox. He wanted to create a theory of a social totality where economic egoism and feelings of humanity are not in contradiction. In the same time Hegel wanted to create a theory on Bildung process where human spirit develops from moral un-freedom (heteronomy) to moral freedom and maturity (autonomy) taking care both aspect of love and reason. In certain Hegel??s texts notion of recognition plays crucial role. That is why modern Hegelians Ludwig Siep, Axel Honneth and Robert Williams consider the notion of recognition to be elementary in Hegel??s threefold theory of developing human spirit from family via civil society to sittliche state. For Hegel family is a sphere where people love their ??concrete other?? and where feeling surpasses reason. Civil Society is a sphere of private contracts and economic exchanges where cold egoistic and calculative reason surpasses feelings. In the sphere of State the contradiction between family and Civil Society (Das Adam-Smith-Problem) is solved by ??rational feeling??. According to Hegel State should protect citizens from alienating effect of egoistic reason of Civil Society and cultivate ??family-feelings?? to rational feelings which integrate citizen into ??sittliche community?? through reciprocal process of recognition. In this article I want to consider Hegelians Honneth??s and Williams??s relevance to the theory of moral development.     

A matter of perspective: why past moral behavior can sometimes encourage and other times discourage future moral striving

In this paper, we investigate the role of different perspectives people take on their past moral and nonmoral behavior. Across two experiments, we show that when people focus on progress toward personal goals, past moral behavior leads to less future moral striving compared to past nonmoral behavior. However, when people focus on commitment toward personal goals, past moral behavior tends to lead to more future moral striving compared to past nonmoral behavior. Our results integrate seemingly contradictive empirical evidence from past research, relying on the overarching theoretical framework of goal regulation theory.     

Power and perspectives not taken

Four experiments and a correlational study explored the relationship between power and perspective taking. In Experiment 1, participants primed with high power were more likely than those primed with low power to draw an E on their forehead in a self-oriented direction, demonstrating less of an inclination to spontaneously adopt another person's visual perspective. In Experiments 2a and 2b, high-power participants were less likely than low-power participants to take into account that other people did not possess their privileged knowledge, a result suggesting that power leads individuals to anchor too heavily on their own vantage point, insufficiently adjusting to others' perspectives. In Experiment 3, high-power participants were less accurate than control participants in determining other people's emotion expressions; these results suggest a power-induced impediment to experiencing empathy. An additional study found a negative relationship between individual difference measures of power and perspective taking. Across these studies, power was associated with a reduced tendency to comprehend how other people see, think, and feel.     

Tie my hands, tie my eyes

Previous studies have demonstrated that motor abilities allow us not only to execute our own actions and to predict their consequences, but also to predict others' actions and their consequences. But just how deeply are motor abilities implicated in action observation? If an observer is prevented from acting while witnessing others' actions, will this impact on their making sense of others' behavior? We recorded proactive eye movements while participants observed an actor grasping objects. The participants' hands were either freely resting on the table or tied behind their back. Proactivity of gaze behavior was dramatically impaired when participants observed others' actions with their hands tied. Since we don't literally perceive actions with our hands, the effect may be explained by the hypothesis that effective observation of action depends not only on motor abilities but on being in a position to exercise them. This suggests, for the first time, that actions are observed best when we are actually in the position to perform them.     

Desire in the face of death: Terror management,attachment, and sexual motivation

Four studies examined the impact of mortality salience (MS) on sexual motivation. In Studies 1–3, participants were primed with death‐related thoughts and then rated their desire to engage in sex in different contexts. Study 4 included an assessment of reasons for engaging in sex. Results showed that MS increased the desire for romantic sex, regardless of gender, and the desire for casual sex among more avoidant men. Sexual desire was fueled by distinct patterns of motives among highly anxious and avoidant people. These findings suggest that the variety of meanings sexual behavior has for different people may explain why, in some cases, sexual behavior may function as a defense against mortality concerns, whereas in other cases, it may exacerbate threat.     

Framing and Risky Choice as Influenced by Comparison of One's Achievements with Others: The Case of Investment in the Stock Exchange

Based on social comparison theory and equity theory, the first aim of this study was to examine the hypothesis that framing is affected not only by previous success or failure, but also by comparisons with relevant others' outcomes as well. The second aim of the study was to examine prospect theory propositions that people are risk aversive for gains and risk seeking for losses. A total of 220 students were administered scenarios that described outcomes of their stock investments (gains or losses). In addition, they were provided with information about their close friends' outcomes investing in similar stocks. Generally, the hypothesis regarding the influence of others' outcomes on framing was confirmed. However, results showed that, in contradiction to prospect theory, gain framing rather than loss framing was related to risk seeking behavior. Specifically, in the gain framing situation, the readiness to take risks was highest when the others' outcomes were equal to those of the participants. The limitations of prospect theory are discussed.     

权力和地位对自利行为的影响及其机制

权力和地位对自利行为的影响不同。权力能够降低认知性观点采择水平,进而使个体更加关注自身利益;地位能够提升认知性观点采择水平,进而使个体推测他人思想与感受,考虑他人利益。然而,权力和地位通过认知性观点采择对自利行为的影响可能受到情境性质的调节。今后的研究应该对这些关系和解释进行验证,探索共情性关心的中介作用,以及权力和地位影响认知性观点采择的调节变量;探究权力和地位拥有者对群体内、外他人的自利行为差异;探讨权力和地位的交互作用对自利行为的影响。     

The Psychology of Future-Oriented Thinking: From Achievement to Proactive Coping,Adaptation, and Aging

Contributions to this special issue examine multiple aspects of how people think about and prepare for desired and undesired future outcomes, including the processes that link thoughts about one's present situation to possible future outcomes and those that promote the balanced pursuit of long-term vs. short-term goals. They also identify new distinctions among widely studied future-oriented thoughts and feelings (e.g., optimism versus hope). Several contributions examine proactive efforts to prevent adverse effects or reduce their impact in such challenging contexts as being discriminated against, aging and becoming disabled, preparing for potential disasters, or coping with terrorist attacks. Two final contributions examine the implications of temporal factors for advance decision-making in medicine and business. This introductory article highlights the central issues addressed by the contributions and discusses ways in which studying future-oriented thoughts, feelings, and behavior in the contexts of stress and lifespan development may extend our understanding of future-oriented phenomena beyond the achievement domain.     

Vicarious moral licensing: the influence of others' past moral actions on moral behavior

This article investigates the effect of others' prior nonprejudiced behavior on an individual's subsequent behavior. Five studies supported the hypothesis that people are more willing to express prejudiced attitudes when their group members' past behavior has established nonprejudiced credentials. Study 1a showed that participants who were told that their group was more moral than similar other groups were more willing to describe a job as better suited for Whites than for African Americans. In Study 1b, when given information on group members' prior nondiscriminatory behavior (selecting a Hispanic applicant in a prior task), participants subsequently gave more discriminatory ratings to the Hispanic applicant for a position stereotypically suited for majority members (Whites). In Study 2, moral self-concept mediated the effect of others' prior nonprejudiced actions on a participant's subsequent prejudiced behavior such that others' past nonprejudiced actions enhanced the participant's moral self-concept, and this inflated moral self-concept subsequently drove the participant's prejudiced ratings of a Hispanic applicant. In Study 3, the moderating role of identification with the credentialing group was tested. Results showed that participants expressed more prejudiced attitudes toward a Hispanic applicant when they highly identified with the group members behaving in nonprejudiced manner. In Study 4, the credentialing task was dissociated from the participants' own judgmental task, and, in addition, identification with the credentialing group was manipulated rather than measured. Consistent with prior studies, the results showed that participants who first had the opportunity to view an in-group member's nonprejudiced hiring decision were more likely to reject an African American man for a job stereotypically suited for majority members. These studies suggest a vicarious moral licensing effect.     

The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism

Eudaimonists deny that eudaimonism is objectionably egoistic, but the way in which they do so commits them to eschewing an important insight that has been a central motivation for eudaimonism: the idea that an individual must, in the end, organize her life in such a way that it is good for her. In this paper I argue that the egoism objection prods eudaimonists to make a choice between (what we might roughly call) welfare‐prior and excellence‐prior eudaimonism, and I make some preliminary remarks on behalf of welfare‐prior eudaimonism.     

视觉观点采择中自我中心性偏差的抑制和归因之争

自我中心性偏差是社交失败的重要原因,但其产生机制还存在争议。以往研究存在抑制性选择模型与流利性错误归因两种理论观点:前者认为对自身观点的抑制失败会导致自我中心性偏差;后者则认为错误地选择自身更为流畅的信息会导致自我中心性偏差。为整合上述争论,提出抑制-归因协同作用模型,认为抑制和归因两种加工或可共同导致自我中心性偏差。未来研究应借助精巧的研究范式和特殊被试群体,进一步验证该模型。     

Aquinas and modern consequentialism

Because the moral philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas is egoistic while modern consequentialism is impartialistic, it might at first appear that the former cannot, while the latter can, provide a common value on the basis of which inter‐personal conflicts may be settled morally. On the contrary, in this paper I intend to argue not only that Aquinas’ theory does provide just such a common value, but that it is more true to say of modern consequentialism than of Thomism that it gives in to the partiality of different interests and fails to provide a robust common value on the basis of which disagreements may be settled morally. This is so primarily because the egoism of Aquinas represents a fundamental commitment to personal moral development which is absent from modern teleological theories.     

The Illusion-of-Transparency and Episodic Memory: Are People Egocentric or Do People Think that Lies are Easy to Detect?

The illusion-of-transparency seems like an egocentric bias, in which people believe that their inner feelings, thoughts and perspectives are more apparent to others than they actually are. In Experiment 1, participants read out true and false episodic memories to an audience. Participants over-estimated the number of people who would think that they were the liar, and they overestimated how many would correctly identify the liar. Experiment 2 found that with lessened task demands, and by using a scale of doubt, participants distinguished lies from truthful statements (albeit with a degree of error). Over the two experiments, results indicated that people have some ability to distinguish lies from truth (in illusion-of-transparency tasks), although people often overestimate this ability, and participants sometimes think their own lies are easier to detect than is really the case.     

Situational Determinants of the Acceptability of Telling Lies1

It was tested whether the same factors people take into account when involved in the decision to lie apply to the evaluation of lies presented in scenarios. The scenarios represented 12 different situation categories formed by the crossing of the motive for lying (social. individualistic, egoistic), the relative importance of the situation (important matter, unimportant matter), and the closeness of the relation between the subject and the receiver of the lie (best friend, acquaintance). The acceptability of lying was evaluated from 2 perspectives (self, others) by 180 women of the general public. The results show that as the interest of the person that is lied to becomes greater, lying becomes more acceptable. As the interest of the liar becomes greater, lying becomes less acceptable. The systematically higher estimations of acceptability attributed to others indicate a false-uniqueness effect.