The Interpenetration of Culture and Biology in Human Development

The central argument of this article is that human development should be viewed as the product of the interpenetration1 of cultural and biological processes. Using developmental system theory, it is argued that our work as investigators of human development is to examine this mutual coregulation: how biology and culture interpenetrate over time in concert with developmental processes. Various findings from developmental research are used to provide evidence on (a) how our biology constrains, gives expression to, mediates, or moderates how culture operates on developmental processes and (b) how culture infiltrates and becomes part of our biology and basic developmental processes. Examples of advances in neuroscience are also used to illustrate this interpenetration and to argue for the pervasiveness of cultural influences on development. To conduct the necessary research, new methodologies are needed. Promise is seen in emerging areas of social cognitive neuroscience.     

Gene Concepts and Genethics: Beyond Exceptionalism

The discursive explosion that was provoked by the new genetics could support the impression that the ethical and social problems posed by the new genetics are somehow exceptional in their very nature. According to this view we are faced with special ethical and social problems that create a challenge so fundamental that the special label of genethics is needless to justify. The historical account regarding the evolution of the gene concepts could serve us to highlight the limits of what we know about genes and what we can do with genes. The widespread notion about the exceptionality of genetic knowledge and its applicative possibilities is hardly justifiable and leads to misunderstandings regarding the conceptualization of the ethical and social problems we might face. Following a more realistic interpretation of the role of genes in human life we might avoid a whole set of fictive dilemmas and counterproductive regulatory efforts in bioethics. Bioethical discourse should move from the gene-centered scientific discourse toward the more sophisticated and complex discourses where human development represented as a matter of complex interactions between genomes and environments, between genes, educational factors, nutritional regimes, and other different developmental resources. If a gene is seen as one among the different developmental resources that are shaping a given human trait then both genethics and genetic exceptionalism could hardly be represented as a justified approach in discussing the ethical and social problems of genetics.     

The bioethical structure of a human being

Bioethical debates such as those surrounding the manipulation of human embryos are often based on metaphysical assumptions that lack a foundation in the natural sciences. In this paper we support a gradualist position whereby the embryo progressively takes on the form and associated ethical significance of a human being. We support this position by introducing a concept of biological structure or form to show how the gradualist position has its metaphysical foundations in modern biology. The conceptual basis for form and structure are outlined and their compatibility with and basis in current empirical biology is demonstrated by some recent advances in our understanding of the processes of development from single cell to organism. We then briefly explore the ethical significance of accepting a form or structure based conception of biology for the status of the early embryo.     

Taking old ideas seriously: Evolution, development, and human behavior

I argue that the roots of an adequate integration of evolution into psychology are not to be found in evolutionary psychology, but rather in evolutionary developmental biology (evo–devo). To this end, I provide an overview of evo–devo and explore the limited role that behavioral sciences have played in its genesis. I then motivate an evo–devo approach to psychobiology, and sketch desiderata for the success of this enterprise. In particular, I elucidate what it means to take both development and evolution seriously, and argue for the primacy of developmental analysis in the exploration of (human) behavior and its evolution.     

The relations between neuroscience and human behavioral science.

Neuroscience seeks to understand how the human brain, perhaps the most complex electrochemical machine in the universe, works, in terms of molecules, membranes, cells and cell assemblies, development, plasticity, learning, memory, cognition, and behavior. The human behavioral sciences, in particular psychiatry and clinical psychology, deal with disorders of human behavior and mentation. The gap between neuroscience and the human behavioral sciences is still large. However, some major advances in neuroscience over the last two decades have diminished the span. This article reviews the major advances of neuroscience in six areas with relevance to the behavioral sciences: (a) evolution of the nervous system; (b) visualizing activity in the human brain; (c) plasticity of the cerebral cortex; (d) receptors, ion channels, and second/third messengers; (e) molecular genetic approaches; and (f) understanding integrative systems with networks and circadian clocks as examples.     

BIOLOGY AND THE THEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN

We will consider two Christian responses to the enormous advances in recent years in the connected sciences of genetics, evolutionary biology, and biochemistry, a dualist one by Pope John Paul II and an “emergentist” one by Arthur Peacocke. These two could hardly be more different. It would be impossible within the scope of a brief comment to do justice to these differences. What I hope to do instead is more modest: to draw attention to troublesome ambiguities in some of the key concepts on which discussions of human uniqueness depend, to recall very briefly some of the difficulties philosophers have encountered in their attempts to define the relation of the human powers of mind to the material capacities of body, and finally to ask what the theological significance of all this is.     

Individuals and populations: How biology's theory and data have interfered with the integration of development and evolution

Research programs in quantitative behavior genetics and evolutionary psychology have contributed to the widespread belief that some psychological characteristics can be “inherited” via genetic mechanisms. In fact, molecular and developmental biologists have concluded that while genetic factors contribute to the development of all of our traits, non-genetic factors always do too, and in ways that make them no less important than genetic factors. This insight demands a reworking of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, a theory that defined evolution as a process involving changes in the frequencies of genes in populations, and that envisioned no role for experiential factors now known to play essential roles in adaptive trait development. Furthermore, since evolution has been taken to be strictly a population-level phenomenon while development affects individuals, the two have been understood to require different levels of analysis; this understanding has given rise to incompatible research programs. This state of affairs is untenable because development and evolution mutually influence one another in fundamental ways, several of which are detailed in this article. The balance of this paper considers the conceptual problem that has arisen because understandings generated by developmental scientists cannot be enhanced by studies designed merely to account for variation across populations. Because the theoretical conceptions and methodological tools used to study development and evolution have produced non-corresponding sets of information about these closely related and mutually influential biological processes, these conceptions and tools are interfering with the establishment of a unified theory of biology that encompasses both phenomena.     

A post-genomic view of behavioral development and adaptation to the environment

Recent advances in molecular genetics and epigenetics are reviewed that have major implications for the bio-behavioral sciences and for understanding how organisms adapt to their environments at both phylogenetic and ontogenic levels. From a post-genomics perspective, the environment is as crucial as the DNA sequence for constructing the phenotype, and as a source of information in trying to predict phenotypes. The review is organized with respect to four basic processes by which phenotypes adapt to environmental challenges, with an emphasis on the data for humans: (1) developmental plasticity, (2) epigenetic mechanisms, (3) genotype-environment correlations, and (4) gene × environment interactions.     

Probabilistic epigenesis

The notion that phenotypic traits, including behavior, can be predetermined has slowly given way in biology and psychology over the last two decades. This shift in thinking is due in large part to the growing evidence for the fundamental role of developmental processes in the generation of the stability and variations in phenotype that researchers in developmental and evolutionary sciences seek to understand. Here I review the tenets of a metatheoretical model of development called probabilistic epigenesis (PE) and explore its implications for furthering our understanding of developmental and evolutionary processes. The PE framework emphasizes the reciprocity of influences within and between levels of an organism's developmental manifold (genetic activity, neural activity, behavior, and the physical, social, and cultural influences of the external environment) and the ubiquity of gene-environment interaction in the realization of all phenotypes.     

Synaptogenesis and heritable aspects of executive attention

In humans, changes in brain structure and function can be measured non-invasively during postnatal development. In animals, advanced optical imaging measures can track the formation of synapses during learning and behavior. With the recent progress in these technologies, it is appropriate to begin to assess how the physiological processes of synapse, circuit, and neural network formation relate to the process of cognitive development. Of particular interest is the development of executive function, which develops more gradually in humans. One approach that has shown promise is molecular genetics. The completion of the human genome project and the human genome diversity project make it straightforward to ask whether variation in a particular gene correlates with variation in behavior, brain structure, brain activity, or all of the above. Strategies that unify the wealth of biochemical knowledge pertaining to synapse formation with the functional measures of brain structure and activity may lead to new insights in developmental cognitive psychology.     

Upon Further Reflection: View from the Other Side of “Windows on the 21st Century”

Three points discussed in Glenn (1993) are reviewed in the context of current events: the discipline of behavior analysis as a cultural system, the importance of that discipline in the training and regulation of behavior analytic practitioners, and Association for Behavior Analysis International (ABAI) as a cultural subsystem that links to all the other parts and therefore links the other parts to one another. Noting similarities between behavior analysis and biology, I consider the growth of biological sciences as a model for behavior analysis. Of particular importance for biology has been the role of basic biological sciences in the practice of medicine and the resulting feedback loops that have developed among its basic sciences, applied sciences, and medical practice. I suggest that behavior analysis explicitly follow this model and that ABAI has a critical role to play in leading the field to developing the feedback loops that have integrated the biological sciences and medicine.     

Tools from evolutionary biology shed new light on the diversification of languages

Computational methods have revolutionized evolutionary biology. In this paper we explore the impact these methods are now having on our understanding of the forces that both affect the diversification of human languages and shape human cognition. We show how these methods can illuminate problems ranging from the nature of constraints on linguistic variation to the role that social processes play in determining the rate of linguistic change. Throughout the paper we argue that the cognitive sciences should move away from an idealized model of human cognition, to a more biologically realistic model where variation is central.     

Sensitivity and specificity in affective and social learning in adolescence

Adolescence is a period of heightened affective and social sensitivity. In this review we address how this increased sensitivity influences associative learning. Based on recent evidence from human and rodent studies, as well as advances in computational biology, we suggest that, compared to other age groups, adolescents show features of heightened Pavlovian learning but tend to perform worse than adults at instrumental learning. Because Pavlovian learning does not involve decision-making, whereas instrumental learning does, we propose that these developmental differences might be due to heightened sensitivity to rewards and threats in adolescence, coupled with a lower specificity of responding. We discuss the implications of these findings for adolescent mental health and education.     

Broadening Political Psychology

One hundred years ago, if we proposed that we could make you happy with a pill, we would have been ridiculed and would have entered the realm of science fiction and not science itself. Yet that is precisely where we are today. The genetics and neurobiological revolution is upon us, and we advocate that political psychology not simply join this revolution but take a lead role in it. Here in this review, we explore the various ways in which political psychology can embrace this revolution and incorporate work in neuropsychology, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, endocrinology, and recent advances in genetics. In doing so, we advocate the adoption of an epidemiological approach and discuss the ways in which various methods including physiological experimentation, genetic analysis, and neurological explorations including MRIs and other technical advances provide critical insight into human behavior and present intriguing possibilities for exploring the nature of political attitudes, attachments, and behaviors. In advocating for broadening the approaches used in the field, we reflect critically on how we might improve and strengthen the accuracy of our understanding of the psychological bases of political preferences and behavior in the future.     

An Interactionist Perspective on Genetic and Environmental Contributions to Personality

It is now well established that nature and nurture are both important contributors to variation in human personality. As a result, the field of personality behavior genetics is moving beyond simply estimating the magnitude of genetic and environmental influences on various personality constructs. Recent methodological advances provide for the study of how these different sources of influence interact in the development of personality. Specifically, newer biometrical moderation models allow for group‐specific estimates of heritability and environmental influences on personality (a form of gene–environment interaction). In the current paper, we review selected recent research using these models. Furthermore, we explore how moderation might also be important in understanding links between specific genes and personality. Accounting for the contingencies between genes and environment will be an important catalyst for the molecular genetic study of personality, as unmoderated ‘main effect’ types of gene → personality associations have been elusive.     

Identification: psychoanalytic and biological perspectives

In recent attempts to bring psychoanalysis into greater contact with other sciences, a number of works have explicated neural science concepts and phenomena--affect, memory, consciousness--for the psychoanalyst. These efforts have helped analysts build a more scientific foundation for their theory and practice. A related task remains--namely, to take psychoanalytic concepts and see how they relate to other sciences. The concept of identification has a long history in psychoanalytic theory. It is seen in parent-child interactions, in teaching and mentoring relationships, and in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Neuropsychology and evolutionary biology have explored the phylogenetic precursors of identification, while genetics and infant observation provide insights into individual processes of identification. Finally, neuroscience, particularly recent studies of mirror neurons, offers information about the biological mechanisms of imitation and the relationship of imitation to identification. Findings from these sciences are presented in an effort to further the psychoanalytic understanding of identification, especially its biological underpinnings.     

Why Social Science is Biological Science

The social sciences need to take seriously their status as divisions of biology. As such they need to recognize the central role of Darwinian processes in all the phenomena they seek to explain. An argument for this claim is formulated in terms of a small number of relatively precise premises that focus on the nature of the kinds and taxonomies of all the social sciences. The analytical taxonomies of all the social sciences are shown to require a Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a nativist or genetically driven theory by any means. Non-genetic Darwinian processes have the fundamental role on all human affairs. I expound a general account of how Darwinian processes operate in human affairs by selecting for strategies and sets of strategies individuals and groups employ. I conclude by showing how a great deal of social science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology, and in particular the studies of one particular biological species.     

Socio-cultural selection and the sculpting of the human genome: Cultures’ directional forces on evolution and development

This paper argues for culture as a significant determinant of the modern human genome. As progress in the fields of genetics and evolutionary biology have gained greater insights into evolutionary process, aspects of classical proposals explaining how phenotypic responses to environmental experience could make their way into the genotype have returned in new guises. Recent proposals recognize environmental context as a key source of genetic variation by directly altering selection pressures to mask and unmask adaptive value of expressed traits, by reorganizing the combination and expression of genes during ontogeny to provide novel variants for selection, and by influencing developmental trajectories through epigenetic systems acutely sensitive to ontogenetic contexts. The emergence of a robust human socio-cultural niche, shielding humans from more proximate evolutionary pressures that marked our ancestral evolution, has arguably provided the strongest directive force on modern human evolution. Language is discussed as an exemplar of a cultural niche with a powerful self-organizing dynamic and the potential to dramatically alter the human genome.     

Transforming Better Babies into Fitter Families: archival resources and the history of American eugenics movement, 1908-1930

In the early 1920s, determinist conceptions of biology helped to transform Better Babies contest into Fitter Families competitions with a strong commitment to controlled human breeding. While the earlier competitions were concerned for physical and mental standards, the latter contests collected data on a broad range of presumed hereditary characters. The complex behaviors thought to be determined by one's heredity included being generous, jealous, and cruel. In today's context, the popular media often interpret advances in molecular genetics in a similarly reductive and determinist fashion. This paper argues that such a narrow interpretation of contemporary biology unnecessarily constrains the public in developing social policies concerning complex social behavior ranging from crime to intelligence.