A software tool for auditory and speech perception experimentation

A computer program capable of supporting auditory and speech perception experimentation is described. Given a continuum of acoustic stimuli, the program (Paradigm) allows the user to present those stimuli under different, well-known psychophysical paradigms (simple identification, identification with a rating scale, 2IAX, ABX, AXB, and oddity task). For discrimination tests, both high uncertainty (roving designs) and minimal psychophysical uncertainty (fixed designs) procedures are available. All the relevant time intervals can be precisely specified, and feedback is also available. Response times can be measured as well. Furthermore, the program stores subjects’ responses and provides summaries of experimental results for both individual subjects and groups. The program runs on Microsoft Windows (3.1 or 95) on personal computers equipped with any soundboard.     

Ambiguity and structural information in the perception of reversible figures

The perspective reversals elicited by a set of drawings based on the Mach truncated pyramid are examined. We obtained each pattern of the set from the previous one by adding to it some graphic cues, which were easily integrated into one of the two competing interpretations, thus reducing step by step the ambiguity of the basic pattern. The phenomenological model, proposed to link the mean times of both alternative interpretations with their complexities, is in close agreement with our experimental data. Furthermore, different aspects of such data are well described by the model equations: The measure of the prevalence of the supported interpretation is well correlated with the difference in complexity between the two alternative interpretations; the two different trends of the mean time of the unfavored interpretation, found in the data obtained from different observers as a function of the various patterns of the set, are well fitted by the model without the need for any specific additional hypothesis.     

Laboratory experimentation and social field experimentation: An ambiguous distinction

Critical and epistemological reflections on the use of experimental methods in social psychology are often made to distinguish between two types of settings where these methods are used: The laboratory and the social field. But it is by no means certain that such a division has, from the start and at its own level, real significance: for one thing, because in social psychology, laboratory work is probably never merely laboratory work; and for another, because an analysis of what happens in practice would show that much experimental research work carried out in the social field merely transfers into that setting tools, concepts and a theoretical intention derived from the laboratory. If that is so, it follows that it is not at its own level that the laboratory-social field distinction has a heuristic and epistemological significance, nor is that the real location of the breaking-point between the methodologies. Perhaps the real ‘dividing’ line is one which separates experimental work which, whether in the laboratory or in the social field, concentrates on social interactions which are miniaturized or able to be so, from work which, in the social field, aims to concentrcte on processes which cannot be simulated or miniaturized without becoming distorted and seeks to reach social systems which are relatively complete and essentially intact.     

Ambiguity and rationality

Recently, several theories of decision making and probability judgment have been proposed that take into account ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). However, none of these theories explains exactly what the psychological causes of ambiguity are or addresses the issue of whether ambiguity effects are rational. In this paper, we define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a prediction. We show how this definition can explain why ambiguity affects decisions in the ways it does. We argue that there are a variety of rational reasons ambiguity affects probability judgments and choices in the ways it does. However, we argue that the ambiguity effect does not cast doubt on the claim that utility theory is a standard of rational choice. Rather, we suggest that the effect of ambiguity on decisions highlights the fact that utility theory, like any normative model of decision making only prescribes the optimal decision, given what one knows.     

Ambiguity and explanation

This paper presents evidence that ‘because’ is importantly ambiguous between two closely related senses covering what are usually called causal explanations, on the one hand, and grounding or metaphysical explanations, on the other hand. To this end, it introduces the lexical categories of monosemy, polysemy and homonymy; describes a test for polysemy; and discusses the results of the test when applied to ‘because’. It also shows how to understand so-called hybrid explanations in light of the semantic facts established by the analysis.     

On boredom and experimentation in humans

This article discusses the ethical and methodological issues associated with boredom experienced by human participants during psychological experiments. Ways are suggested in which informed consent, briefing, and debriefing can be used to prevent or remedy boredom induced during experiments. We address methodological and ethical concerns, and we discuss the advantages of the proposed approach for experimenters' practice and training of undergraduate students. Future directions for much needed research on these topics are also emphasized.     

Animal experimentation

Millions of animals are used every year in oftentimes extremely painful and distressing scientific procedures. Legislation of animal experimentation in modern societies is based on the supposition that this is ethically acceptable when certain more or less defined formal (e.g. logistical, technical) demands and ethical principles are met. The main parameters in this context correspond to the “3Rs” concept as defined by Russel and Burch in 1959, i.e. that all efforts to replace, reduce and refine experiments must be undertaken. The licensing of animal experiments normally requires an ethical evaluation process, oftentimes undertaken by ethics committees. The serious problems in putting this idea into practice include inter alia unclear conditions and standards for ethical decisions, insufficient management of experiments undertaken for specific (e.g. regulatory) purposes, and conflicts of interest of ethics committees’ members. There is an ongoing societal debate about ethical issues of animal use in science. Existing EU legislation on animal experimentation for cosmetics testing is an example of both the public will for setting clear limits to animal experiments and the need to further critically examine other fields and aspects of animal experimentation. This paper was presented at the 6th International Bioethics Conference on the subject of ‘The Responsible Conduct of Basic and Clinical Research’, held in Warsaw, Poland, 3–4 June 2005. The paper has been expanded from an article to be published in the forthcoming Council of Europe publication entitled “Animal Protection and Welfare”.     

Painless computer-controlled experimentation

More Es might employ computers to control psychological experiments if computer languages suitable for experimental control were easier to learn. In fact, course author languages intended for writing instructional sequences offer many facilities desirable for experimental control. A particular language, CAN-4, is examined for its suitability, and its use in a concept learning experiment is illustrated.     

Ambiguity in pictorial depth

Pictorial space is the 3-D impression that one obtains when looking 'into' a 2-D picture. One is aware of 3-D 'opaque' objects. 'Pictorial reliefs' are the surfaces of such pictorial objects in 'pictorial space'. Photographs (or any pictures) do in no way fully specify physical scenes. Rather, any photograph is compatible with an infinite number of possible scenes that may be called 'metameric scenes'. If pictorial relief is one of these metameric scenes, the response may be considered 'veridical'. The conventional usage is more restrictive and is indeed inconsistent. Thus the observer has much freedom in arriving at such a 'veridical' response. To address this ambiguity, we determined the pictorial reliefs for eight observers, six pictures, and two psychophysical methods. We used 'methods of cross-sections' to operationalise pictorial reliefs. We find that linear regression of the depths of relief at corresponding locations in the picture for different observers often lead to very low (even insignificant) R2s. Thus the responses are idiosyncratic to a large degree. Perhaps surprisingly, we also observed that multiple regression of depth and picture coordinates at corresponding locations often lead to very high R2s. Often R2s increased from insignificant up to almost 1. Apparently, to a large extent 'depth' is irrelevant as a psychophysical variable, in the sense that it does not uniquely account for the relation of the response to the pictorial structure. This clearly runs counter to the bulk of the literature on pictorial 'depth perception'. The invariant core of interindividual perception proves to be of an 'affine' rather than a Euclidean nature; that is to say, 'pictorial space' is not simply the picture plane augmented with a depth dimension.     

Ethical Ambiguity in Science

Drawing on 171 in-depth interviews with physicists at universities in the United States and the UK, this study examines the narratives of 48 physicists to explain the concept of ethical ambiguity: the border where legitimate and illegitimate conduct is blurred. Researchers generally assume that scientists agree on what constitutes both egregious and more routine forms of misconduct in science. The results of this study show that scientists perceive many scenarios as ethically gray, rather than black and white. Three orientations to ethical ambiguity are considered—altruism, inconsequential outcomes, and preserving the status quo—that allow possibly questionable behavior to persist unchallenged. Each discursive strategy is rationalized as promoting the collective interest of science rather than addressing what is ethically correct or incorrect. The results of this study suggest that ethics training in science should focus not only on fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism and more routine forms of misconduct, but also on strategies for resolving ethically ambiguous scenarios where appropriate action may not be clear.     

Ambiguity in sentence processing

As listeners and readers, we rarely notice the ambiguities that pervade our everyday language. When we hear the proverb `Time flies like an arrow' we might ponder its meaning, but not the fact that there are almost 100 grammatically permissible interpretations of this short sentence. On occasion, however, we do notice sentential ambiguity: headlines, such as `Two Sisters Reunited After 18 Years in Checkout Counter', are amusing because they so consistently lead to the unintended interpretation (presumably, the sisters did not spend 18 years at the checkout). It is this consistent preference for one interpretation-and one grammatical structure-rather than another that has fuelled research into sentence processing for more than 20 years. Until relatively recently, the dominant belief had been that these preferences arise from general principles that underlie our use of grammar, with certain grammatical constructions being preferred over others. There has now accrued, however, a considerable body of evidence demonstrating that these preferences are not absolute, but can change in particular circumstances. With this evidence have come new theories of sentence processing, some of which, at first glance, radically question the standard notions of linguistic representation, grammar and understanding.     

Ambiguity and gratuitous concurrence in inter-cultural communication

A: Excuse me, but we're just trying to find the right bus that takes us to the boat for Upolu. We were told that it stops here in front of the village store, but we've been waiting since 9 o'clock this morning and we'd like to know if there is going to be a bus before this evening or if we'll have to wait until tomorrow for a bus. I: Yes.