The role of social cognition in early trust

Language serves as a means of learning from other people. However, communication systems allow the truth to be disguised, whether out of ignorance, fear, deviousness or mistaken judgment. Recent research has explored the extent to which young children are selective in whom they trust for information and the mechanisms that support such selectivity.     

The role of social cognition models in predicting attendance at health checks

Abstract

The present study sought to apply the Health Belief Model and the Theory of Planned Behaviour to the prediction of attendance at health checks. In addition, the way in which patients were invited to the health checks and the effect this had on both the uptake of the service and the role of cognitive factors in predicting attendance was analysed. Based in a single general practice, 818 patients were either sent an invitation letter which included an appointment time or they were sent an open invitation to contact the practice to make their own appointment time. Prior to the commencement of the programme health belief questionnaires were sent to patients. The results of the study firstly showed that letters offering patients an appointment produced a much higher attendance rate (70%) than letters containing an open invitation (37%). Secondly, through stepwise discriminant function analyses, the predictors of attendance behaviour were found to vary according to how patients were invited. For patients sent an appointment, attenders were found to be more likely than non-attenders to place a high value on their health, to believe that their health is influenced by powerful others, that certain referent groups would advise them to attend, that attending would lead to positive outcomes and that motivational barriers would not prevent them from attending. For patients sent an open invitation, intention to attend and perceived control were found to be independent predictors of attendance behaviour. These results suggest that attendance at health checks may not be a homogeneous behaviour such that the beliefs which distinguish attenders and non-attenders may be seen to vary according to the way in which the service is offered.     

The mismeasure of ape social cognition

Animal Cognition - In his classic analysis, Gould (The mismeasure of man, WW Norton, New York, 1981) demolished the idea that intelligence was an inherent, genetic trait of different human groups...     

On the role of social interaction in social cognition: a mechanistic alternative to enactivism

Researchers in the enactivist tradition have recently argued that social interaction can constitute social cognition, rather than simply serve as the context for social cognition. They contend that a focus on social interaction corrects the overemphasis on mechanisms inside the individual in the explanation of social cognition. I critically assess enactivism??s claims about the explanatory role of social interaction in social cognition. After sketching the enactivist approach to cognition in general and social cognition in particular, I identify problems with an enactivist taxonomy of roles for social interaction in the explanation of social cognition (contextual, enabling, and constitutive). In particular, I show that this enactivist taxonomy does not clearly distinguish between enabling conditions and constitutive elements, which would make them in danger of committing the coupling-constitution fallacy found in some attempts to extend cognition. I explore resources enactivism has to more clearly demarcate constitutive parts of a cognitive system, but identify problems in applying them to some of the main cases of social cognition enactivists characterize as being constituted by social interaction. I offer the mechanistic approach to explanation as an alternative that captures much of what enactivists want to say about the relations between social and individual levels, but views social interactions from the perspective of embedded cognition rather than as being constitutive of social cognition.     

Interaction of emotion and cognition in word recall

Summary Previous research has demonstrated that the emotional properties of words and their imaginability affect their recallability and that verbal material is recalled better when it is related to subjects' current concerns. This study investigates the extent to which this effect of emotion on recall varies as a function of cognitively controllable inference processes and examines the relation of the effects of emotion to those of imaginability and concern-relatedness. Forty different words were presented visually under one of six orienting conditions that varied according to what the subject was asked to rate: their length, pronounceability, concreteness, defineability, the strength of emotion elicited by the word, and the relation of the word to personal concerns. Subjects were then asked to write as many words as they could recall. Words that aroused stronger emotion and were easier to represent in imagery were recalled better than emotionally less arousing and imaginally less evocative words, regardless of the nature of the orienting task. The evidence suggests that the emotional properties of words are evaluated automatically in an early processing stage, without requiring subjects to reflect on word content. Emotional arousal appears to mediate the effects of current concerns on recall. It is correlated with but appears to function independently of word imaginability.     

The role of socio-communicative rearing environments in the development of social and physical cognition in apes

The cultural intelligence hypothesis (CIH) claims that humans’ advanced cognition is a direct result of human culture and that children are uniquely specialized to absorb and utilize this cultural experience ( Tomasello, 2000 ). Comparative data demonstrating that 2.5‐year‐old human children outperform apes on measures of social cognition but not on measures of physical cognition support this claim ( Herrmann et al., 2007 ). However, the previous study failed to control for rearing when comparing these two species. Specifically, the human children were raised in a human culture whereas the apes were raised in standard sanctuary settings. To further explore the CIH, here we compared the performance on multiple measures of social and physical cognition in a group of standard reared apes raised in conditions typical of zoo and biomedical laboratory settings to that of apes reared in an enculturated socio‐communicatively rich environment. Overall, the enculturated apes significantly outperformed their standard reared counterparts on the cognitive tasks and this was particularly true for measures of communication. Furthermore, the performance of the enculturated apes was very similar to previously reported data from 2.5‐year‐old children. We conclude that apes who are reared in a human‐like socio‐communicatively rich environment develop superior communicative abilities compared to apes reared in standard laboratory settings, which supports some assumptions of the cultural intelligence hypothesis.     

Reconnecting cognition in the lab and cognition in real life: The role of compensatory social and motivational factors in explaining how cognition ages in the wild

The papers in this Special Issue compellingly show that older adults' everyday cognitive life is governed not by the decline in elementary cognitive processes as measured in the lab, but by a multitude of compensatory mechanisms, most of which are of the social/motivational variety. Much of this compensatory behavior can be elicited with no or only little experimental prodding, underscoring the self-organizing or self-initiated nature of this type of behavior, even in advanced old age. We suggest that the study of compensation and the orchestration of cognitive, social, and motivational compensatory mechanisms in effective and healthy aging provides a meaningful challenge to traditional ways of examining developmental changes in cognitive performance.     

On the interdependence of cognition and emotion

Affect and cognition have long been treated as independent entities, but in the current review we suggest that affect and cognition are in fact highly interdependent. We open the article by discussing three classic views for the independence of affect. These are (i) the affective independence hypothesis, that emotion is processed independently from cognition, (ii) the affective primacy hypothesis, that evaluative processing precedes semantic processing, and (iii) the affective automaticity hypothesis, that affectively potent stimuli commandeer attention and evaluation is automatic. We argue that affect is not independent from cognition, that affect is not primary to cognition, nor is affect automatically elicited. The second half of the paper discusses several instances of how affect influences cognition. We review experiments showing affective involvement in perception, semantic activation, and attitude activation. We conclude that one function of affect is to regulate cognitive processing.     

Establishing operations, cognition, and emotion

In this paper we argue that behavior analysts have tended to neglect the study of important aspects of complex human behavior, including cognition and emotion. This relative neglect has been costly in terms of mainstream psychology's perception of the field of behavior analysis and in terms of our ability to provide a more thorough account of human behavior. Observations and findings from the clinical context are offered as examples of behavior that are not readily explained by the three-term contingency, and we argue that an adequate account of these behaviors must include principles derived from recent behavior-analytic work, in particular a better understanding of the short- and long-term effects of establishing operations. The concept of the establishing operation and its implications for understanding complex human behavior are discussed.     

The role of self-efficacy in performing emotion work

This study used a sample of 154 cabin attendants to examine the role of self-efficacy in the performance of emotion work. On the basis of the literature, we hypothesized that self-efficacy would have a moderating influence on the relationship between emotional job demands (i.e., feeling rules and emotionally charged interactions with passengers) and emotional dissonance, and on the relationship between emotional dissonance and well-being (emotional exhaustion and work engagement). In addition, we predicted that emotional dissonance mediates the relationship between emotional job demands and well-being. The results of a series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses generally supported these hypotheses. Results confirmed that emotionally charged interactions with passengers are related to emotional exhaustion and engagement through their influence on emotional dissonance. Furthermore, self-efficacy buffers the relationship between emotional job demands and emotional dissonance, and the relationship between emotional dissonance and work engagement (but not exhaustion).     

Frames of reference in social cognition

How is mindreading affected by social context? It is often implicitly assumed that there is one single way to understand others, whatever the situation or the identity of the person. In contrast, I emphasize the duality of functions of mindreading depending on the context (social interaction and social observation), as well as the duality of social frames of reference (egocentric and allocentric). I argue in favour of a functional distinction between knowledge-oriented mindreading and interaction-oriented mindreading. They both aim at understanding other people's behaviour. But they do so using different strategies. However, to say that mindreading has two functions does not suffice to show that there are two kinds of mindreading. One and the same ability could accomplish different functions. Unfortunately, there has been almost no experimental data on a possible dissociation between two kinds of mindreading abilities. Nonetheless, I discuss a few results that point towards a dual ability.     

The relationship between puberty and social emotion processing

The social brain undergoes developmental change during adolescence, and pubertal hormones are hypothesized to contribute to this development. We used fMRI to explore how pubertal indicators (salivary concentrations of testosterone, oestradiol and DHEA; pubertal stage; menarcheal status) relate to brain activity during a social emotion task. Forty‐two females aged 11.1 to 13.7 years underwent fMRI scanning while reading scenarios pertaining either to social emotions, which require the representation of another person’s mental states, or to basic emotions, which do not. Pubertal stage and menarcheal status were used to assign girls to early or late puberty groups. Across the entire sample, the contrast between social versus basic emotion resulted in activity within the social brain network, including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the posterior superior temporal sulcus, and the anterior temporal cortex (ATC) in both hemispheres. Increased hormone levels (independent of age) were associated with higher left ATC activity during social emotion processing. More advanced age (independent of hormone levels) was associated with lower DMPFC activity during social emotion processing. Our results suggest functionally dissociable effects of pubertal hormones and age on the adolescent social brain.     

The influence of emotion regulation on social interactive decision-making

Although adequate emotion regulation is considered to be essential in every day life, it is especially important in social interactions. However, the question as to what extent two different regulation strategies are effective in changing decision-making in a consequential socially interactive context remains unanswered. We investigated the effect of expressive suppression and emotional reappraisal on strategic decision-making in a social interactive task, that is, the Ultimatum Game. As hypothesized, participants in the emotional reappraisal condition accepted unfair offers more often than participants in the suppression and no-regulation condition. Additionally, the effect of emotional reappraisal influenced the amount of money participants proposed during a second interaction with partners that had treated them unfairly in a previous interaction. These results support and extend previous findings that emotional reappraisal as compared to expressive suppression, is a powerful regulation strategy that influences and changes how we interact with others even in the face of inequity.     

Some social features of cognition

This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the claim that fixation of belief is radically holistic.     

Interactions between cognition and emotion during response inhibition

Cognition and emotion interact to determine ongoing behaviors. In this study, we investigated the interaction between cognition and emotion during response inhibition using the stop-signal task. In Experiment 1, low-threat stop-signals comprising fearful and happy face pictures were employed. We found that both fearful and happy faces improved response inhibition relative to neutral ones. In Experiment 2, we employed high-threat emotional stimuli as stop signals, namely stimuli previously paired with mild shock. In this case, inhibitory performance was impaired relative to a neutral condition. We interpret these findings in terms of the impact of emotional stimuli on early sensory/attentional processing, which resulted in improved performance (Experiment 1), and in terms of their impact at more central stages, which impaired performance (Experiment 2). Taken together, our findings demonstrate that emotion can either enhance or impair cognitive performance depending on the emotional potency of the stimuli involved.