Object representations are biased toward each other through statistical learning

The visual system is remarkably efficient at extracting regularities from the environment through statistical learning. While such extraction has extensive consequences on cognition, it is unclear how statistical learning shapes the representations of the individual objects that comprise the regularities. Here we examine how statistical learning alters object representations. In three experiments, participants were exposed to either random arrays containing objects in a random order, or structured arrays containing object pairs where two objects appeared next to each other in fixed spatial or temporal configurations. After exposure, one object in each pair was briefly presented and participants judged the location or the orientation of the object without seeing the other object in the pair. We found that when an object reliably appeared next to another object in space, it was judged as being closer to the other object in space even though the other object was never presented (Experiments 1 and 2). Likewise, when an object reliably preceded another object in time, its orientation was biased toward the orientation of the other object even though the other object was never presented (Experiment 3). These results demonstrated that statistical learning fundamentally shapes how individual objects are represented in visual memory, by biasing the representation of one object toward its co-occurring partner. Importantly, participants in all experiments were not explicitly aware of the regularities. Thus, the bias in object representations was implicit. The current study reveals a novel impact of statistical learning on object representation: spatially co-occurring objects are represented as being closer in space, and temporally co-occurring objects are represented as having more similar features.     

New essays on old philosophers

In an article in Mind (Vol. 73, No. 291, July 1964) I tried to show that there is a fundamental difference between primary and secondary qualities. The present analysis of perceived size of an object and its relation to the size of the ‘objective’ and the ‘real’ object reveals that my thesis 1 regarding visual primary qualities, viz. size and shape, while true so far as shape is concerned, has to be modified in regard to size. After having criticized the usual view of size constancy, I show by means of a diagram how we may determine the location in physical space of a percept of an object. This diagram reveals at the same time how perceived size decreases gradually with increasing distance of the object from the percipient, but at a much smaller rate than the retinal image of the object. By means of the diagram I show furthermore how the perceived size may in theory vary from person to person. In conclusion a modification of my thesis 1 is suggested.     

Discussion of “Melancholic Psychosis”

Derek Hook’s paper (this issue) represents an important discussion of the Lacanian perspective on melancholia and its close and often forgotten clinical link to psychosis. Hook’s paper provides a critical insight into how melancholia is understood as a surrender to the jouissance of the Other. The reviewer only disagrees with Hook’s idea that there is no object loss in melancholia because the melancholic knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in the absent object. This unknown loss leaves him exposed to an erotogenic masochism proper and a self-annihilating kind of jouissance.     

Craving,longing, denial,and the dangers of change: clinical manifestations of greed

Greed is the unrelenting and unrealistic search for all the good an object has to offer and, via identification, all the good one can produce and provide. In phantasy, and sometimes in the patient's early developmental environment, the object and the ego demand more from each other than either have to give. Some patients cannot contain their urge to possess all and to be all, so it becomes a part of the interpersonal and psychological relationship with the analyst rather quickly. These patients feel something is owed to them, and they demand to be fed immediately. Other patients try and hide these greedy phantasies by being the opposite of greedy. They strive to be independent and charitable, while having great conflict over deeper desires to be dependent and in possession of an idealized giving object, an all-providing breast. Case material was used to explore these ideas.     

Entwicklung religiöser Glaubensfähigkeit

Faith in a broad sense is viewed as trustingly turning to a (personal) object located in the immanent as well as in the (relativ or absolute) transcendental field. The author describes on grounds of the object relational theory how the ability for faith is developing already in early childhood. In case of a beneficial development a firstly archaic faith is replaced later on by a faithful certainty (basic confidence) and, finally, by personal faith. Other forms of faith (faithful longing, magic or irrational faith culminating in fanatism) is viewed by the author as a consequence of unresolved archaic anxiety from the absolute evil. The development of the ability for religious faith is explained on the basis of the model of intersubjective narcissism.     

Spatial updating relies on an egocentric representation of space: Effects of the number of objects

Models of spatial updating attempt to explain how representations of spatial relationships between the actor and objects in the environment change as the actor moves. In allocentric models, object locations are encoded in an external reference frame, and only the actor’s position and orientation in that reference frame need to be updated. Thus, spatial updating should be independent of the number of objects in the environment (set size). In egocentric updating models, object locations are encoded relative to the actor, so the location of each object relative to the actor must be updated as the actor moves. Thus, spatial updating efficiency should depend on set size. We examined which model better accounts for human spatial updating by having people reconstruct the locations of varying numbers of virtual objects either from the original study position or from a changed viewing position. In consistency with the egocentric updating model, object localization following a viewpoint change was affected by the number of objects in the environment.     

The Compatibility of Freedom and Necessity in Marx's Idea of Communist Society

Taking a well‐known passage from the third volume of Capital as my starting point, I explain on what grounds Marx thinks that freedom and necessity will be compatible in a communist society. The necessity in question concerns having to produce to satisfy material needs. Unlike some accounts of this issue, I argue that the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society has more to do with how production is organized than with the direct relation of the worker to the object produced or to his or her own productive activity. Moreover, I show how self‐realization and a form of activity that possesses an intrinsic value are made possible by the organization of the production process and how this is integral to Marx's account of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society.     

Foregrounding Desire: A Defense of Kant’s Incorporation Thesis

In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation.     

How you lie affects what you remember

We investigated how telling different types of lies may impact memory. Participants studied pictures of objects, and later lied and told the truth about these and new objects once or multiple times by describing them or by denying they had seen them. Forty-eight hours later, participants were tested on their source memory. Results revealed that participants had good memory for having falsely described a never-seen object, but relatively poor memory for having falsely denied seeing a studied object. These results suggest that telling certain types of lies may make a person more likely to forget having lied. In addition, repeated truthful denials of having seen a picture paradoxically increased false memories for having seen it. Thus, telling the truth does not always prevent the possibility of memory distortion.     

Contributors

Abstract

This paper studies the interaction of the clinical theories of two major British theorists, Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott. Through three clinical examples, we see how the “Klein-Winnicott dialectic” operates in a significantly developmental fashion to advance and fulfill clinical work. Winnicott’s “object survival” is looked at in developmental conjunction with Klein’s “mourning” as a primary clinical and developmental process. This interaction also captures the essence of working with the aggression of a self that has been traumatically disrupted within its early development. This paper demonstrates how such work leads to the assimilation and grieving of primal object loss, evolving into a “developmental mourning process.” This developmental mourning includes the working-through of an “abandonment depression” in the character-disordered patient. A clinical example in a 1989 essay on “psychic pain” by Betty Joseph is used to set up the clinical challenge of going beyond the symptomatic clinging behavior of developmental arrest, into full psychic birth as a separate other, an Other who can relate to an Other. Conclusively, the subjective visceral affect noted and monitored in its clinical dimensions here is that of human “heartache,” which can also include regret.     

The impact of words on children with ADHD and DAMP Consequences for psychoanalytic technique

Children with attention-defi cit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and disorder of attention, motility control, and perception (DAMP) are often sensitive to the analyst's interventions. This is not always due to the literal import of the intervention. The children sometimes react as if the words were dangerous concrete objects, which they must physically fend off. The author traces this phenomenon to the child's unstable internal situation. A bad, un-containing internal object is easily awakened and threatens to expel the analyst's words independently of their content. This results in violent clinical situations. Infant research and psychoanalytic work with infants and mothers evince how a complex semiotic process develops between mother and baby. The prerequisite for this process to get started and maintained is a secure external object, which gradually is internalized. Findings from developmental research and clinical infant work are used to illuminate analytic work with children with ADHD and DAMP. Vignettes demonstrate how important it is for the analyst to phrase interpretations after having gauged the state of the analysand's internal object as well as his/her own countertransference. If this is overlooked, the psychoanalytic dialogue easily capsizes. The author provides some technical recommendations on the psychoanalysis of these children. As part of the theoretical discussion he raises the general question of how the representations, which the baby forms in interaction with the mother, and the analysand forms in interaction with the analyst, should be classifi ed. Rather than dividing them into bipartite thing- or word-presentations (Freud), the author suggests C. S. Peirce's tripartite semiotic classifi cation in that the baby forms representations of icons, indices, and symbols.     

To have and to be: towards the social representation of quality of life in China

This study explores the social representation of quality of life (QOL) in the Chinese socio‐cultural context. The data were collected by 16 open‐ended individual interviews. The study shows that the social representation of QOL embedded deeply in the collective memory of Chinese society is generated from, and organized around, the central thema of ‘having’/‘being’. ‘Having’ and ‘being’ are both antinomic and dialogically interdependent. ‘Having’ gives priority to how subject instrumentalizes object as resources to be possessed and consumed. It is manifested in the possessions of money, food, housing and car. The possessions are not only simply the material things but also the objects of symbolic significance. ‘Being’ prioritizes the authentic relationship between subject and object. It is manifested in rootedness, connectedness, participation and freedom. These provide a sense of belonging, commitment, direction and purpose and involve the establishment and maintenance of the union between the self and others, and between the individual and the outside world. On the other hand, neither ‘having’ nor ‘being’ exists in its pure form. Rather, they co‐exist dynamically, in rival or complementary ways, and each calls the possibility of the other into play. It is the synthesis of opposites between ‘having’ and ‘being’ that the social representation of QOL is generated and structured. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Binding object features to locations: Does the “spatial congruency bias” update with object movement?

One of the fundamental challenges of visual cognition is how our visual systems combine information about an object’s features with its spatial location. A recent phenomenon related to object–location binding, the “spatial congruency bias,” revealed that two objects are more likely to be perceived as having the same identity or features if they appear in the same spatial location, versus if the second object appears in a different location. The spatial congruency bias suggests that irrelevant location information is automatically encoded with and bound to other object properties, biasing perceptual judgments. Here we further explored this new phenomenon and its role in object–location binding by asking what happens when an object moves to a new location: Is the spatial congruency bias sensitive to spatiotemporal contiguity cues, or does it remain linked to the original object location? Across four experiments, we found that the spatial congruency bias remained strongly linked to the original object location. However, under certain circumstances—for instance, when the first object paused and remained visible for a brief time after the movement—the congruency bias was found at both the original location and the updated location. These data suggest that the spatial congruency bias is based more on low-level visual information than on spatiotemporal contiguity cues, and reflects a type of object–location binding that is primarily tied to the original object location and that may only update to the object’s new location if there is time for the features to be re-encoded and rebound following the movement.     

Walking through doorways causes forgetting: recall

The aim of the current study was to explore how the location updating effect is affected when people are tested using recall rather than recognition, which is what has been done in prior work. Differences in the memory processes involved with these two tasks lead to predictions for two different patterns of data. In Experiment 1, memory was tested by having participants recall the single object they were carrying or had just put down, whereas in Experiment 2, people sometimes needed to recall both objects. It was found that, unlike recognition test performance, a similar location updating effect was found for both Associated (what was currently being carried) and Dissociated (what was recently set down) objects. Moreover, when both objects were correctly recalled, there was a bias to remember them in the order that they were encountered. Finally, if only one object was correctly recalled, it was the Associated object that was currently being carried. Overall, these results are consistent with the Event Horizon Model of event cognition.     

Mental rotation of objects retrieved from memory: a functional MRI study of spatial processing

This functional MRI study examined how people mentally rotate a 3-dimensional object (an alarm clock) that is retrieved from memory and rotated according to a sequence of auditory instructions. We manipulated the geometric properties of the rotation, such as having successive rotation steps around a single axis versus alternating between 2 axes. The latter condition produced much more activation in several areas. Also, the activation in several areas increased with the number of rotation steps. During successive rotations around a single axis, the activation was similar for rotations in the picture plane and rotations in depth. The parietal (but not extrastriate) activation was similar to mental rotation of a visually presented object. The findings indicate that a large-scale cortical network computes different types of spatial information by dynamically drawing on each of its components to a differential, situation-specific degree.     

Event categorization in infancy

Recent research suggests that one of the mechanisms that contribute to infants' acquisition of their physical knowledge is the formation of event categories, such as occlusion and containment. Some of this research compared infants' identification of similar variables in different event categories. Marked developmental lags were found, suggesting that infants acquire event-specific rather than event-general expectations. Other research - on variable priming, perseveration, and object individuation - presented infants with successive events from the same or from different event categories. To understand the world as it unfolds, infants must not only represent each separate event, but also link successive events; this research begins to explore how infants respond to multiple events over time.     

The phenomenological character of color perception

When an object looks red to an observer, the visual experience of the observer has two important features. The experience visually represents the object as having a property—being red. And the experience has a phenomenological character; that is, there is something that it is like to have an experience of seeing an object as red. Let qualia be the properties that give our sensory and perceptual experiences their phenomenological character. This essay takes up two related problem for a nonreductive account of qualia. Some have argued that on such an account there is no room in a physicalist ontology for qualia. Section 1 shows how qualia might fit into a physicalist ontology. The second problem begins with the observation that there is a gap in scientific accounts of color experience; there is no explanation of why the features of the brain that determine our color experiences give those experiences their phenomenological character. Building on the results of Sect. 1, Sect. 2 develops an account of color perception that bridges this gap and shows how qualia give color perception its phenomenological character. To get a grip on the issues involved the paper begins by considering some aspects of a physicalist account of color.     

Defending Desire: Scanlon's Anti-Humeanism

In the opening chapter of What We Owe To Each Other , Tim Scanlon produces a sustained critique of a Humean conception of practical reason. Scanlon claims he will argue that unless having a desire just is to see something as a reason, desires play (almost) no role in the explanation or justification of action. Yet his specific arguments against Humeanism all employ a very austere understanding of desire (which he calls the "standard model"), and attempt to show that desires so understood are not up to any explanatory or justificatory task. Since the standard model represents only one understanding of desire (distinct from the "recognition of reasons") his specific arguments cannot establish his stated general thesis. I show how a more robust conception of desire will leave the Humean account safe from Scanlon's specific arguments.