What Not to Multiply Without Necessity

The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity.     

Do Not Revise Ockham's Razor Without Necessity

Ockham's razor asks that we not multiply entities beyond necessity. The razor is a powerful methodological tool, enabling us to articulate reasons for preferring one theory to another. There are those, however, who would modify the razor. Schaffer (2010: 313—our italics), for one, tells us that, ‘I think the proper rendering of Ockham's razor should be ‘Do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity’’. Our aim, here, is to challenge such re‐workings of Ockham's razor.     

A Realistic Argument for Scientific Realism: How to be a Realist Without Really Knowing It

Philosophia - In this paper I provide a novel argument for scientific realism (SR). In contrast to most recent defenses of SR, my defense of SR does not rely on the no-miracles argument (NMA)....     

When Your Team is Not Really Your Team Anymore: Identification with a Merged Basketball Club

In this questionnaire study it was tested to what extent identification with a merged basketball club could be predicted on the basis of six concepts derived from a social identity perspective on mergers. Respondents were 160 fans and 91 youth players of a Belgian first division basketball club that had merged the previous season. A direct multiple regression analysis indicated that, both for fans and youth players identification with the pre-merger club was the best predictor of identification with the new merger club, followed by the perceived success of the merger. Two other concepts emerged as significant, though modest, predictors of post-merger identification for fans and youth players: the perceived necessity of the merger and their satisfaction with the merger process. For the fans, the perceived continuity/representation of the in-group in the merger group was also a significant predictor. Together, the hypothesized predictors accounted for 70% of the total variance in their post-merger identification. This high percentage underlines the relevance of a social-psychological perspective on how sport fans' react to mergers. For youth players, 61% of the total variance in their post-merger identification was explained, which suggests that the processes that facilitate fans and youth players’ post-merger identification are quite similar.     

Pretense,Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters

Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non‐real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn about the world. Both planning with causal models and learning about them require the ability to create false premises and generate conclusions from these premises. We argue that pretending allows children to practice these important cognitive skills. We also consider the prevalence of unrealistic scenarios in children's play and explain how they can be useful in learning, despite appearances to the contrary.     

Expanding the Limits of Bibliotherapy for Panic Disorder: Randomized Trial of Self-Help Without Support but With a Clear Deadline

Cognitive behavioral bibliotherapy for panic disorder has been found to be less effective without therapist support. In this study, participants were randomized to either unassisted bibliotherapy (n = 20) with a scheduled follow-up telephone interview or to a waiting list control group (n = 19). Following a structured psychiatric interview, participants in the treatment group were sent a self-help book consisting of 10 chapters based on cognitive behavioral strategies for the treatment of panic disorder. No therapist contact of any kind was provided during the treatment phase, which lasted for 10 weeks. Results showed that the treatment group had, in comparison to the control group, improved on all outcome measures at posttreatment and at 3-month follow-up. The tentative conclusion drawn from these results is that pure bibliotherapy with a clear deadline can be effective for people suffering from panic disorder with or without agoraphobia.     

Really Ultimate Reality

This essay sketches a radically apophatic conception of ultimate reality, explains how rational comparison and evaluation of theological views is possible, and indicates how this view comports with the social and natural sciences. Really ultimate reality, whatever it finally is, is beyond being, and thus beyond the putative gods that are held to be beings.     

Not a Total Failure

In this paper I offer a partial defence of Armstrong’s totality relation as a solution to the problem of so-called “negative existentials”.     

It's Not a Story

This writing presents a firsthand account of living with the certain knowledge that you can't rely on your brain the way you used to. Epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, brain tumor—what do these words really mean day by day, moment by moment? The author blends poetry and prose in her account of forging a new relationship with her own brain. Activities that were once routine are now difficult and even dangerous. No longer is her brain a silent partner as she navigates the debilitating, embarrassing, and occasionally humiliating symptoms of her disease. Can I really get through this shower? How much help do we need today, Brain? Mindfulness practice helps the author become more aware of her moment-by-moment experience. Her therapist prods her to dig into her own story, but the author resists. She resists and yet she shares her story that may not be a story.     

Why Evolution is Really Indeterministic

Leslie Graves, Barbara Horan and Alex Rosenberg (1999) have argued that the process of evolution is really deterministic, so we should be instrumentalists about our probabilistic evolutionary theory. I criticize the consistency of their view. I argue that because they are realists towards multiple theories (quantum mechanics and macrophysics) their arguments against realism for another scientific theory fail. The main point of this paper is critical, but in order to set up this criticism I explore the ramifications of realism for multiple theories. Finally, I offer a brief metaphysical justification for realism about multiple theories. This view justifies realism for evolutionary theory, which has been defended by Robert Brandon and Scott Carson (1996).