Implicit Theories of Well-Being Predict Well-Being and the Endorsement of Therapeutic Lifestyle Changes

The current studies investigated whether beliefs concerning the malleability or immutability of well-being (i.e., incremental and entity implicit theories of well-being, respectively) are predictive of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being and of the endorsement of activities conducive to well-being. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that, relative to entity theory endorsement, the endorsement of an incremental theory of well-being predicted greater hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Moreover, regression analyses showed that these associations remained when including scores on measures of socially desirable responding, implicit theories of ability, and related variables of striving for personal growth, hope, and character strengths usage. Study 3 showed that greater endorsement of an incremental theory of well-being predicted greater perceived utility of well-being activities. Study 4 showed that an experimentally-induced incremental theory of well-being caused greater endorsement of well-being activities than an experimentally-induced entity theory of well-being. These findings suggest that amenability toward, and responsiveness to, existing well-being interventions may be fostered by an incremental theory of well-being. Furthermore, they suggest that cultivating an incremental mindset regarding well-being may facilitate adaptive functioning and, thereby, serve as a well-being intervention.     

The Strong-Tie Requirement and Objective-List Theories of Well-Being

Many philosophers with hedonistic sympathies (e.g., Mill, Sidgwick, Sumner, Feldman, Crisp, Heathwood, and Bradley) have claimed that well-being is necessarily experiential. Kagan once claimed something slightly different, saying that, although unexperienced bodily events can directly impact a person’s well-being, it is nonetheless true that any change in a person’s well-being must involve a change in her (i.e., either in her mind or in her body). Kagan elaborated by saying that a person’s well-being cannot float freely of her such that it is affected by events that do not affect her (Kagan 1992, 169–189). These two claims—that well-being is necessarily experiential and that changes in well-being must involve changes in the person—are two different ways of specifying the general intuition that a person’s well-being must be strongly tied to her. This general intuition imposes an adequacy constraint on welfare theorizing: To be adequate, a welfare theory cannot allow that someone can be directly benefited by events that are not strongly tied to her. Call this the strong-tie requirement. The strong-tie requirement is easily satisfied by welfare hedonism, but it poses problems for desire-fulfillment welfare theories and objective-list welfare theories. Though a great deal has been written about desire-fulfillment welfare theories in relation to the strong-tie requirement, not as much has been written about objective-list welfare theories in relation to the strong-tie requirement. This paper argues that objective-list welfare theories can satisfy the strong-tie requirement, though probably only if they take a perfectionist form, as opposed to a brute-list form.     

The Subjectivity Inherent in Objective Measures of Well-Being

Claims abound that GDP accounting ignores social and ecological problems and misrepresents social well-being. While GDP growth continues to be a policy priority in most countries, it is at best one objective among many in achieving humanity’s “ultimate purpose.” Yet revisions to the income accounts and alternative well-being indicators are also problematic, since they reinforce the illusion that social and ecological impacts on well-being are objectively measurable. Future policy must not only be informed to a greater extent by qualitative and multi-dimensional assessments, but must recognize that any rank-ordering of society’s ultimate ends cannot but be subjective.

Positioning Implicit Theories of Well-Being Within a Positivity Framework

Two studies with 230 and 363 Canadian undergraduate students tested the relationship between incremental theories of well-being (i.e., beliefs regarding the malleability of well-being) and a positive mental outlook. In Study 1, incremental theories of well-being were associated with Prioritizing Positivity (purposely incorporating pleasant activities into one’s daily routine) and showed a positive relationship with several other indicators of positive mental functioning (e.g., intrinsic motivation, eudaimonic motivation). In Study 2, incremental theories of well-being were associated with Positivity (viewing life and experiences with a positive outlook) and were positively correlated with additional indicators of positive mental functioning (e.g., harmony in life, self-compassion). In both studies, the relationship between incremental theories of well-being and both hedonic and eudaimonic well-being held true across different measures. A synthesis of major results using a Bayesian meta-analytic procedure suggested a moderate association between an incremental well-being mindset and well-being. Results of these studies help to situate incremental views toward well-being within a broad positivity framework, and to expand the nomological web of correlates of implicit theories of well-being.     

Autonomy,Subject-relativity,and Subjective and Objective Theories of Well-being in Bioethics

Among the different approaches to questions of biomedical ethics, there is a view that stresses the importance of a patient’s right to make her own decisions in evaluative questions concerning her own well-being. This approach, the autonomy-based approach to biomedical ethics, has usually led to the adoption of a subjective theory of well-being on the basis of its commitment to the value of autonomy and to the view that well-being is always relative to a subject. In this article, it is argued that these two commitments need not lead to subjectivism concerning the nature of well-being. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Integrating Intermediate Goods to Theories of Distributive Justice: The Importance of Platforms

Res Publica - There is an underappreciated disconnect between the ultimate values that lie at the heart of contemporary theories of distributive justice, and the practice of state institutions....     

30年来西方关于主观幸福感的理论发展

文章详尽介绍了西方30年来关于主观幸福感研究的理论成果,重点介绍SWB的结构、内容和理论,探讨了下一步发展方向和新的研究课题,旨在为我国本土化研究提供参考。     

Age-Related Differences in Lay Conceptions of Well-Being and Experienced Well-Being

Conceptions of well-being are defined as a system of beliefs concerning the nature and experience of well-being and can be described generally by the degree to which four dimensions, representing (1) the experience of pleasure, (2) avoidance of negative experience, (3) selfdevelopment, and (4) contribution to others, are emphasized. A first main objective of the current study was to investigate age-related differences in younger and older adults’ conceptions of well-being. A second main objective was to address whether conceptions of well-being are differentially associated with experienced well-being in younger and older adults. Results indicated several age-related differences in conceptions of well-being, with younger adults reporting more emphasis on the experience of pleasure and self-development, older adults reporting more emphasis on avoidance of negative experience, and younger and older adults reporting similar levels of emphasis on contribution to others. Results further indicated several age-related differences in associations between the experience of pleasure and avoidance of negative experience dimensions and well-being, with these two dimensions being more strongly and positively associated with well-being in older adults. Self-development and contribution to others were found to be positively associated with well-being regardless of age.     

Well-Being and Pluralism

It is a commonly expressed sentiment that the science and philosophy of well-being would do well to learn from each other. Typically such calls identify mistakes and bad practices on both sides that would be remedied if scientists picked the right bit of philosophy and philosophers picked the right bit of science. We argue that the differences between philosophers and scientists thinking about well-being are more difficult to reconcile than such calls suggest, and that pluralism is central to this task. Pluralism is a stance that explicitly drives towards accommodating and nurturing the richness and diversity of well-being, both as a concept and as an object of inquiry. We show that well-being science manifests a contingent pluralism at the level of methodology, whereas philosophy of well-being has largely rejected pluralism at the conceptual level. Recently, things have begun to change. Within philosophy, conceptual monism is under attack. But so is methodological pluralism within science. We welcome the first development, and bemoan the second. We argue that a joined-up philosophy and science of well-being should recognise the virtues of both conceptual and methodological pluralism. Philosophers should embrace the methodological justification of pluralism that can be found in the well-being sciences, and scientists should embrace the conceptual reasons to be pluralist that can be found in philosophical debate.

     

Well-Being and Experience

The Journal of Ethics - Robert Nozick argued that we would not plug into his machine that could give us any experiences we chose. More recently Richard Kraut has argued that it would be...     

Well-Being and Fairness

The article explores the interaction of two, potentially clashing, considerations, each reflecting a different conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts. According to the Equal Chance Principle, the harm for each person should be minimized in a significant and (roughly) equal degree; when this is impossible, each person should be accorded the highest possible equal chance to avoid the harm. According to the Importance Principle, the danger to the person who would otherwise suffer the more serious harm should be prevented. An erratum to this article is available at .     

Subjective Well-Being and Policy

This paper analyses whether the aggregation of individual happiness scores to a National Happiness Index can still be trusted once governments have proclaimed their main objective to be the pursuit—or even maximization—of this National Happiness Index. The answer to this investigation is clear-cut: as soon as the National Happiness Index has become a policy goal, it can no longer be trusted to reflect people’s true happiness. Rather, the Index will be systematically distorted due to the incentive for citizens to answer strategically and the incentive for government to manipulate the Index in its favour. Such a distortion would arise even if the measurement of subjective well-being correctly reflected actual happiness before the intervention of government. Governments in a democracy should establish the conditions enabling individuals to become happy. The valuable and important results of happiness research should be introduced into the political process. Each person should be free to pursue happiness according to his or her preferences. This process is supported by obedience to the rule of law, human rights and free media, as well as by extended political participation rights, decentralized public decision-making, an open and effective education system fostering upward mobility and the possibility to find suitable employment.     

Effects of Spiritual Well-Being on Subsequent Happiness,Psychological Well-Being,and Stress

Recently, Gomez and Fisher (Gomez R and Fisher JW (2003) Pers Individ Dif 35: 1975–1991) proposed that four facets of spiritual well-being exist, namely, personal, communal, environmental, and transcendental spiritual well-being. Based on data from three independent studies, the present research effort tested the validity of a German version of (Gomez R and Fisher JW (2003) Pers Individ Dif 35: 1975–1991) of the Spiritual Well-Being Questionnaire (SWBQ-G). It was found that the SWBQ-G was factorially valid and that each of the four SWBQ-G scales was discriminant to mental, physical, and emotional well-being. Also, it was found that the SWBQ-G predicted levels of subsequent happiness, psychological well-being (positive relationship), and stress (negative relationship). These results add to our knowledge about the validity of the construct of spiritual well-being.     

Sacrifice and Relational Well-Being

ABSTRACT

The well-being account of sacrifice says that sacrifices are gross losses of well-being. This account is attractive because it explains the relationship between sacrifice and moral obligation. However, sacrifices made on behalf of loved ones may cause trouble for the account. Loving sacrifices occur in a context where the agent’s well-being and the beneficiary’s well-being are intertwined. They present a challenge to individualism about well-being. Drawing inspiration from feminist philosophers and bioethicists, I argue that a notion of ‘relational well-being’, analogous to ‘relational autonomy’, can help account for loving sacrifices without either undermining the well-being theory of sacrifice or minimizing the very real sacrifices made in caregiving situations.     

Integrated Conative Model of Well-Being: from Motives to Well-Being

The aim of this study was to develop the self-concordance model of healthy goal striving through testing the extended conative model of well-being. This model included: goal self-concordance as an aspect of positive motive; sustained effort as positive behaviour directed toward attaining the goal; goal attainment; personal growth interpretation as positive cognition regarding goal attainment; need satisfaction; and finally well-being as the outcome of the successful goal-striving process. Across three studies, university students completed online surveys regarding these variables, making reference to their most important goal during the past 4 weeks. The results indicated that (a) goal self-concordance predicted well-being via mediation of need satisfaction; (b) sustained effort also predicted well-being via mediation of need satisfaction; (c) personal growth interpretation predicted well-being via mediation of need satisfaction. The suggested integrated conative model of well-being provided appropriate goodness of fit. The three model-fitting studies highlight the important role of psychological processes such as construal in the conative processes that predict subjective well-being.