Subjective memorability and the mirror effect.

The mirror effect refers to the common finding that hit and false alarm rates on a recognition test are inversely related. The present research investigated the generality of the mirror effect (to rare words) and tested whether the effect might be grounded in accurate estimates of word memorability. The first 2 experiments showed that although high- and low-frequency words exhibit a mirror effect, rare words do not. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, Ss consistently (and mistakenly) predicted that memorability was directly correlated with frequency of usage. These findings weight against the idea that the mirror effect arises because of a S's ability to reject low-frequency lures on the grounds that such words would have been remembered had they appeared previously. Instead, the rejection of lures from different frequency categories may be determined by their semantic or phonemic overlap with list targets, and an analysis along these lines may help to explain why rare words constitute an exception to the otherwise ubiquitous mirror effect.     

Recognition of color-form compounds by 4-month-old infants

In two studies, a paired-comparison procedure was used to investigate whether 4-month-old infants can perceive and remember correlations of color and form. In Study 1, infants were shown simultaneous presentations of two different colored shapes until two criteria for familiarization had been met. They were then offered a simultaneous choice between a colored form that they had already seen and one that was a new combination of a familiar color and a familiar shape. The infants looked significantly longer at the new combination than at the familiar combination on the test trial. In Study 2, the same procedure was used, except that the familiarization criteria were less stringent and additional analyses of the infants' test trial behavior were conducted. Infants again exhibited a significant preference for the new combination, both when looking time accumulated during the entire test-trial was analyzed and when looking just up to the “first look away” was considered. These findings that 4-months-olds can perceive and remember compounds of visual attributes conflict with the results of several studies in which the habituation and test stimuli were presented sequentially rather than simultaneously. Differences in the nature of the information processing that may be evoked by the two methods are discussed.     

Stimulus control acquired by components of two color-form compound stimuli

Four pigeons were trained to respond on one of two keys in the presence of one color-form display, and on the other key when a second color-form display was present. Both responses were maintained on a 2-min variable-internal schedule of reinforcement. Subsequently, stimulus control acquired by components of the compound stimuli was determined by brief test probes in which the colors and forms separately, and in novel combinations, appeared on the display screen. When either color component was present, both choice of response key and response rate were like responding to the training compound display containing that color. When the forms were presented separate from the colors, generally low and comparable rates of responding occurred on both keys.     

Global subjective memorability and the strength-based mirror effect in recognition memory

Between-list manipulations of memory strength through repetition commonly generate a mirror effect, with more hits and fewer false alarms for strengthened items. However, this pattern is rarely seen with within-list manipulations of strength. In three experiments, we investigated the conditions under which a within-list mirror effect of strength (items presented once or thrice) is observed. In Experiments 1 and 2, we indirectly manipulated the overall subjective memorability of the studied lists by varying the proportion of nonwords. A within-list mirror effect was observed only in Experiment 2, in which a higher proportion of nonwords was presented in the study list. In Experiment 3, the presentation duration for each item (0.5 vs. 3 sec) was manipulated between groups with the purpose of affecting subjective memorability. A within-list mirror effect was observed only for the short presentation durations. Thus, across three experiments, we found the within-list mirror effect only under conditions of poor overall subjective memorability. We propose that when the overall subjective memorability is low, people switch their response strategy on an item-by-item basis and that this generates the observed mirror effect.     

A Multi-Occasion Multi-Rater Model of Affective Dispositions and Affective Well-Being

Personality theories assume that affective dispositions have a strong influence on affective experience and well-being, produce cross-situational consistency, and that positive and negative experiences are influenced by separate dispositions. These assumptions were tested using multi-method data. 97 married couples completed self and informant ratings of affective dispositions, a 14-day experience sampling study, and retrospective self and informant ratings of affective experiences (overall and with spouse). Analysis was conducted using a multi-trait-multi-method matrix and structural equation modeling. Main findings were (a) strong effects of affective dispositions on affective experiences with partner and affective well-being, (b) shared method variance among disposition and well-being ratings by the same rater, and (c) moderate to strong negative correlations between dispositions for positive and negative affect.     

Familiarity,memorability, and the effect of typicality on the recognition of faces

Typical faces are more poorly discriminated on tests of recognition than are atypical faces, an effect suggested to mediate similar findings for attractive or likable faces. We tested the hypothesis that the effect of typicality on recognition is a function of context-free familiarity and memorability, which function in opposition. Two orthogonal principal components were extracted from subjects' ratings of faces for typicality, familiarity, attractiveness, likability, and memorability--one consisting of the ratings of familiarity, attractiveness, and likability, and reflecting context-free familiarity, and the other consisting of the memorability rating. As expected, typicality loaded equally (r approximately .66), but with opposite sign, on both components. In subsequent experiments, both components were found to be significant and additive predictors of face recognition with no residual effect of typicality. General familiarity decreased discrimination, and the memorability component enhanced it, supporting the hypothesis. The results are discussed in terms of the mirror effect.     

The effect of increasing the memorability of category instances on estimates of category size

According to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) availability heuristic, people sometimes make use of the ease with which instances are retrieved when they have to estimate proportions or frequencies. One implication of this availability heuristic is that any factor that affects memorability of instances from a category should also affect the estimated category size. In one of their experiments, Tversky and Kahneman found that, after being presented with a list of names, people judged the more famous names to be more frequent. Similarly, recall was found to be greater for the more famous names. Three experiments that used Tversky and Kahneman’s paradigm are reported. Repeating nonfamous names resulted in their increased recallability and a corresponding increase in estimates of their frequency (Experiments 1 and 3). Making nonfamous names more salient (Experiment 3) also had parallel effects on recallability and frequency estimates, indicating that different memory manipulations affected availability in a similar fashion. Furthermore, reliance on the heuristic was not changed as a function of prior knowledge (Experiment 2) or practice (Experiment 3)     

The Effects of Cognitive and Affective Program Involvement on Cognitive and Affective Ad Involvement

Advertisers attempt to create ads which gain the attention and involvement of their audience. These advertisements may be primarily cognitively or affectively involving. Similarly the programs in which the ads are embedded may be primarily cognitively or affectively involving. Does the type of program involvement affect involvement with ads? Building on previous research (Mc-Clung, Park and Sauer 1985; Park and McClung 1986) a study is presented which suggests that cognitive involvement in ads (particularly cognitive ads) suffers from an overload effect when the ads are placed in cognitively involving programs while affective involvement in ads is enhanced by a priming effect when the ads are placed in affectively involving programs.     

The movement-induced self-reference effect: enhancing memorability through movement toward the self

Much evidence suggests that bodily actions affect cognitive states. In particular, pulling owned objects toward the self improves memory for those objects compared to memory for objects pushed away from the self. Experiments 1 and 2 examined the effect of incidental joystick movement on static stimuli, hypothesizing that using the physical self (rather than a computer monitor) as a reference point would enhance memory for items categorized via a toward-the-self action but not toward-the-computer-monitor action. Experiment 3 examined whether movement toward an external representation of self, one’s cellular phone, would enhance memory compared to the same movement toward an unfamiliar phone. Recognition memory was enhanced for both words and pictures evaluated during movements toward a representation of the self, regardless of whether the representation was a physical self or a disembodied self. Furthermore, movement toward the self enhanced memory, rather than movement away from the self depressing memory. These results suggest that self-referential processing can be induced by an approach motor action and impact episodic memory regardless of intention to learn, stimulus type, or motion of the stimuli. They also suggest that self-referential memory advantage can be disembodied.     

Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy

This article defends the view that an adequate response to some central epistemological problems requires us to find a role for emotions and other affective states in epistemic evaluation and also to invoke virtuous traits of character in order to explain how these affective evaluations are regulated. The argument is based on the need for some epistemic evaluations to possess a kind of immediacy, if we are not to face a worrying regress. The closing sections support the claim that epistemic evaluation depends upon appropriate character traits though a discussion of what is involved in being observant .