Emotions, Retribution, and Punishment

I examine emotional reactions to wrongdoing to determine whether they offer support for retributivism. It is often thought that victims desire to see their victimizer suffer and that this reaction offers support for retributivism. After rejecting several attempts to use different theories of emotion and different approaches to using emotions to justify retributivism, I find that, assuming a cognitive theory of emotion is correct, emotions can be used as heuristic guides much as suggested by Michael Moore. Applying this method to the actual emotional reactions of victims' relatives, however, does not find support for retributivism. Instead, it suggests punishment should be understood as part of a process of recovery with a complex set of demands. Retributive concerns can play a role in the process, but they don't have the priority that retributivism requires.     

Crime, Prohibition, and Punishment

Nigel Walker's first principle of criminalization declares that 'Prohibitions should not be included in the criminal law for the sole purpose of ensuring that breaches of them are visited with retributive punishment'. I argue that we should reject this principle, for 'mala prohibita' as well as for 'mala in se': conduct should be criminalized in order to ensure (as far as we reasonably can) that those who engage in it receive retributive punishment. In the course of the argument, I show why we should not see the criminal law as consisting in 'prohibitions'; I explain different species of mala prohibita, and show how their commission does involve genuine wrongdoing; and I show the importance of distinguishing the question of regulation from that of sanction.     

Communication,Punishment, and Virtue

This essay suggests that while Antony Duff's model of criminal punishment as secular penance is pregnant with possibilities for theological reception and reflection, it proceeds by way of a number of separations that are brought into question by the penitential traditions of Christianity. The first three of these—between justice and mercy, censure and invitation, and state and victim, constrain the true communicative character of his account of punishment. The second set of oppositions, between sacrament and virtue, interior character and external action, and formal and moral reconciliation, subject the model of state punishment as secular penance to problematic liberal and libertarian constraints. A postsecular analogy, outlining a theology of the invitational nature of divine judgment, and drawing on Thomas Aquinas's account of penance as both sacrament and virtue, is proposed.     

病人、医生与知情同意

医务人员应当视病人为治疗疾病过程中的参与者.知情同意的目的是,使病人充分理解他的困境后做出理性的决定.医生与病人分享信息、分担责任与做出决定,以保持良好的医患关系.     

Punishment,Forgiveness and Reconciliation

It is sometimes thought that the normative justification for responding to large-scale violations of human rights via the judicial appararatus of trial and punishment is undermined by the desirability of reconciliation between conflicting parties as part of the process of conflict resolution. I take there to be philosophical, as well as practical and psychological issues involved here: on some conceptions of punishment and reconciliation, the attitudes that they involve conflict with one another on rational grounds. But I shall argue that there is a conception of political reconciliation available which does not involve forgiveness and this forms of reconciliation may be the best we can hope for in many conflicts. Reconciliation is nevertheless likely to require the expression of what Darrell Moellendorf has called ‘political regret’ and the denunciatory role aspect of punishment makes it particularly well-suited to this role.     

Additive Effects of Certainty,Severity, and Celerity of Punishment on Judgments of Crime Deterrence Scale Value1

The certainty and severity of punishment for crimes are commonly given credence as determinants of deterrence value, whereas celerity of punishment is not. Moreover, data are sparse and divided on the question of how certainty and severity components combine algebraically. Two experiments inspected the effects of certainty, severity and celerity of hypothetical punishments on judged deterrence value, and the form of their factorial combination. Judged deterrence scale values were obtained for eight hypothetical conditions of punishment for serious crimes. These conditions of punishment consisted of orthogonal combinations of two levels each of certainty, severity, and celerity and were administered to independent subjects. Strong effects of certainty and severity and moderate effects of celerity were found, and there were no interactions among the three variables. Thus, celerity is pertinent to judged deterrence value, and the three components of punishment clearly combine additively rather than multiplicatively. It is argued that despite the empirical results, certainty, severity, and celerity must, however, ultimately be showp to combine according to a multiplying rule. The Discussion centers largely on an analysis and justification for that argument.     

对知情同意书和知情同意过程的探讨

在<医疗事故处理条例>实施中,存在着一种现象:重视一张由患者签字的知情同意书,轻待知情同意过程.签字的知情同意书不等于知情同意,知情同意书不等于"生死契约".知情同意的本义:对患者权利、尊严、人格和自由的尊重,只有在知情同意过程中获得.因此知情同意过程应该重要于知情同意书.医生严格履行好法定的告知和说明义务,尊重患者的知情同意权,就是尊重法律,也是医生保护自己的最好方式.     

Powers,Non‐Consent and Freedom

There are a number of dispositionalist solutions to the free will problem based on freedom consisting in the agent's exercise of a power. But if a subject a is free when they exercise their power P, there is an objection to be overcome from the possibility of power implantation. A brainwasher, rather than directly manipulating a subject's movements, can instead implant in them a desire, to be understood as a disposition to act, and allow the subject to exercise such a power. It seems that, according to the dispositionalist theory of freedom, such an agent would still count as acting freely. There is a strong non‐consent intuition that a is not free in such a case because they did not consent to having the power P—the desire in question. Filling out this intuition is not straightforward. But it can be done in terms of the exercise of P being regulated by higher‐order powers of self‐reflection. Such regulation is what allows an agent to either take ownership of a power or to reject it.     

知情权 选择权 责任与义务

讨论患者的知情权、选择权与医生的责任义务很有现实意义。病人一旦就医,安全和早日康复是第一位的,当医生面对患者时,救死扶伤不惜一切地去挽救患者的生命是医生的天职,患者一旦推动生命,其他权力都是空话。     

Capital Punishment, Restoration and Moral Rightness

In order to show that opposition to capital punishment cannot be both moral and entirely unconditional, Hugo Bedau proposes a fantasy–world scenario in which the execution of a murderer restores his murder victim to life. Were such a world to exist, argues Bedau, the death penalty would then be morally right. The aim of this article is to show that Bedau's argument is mistaken, largely because capital punishment in his fantasy world would not be an instrument of perfect restitution, as he thinks, but instead would be an instrument of unfair restitution. Two attempts are made to repair Bedau's fantasy–world argument, but neither of them is found to be successful. Consequently his fantasy world does not successfully provide the conditions under which opposition to capital punishment morally would have to cease. However, because capital punishment is morally wrong in his fantasy world it does not follow that it is morally wrong in this world.     

Informed Consent

Summary

This article focuses on informed consent and the components to be reviewed with clients in the first session or as early as possible thereafter. Recent changes that give patients greater autonomy in the treatment process are also presented. The process of obtaining informed consent or informed refusal places a new responsibility on the practitioner. Informed consent as it pertains to clinical practice, supervision and training, and psychological research is also discussed.     

知情同意—患者的权利与困境

知情同意是目前被广为认可的一项病人权利。从历史渊源看,它可以分为出于医生权威的知情同意与出于尊重患者人格、尊严、个性化权利的知情同意。尽管东西方对权利主体的强调不一致,但都是出于医疗行善的目的。这并不一定能保证病人的真正利益。现实中,有必要对这一权利做一定的限制。     

Harming Consent

I argue that Nafsika Athanassoulis fails to establish the main contention of her paper (“The Role of Consent in Sado-MasochisticPractices”, Res Publica 8, 2 (2002)), namely that, given liberalism, consent should be a defence to a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm even when the harm is a consequence of a sado-masochistic encounter. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.