Popper's naturalized approach to the reduction of chemistry

Sir Karl Popper is one of the few authors to have discussed the reduction of chemistry. His approach consists of what I term naturalistic reduction, which I suggest bears close similarities to the way in which scientists regard reduction. The present article aims to build on Popper's insights into the nature of reduction in science and more specifically to suggest an approach to characterizing a specific sense of the notion of approximate reduction in the context of chemistry. In the course of the discussion, one of Popper's better known passages on the reduction of chemistry is analysed in some detail.     

Reduction and abduction in chemistry‐a response to Scerri

Eric Scerri has proposed an account of how reduction might be understood in chemistry. He claims to build on a general aspect of Popper's views which survives his otherwise heavy criticism, namely adherence to actual scientific practice. This is contrasted with Nagel's conception, which Scerri takes to be the philosopher's standard notion. I argue that his proposal, interesting though it is, is not so foreign to ideas in the tradition within which Nagel wrote as Scerri would have us believe. Moreover, actual scientific practice can be commandeered in support of a holistic conception which Popper contrasted with what he saw as the admirable strivings towards reduction in science.     

When did atoms begin to do any explanatory work in chemistry?

During the 19th century atomism was a controversial issue in chemistry. It is an oversimplification to dismiss the critics' arguments as all falling under the general positivist view that what can't be seen can't be. The more interesting lines of argument either questioned whether any coherent notion of an atom had ever been formulated or questioned whether atoms were ever really given any explanatory role. At what point, and for what reasons, did atomistic hypotheses begin to explain anything in chemistry? It is argued that 19th‐century atomic accounts of constant proportions and isomerism had little to offer, whereas a non‐atomic explanation of chemical combination was developed. Not until the turn of the century did atomism begin to do serious explanatory work in chemistry.     

On Kantians and Pragmatists: Kenneth Baynes's Habermas

In this article I lay out Kenneth Baynes's interpretation of Habermas's social and political philosophy, and develop three lines of criticism. The first concerns the question of whether, and if so in what respect, Habermas's political theory counts as a critical social theory. I argue that it is not clear in what sense Habermas's political theory is a ‘critical’ social theory, and that Baynes's interpretation throws little light on this issue. The second related issue is to what extent it can be fairly claimed that on Habermas's account of democracy, political legitimacy rests on a “core morality”. While there is a possible reconstruction of Habermas along these lines, I argue that it conflicts with the central tenets of Habemras's political theory. Finally, I question whether Baynes is right to align Habermas's ideal of public reason so closely with Rawls's.     

Frank Ebersole on Wittgenstein and Pictures in Philosophy

How do we get into trouble in philosophy, and what do pictures have to do with it? This article addresses Frank Ebersole's thoughts on (Wittgenstein's remarks on) pictures in philosophy. It identifies the puzzlement generated for Ebersole by what Wittgenstein says and also considers some puzzling aspects of Ebersole's own renderings of pictures. It distinguishes between the philosophical picture and the pictorial form in which it may be crystalized and shows how philosophy's reliance on situationally disembedded grammatical stories (pictorial or not) leads us into trouble. Accordingly, responding to such trouble consists not in recovering the picture, in the sense of a single “object” or image we had before our mind's eye, but in—what is better described as Ebersole's strategy of—supplying a grammatical example (pictorial or otherwise) to go with our thinking, an example that makes what we think and say clear to ourselves.     

Playing the Odds: A New Response to Lucretius's Symmetry Argument

Abstract: Most commentators have assumed that Lucretius's symmetry argument against the fear of death is flawed. There remains, however, dispute as to what the flaw is. After establishing what I understand the target of Lucretius's argument to be (a desire for a longer life as such), I argue for a novel interpretation of what the flaw is, namely, that extending one's life into the time before one was actually born would be an uncertain bet for one who wanted to extend his life, whereas extending one's life beyond the time one actually dies is a sure bet. This account of what the flaw is has the particular merit of relying only on simple concepts used in everyday reasoning and thus can explain why Lucretius's argument gains no traction even in the absence of sophisticated philosophical analysis.     

Motivation as a Mediator of Social Disparities in Academic Achievement

The present study aimed at contributing to the understanding of social disparities in relation to students' academic achievement in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics domains. A sample of n = 321 German 11th graders completed measures of their family socio‐economic status (SES), general intelligence, domain‐specific ability self‐concepts and subjective scholastic values in math, physics and chemistry. Students' grades in these subjects received four months after testing served as criteria. Significant mediation effects were found for all motivational variables between fathers' SES and students' achievement, whereas for mothers' SES, only children's academic self‐concept in chemistry was a significant mediator. These results also held when students' general intelligence was controlled. Additionally, we controlled for students' grades before testing to investigate which variables mediated the influence of SES on change in school performance. Motivational variables significantly mediated the influence of fathers' SES on change in school performance in math but not in chemistry and physics. Intelligence significantly mediated the influence of fathers' SES on change in school performance in physics and chemistry but not in mathematics. The impact of mothers' SES on change in grades in chemistry was mediated by intelligence. Among others, the reasons potentially accounting for the differential influences of fathers' and mothers' SES are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fichte's Voluntarism

Abstract: In recent work Stephen Darwall has attacked what he calls J. G. Fichte's ‘voluntarist’ thesis, the idea—on Darwall's reading—that I am bound by obligations of respect to another person by virtue of my choice to interact with him. Darwall argues that voluntary choice is incompatible with the normative force behind the concept of a person, which demands my respect non‐voluntarily. He in turn defends a ‘presuppositional’ thesis which claims that I am bound by obligations of respect simply by recognizing the other as a person. In this paper I argue Darwall has misidentified the voluntary element in Fichte's account (sections 4–5). This requires me first to explain what Fichte's voluntarism really consists in (sections 1–3), and I suggest an apparent ambiguity in Fichte's position is responsible for Darwall's misreading. Clarifying this ambiguity, however, exposes some limitations to Darwall's thesis, and I end by discussing what those limitations are and what we can learn from them (sections 6–8).     

Herder's ‘Expressivist’ Metaphysics and the Origins of German Idealism

Charles Taylor's influential exposition of Hegel made the doctrine of expressivism of central importance and identified Herder as its exemplary historical advocate. The breadth and generality of Taylor's use of ‘expressivism’ have led the concept into some disrepute, but a more precise formulation of the doctrine as a theory of meaning can both demonstrate what is worthwhile and accurate in Taylor's account, and allow us a useful point of entry into Herder's multifaceted philosophy. A reconstruction of Herder's overall philosophical position, centred around a refined theory of what this paper labels ‘Herderean expressivism’, reveals a naturalistic, teleological metaphysics. This metaphysics fulfils the Hegelian aim of providing what Dieter Henrich has called a ‘feedback loop’ between ontology and epistemology. Exploring Herder's expressivism, therefore, helps further the case for his decisive impact on Hegel's philosophy. Herder's methodological naturalism, however, represents an obstacle to Hegel's absolute idealism.     

Freud's Ironically Jewish Science: Commentary on Paper by Jill Salberg

In his commentary on Jill Salberg's integrative and contextualizing article, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Freud's Jewish Identity Revisited,” Aron examines several ideas related to Freud's ironically “Jewish science.” First, this commentary takes up the question of what it has meant to speak of a “Jewish science” historically, and what it might mean today. Shockingly, Aron shows that the rise and fall of psychoanalysis has been traced to Jewish influence. He then expands on Salberg's article by reviewing the relationship between circumcision and castration and considers the impact of Freud's Jewish identity and his anxiety about anti-Semitism on the structure of the psychoanalytic method and specifically on Freud's discovery of the “royal road.”     

Why Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem1

With what right and with what meaning does Heidegger use the term ‘truth’ to characterize Dasein's disclosedness? This is the question at the focal point of Ernst Tugendhat's long‐standing critique of Heidegger's understanding of truth, one to which he finds no answer in Heidegger's treatment of truth in §44 of Being and Time or his later work. To put the question differently: insofar as unconcealment or disclosedness is normally understood as the condition for the possibility of propositional truth rather than truth itself, what does it mean to say – as Heidegger does – that disclosedness is the “primordial phenomenon of truth” and what justifies that claim? The central aim of this paper is to show that Tugendhat's critique remains unanswered. Recent Heidegger scholarship, though it confronts Tugendhat, has not produced a viable answer to his criticism, in part because it overlooks his basic question and therefore misconstrues the thrust of his objections. Ultimately, the paper suggests that what is needed is a re‐evaluation of Heidegger's analysis of truth in light of a more accurate understanding of Tugendhat's critique. The paper concludes by sketching the profile of a more satisfactory reply to Tugendhat's critical question, advocating a return to Heidegger's ‘existential’ analyses in Being and Time in order to locate the normative resources Tugendhat finds lacking in Heidegger's concept of truth.     

Inferring task performance and confidence from displays of eye movements

Eye movements reveal what is at the center of people's attention, which is assumed to coincide with what they are thinking about. Eye-movement displays (visualizations of a person's fixations superimposed onto the stimulus, for example, as dots or circles) might provide useful information for diagnosing that person's performance. However, making inferences about a person's task performance based on eye-movement displays requires substantial interpretation. Using graph-comprehension tasks, we investigated to what extent observers (N = 46) could make accurate inferences about a performer's multiple-choice task performance (i.e., chosen answer), confidence, and competence from displays of that person's eye movements. Observers' accuracy when judging which answer the performer chose was above chance level and was higher for displays reflecting confident performance. Observers were also able to infer performers' confidence from the eye-movement displays; moreover, their own task performance and perceived similarity with the performer affected their judgments of the other's competence.     

Webers Idealtypus Als Methode Zur Bestimmung Des Begriffsinhaltes Theoretischer Begriffe in Den Kulturwissenschaften

Weber's Ideal Type as a Method of Forming the Content of Theoretical Concepts in Social Sciences}. Max Weber introduced the ideal type as the specific method of concept formation in social sciences. But the ideal type is not established in social research. Instead, authors in philosophy of science until today try to reconstruct and interpret what Weber said about ideal types as well as what might be their importance in Weber's social theory. The thesis of the following paper is that the difficulties in understanding Weber's ideal types are linked with Weber's intensional logic of concept formation. The thesis is defended in three steps. The first step deals with Weber's understanding of what is a scientific question in cultural sciences. Secondly Weber's critical arguments against positivism, hegelianism and historism are worked out. Thirdly, Weber's method of concept formation is reconstructed.     

Does Conversation Need Shared Language? Davidson and Gadamer on Communicative Understanding

In a rare discussion of Gadamer's work, Davidson takes issue with Gadamer's claim that successful communication requires that interlocutors share a common language. While he is right to see a difference between his own views and Gadamer's on this point, Davidson appears to have misunderstood what motivates Gadamer's position, conflating it with that of his more familiar conventionalist interlocutors. This paper articulates Gadamer's view of the role of language in communicative understanding as an alternative to both Davidson's and that of the conventionalist writers Davidson critiques. It is argued, first, that Gadamer employs a conception of what individuates a language, and thus of what it means for two speakers to “share” a language, that Davidson never considers. By emphasizing the role of “application” in the historical development of languages, Gadamer develops a view in which languages are distinguished not by their particular semantic or syntactic rules, but by subtle differences between the concepts they express. Second, it is argued that the instances of “asymmetrical” communication—communication between interlocutors who have different sets of concepts at their disposal—that motivate Gadamer's position pose a challenge to Davidson's account of interpretative charity.     

On Regretting Things I Didn't Do and Couldn't Have Done

One of the lines of investigation opened up by Wallace in The View from Here concerns the notion of regret: what it is, what it is rationally constrained by, and what are the proper objects of regret. A distinctive feature of Wallace's view is that regret is an intention‐like state, which, whilst backward‐looking, is bound up with our future directed practices of value. In this commentary, I set out Wallace's claims on regret, its rational constraints, and its objects, and raise some worries about Wallace's position on each of these three issues.     

“I'll Have What She's Having”: Commentary on Paper by Karen E. Starr and Lewis Aron

This discussion utilizes a feminist discourse originating in the 1970s to reconsider Freud's famous question, “What do women want?” and from there explores some hidden dimensions in Starr and Aron's paper concerning female agency, sexuality, and the twists and turns of psychoanalytic theory and social conventions. Highlighting Rachel Maines's researches into the use of vibrators in medical treatment in particular, the discussion illuminates how social conventions function as powerful determinants that legislate what is seen and not seen, what is questioned and what is accepted—and ultimately what is considered psychoanalytic “bedrock.”     

In search of meaningful participation: Making connections between emotions and learning

Research on participation has advanced our understanding of children's everyday lives by increasingly bringing into focus what society perceives as ‘meaningful’. This piece is driven by a desire to extend this investigation by sharing a creative research journey. Here, we have combined our theoretical musings, initial conversations with children, and evolving methodological approaches to show how our research approach has changed as we seek meaningful ways to involve children. Accordingly, this paper highlights the positive consequences of a reflective research process that focuses on children's emotions as we consider children's capacities as learners. We argue that by critically engaging with what is meaningful in the context of participation, we can demonstrate the value of children's voices, challenging dominant discourses about children's competence.     

Clinical Decision Making in Alzheimer's Disease

In the treatment of Alzheimer's Disease the occupational therapy goal is to enable persons to function as optimally as possible. Maximizing the patient's functioning in daily life necessitates a framework for clinical reasoning. Clinical reasoning currently emphasizes what persons can do but may fail to recognize the complex factors involved in what a person actually will do. A framework to guide clinical decision making for persons with Alzheimer's disease based on the model of human occupation was developed. The use of this framework is illustrated through a case application.