Contagious yawning in domestic dog puppies (Canis lupus familiaris): the effect of ontogeny and emotional closeness on low-level imitation in dogs

Contagious yawning is a well-documented phenomenon in humans and has recently attracted much attention from developmental and comparative sciences. The function, development and underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon, however, remain largely unclear. Contagious yawning has been demonstrated in dogs and several non-human primate species, and theoretically and empirically associated with empathy in humans and non-human primates. Evidence of emotional closeness modulating contagious yawning in dogs has, nonetheless, been contradictory. Humans show a developmental increase in susceptibility to yawn contagion, with typically developing children displaying a substantial increase at the age of four, when a number of cognitive abilities (e.g. accurate identification of others’ emotions) begin to clearly manifest. Explicit tests of yawn contagion in non-human animals have, however, thus far only involved adult individuals. Here, we report a study of the ontogeny of domestic dogs’ (Canis lupus familiaris) susceptibility to yawn contagion, and whether emotional closeness to the yawning model affects this. Thirty-five dogs, aged 4–14 months, observed a familiar and unfamiliar human repeatedly yawn or gape. The dogs yawned contagiously, but emotional closeness with the model did not affect the strength of contagion, raising questions as to recent evidence of emotionally modulated auditory contagious yawning in dogs. The dogs showed a developmental effect, with only dogs above 7 months evidencing contagion. The results support the notion of a developmental increase in dogs’ attention to others and identification of others’ emotional states and suggest that yawn contagion is underpinned by developmental processes shared by humans and other animals.     

Automatic testing of cognitive performance in baboons maintained in social groups

Laboratory procedures used to study the cognitive functions of primates traditionally have involved removal of the subjects from their living quarters to be tested singly in a remote experimental room. This article presents an alternative research strategy favoring testing primates while they are maintained in their social group. The automatic learning device for monkeys (ALDM) is a computerized test system controlled by an automatic radio frequency identification of subjects. It is provided ad lib inside the social group of monkeys, for voluntary self-testing on a 24-h schedule. Nine baboons were tested with ALDM during a 7-month period. Experiments were performed to assess learning in motor control and abstract reasoning tasks. The results revealed high trial frequencies and excellent learning performance, even in tasks involving the highest cognitive complexities. A different study using ALDM with a group of 3 rhesus monkeys revealed social influences on learning. Beyond its interest for cognitive psychologists, ALDM is of interest for pharmacologists and cognitive neuroscientists working with nonhuman primates. ALDM also can serve as an enrichment tool for captive animals and may be used to study a variety of species other than primates.     

Generalized relational matching by guinea baboons (Papio papio) in two-by-two-item analogy problems

Analogical reasoning is considered the hallmark of human reasoning, but some studies have demonstrated that language- and symbol-trained chimpanzees can also reason analogically. Despite the potential adaptive value of this ability, evidence from other studies strongly suggests that other nonhuman primates do not have this capacity for analogical reasoning. In our three experiments, 6 of 29 baboons acquired the ability to perform a relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) task in which pairs of shapes composed relational displays. Five of these 6 monkeys then transferred this ability to RMTS tasks using novel exemplars of identity (elements in a pair are the same) and nonidentity (elements in a pair are different) relations. This transfer occurred even on trials in which the incorrect pair shared an element with the sample pair with which it was being compared. The baboons retained this ability 12 months later. The findings from our study of symbol-naive monkeys indicate that although language and symbol training facilitate conceptual thinking in nonhuman primates, such training is not a prerequisite for analogical reasoning.     

`Babbling' and social context in infant monkeys: parallels to human infants

Although only humans use spoken language, the vocal communication of many animals shares some features with language. Within the context of their family, normal children and young non-human primates develop proficiency in the nuances of their species-specific vocal communication system. Engaging in speech-like phonetic activity, or babbling, occurs in all normal children regardless of their native language. Similar periods of vocal development have not been described previously for non-human primates. However, in the pygmy marmoset, a South American monkey, we found that the primary vocal behavior of infants parallels many characteristics of human infant babbling. These analogous features include universality, repetition, use of a subset of the adult vocal repertoire, recognizably adult-like vocal structure and lack of a clear vocal referent. Also, like human infants, young marmosets develop in a closely knit family unit that includes both parents and often older siblings. In this context, the babbling-like behavior of the marmoset infant stimulates interaction with caregivers, thereby serving a key role in the infant's own development. These developmental and social processes indicate that the study of vocal development in non-human primate species can provide insights into the function of babbling in humans.     

Conserved evolutionary history for quick detection of threatening faces

Humans quickly recognize threats such as snakes and threatening faces, suggesting that human ancestors evolved specialized visual systems to detect biologically relevant threat stimuli. Although non-human primates also detect snakes quickly, it is unclear whether primates share the efficient visual systems to process the threatening faces of their conspecifics. Primates may not necessarily process conspecific threats by facial expressions, because threats from conspecifics in natural situations are often accompanied by other cues such as threatening actions (or attacks) and vocal calls. Here, we show a similar threat superiority effect in both humans and macaque Japanese monkeys. In visual search tasks, monkeys and humans both responded to pictures of a threatening face of an unfamiliar adult male monkey among neutral faces faster than to pictures of a neutral face among threatening faces. However, the monkeys’ response times to detect deviant pictures of a non-face stimulus were not slower when it was shown among threat faces than when it was shown among neutral faces. These results provide the first evidence that monkeys have an attentional bias toward the threatening faces of conspecifics and suggest that threatening faces are evolutionarily relevant fear stimuli. The subcortical visual systems in primates likely process not only snakes, but also more general biological threat-relevant stimuli, including threatening conspecific faces.     

Evolutionary Constraints on Human Object Perception

Language and culture endow humans with access to conceptual information that far exceeds any which could be accessed by a non‐human animal. Yet, it is possible that, even without language or specific experiences, non‐human animals represent and infer some aspects of similarity relations between objects in the same way as humans. Here, we show that monkeys’ discrimination sensitivity when identifying images of animals is predicted by established measures of semantic similarity derived from human conceptual judgments. We used metrics from computer vision and computational neuroscience to show that monkeys’ and humans’ performance cannot be explained by low‐level visual similarity alone. The results demonstrate that at least some of the underlying structure of object representations in humans is shared with non‐human primates, at an abstract level that extends beyond low‐level visual similarity. Because the monkeys had no experience with the objects we tested, the results suggest that monkeys and humans share a primitive representation of object similarity that is independent of formal knowledge and cultural experience, and likely derived from common evolutionary constraints on object representation.     

Tufted capuchin monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>) show understanding of human attentional states when requesting food held by a human

Researchers have investigated to what extent non-human primates understand others’ attentional states, as this ability is considered an important prerequisite for theory of mind. However, previous studies using food requesting tasks have failed to show that non-human primates attribute perception to others as a function of their attentional states. One possible reason is that food requesting tasks may require subjects not only to take into account an experimenter’s attentional state but also to direct it toward the food. The present study tested tufted capuchin monkeys’ (Cebus apella) understanding of others’ attentional states in a food requesting task. In the first situation, monkeys were required only to attract an experimenter’s attention. In the second situation, the monkeys were required to both attract the experimenter’s attention and direct it toward food on a table. The results revealed that capuchin monkeys showed evidence of understanding the experimenter’s attentional variations only in the former condition. This suggests that previous tasks, requiring referential gestures, lacking in most non-human primates, failed to reveal sensitivity to human attentional states because the subjects might not have understood the requesting situation. In conclusion, capuchin monkeys can understand variations in others’ attentional states, although this ability appears limited compared to what is seen in humans.     

Evolutionary developmental psychology: Contributions from comparative research with nonhuman primates

Evolutionary developmental psychology is a discipline that has the potential to integrate conceptual approaches to the study of behavioral development derived from psychology and biology as well as empirical data from humans and animals. Comparative research with animals, and especially with nonhuman primates, can provide evidence of adaptation in human psychological and behavioral traits by highlighting possible analogies (i.e., similar function, but independent evolution) or homologies (i.e., inheritance from a common ancestor) between human traits and similar traits present in animals. Data from nonhuman primates have played a crucial role in our understanding of infant attachment to the caregiver as a developmental adaptation for survival. Primate and human data are also consistent in suggesting that female interest in infants during the juvenile years may be a developmental adaptation for reproduction that facilitates the acquisition of maternal skills prior to the onset of reproduction.     

Ultra-rapid categorisation in non-human primates

The visual system of primates is remarkably efficient for analysing information about objects present in complex natural scenes. Recent work has demonstrated that they perform this at very high speeds. In a choice saccade task, human subjects can initiate a first reliable saccadic eye movement response to a target (the image containing an animal) in only 120 ms after image onset. Such fast responses impose severe time constraints if one considers neuronal responses latencies in high-level ventral areas of the macaque monkey. The question then arises: are non-human primates able to perform the task? Two rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were trained to perform the same forced-choice categorization task as the one used in humans. Both animals performed the task with a high accuracy and generalized to new stimuli that were introduced everyday: accuracy levels were comparable both with new and well-known images (84% vs. 94%). More importantly, reaction times were extremely fast (minimum reaction time 100 ms and median reaction time 152 ms). Given that typical single units onset times in Inferotemporal cortex (IT) are about as long as the shortest behavioural responses measured here, we conclude that visual processing involved in ultra rapid categorisations might be based on rather simple shape cue analysis that can be achieved in areas such as extrastriate cortical area V4. The present paper demonstrates for the first time, that rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are able to match human performance in a forced-choice saccadic categorisation task of animals in natural scenes.     

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) immediately generalize the uncertain response

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.     

Transfer of metacognitive skills and hint seeking in monkeys

Metacognition is knowledge that can be expressed as confidence judgments about what one knows (monitoring) and by strategies for learning what one does not know (control). Although there is a substantial literature on cognitive processes in animals, little is known about their metacognitive abilities. Here we show that rhesus macaques, trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments about their performance on perceptual tasks, transferred that ability immediately to a new perceptual task and to a working memory task. We also show that monkeys can learn to request "hints" when they are given problems that they would otherwise have to solve by trial and error. This study demonstrates, for the first time, that nonhuman primates share with humans the ability to monitor and transfer their metacognitive ability both within and between different cognitive tasks, and to seek new knowledge on a need-to-know basis.     

The cognitive bases of human tool use

This article has two goals. The first is to assess, in the face of accruing reports on the ingenuity of great ape tool use, whether and in what sense human tool use still evidences unique, higher cognitive ability. To that effect, I offer a systematic comparison between humans and nonhuman primates with respect to nine cognitive capacities deemed crucial to tool use: enhanced hand-eye coordination, body schema plasticity, causal reasoning, function representation, executive control, social learning, teaching, social intelligence, and language. Since striking differences between humans and great apes stand firm in eight out of nine of these domains, I conclude that human tool use still marks a major cognitive discontinuity between us and our closest relatives. As a second goal of the paper, I address the evolution of human technologies. In particular, I show how the cognitive traits reviewed help to explain why technological accumulation evolved so markedly in humans, and so modestly in apes.     

Grammatical pattern learning by human infants and cotton-top tamarin monkeys

There is a surprising degree of overlapping structure evident across the languages of the world. One factor leading to cross-linguistic similarities may be constraints on human learning abilities. Linguistic structures that are easier for infants to learn should predominate in human languages. If correct, then (a) human infants should more readily acquire structures that are consistent with the form of natural language, whereas (b) non-human primates' patterns of learning should be less tightly linked to the structure of human languages. Prior experiments have not directly compared laboratory-based learning of grammatical structures by human infants and non-human primates, especially under comparable testing conditions and with similar materials. Five experiments with 12-month-old human infants and adult cotton-top tamarin monkeys addressed these predictions, employing comparable methods (familiarization-discrimination) and materials. Infants rapidly acquired complex grammatical structures by using statistically predictive patterns, failing to learn structures that lacked such patterns. In contrast, the tamarins only exploited predictive patterns when learning relatively simple grammatical structures. Infant learning abilities may serve both to facilitate natural language acquisition and to impose constraints on the structure of human languages.     

Plasticity of ability to form cross‐modal representations in infant Japanese macaques

In a previous study, Adachi, Kuwahata, Fujita, Tomonaga & Matsuzawa demonstrated that infant Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) form cross‐modal representations of conspecifics but not of humans. However, because the subjects in the experiment were raised in a large social group and had considerably less exposure to humans than to conspecifics, it was an open question whether their lack of cross‐modal representation of humans simply reflected their lower levels of exposure to humans or was caused by some innate restrictions on the ability. To answer the question, we used the same procedure but tested infant Japanese macaques with more extensive experience of humans in daily life. Briefly, we presented monkeys with a photograph of either a monkey or a human face on an LCD monitor after playing a vocalization of one of these two species. The subjects looked at the monitor longer when a voice and a face were mismatched than when they were matched, irrespective of whether the preceding vocalization was a monkey's or a human's. This suggests that once monkeys have extensive experience with humans, they will form a cross‐modal representation of humans as well as of conspecifics.     

Social touch alters newborn monkey behavior

In humans, infants respond positively to slow, gentle stroking—processed by C-tactile (CT) nerve fibers—by showing reductions in stress and increases in eye contact, smiling, and positive vocalizations. More frequent maternal touch is linked to greater activity and connectivity strength in social brain regions, and increases children’s attention to and learning of faces. It has been theorized that touch may prime children for social interactions and set them on a path towards healthy social cognitive development. However, less is known about the effects of touch on young infants’ psychological development, especially in the newborn period, a highly sensitive period of transition with rapid growth in sensory and social processing. It remains untested whether newborns can distinguish CT-targeted touch from other types of touch, or whether there are benefits of touch for newborns’ social, emotional, or cognitive development. In the present study, we experimentally investigated the acute effects of touch in newborn monkeys, a common model for human social development. Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), like humans, are highly social, have complex mother-infant interactions with frequent body contact for the first weeks of life, making them an excellent model of infant sociality. Infant monkeys in the present study were reared in a neonatal nursery, enabling control over their early environment, including all caregiver interactions. One-week-old macaque infants (N = 27) participated in three 5-minute counter-balanced caregiver interactions, all with mutual gaze: stroking head and shoulders (CT-targeted touch), stroking palms of hands and soles of feet (Non-CT touch), or no stroking (No-touch). Immediately following the interaction, infants watched social and nonsocial videos and picture arrays including faces and objects, while we tracked their visual attention with remote eye tracking. We found that, during the caregiver interactions, infants behaved differently while being touched compared to the no-touch condition, irrespective of the body part touched. Most notably, in both touch conditions, infants exhibited fewer stress-related behaviors—self-scratching, locomotion, and contact time with a comfort object—compared to when they were not touched. Following CT-targeted touch, infants were faster to orient to the picture arrays compared to the other interaction conditions, suggesting CT-targeted touch may activate or prime infants’ attentional orienting system. In the No-touch condition infants attended longer to the nonsocial compared to the social video, possibly reflecting a baseline preference for nonsocial stimuli. In contrast, in both touch conditions, infants’ looked equally to the social and nonsocial videos, suggesting that touch may influence the types of visual stimuli that hold infants’ attention. Collectively, our results reveal that newborn macaques responded positively to touch, and touch appeared to influence some aspects of their subsequent attention, although we found limited evidence that these effects are mediated by CT fibers. These findings suggest that newborn touch may broadly support infants’ psychological development, and may have early evolutionary roots, shared across primates. This study illustrates the unique insight offered by nonhuman primates for exploring early infant social touch, revealing that touch may positively affect emotional and attentional development as early as the newborn period.     

Protracted development of motor cortex constrains rich interpretations of infant cognition

Cognition in preverbal human infants must be inferred from overt motor behaviors such as gaze shifts, head turns, or reaching for objects. However, infant mammals – including human infants – show protracted postnatal development of cortical motor outflow. Cortical control of eye, face, head, and limb movements is absent at birth and slowly emerges over the first postnatal year and beyond. Accordingly, the neonatal cortex in humans cannot generate the motor behaviors routinely used to support inferences about infants’ cognitive abilities, and thus claims of developmental continuity between infant and adult cognition are suspect. Recognition of the protracted development of motor cortex should temper rich interpretations of infant cognition and motivate more serious consideration of the role of subcortical mechanisms in early cognitive development.     

An analysis of immediate serial recall performance in a macaque

There has been considerable research into the ability of nonhuman primates to process sequential information, a topic that is of interest in part because of the extensive involvement of sequence processing in human language use. Surprisingly, no previous study has unambiguously tested the ability of nonhuman primates to encode and immediately reproduce a novel temporal sequence of perceptual events, the ability tapped in the immediate serial recall (ISR) task extensively studied in humans. We report here the performance of a rhesus macaque on a spatial ISR task, closely resembling tasks widely used in human memory research. Detailed analysis of the monkey’s recall performance indicates a number of important parallels with human ISR, consistent with the idea that a single mechanism for short-term serial order memory may be shared across species.     

Sequential learning in non-human primates

Sequential learning plays a role in a variety of common tasks, such as human language processing, animal communication, and the learning of action sequences. In this article, we investigate sequential learning in non-human primates from a comparative perspective, focusing on three areas: the learning of arbitrary, fixed sequences; statistical learning; and the learning of hierarchical structure. Although primates exhibit many similarities to humans in their performance on sequence learning tasks, there are also important differences. Crucially, non-human primates appear to be limited in their ability to learn and represent the hierarchical structure of sequences. We consider the evolutionary implications of these differences and suggest that limitations in sequential learning may help explain why non-human primates lack human-like language.     

Categorical perception for voicing contrasts in normal and lead-treated rhesus monkeys: electrophysiological indices

Categorical perception of voicing contrasts was evaluated in rhesus monkeys. The monkeys had been chronically exposed to subclinical levels of lead either from conception to birth, or for approximately 6 months postnatally beginning at birth, or were never exposed to lead. Auditory evoked responses were recorded at 1 year of age from scalp electrodes placed over the left and right hemispheres during stimulus presentation. A late component of the brain responses recorded from the right temporal region of all monkeys discriminated between stimuli in a categorical manner. This pattern of responses was noted to be similar to that previously reported for humans. Categorical discriminations were also noted earlier in the waveforms for control monkeys and for monkeys exposed to lead prenatally, although this discrimination pattern shifted to the left hemisphere of the latter group. No such effects were noted for monkeys exposed to lead postnatally. These results suggest that the neurocortical mechanisms associated with categorical perception for voicing information may be similar across human and nonhuman primates. However, early exposure to lead appears to alter these processes.