Need for closure is associated with urgency in perceptual decision-making

Constant decision-making underpins much of daily life, from simple perceptual decisions about navigation through to more complex decisions about important life events. At many scales, a fundamental task of the decision-maker is to balance competing needs for caution and urgency: fast decisions can be more efficient, but also more often wrong. We show how a single mathematical framework for decision-making explains the urgency/caution balance across decision-making at two very different scales. This explanation has been applied at the level of neuronal circuits (on a time scale of hundreds of milliseconds) through to the level of stable personality traits (time scale of years).     

Muscularity concerns among men: development of attitudinal and perceptual measures

The current study reports the development and psychometrics of a figure rating scale with leanness and muscularity dimensions and a 13-item questionnaire assessing symptoms associated with muscle dysmorphia (MD). Three separate samples of men and women completed the muscle dysmorphic disorder inventory (MDDI), the bodybuilder image grid (BIG) or both to measure 1-week test–retest reliability, internal consistency, convergent and divergent validity and valid placement of BIG figures along interval scales of body fat and lean muscle mass. The MDDI and MDDI subscales (drive for size, appearance intolerance, and functional impairment) had good reliability, internal consistency, convergent and divergent validity. The BIG had good to excellent test–retest reliability, good convergent and divergent validity and validity as an interval scale. Implications for characterizing body image disturbance in men and benefits and limitations of the measures are discussed.     

The impact of MRI scanner environment on perceptual decision-making

Despite the widespread use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), few studies have addressed scanner effects on performance. The studies that have examined this question show a wide variety of results. In this article we report analyses of three experiments in which participants performed a perceptual decision-making task both in a traditional setting as well as inside an MRI scanner. The results consistently show that response times increase inside the scanner. Error rates also increase, but to a lesser extent. To reveal the underlying mechanisms that drive the behavioral changes when performing a task inside the MRI scanner, the data were analyzed using the linear ballistic accumulator model of decision-making. These analyses show that, in the scanner, participants exhibit a slow down of the motor component of the response and have less attentional focus on the task. However, the balance between focus and motor slowing depends on the specific task requirements.     

Of mice and men: The comparative assumption in psychology

Surprisingly, little theoretical attention has so far been paid to the ‘Comparative Assumption’: the attempt to extrapolate from species to species in psychology (and particularly to the human species). This paper examines the problems and the possibilities inherent in the Comparative Assumption. Perhaps the most important conclusion of the paper is that much more work is needed on this intriguing question.     

A generative joint model for spike trains and saccades during perceptual decision-making

Theory development in both psychology and neuroscience can benefit by consideration of both behavioral and neural data sets. However, the development of appropriate methods for linking these data sets is a difficult statistical and conceptual problem. Over the past decades, different linking approaches have been employed in the study of perceptual decision-making, beginning with rudimentary linking of the data sets at a qualitative, structural level, culminating in sophisticated statistical approaches with quantitative links. We outline a new approach, in which a single model is developed that jointly addresses neural and behavioral data. This approach allows for specification and testing of quantitative links between neural and behavioral aspects of the model. Estimating the model in a Bayesian framework allows both data sets to equally inform the estimation of all model parameters. The use of a hierarchical model architecture allows for a model, which accounts for and measures the variability between neurons. We demonstrate the approach by re-analysis of a classic data set containing behavioral recordings of decision-making with accompanying single-cell neural recordings. The joint model is able to capture most aspects of both data sets, and also supports the analysis of interesting questions about prediction, including predicting the times at which responses are made, and the corresponding neural firing rates.     

Multiple perceptual strategies used by macaque monkeys for face recognition

Successful integration of individuals in macaque societies suggests that monkeys use fast and efficient perceptual mechanisms to discriminate between conspecifics. Humans and great apes use primarily holistic and configural, but also feature-based, processing for face recognition. The relative contribution of these processes to face recognition in monkeys is not known. We measured face recognition in three monkeys performing a visual paired comparison task. Monkey and humans faces were (1) axially rotated, (2) inverted, (3) high-pass filtered, and (4) low-pass filtered to isolate different face processing strategies. The amount of time spent looking at the eyes, mouth, and other facial features was compared across monkey and human faces for each type of stimulus manipulation. For all monkeys, face recognition, expressed as novelty preference, was intact for monkey faces that were axially rotated or spatially filtered and was supported in general by preferential looking at the eyes, but was impaired for inverted faces in two of the three monkeys. Axially rotated, upright human faces with a full range of spatial frequencies were also recognized, however, the distribution of time spent exploring each facial feature was significantly different compared to monkey faces. No novelty preference, and hence no inferred recognition, was observed for inverted or low-pass filtered human faces. High-pass filtered human faces were recognized, however, the looking pattern on facial features deviated from the pattern observed for monkey faces. Taken together these results indicate large differences in recognition success and in perceptual strategies used by monkeys to recognize humans versus conspecifics. Monkeys use both second-order configural and feature-based processing to recognize the faces of conspecifics, but they use primarily feature-based strategies to recognize human faces.     

Of private talk and public print: General pre-trial publicity and juror decision-making

The term ‘general pre-trial publicity’ refers to trial-related information that is prominently in the news, and that affects jurors in wholly unrelated cases. Two experiments explored the impact of general pre-trial publicity on juror decision-making. In Experiment 1 mock jurors who earlier read a newspaper article about a defendant mistakenly identified and subsequently convicted of a crime he did not commit were less likely to convict the defendant in an unrelated case than were jurors who read instead about a series of heinous crimes or who had no pre-trial publicity. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect is somewhat stronger when the general pre-trial publicity concerns a case that closely resembles the one jurors must decide than when the two cases are dissimilar. These data are discussed in terms of the availability of relevant information in memory. People may evaluate the probability of a defendant's guilt by the ease with which similar or relevant examples come to mind.     

Attentional biases and memory for emotional stimuli in men and male rhesus monkeys

We examined attentional biases for social and non-social emotional stimuli in young adult men and compared the results to those of male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) previously tested in a similar dot-probe task (King et al. in Psychoneuroendocrinology 37(3):396–409, 2012). Recognition memory for these stimuli was also analyzed in each species, using a recognition memory task in humans and a delayed non-matching-to-sample task in monkeys. We found that both humans and monkeys displayed a similar pattern of attentional biases toward threatening facial expressions of conspecifics. The bias was significant in monkeys and of marginal significance in humans. In addition, humans, but not monkeys, exhibited an attentional bias away from negative non-social images. Attentional biases for social and non-social threat differed significantly, with both species showing a pattern of vigilance toward negative social images and avoidance of negative non-social images. Positive stimuli did not elicit significant attentional biases for either species. In humans, emotional content facilitated the recognition of non-social images, but no effect of emotion was found for the recognition of social images. Recognition accuracy was not affected by emotion in monkeys, but response times were faster for negative relative to positive images. Altogether, these results suggest shared mechanisms of social attention in humans and monkeys, with both species showing a pattern of selective attention toward threatening faces of conspecifics. These data are consistent with the view that selective vigilance to social threat is the result of evolutionary constraints. Yet, selective attention to threat was weaker in humans than in monkeys, suggesting that regulatory mechanisms enable non-anxious humans to reduce sensitivity to social threat in this paradigm, likely through enhanced prefrontal control and reduced amygdala activation. In addition, the findings emphasize important differences in attentional biases to social versus non-social threat in both species. Differences in the impact of emotional stimuli on recognition memory between monkeys and humans will require further study, as methodological differences in the recognition tasks may have affected the results.     

The Churchlands' Eliminative Materialism: or The Result of Impatience

In the mid-seventies I discovered that my patience with most main-stream philosophy had run out. What had instead begun to seem promising was the new wave in philosophical method, which ceased to pander to “ordinary language” and which began in earnest to reverse the antiscientific bias typical of “linguistic analysis”… Since I was a materialist and hence believed that the mind is the brain.     

From Functional Efficiency to Temporal Efficiency: Multifunctional Products Increase Consumer Impatience

Multifunctional products are ubiquitous in consumers' daily lives. However, scant research has examined whether and how the presence of multifunctional products systematically alters consumer behavior beyond product evaluations and adoption. Across four experiments and three supplementary studies, the authors identify a multifunction-impatience effect. They show that after exposure to multifunctional (vs. single-function) products, consumers are more likely to choose a smaller but sooner (vs. a larger but later) reward (Study 1), report more impatience when waiting for the web search results to load and perceive the loading time as longer (Study 2), and are willing to pay more for expedited shipping (Study 3). The authors further show that the effects occur because multifunctional products activate an efficiency goal among consumers, which renders them less patient (studies 2 and 3). In addition to the regular, “sequential” multifunctional products for which each of the functions has a specific usage situation, the proposed effect also applies to “simultaneous” multifunctional products whose functions operate simultaneously during consumption (Study 4). Taken together, this research broadens the scholarly understanding of the effects of multifunctional products from consumers' responses to these products to the unintended impact of such products on consumer impatience.     

Attention and perceptual priming in the perceptual identification task

Prior research indicates that manipulations of attention during encoding sometimes affect perceptual implicit memory. Two hypotheses were investigated. One proposes that manipulations of attention affect perceptual priming only to the extent that they disrupt stimulus identification. The other attributes reduced priming to the disruptive effects of distractor selection. The role of attention was investigated with a variant of the Stroop task in which participants either read words, identified their color, or did both. Identifying the color reduced priming even when the word was also overtly identified. This result held regardless of whether color and word were presented as a single object (Experiments 1 and 2) or as separate objects (Experiment 4). When participants read and identified a color, the overt order of the responses did not matter; both conditions reduced priming relative to reading alone (Experiment 3). The results provide evidence against the stimulus-identification account but are consistent with the distractor-selection hypothesis.     

Compared to Dematerialized Money,Cash Increases Impatience in Intertemporal Choice

When it comes to trading time for money (or vice versa), people tend to be impatient and myopic. Often dramatically so. For illustration, half of people would rather collect $15 now than $30 in 3 months. This willingness to forego 50% of the reward to skip a 3‐month wait corresponds to an annual discount rate of 277%. This article investigates how money's physical form biases intertemporal choice. We ask, what happens to (im)patience (i.e., discount rates) when time is traded against cash rather than against an equivalent sum of dematerialized money? We find that intertemporal decisions pitting time against cash (rather than against dematerialized money) increase impatience. The underlying mechanism relates to the pain of parting from money. Letting go of cash (dematerialized money) we can have now is psychologically more (less) painful, which in turn reduces (increases) our willingness to wait for larger‐later payoffs. Importantly, heightening prevention focus (i.e., concerns for safety and security) moderates this bias. The article concludes by discussing the implications of the research, particularly for the psychology of saving behavior.